At the same time as Japan was considering the benefits of seeking Jewish capital, the President of the Southern Manchurian Railway Matsuoka Yosuke (1886-1946) and the Chairman of the Manchurian Heavy Industries Association Oikawa Yoshisuke (1880-1967) toyed with the idea of settling some fifty thousand European Jews in Manchukuo. They would, it was believed, bring with them not only capital but also technological know-how and managerial skills. The idea was developed in an article written by Oikawa in 1934 called “A Plan to Settle Fifty Thousand German Jews in Manchukuo.” The underlying assumption was that the Jews Germany wanted to get rid of would be seeking a refuge wherever they could settle and invest their capital. Here, Oikawa stated, was an opportunity for Japan to steer a highly desirable population to Manchukuo. It is highly doubt-ful that he had ever heard of the so-called “Transfer Plan” arranged by the
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Japan and the Jews of Manchuria Beginning in 1931
World Zionist Organization and the German government in 1933, whereby the newly installed Nazi regime of Germany would allow Jews to immigrate to Palestine and transfer their capital to that country.
Key Japanese officials such as finance ministry official Kishi Nobosuke (1896-1987), a future minister in Tojo’s wartime cabinet and later prime minister of Japan in the late 1950’s, supported this idea, as did other finance ministry officials.
The idea—which never amounted to an operational plan in its full meaning—was described in retrospect by writers Marvin Tokayer and Mary Swartz in their 1979 book The Fugu Plan. Fugu is a word for blowfish, which has some poisonous flesh and some edible parts, and which is a much sought-after delicacy. The idea was suggested by Inuzuka’s January 18, 1939, report to the Navy General Staff, which stated that “The Jews are just like a fugu (blowfish). It is very delicious but unless you know well how to cook it, it may prove fatal.” The reference indicated that Jews spread poison in the societies in which they lived, but that they could also be highly beneficial if properly monitored and controlled. In the end, this idea remained on paper and was never accompanied by a serious, detailed, and well thought-out operational plan. Those who espoused it never determined who would be responsible for obtaining the necessary permits from the government in Tokyo, who would prepare the required infrastructure in Manchuria, who would approach and recruit those German Jews deemed eligible and mobi-lize their capital, and who would contact the Nazi regime to start things moving. There was never any serious effort by a responsible Japanese gov-ernment body to interest German Jews and attempt to persuade them to migrate to Manchuria. The proponents of this idea never even contacted international Jewish organizations such as the World Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Congress, or the World Zionist Organization.
The causes for the failure of the idea to get off the ground were varied, and were partly the result of the planners’ inability to implement such an ambitious and grandiose plan. There was also a total lack of basic knowledge on the topic, and no one had even begun to prepare the ground-work for such an undertaking. But the main reason seems to be the reticence of the Japanese government in Tokyo as well as the puppet regime of Manchukuo and their reluctance to become involved in such a scheme. In Tokyo there was less and less enthusiasm for collaborating with Jewish factors because of the government’s growing ties with Nazi Germany, especially after the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936. As German-Japanese ties grew stronger and warmer, and Germany became a strategic asset to Japan, any
measure that could be interpreted as helping Jews or encouraging German Jews to remove their capital from Germany was seen as counter-productive.
Meanwhile, the Japanese military authorities in Manchukuo may have thought that the settlement of German Jews there would be a posi-tive step in the development of that region, but they may also have feared that it would endanger their ties with the White Russian population in that country, a population far larger and more influential than the local Jewish community. They followed a policy designed to avoid alienating the two communities and acted to alleviate the fears of the Jews by making sure that there would be no outbreak of violent antisemitism. At the same time, they also made strong efforts not to alienate the local White Russian community. The final outcome of this policy was contrary to what they wanted to achieve: not only did it fail to attract German Jews, but it caused a growing flight of wealthy Jews from Manchuria, many of whom resettled in Shanghai, where entry visas were not required. By the middle of the 1930’s the Harbin Jewish community had shrunk from 15,000 to less than 3,000 individuals. Even the intervention of the Japanese consul general in Harbin, General Morishima Morito (1896-1975), who met with the leaders of the community periodically in order to pacify them, did not yield any results.
The idea that the settlement of such a large number of Jewish refu-gees in Manchuria would improve Japan’s image in the American media was preposterous from the beginning, and naturally backfired. Those who toyed with it failed to understand that American Jews had no intention of investing in Manchuria in the depths of the Great Depression. Furthermore, an investment in Manchuria would only anger the American government, which opposed the occupation of that country by Japan and in 1932 had adopted a policy of non-recognition (also known as the Stimson Doctrine).
There were also several Japanese officers who argued that Japan must distance itself from anything connected to Jews and Judaism in view of what they believed to be the Jews’ constant scheming to control the world through their nefarious activities. This group based its arguments on The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which as noted had been translated into Japanese in the mid-1920’s. How could Japan seek Jewish help to advance its economy at the same time that the rootless Jews were considered the world’s great-est danger by the Germans—Japan’s own allies? Those who opposed turn-ing to the Jews claimed that many Jews were disguised Soviet agents who could undermine Japanese society from within. The counter-view was that at least an effort should be made to harness the Manchurian Jewish com-munity to promote Japan’s interests. The task was assigned to officers in the
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Japan and the Jews of Manchuria Beginning in 1931
Intelligence Section of the Kwantung Army, and specifically in the Special Services unit, whose main role was to spy on Russians suspected of sup-porting the Soviet Union, mobilize White Russians, and create anti- Soviet front organizations. In 1934 this unit established the Office for Russian Émigrés and made sure that some of its members obtained senior posts in the Russian Fascist Party, which was otherwise made up of anti-Bolshevik, antisemitic White Russian émigrés. One of the first measures they took was designed to stop attacks on Jews by White Russians, attacks that had reached their peak in the years 1931-1932 with the kidnapping and subse-quent murder of the son of a wealthy Jew by the name of Kaspe, who owned the largest hotel in Harbin, the Moderne.3
Attacks on Jews in Manchuria led to criticism by various Jewish com-munities overseas, mainly that of Shanghai. One of the Shanghai communi-ty’s leaders, Nessim Benjamin Ezra, the editor of the Jewish Messenger, was received by Japan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru (1887-1957) in the fall of 1934 to protest these attacks. Shigemitsu promised that Japan would maintain law and order in Harbin. The Japanese government feared adverse news items on this topic in the American media, and attributed these stories to Jewish sources—hence the need to appease the Jews.