Years later, it became known that in his efforts to obtain intelligence on both the Germans and the Russians, Sugihara established close working relations
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with members of the Polish underground intelligence, who supplied him with a great deal of information that he used in his cables to Tokyo. Two such Poles were on his staff at the Kaunas consulate, and he even allowed them the use of his official car. Later he maintained close ties with Polish intelligence officers working out of Stockholm. The German government apparently knew of his activities and kept an eye on him. After the clo-sure of the Japanese consulate in Kaunas on August 30, 1940, Sugihara was transferred to Berlin and served under the new Japanese ambassador there, Kurusu Saburo (1886-1954). Even during his brief stay in Berlin, which totaled less than three months, Sugihara issued 69 transit visas to German Jews. It is not clear whether Ambassador Kurusu was aware of the visas Sugihara issued in Kaunas and Berlin. If he was, he made no issue of the matter. In a cable to Tokyo, however, Kurusu wrote that there was no need to grant asylum in Asia to refugees expelled from Germany, Italy, Hungary, and the Baltic states, and nor would granting such asylum be of benefit to Japan. If we do not stem the tide now, he wrote, the refugees will be the source of much trouble in the future.
From Berlin Sugihara was transferred to Prague, where he served as acting consul general until February 1941. When the Japanese lega-tion in Prague closed in March 1941, Sugihara was transferred briefly to Koenigsberg in Eastern Prussia. The German authorities, knowing of his connections with Polish intelligence, asked Japan to remove him from that city, and he was transferred to the Japanese legation in Bucharest where he served until the arrival of the Red Army in Romania. In all of these posts his expertise in Russian affairs proved useful. It is no wonder that the Russians, who knew he was a Japanese intelligence officer, captured him when the Soviet Army entered Romania in the summer of 1944 and sent him to Siberia. When he was repatriated to Japan in 1947, he along with hundreds of other former Japanese diplomats was dismissed from the Japanese Foreign Service, as Japan was now under American occupation and there was no need for an independent foreign ministry. Those dis-missed were given severance pay for their previous service in the Japanese foreign ministry. Many of them were reinstated after Japan regained its independce in April 1952. Years later, Sugihara’s wife claimed that he was dismissed for issuing visas to Jews in Kaunas without authorization, but this claim cannot be substantiated. In the late 1940’s, Sugihara worked for a Jewish merchant in Tokyo. Later, again because of his fluency in Russian, he represented a Japanese firm in Moscow for fifteen years. This would give rise to the allegation that he was also a Soviet agent all those years, surely
the Soviets knew exactly who he was before giving him a visa to work in Moscow. But there is definitely no proof to back this allegation.
Sugihara’s actions in saving Jews were well known to many people in Israel. One of them, who served as commercial attaché in the Israeli embassy in Tokyo and had been granted a visa by Sugihara, tracked him down and in 1968, at the behest of then-Israeli Minister for Religious Affairs Zerach Warhaftig, also the beneficiary of a Sugihara visa, Sugihara was invited to visit Israel. While there, he was received by Prime Minister Levy Eshkol (1894-1969), who awarded him a plaque commemorating his exploits in helping saved Jews and arranged for a scholarship for his son to study at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. It was only in 1985, a year before he died, that Yad Vashem decided to recognize Sugihara as Righteous Gentile.
Many to whom he had given visas worked together to plant a tree bearing his name plate in Jerusalem. He was too old and frail to travel to Jerusalem, and received the associated certificate from Amnon Ben Yochanan, Israel’s ambassador to Japan. Toward the end of his life, the Japanese government reinstated his pension.
Why Sugihara Chiune was granted the title of a Righteous Gentile, even though he did not fulfill the key requirements set by Yad Vashem for this distinction? He did not risk his own life or those of his family mem-bers, and he did not knowingly rescue Jews from imminent death, for in the summer of 1940, few considered the total extermination of Jews pos-sible. The pressure to grant Sugihara this honor was exerted by Minister Warhaftig, and it was probably politically expedient for both the Israeli and Japanese governments to have at least one Japanese official among the Righteous Gentiles and to demonstrate that not all Japanese people disliked Jews or were antisemitic in those dark days. Unlike Spain under Franco, which took credit for rescue operations carried out by Spanish diplomats who helped save some 40,000 Jews during the war, the Japanese govern-ment never took credit for Sugihara’s activities. In 2006, the Japanese com-poser Ichiyanagi Toshi wrote an opera called White Nights of Love: Visas for 6,000 Jewish Refugees, which was staged in Tokyo and won much acclaim.
Many articles and books have been written in Japanese and English on this unique man.
Why did Sugihara become one of the very few Japanese people (a group that included Higuchi and Yasue) who bothered to help Jews, even though he may have risked his career by disobeying orders? In the end, his career was not damaged: after Kaunas, he was promoted and sent to Berlin, to Prague, and later to Bucharest. It must be noted that other
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Japanese diplomats in Berlin and Vienna granted 1,200 visas to Jewish ref-ugees. Between October 1940 and August 1941, some 3,500 Jewish refugees arrived in Japan, the majority in possession of visas to the United States or to various South American countries. Sugihara issued his visas in the summer of 1940, a year and a half before the Wansee Conference of January 1942, at which the plan to exterminate the Jews was approved and put into operation. The Japan option was by that point virtually non-existent for European Jews, since Japanese consular and diplomatic representatives in various European cities were issued a general directive not to admit Jews to Japan. This was done partly to appease Germany, partly because very few Jews bothered to apply for Japanese visas because it never occurred to them as a real alternative, and partly because the Japanese Foreign Service officials understood the general policies of their superiors. By effectively barring Jewish refugees from Japan, the Japanese foreign ministry ignored its own previous belief about the enormous influence that world Jewry wielded over Western governments. Japan could have won much praise from Jews (who, as we discussed, were believed by many Japanese officials to control international public opinion) if they had made the slightest effort to rescue Jews. It would certainly have won them points in the United States prior to Pearl Harbor.
Most of those who have been awarded the title Righteous Gentiles were involved in hiding Jews during the Holocaust or preventing them from being handed over to the Germans and their collaborators. There was no need to hide Jews from the Japanese. They did not build death camps or hand over Jews to the Nazis, and the Jews in territories under Japanese occupation did not face the danger of being liquidated. Besides, it was impossible to hide Jews in Asia because of their obviously different appearance.
What happened to the Japanese officers who were known as Jewish affairs specialists? Captain Inuzuka, who helped Jews in Manchuria and later in Shanghai, was transferred by the Japanese navy to the Philippines in 1943. Two years later he was captured by American forces, who wanted to try him as a war criminal. He was spared because he had in his possession a cigarette box he’d received in March 1941 from Rabbi Frank Newman on behalf of the American Union of Orthodox Rabbis, in gratitude for the ser-vices he had rendered to the Jewish people. The box’s dedication matched Inuzuka’s explanation, and he was safe. He returned to Japan and was active in the Israel-Japan Friendship Association until his death in 1965. Colonel Yasue was captured by the Soviet army in Manchuria and was probably
sent to Siberia, where his trail goes cold. One report indicates that he died in Siberia in 1950. These two men shared an interesting trait. They were both antisemites who translated and circulated the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, but their behavior toward the Jews of Manchuria and Shanghai was humane and pragmatic. Goya Kano, who as was mentioned earlier was the official responsible for the Hongkew Ghetto, was beaten up by some Shanghai Jews when he was interned in that city shortly after the end of the war and returned to Japan.
Why were there no other known Japanese individuals who were pre-pared to rescue Jews? The answer seems to be quite plain. Most Japanese people, whether civilians or soldiers, had no clue about Jews, their religion, or why they should be treated in any way differently than other foreigners.
It is also important to note that the Japanese have historically been a highly disciplined people whose culture encourages them to act according to the book and carry out orders scrupulously. There were few cases during the era in question of people disobeying orders or following a personal initia-tive; in fact, even Sugihara Chiune was not one of those rare exceptions.
Most of the time he, like other Japanese diplomatic and consular officials, obeyed orders without asking superfluous questions. And since they were not asked to carry out violent acts against Jews, the officials did not ask questions about them. There was also a practical issue, however. Assuming that some people would have wanted to help Jews, they would have had to know something about Japan’s policy regarding the treatment of the Jews, and above all would have needed an idea of how could they help them.
Perhaps some guards could have been more humane in the camps where Jews were interned with non-Jews, but helping Jews or other Westerners escape from prisoner-of-war or internment camps was a totally different matter. There would be a need to hide the Jews, or to help them reach a neutral country, both impossible tasks. No Japanese patriot would consider attempting such acts. Sugihara stands out mainly because Israel decided to make him an example and as such highlighted the fact that he deserved the gratitude of thousands of Jews.
Chapter 11