briefly is constructivism. Constructivism is the most recent school and its relative newness means that its precepts have not yet seeped into diplomatic practice, nor has its terminology entered pub-lic debate. Further, constructivism departs significantly from the other two schools, particularly in its rejection of the assumption that states use an economic mode of reasoning. In addition, of the three approaches constructivism is most easily misrepresented because it rejects the crudely materialist view that the physical reality of the environment governs state behavior. Consequent-ly, constructivists are often labeled idealists. In one sense, this is an unfortunate label because idealism conjures up notions of impractical, naïve and unrealistic views of the world. However,
in another more philosophic sense, the label idealist is appropriate because constructivists focus on more intangible factors like the impact of ideas on state behavior. Thus the starting point for constructivist analysis is to consider facets of culture like norms and ideas as well as processes of social interaction as the best avenue for understanding state behavior. One way constructiv-ists illustrate the weakness of a purely material explanation for state behavior is to consider U.S.
relations with two neighbors, Cuba and Canada. From the standpoint of power, the two stand in comparable positions in relation to the United States. Yet, power is an insufficient explanation of U.S. behavior toward each.32
Alexander Wendt is one leading scholar who draws on a constructivist approach, which he outlines in his book, Social Theory of International Politics. Indeed, his work is sufficiently notable that a journal devoted to international security found it worthy as a subject of a major review es-say. As a starting point, Wendt notes that:
A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them. States act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not.33
Given such a principle, constructivists would never accept the fact that any given condition in international politics like anarchy (or balance of power) has an effect on state behavior that is universal across time and space. There is in other words, no inherent logic to anarchy, it is, as one author phrased it, an “empty vessel.”34 That empty vessel may be filled in various ways, depending on social interaction of the states and the knowledge they gain concerning anarchy from this interaction. For example, Wendt describes three possible meanings for anarchy that he labels: competitive, individualistic, and cooperative. The first two forms of anarchy fit the classic realist conception of international politics in that they are self-help systems where states do not positively identify their security with that of others. For Wendt, there is a possible third meaning for anarchy that is cooperative because states see their security as linked to the security of others.35 Realists would claim that the competitive meaning for anarchy is the only possible one, while Wendt would suggest that although it happens that our system of international politics accepts the competitive meaning for anarchy, there is nothing inevitable about this acceptance. Rather, as Wendt would have it, the meaning of anarchy was socially constructed and emerged as a result of past practice—so changes in practice can be expected to yield changes in the understanding of anarchy that will lead to changes in behavior. Indeed some scholars suggest that changes may already be taking place, and here changes in inter-subjective knowledge is viewed as prompting adoption of institutional strategies:
To a large extent the sovereigns have tamed themselves through the construction of international institu-tions. They have done so only imperfectly but the trajectories are in the direction of increased peaceful coexistence between political communities. For most states most of the time, sovereignty and peace are compatible. Hobbes and Rousseau predicted permanent insecurity and war as the predominant conse-quence of sovereignty. Institutional development since they wrote has proved them wrong.36
The impact that social construction has on state behavior suggested above can be likened to the formulation of customary international law. Customary international law establishes legal norms and obligations through state practices. States are expected to carry out their obligations consistent with past accepted conduct so that customary international law is as binding on states as treaty law. The notion that world politics is socially constructed in a manner similar to customary interna-tional law is not intended to suggest that world politics is so malleable that human choice and free
will have unlimited options because any social construction and the intersubjective meanings that emerge from them will take on a self-perpetuating quality creating path dependencies difficult for new ideas or social interactions to transcend.37 The fact that social construction of new meanings may take time and be difficult does not mean the process does not occur. For example, the meaning that people of the West give to war today is quite different from the view in 1914 when under the impact of Social Darwinist ideas, people viewed war as a means to reinvigorate society.38
Two more aspects of the constructivist approach are important for understanding the under-lying dynamics of international politics: identity and interests. The constructivist view of these two elements is a stark contrast to that held by the other two schools. Neither realists or liberals examine the origins of state identities or interests. Realists in particular see interests and identities as “unvarying and a-contextual.”39 Liberal institutionalist scholars are closer to constructivists on the issue of the impact of ideas and norms on international politics; however, they focus on the consequences of ideas and are less concerned about their origin. For constructivists, state identities are inherently relational and thus dependent on social construction, for how can one state view another as a friend or foe a priori, without some previous interaction? Constructivists adopt the term identity from social psychology where it refers to “images of individuality and distinctive-ness” held and projected by an actor and formed through relations with others. As conventionally used, therefore, the term refers to mutually constructed and evolving images of self and others.40
For constructivists, identities serve as a crucial link between the external world and interests.
Therefore, interests are not predetermined, nor are they permanent, Lord Palmerston’s assertion about British interests notwithstanding. Rather, interests emerge from social practice and depend on the state’s sense of identity. One scholar stated the point this way: “Actors often cannot de-cide what their interests are until they know what they are representing—’who they are’—which in turn depends on their social relationships.”41 Constructivist do not take national interests for granted, but seek instead to locate their source.
Germany and Japan provide excellent cases for illustrating the way constructivists see identity as affecting national interest.42 Both countries exhibited a xenophobic nationalism that culminated in their policies of conquest during World War II. The devastation they suffered during the war and their unconditional surrender goes a long way toward explaining their anti-militarist policies after 1945. Certainly the adoption of anti-militarist policies is consistent with a realist understand-ing of state behavior. However well realists may account for the origin of anti-militarism in Japan and Germany, they are not able to account for the persistence of the trend at the end of the Cold War, which enlarged German and Japanese power and opened up greater latitude for maneuver.
Moreover, although a liberalist view might attribute the continued anti-militarism to the spread of democracy or growing interdependence, liberalists are less able to explain why feelings of anti-militarism run deeper in Japan and Germany—as was evident by their policies during the first Gulf War—than in Britain or France.
Thomas Berger believes that a constructivist understanding about the way identity shapes in-terests is useful for understanding the persistence of anti-militarism in Japan and Germany. One indicator of that anti-militarism is the extent to which each country has sought to assert civilian control of the military, albeit using different methods. Berger draws on survey data to show the increasing consensus for anti-militarist policies after the 1950s. Commitment to such policies as the means for pursing national interests can only be understood by the changing sense of national identity in each country. For Japan, that identity was defined in terms of economic expansion as a trading state. For Germany that sense of identity was defined as part of a larger European commu-nity bound together by common values and interests. So deep was the German redefinition of its identity—what one journalist described as a “deeply internalized ethics of repentance for World
War II”43—that once reunification was achieved, Germany further reduced its sovereignty by ac-celerating European integration through the Maastrict Treaty. Acceptance of Maastrict required Germany to make economic concessions that amounted to an abandonment of major sources of power and influence in a way that neither realism nor liberalism explain. To be sure, changes in German and Japanese identity is part of a broader trend concerning notions about governance that are part of a post-modern politics focusing greater emphasis on welfare than traditional concep-tions of national security. Berger goes on to conclude:
. . .Germany’s decision to integrate itself into the West, and Japan’s determination to stay aloof from regional security affairs were logical responses to the particular external pressures that the two countries experienced. Once made, however, these decisions were tied to the new national identities by the Ger-man and Japanese governments, which had to justify their policies to their highly critical public. In this way policies were invested with a symbolic value that linked them to the core values. . . 44