During the first six months of the Pacific War, Japan attained highly impres-sive achievements by any standards, and particularly by military standards.
Japanese forces occupied Hong Kong and additional parts of China, all of Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines, Wake and Guam, all of the Dutch East Indies, most of Burma, and parts of New Guinea. They were even threaten-ing Australia. They were on the threshold of India, the jewel of the British crown. Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) also came under threat, and if Japan had wanted to occupy Madagascar near the east coast of Africa, there was not much to stop her from doing so. The Japanese navy ruled the seas from Hawaii to Ceylon. It seemed at the time that there was no force that could stem the Japanese blitz.
Even before the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, broad policy guidelines were discussed in Tokyo on November 20, 1941, by an inter-ministerial committee regarding the future status of and adminis-tration policies in the territories to be occupied. It was decided that once the fighting was over, a military government would be established in the occupied areas to ensure the restoration of law and order and mainly to ensure a steady supply of rice, raw materials and oil to Japan. It was also decided that the Japanese military administration would honor local cus-toms and act through local officials. In order to gain the trust of the local population, it was determined that in addition to showing respect for native traditions and languages, in certain areas the Japanese would make efforts to encourage local national liberation movements that would be willing to collaborate with them. In any case, it was decided that the Japanese military administration would act to uproot all traces of the former colonial admin-istrations, so that even if Japan lost the war the West would not be able
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to return to play a significant role in Asia. Above all, it was unanimously agreed that policy in the occupied areas must focus specifically on helping Japan’s war effort.
In general terms, it was decided that in the initial phase of occupa-tion the territories would come under direct military administraoccupa-tion.
Later there would be further discussion of the territories’ eventual roles in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere led by Japan. It should be recalled that these ideas were essentially an ideological and propaganda platform for Japan’s basic intention of gaining political and economic mas-tery in East and South East Asia while erasing all vestiges of the Western colonial powers from these regions. Appropriate slogans would be coined to help convince each local population of Japan’s determination to expel Western imperialism and colonialism, put an end to the rule of the white races, and support local national liberation movements working to achieve independence—whose target date was never announced.
This would enable Japan to use the natural resources that abounded in the region, mainly oil from the Dutch East Indies and rubber from Malayan plantations – so vital for Japan’s war effort—in the most efficient manner.
Obtaining the assistance of the local populations was necessary. They would have to be convinced that the white man’s rule was over and that it would be in their best interest to collaborate with Japan in the coming days. Japan’s initial goal was to ensure stability and calm in these territories.
It was obvious that Japan would not only be in charge of the local admin-istration, but would also dominate the economy and culture, and naturally local internal politics.
The principles formulated in November 1941 were general indications and guidelines for the actions to be undertaken by the occupation author-ities in each area. The speed and relative ease with which Japan was able to capture these territories surprised even the Japanese leadership. Between December 1941 and May 1942 Japan captured territories that came with hundreds of thousands of Westerners, both soldiers and civilians: British, Americans, Dutchmen, and even Frenchmen, along with several thou-sand Jews. Local Japanese commanders were given a great deal of leeway in governing the new territories, and in fact made the key decisions on the details of how to deal with the local population and the thousands of foreign prisoners who were now their captives. The Japanese govern-ment had to address the more general question of how to treat prisoners, both civilians and military. The central idea was to exploit those who were willing to cooperate with Japan mainly in local administration and the
production of oil, rubber, tungsten, and other raw materials. The initial decisions were obvious. Soldiers were to be imprisoned in prisoner-of-war camps, to be dealt with in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. This did not prevent Japan from using tens of thousands of prisoners as slave laborers. The best-known episode involving the use of slave labor was the laying of a railway from Burma to Thailand, which included building a bridge across the River Kwai.
Once Japan completed the occupation of those areas deemed vital for its war effort and broad policies, it was decided in Tokyo that Malaya and the Dutch East Indies would be governed directly by the Japanese army under the overall authority of the area commander, whose headquarters was in Singapore. Java and Madura would be administered by officers belong-ing to the 26th Army, whose headquarters was in Batavia (today known as Jakarta, Indonesia), and Sumatra would be administered by the 25th Army, whose headquarters was initially in Singapore, but in 1943 was transferred to Sumatra. Celebes and the Mollukas would be handled by the Japanese navy, whose command included New Guinea and the Bismark Islands. The Navy headquarters was on the Dutch East Indies port of Macassar.
As noted, while the main guidelines were determined by the govern-ment and military headquarters in Tokyo, the implegovern-mentation of the policies was left to local commanders, including the commandants of the prisoner- of-war camps and civilian internment camps. Postwar evidence shows that a great dal of what happened in these camps and territories depended on the personality of individual commanders. Some behaved in a decent, humane fashion while others were brutal and did their utmost to humiliate the pris-oners under their control, partly because the Japanese samurai ethos dis-dained those who surrendered rather than dying for their country.
The first priority regarding the newly occupied population was decid-ing how to treat the overseas Chinese (Nanyang) communities in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines, and Burma, which totalled some twenty-five million individuals. These Nanyang Chinese maintained strong links to the motherland, and among them were elements that supported the war effort of Chiang Kai-Shek against the Japanese invaders. Despite their political leanings, these communities were by and large prosperous and numerous, and so their economic activity was vital for the Japanese to ensure that the economies of the newly occupied territories continued to function. Thus the general interest of Japan was in maintain-ing social and economic order in these areas without causmaintain-ing shock waves.
Special efforts were made to control the native communities by inciting
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them against the Chinese minorities, portraying the latter as an exploitative element. This policy of divide-and-rule is typical of any occupier aspiring to entrench his rule in the areas he has captured.
As for the some 350,000 European civilians and members of the mil-itary, several guidelines were determined. Nationals of Japan’s allies—
Germans, Austrians, Italians, and even Frenchmen—would not be harmed in any way. But that did not include refugees from Germany and Austria, meaning specifically Jews. It was also decided not to harm Russian citizens or even stateless persons of Russian origin in any way, so as to avoid dam-aging the fragile non-aggression pact between Japan and the Soviet Union signed in April 1941. Further, it was determined that citizens of enemy countries—the United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the Netherlands—would be put in internment camps. This category included most of the Jews who fell under Japanese control in the early months of 1942. For some reason Iraq was proclaimed in 1942 a “friendly enemy” territory—a territory that was a colony of an enemy nation but not itself an enemy, and therefore Jews of Iraqi origins, also known as Baghdadi Jews, were treated with some consideration.
As noted, the Jews who fell captive to the Japanese in the early months of 1942 were considered to belong mainly to the group of Western nation-als of enemy countries. But there were nation-also Jewish refugees from Germany, Austria, and even Italy. The need to determine a clear-cut policy became more obvious when Japan captured the large cities of Hong Kong, Manila, Singapore, Batavia, and Rangoon, all of which contained Jewish communi-ties. Most of these Jews held British, American, or Dutch passports. Among the first actions taken against the Jews in those places were the confisca-tions of homes, estates, and other real estate property, the freezing of bank accounts and other liquid assets, and the seizure of gold and jewels. All this was done even before specific guidelines were determined in Tokyo. The need to decide how to deal with the Jews was now urgent. On the one hand, Japanese authorities may have thought that any action designed to harm the Jews would be welcomed by their German allies and would be seen as expressing Japan’s desire to become part of the German strategy. Great benefits would be obtained for the small price of hurting the Jews. But there were those who feared that harsh treatment of Jews would further exacer-bate Japan’s already tarnished image in the West and might also jeapordize future ties with the United States after the war.
In order to find a golden rule between the two opposing views, and in order to decide on a binding policy toward the Jews, it was decided that
an Imperial Liaison Conference was required. This conference was prob-ably Japan’s supreme institution during the war, and consisted of the most senior military and civilian leaders charged with conducting the war. The discussion regarding the newly captured Jewish populations was held in Tokyo on March 11, 1942.1 The subject was presented by War Minister General Sugiyama Hajime (1880-1945). He did not deny the principles determined by the Five Ministers Committee in December 1938, which had stated that Japan would not adopt a discriminatory policy against the Jews. However, he argued that since then a dramatic change has taken place:
Japan was now part of the Axis Alliance and was in the midst of fight-ing a war against the Western democracies alongside Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Therefore, “It is incumbent on us to check matters regarding the Jews, especially in view of our ties with other nations.” He also issued a veiled threat: “If we do not undertake at once appropriate measures toward the Jews and their racial traits, it should not be ruled out that there will be undesirable incidents in the occupied areas.” For this reason Sugiyama called for the adoption of something in the vein of the anti-Jewish laws enacted by Nazi Germany, but did not suggest going so far as to turn the persecution of Jews into the declared policy of Japan. That would furnish additional propaganda grist to the British and Americans, and would also be in stark contradiction to the Japanese “Eight Roofs” policy, under which members of all races and people can live in peace, harmony, and security under Japan’s beneficent roof.
At the conclusion of the discussion, the Japanese government adopted a series of policies regarding the treatment of Jews in the Japanese-occupied areas. Apart from special cases, additional Jews would not be allowed to migrate to the areas of the Japanese Empire. As far as those Jews already residing in the territories were concerned, the Japanese authorities would treat them as citizens of the places where they lived, but due to their racial traits there would be constant surveillance of their persons and their busi-nesses, and any pro-enemy activity on their part would be suppressed.
It was also decided that Jews who could be of value to the emperor, among them those who could be of assistance to the Axis Alliance and those who did not oppose the national policy of Japan, would be carefully selected and would receive the same treatment they were accorded before the war.
German Jews would be considered stateless (as were White Russian émi-grés), but would also be under close surveillance. The results of the confer-ence were dispatched to all Japanese legations, embassies, and consulates in East Asia and to the Army and Navy headquarters. Their implementation
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was entrusted to local commanders, starting with corps commanders and ending with the most junior officers.
A broad examination of these important decisions shows that there had been no dramatic change in the Japanese perception of how the Jews should be dealt with. Moreover, the new policies also contain an element reflecting Japan’s determination to adhere to their already-stated policy of maintaining racial harmony in the areas under their control, the policy that was the foundation on which they wanted to base the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere so dear to the hearts of their wartime leaders. A crude antisemitic policy would not be in step with the idea of social and racial harmony, which was seen as a vital national interest. The concrete result of the directives issued in March 1942 would be to make Jews in the occupied areas something akin to a “tolerated” or “protected” minority. Their protec-tors would be the military authorities, who would translate the guidelines they had received into concrete measures on the ground. The treatment of the Jews was in its essence not much different from the treatment of other European enemy aliens. In some cases the local attitude toward the Jews was determined by Japanese special police units, some of whose officers had once served in Manchuria and Shanghai and knew about the “Jewish Question” from their service there. A few local commanders tended to see the Jews as fully or partly responsible for Japan’s reversals in the war that had begun with the defeat of the Japanese task force in the battle of Midway in June 1942, and those few did occasionally incite local antisemitic activity aimed at turning the Jews into scapegoats for Japan’s growing hardships.
Most interesting is the fact that in the final analysis Germany had no visible influence on Japan’s attitude toward and treatment of the Jews. Even if the Japanese may have sought to impress their wartime allies, they never adopted Germany’s genocidal policies. This is made clear by a telegram sent to Japan in May 1942, two months after the Imperial Liaison Conference decisions were made and then intercepted by the Allies. In the telegram, Alfred Rosenberg, the chief ideologist of the Nazi party regarding Jewish matters, who was also serving at the time as the minister responsible for the German-occupied areas in the East, demanded that Japan take harsh measures against the Jews under its control, and specifically that it create severe limitations on the movements of Jews in southeast Asia, before the Jews became a problem. The Japanese government ignored this and other similar demands. Perhaps Japan no longer considered Rosenberg a major figure, since he had time to focus his attention on limiting the movements of Jews. It is likely that by this time the Germans understood that there was
no hope that Japanese policy, determined at the highest levels of govern-ment, would shift toward persecuting Jews in the Japanese Empire, let alone considering their extermination, as Germany would have liked them to do.
Another possible reason for Japan’s relatively mild treatment of Jews during the war is the fact that in its colonies Jews did not play any role in the emerging national liberation movements or in the existing and emerg-ing communist parties. Similarly, Jews did not stand out in the local media or in the academic world. They were mostly middle–class and engaged in business or government service.