The four major theoretical paradigms in IR theory—realism, liberalism, institutionalism, and constructivism—have each attempted to explain order and changes in order.9 They agree that international order emerges in the context of international anarchy. International anarchy refers to a situation where no central governing authority exists above and beyond states; there is no supranational world government that rules the world. Thus, there is no central political authority that can establish rules, force states to obey them, punish states that break the rules, or otherwise arbitrate among states.10 However, the major theoretical paradigms draw different implications from anarchy.
Realism.
Realist theorizing views international relations through the prism of power. For realists, power and the distribution of power are the only important factors in IR. It is the amount of (primarily military) power a state has that drives its actions and behaviors. In international anarchy, states with lots of power have free reign to do what they want, while states with little power are con-strained in what they can do. This is the very old concept that Thucydides expressed in his recount-ing of the Peloponnesian War. The Athenians allegedly told the Melians, “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”11 Realists do not think regime type matters in explaining state national security policies. They argue that any state with the same amount of power would behave in the same way. They also argue that states are almost exclusively focused on survival, and since military power and the use of force are the only sure ways to guarantee survival, states concentrate on maximizing their military power. This can lead to a circlar security dilemma: ac-tions states take to increase their military power so as to increase their security can be perceived as threatening by other states. Other states then take action to increase their military power. This can lead to an arms race spiral and ultimately to conflict. Realists, therefore, draw negative conclusions from international anarchy: states are alone and have to fend for themselves (the international environment is self-help); conflict and war are likely and prevalent; and states have no choice but to be suspicious of other states because they lack information about the intentions of other states, which in turn forces decisionmakers to make worst-case scenario calculations. Realists conclude that the nature of the international system is inherently conflictual, with cooperation among states being difficult, only short-term, and rare.12
To understand and explain international order, realists focus on structure (distribution of power) and functioning (balancing or domination). For realists, structure and order equate to the same thing. In the realist view, the nature of international order is unchanging—regime type is irrelevant in understanding order. Realists also consider international law irrelevant in regulating state behavior, because there is no world government to enforce it, and they further argue that international institutions and organizations exert no independent effect on state behavior. States will act to preserve their security no matter what, and they will not allow the restraining efforts of multilateral organizations or international law to obstruct their actions. For realists, international order originates from power, and it can change significantly over time as changes in the distribu-tion of power occur. The formadistribu-tion of a new order is the result of dramatic internadistribu-tional events, particularly major wars, that shift the distribution of power among states.13 Two schools of realist thinking advance different explanations for the emergence and functioning of international order.
One realist school of thought, balance of power theory, argues that the key rule of the game in international order is balancing behavior by states. Order is achieved when there is an equi-librium of power among the great powers (the most dominant states in the system), and order is then maintained through continued balancing behavior. Balancing is essentially a process that aims to establish and maintain a given order by threatening potential transgressors with unac-ceptable costs if they challenge the order. Balance of power theory does not assume peace will result; war may be necessary to maintain the balance. Not only will strong states balance against each other, but weaker states will either flock together to balance against stronger states, or they will bandwagon with stronger states to ensure their survival. The assumption is that weak states fear stronger states will dominate the system and threaten the security or existence of weaker states. States engage in both internal and external balancing behavior. Internal balancing refers to a state building up of its military capabilities. External balancing refers to the formation of alliances among states to maintain an order or respond to a threatening state. Since the relative power of states is constantly changing, realists argue that alliances are also fluid and flexible. States avoid entangling alliances and other international institutions, and they constantly reassess with whom they should align in order to ensure their security and maintain the international order.14 For real-ists, today’s alliance partner can be tomorrow’s enemy; alliances are merely “temporary marriages of convenience” that fall apart when a threatening state disappears.15 However, this line of theoriz-ing cannot explain the endurance of long-lived alliances like NATO.
The second school of realist thinking argues that the emergence of a preponderant or hege-monic state creates and maintains order. The rule of the game for international order is domina-tion. The preponderant state uses its power to create the type of new order it wants and that best advances its interests. It also uses its power to organize relations among states, and it can offer both positive and negative incentives to the other states in the international system to induce them to agree to cooperate and participate in the order. Thus, preponderant power is the mechanism by which a hegemonic state creates and maintains order. However, because relative power differen-tials are constantly changing, there may come a time when a rising state will challenge (either by itself or in coalition with other states) the declining dominant state and subsequently change the international order.16
For all realists, in the struggle for state survival, international order is created after dramatic events through the emergence of one or a few strong states that are powerful enough to subordi-nate or counter-balance their rivals. International order is therefore a consequence of the self-help international environment and the struggle for survival. A given international order is also a mani-festation of the given distribution of power. If one state emerges as the strongest, the international order will be unipolar; if two or more states emerge as the strongest, the order will be bipolar or multipolar. Realists do not deny the existence of social arrangements, international rules, inter-national laws, or interinter-national organizations. However, they argue that the most powerful states in the international system will create the arrangements, rules, laws, and organizations that serve their interests (because in anarchy no other state can stop them), and the weaker states in the system have no choice but to accept them. Furthermore, states will also ignore the rules, laws and organizations when it suits them.17 Realists disagree on which international structure—unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar—is the most stable and peaceful international order.
Realist theorizing, however, does not account well for the fact that states are also social actors operating in a social context, and it cannot account for why in modern times powerful states often allow international organizations, laws, and norms to constrain their actions. It also cannot ac-count for why rising and declining democratic states do not balance against each other and rarely fight each other. Since it is impossible for states to exist alone and completely independently of
other states, and since the phenomenon of globalization makes state independence increasingly impossible, it is in even the most powerful state’s interest to create and regularize some sort of social structure or pattern of relational activity with other states. Also, the type of state interaction (conflictual or cooperative) is not predetermined by the context of anarchy or the structure (distri-bution of power) of the international environment. Liberal, institutional, and constructivist theo-rists draw a more positive conclusion from international anarchy. They argue that state interaction can be either cooperative or conflictual, and that states are not doomed to self-help, the security dilemma, or constant conflict and war. Cooperative relations among states can be far-reaching and enduring.
Liberalism.
Liberal theorizing views international relations through the prism of state policy preferences.
Liberal IR theory bears no relation to American political parties or philosophies. The use of the term “liberal” for politicians on the left of the political spectrum is completely different from lib-eralism as used in IR theory. Liberal IR theory has its foundation in the ideas of John Locke and Adam Smith, embracing the concepts of free market economics, representative democratic govern-ment, and individual liberty and equality. In liberal theorizing, regime-type matters for explaining the policies and behaviors of states. Different states behave in different ways, and internal do-mestic politics drive a state’s policies, actions, and behaviors. State policy preferences can change dramatically over time and are not focused solely on security and the accumulation of military power. Liberal theory asserts that the incidence of conflict and cooperation is determined by do-mestic politics (the political competition among different sub-state actors to influence state policy) and national interests that result in state policy preferences. Policy preferences among states can converge, thus leading to cooperative behavior, especially when states share compatible political institutions and political ideology such as democratic political institutions and values or when they share economic interests.18
For liberal theory, international order originates from power, international society, and inter-national law. Liberals argue that despite the condition of anarchy, a more peaceful interinter-national order is slowly emerging over time, especially since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, because within anarchy a slowly enlarging society of states has developed. Liberals focus less on structure and the asymmetries of power among states and more on ideas, values, processes, and rules that influence and regulate interstate relations. This is so because, from their viewpoint, states can cooperate in any given structure, whether unipolar, bipolar or multipolar.
A society of states (also called international society) comprises a group of states that have com-mon interests or values. The states conceive of themselves as a group bound by a comcom-mon set of rules that regulate the relations among them. They share in the creation and workings of common international institutions and organizations. A society of states is cooperative because the states respect one another’s independence (sovereignty, autonomy, and territory), they honor the agree-ments they enter into with each other, and they accept limitations on the use of force against each other.19 (Note: realists argue that international society does not exist.) An example of a society of states is the group that comprises the liberal democracies.20 One can argue that the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) comprises another international society since it includes 56 Islamic states that promote Muslim solidarity in economic, social, and political affairs, although this soci-ety is “looser” in that Muslim states have often warred against each other, and they do not have formal rules or institutions that regulate their interactions. While liberal theorists argue that states can be capable of harmonizing their interests, especially when they share liberal democratic politi-cal institutions and norms, they acknowledge that states will never be in perfect accord; therefore,
discord and coercion will continue to be an enduring aspect of international relations, especially among states that have differing domestic political institutions (i.e., democratic versus autocratic states).21
A society of states is not the same as a system of states. A system of states refers to a situa-tion where two or more states have regular contact and sufficient impact on each other that the behavior of each state is an element in the calculations of the behaviors of other states. Interac-tions among states in a system of states can be cooperative, conflictual, neutral, or indifferent. An international society presupposes an international system of states; however, not all the states in the international system are necessarily in the society of states. Thus, the liberal democracies and the OIC represent two different international societies in the contemporary international system of states. Furthermore, a society of states is not necessarily peaceful toward states outside the society.
Pariah states like North Korea, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and Iran, as well as failed states, are outside international society, and they have been the focus of a variety of military interventions and economic sanctions by international society because the states in international society recog-nize that war is sometimes necessary to uphold international order. Thus, some wars are just, and international law codifies when war is permissible.22
Some liberal theorists have argued that there is only one modern international society, and it is a result of Western civilization. This international society encompasses particular political and economic elements: the values of constitutional government and individual liberty, capitalism, international free trade, and industrialization.23 The rise and spread of these elements through-out the world have brought unprecedented levels of military and economic power to Western civilization, and they have made both interdependence and cooperation more prevalent. This has strengthened the ties among the members of the society of states and increased the number of states in international society. With increasing interdependence, states are concerned with more than just security, and they recognize it is possible to craft collective solutions to problems.24 With industrialization, democratization, and interdependence, and under U.S. leadership since 1945, the functioning of the international order has become formalized and institutionalized as states in the society created formal and informal international institutions (comprised of international organizations, regimes, treaties, and conventions), international norms, and international laws as the means to encourage peaceful cooperation and peaceful resolution of conflict. The rules of the game are specified in, and operate through, the institutions, norms, and laws that promote and maintain the U.S.-led contemporary international order. They are the mechanisms through which states achieve their objectives, they regulate and control state behavior, and they identify the rights and obligations of states.25
This contemporary international order has a distinct and unique nature. G. John Ikenberry argues that the contemporary international order is a “constitutional” order. It is not based on the raw balancing of power or hegemony, but rather on legal, political, economic, and security institu-tions that limit the raw exercise of power. The internal U.S. political system (liberal democracy) exerted a major influence on the type of order it established after 1945. In the contemporary order, the United States purposefully restrained the exercise of its own power in order to lessen the fears of weaker states that it would dominate them. The United States created international institutions that constrained its room for maneuver and gave weaker states more leverage in international politics in order to obtain their willing cooperation and participation in the international order.
Over the last 60 years, this order has become increasingly institutionalized, and this has increas-ingly restrained U.S. power.26
In general, liberals do not reject the importance of power, power politics, or the balance of power. Instead, they argue that these concepts are linked: the balance of power provides the
foun-dation on which diplomacy and international law operate, especially between the society of states and other states in the international system. In addition, international institutions, norms, and laws shape the game of power politics. Pariah and failed states sometimes comply with interna-tional treaties, the demands of multilateral organizations, and other rules. However, they do not share the values and political institutions of the members of international society, so they are less trusted, and their actions receive more scrutiny. When they choose to flout international law and norms, international society often engages in traditional balancing to respond to their aggression or threatening behavior. However, a problem with liberal theorizing is that it cannot predict when international society will act or how it will act, and assumes members of international society will always comply with their self-created institutions, norms, and laws.
Liberals argue that the lack of a world government does not inhibit the functioning of interna-tional law or the maintenance of order. They argue that internainterna-tional law does not require coercion to affect the behavior of states (both inside and outside the society); therefore, there is no require-ment for a centralized, global enforcerequire-ment mechanism. They argue that international law acts as a sanctioning mechanism that can deter state aggression.27 This does not mean states always obey the law. For example, Iraq flouted international law in 1990 when it invaded Kuwait, but it was
“sanctioned” by the international coalition and forced to withdraw. It also does not mean that states interpret international law the same way. For example, many states in the international community argued that the George W. Bush administration violated international law when its coalition invaded Iraq in 2003. However, the administration (along with the British government) argued that since Iraq was in material breach of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1441, as well as 16 earlier UNSCRs that dated back to 1990, it had the authority to invade in order to force compliance and thus maintain international order.28 Finally, liberals argue international society and cooperative relations have endured and expanded over time, encompassing more states in the international system, because states have reaped benefits they would not have otherwise received, particularly prosperity and security.29
Institutionalism.
Institutional theorizing focuses on how information and uncertainty influence state actions. In particular, institutional scholars argue that the creation of international institutions helps reduce uncertainties about state intentions (i.e., they help identify which states are aggressive and revi-sionist and which are cooperative and peaceful). They provide important information to member states, mechanisms to monitor state compliance with international law, and forums that facilitate negotiation and cooperation among states.30
Institutional theorists argue that cooperation under anarchy is not only possible, but it is in-creasingly prevalent in the modern world. States are inin-creasingly making the calculation that it is to their benefit to cooperate to achieve their self-interests. This is evident in the creation and expansion of a wide range of international institutions, such as political, military, and economic multilateral organizations (UN, EU, NATO, OPEC, and WTO), international regimes (the post-WWII monetary regime and free trade regime), and international treaties and conventions (like the NPT and the CTBT). State cooperation through international institutions, far from being short-term, has actually been be durable and long-lasting even in the face of changes in the international distribution of power and changes in the structure of the international system.31 NATO is an ex-ample. The defining purpose of the defensive Alliance disappeared with the end of the Cold War,
Institutional theorists argue that cooperation under anarchy is not only possible, but it is in-creasingly prevalent in the modern world. States are inin-creasingly making the calculation that it is to their benefit to cooperate to achieve their self-interests. This is evident in the creation and expansion of a wide range of international institutions, such as political, military, and economic multilateral organizations (UN, EU, NATO, OPEC, and WTO), international regimes (the post-WWII monetary regime and free trade regime), and international treaties and conventions (like the NPT and the CTBT). State cooperation through international institutions, far from being short-term, has actually been be durable and long-lasting even in the face of changes in the international distribution of power and changes in the structure of the international system.31 NATO is an ex-ample. The defining purpose of the defensive Alliance disappeared with the end of the Cold War,