1. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press, 2006, pp. xi, 43-51.
2. John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” International Security, Vol.
15, No. 1, 1990; Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1996, pp. 13, 19-21.
3. G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 1, January, 2009, pp. 1-27.
4. Andrew Moravscik, “Europe, the Second Superpower,” Current History, March 2010, p. 91.
5. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power, New York: PublicAffairs, 2011, pp. xv, xvi, 113-117; Bates Gill, “Diffuse Threats, Frail Institutions: Managing Security in the New Era,” Current History, Vol. 109, No. 730, November 2010, pp.
329; Timothy Garton Ash, “A new world disorder,” Los Angeles Times, January 28, 2011, available from latimes.com/
news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-gartonash-davos-20110128,0,3772495.story.
6. Wu Xinbo, “Understanding the Geopolitical Implications of the Global Financial Crisis,” The Washington Quar-terly, Vol. 33, No. 4, October 2010, pp. 155-156; Stephen Fidler and Alexander Nicoll, “Out of Balance: The Fragile World Economy,” Survival, Vol. 52, No. 6, December 2010, p. 89; Peter J. Munson, “The Socio-economics of Geopoliti-cal Change,” Survival, Vol. 53, No. 1, February 2011, p. 77.
7. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981; G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2001.
8. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Ikenberry, After Victory; Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, Diplo-matic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966.
9. For analytical clarity, I have explicitly chosen to identify these four major IR paradigms as separate and dis-tinct. An argument can be made that institutional theorizing emerged from liberal theorizing and thus is a variant of liberalism, for example, Joseph Grieco refers to the new institutional theorizing as neoliberal institutionalism; Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the new newest liberal institutionalism,” Inter-national Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer, 1988, pp. 485-507. However, Robert Keohane has more recently argued that institutional arguments now rest in a middle ground between realism and liberalism, and that it draws its as-sumptions from aspects of both realism and liberalism, thus it can be considered a distinct paradigm in IR; Robert O.
Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffman, eds., After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.
10. Robert Art and Robert Jervis, eds., International Politics, Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1985; Butterfield and Wight, Diplomatic Investigations.
11. Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, New York:
Free Press, 1996, p. 352.
12. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959;
Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, January, 1978, pp. 167-214;
John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton, 2001.
13. Waltz, Man, the State and War; Butterfield and Wight, Diplomatic Investigations; John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter, 1994-1995.
14. Butterfield and Wight, Diplomatic Investigations; T. V. Paul, James L. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds., Bal-ance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978; Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit,”
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer, 1994.
15. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions.”
16. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Duncan Snidal, “The limits of hegemonic stability theory,” Interna-tional Organization, Vol. 39, No. 4, Autumn, 1985, pp. 579-614; Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski, “The Power Transi-tion: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies, Boston, MA:
Unwin Hyman, 1989.
17. Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann, Balance of Power; Butterfield and Wight, Diplomatic Investigations; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Kugler and Organski, “The Power Transition”; Waltz, Man, the State and War; Mearsheimer,
“The False Promise of International Institutions.”
18. Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4, Autumn, 1997, pp. 513-555; John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,”
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2, Autumn, 1994, pp. 87-125; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993; Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, New York: Norton, 1997; Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics: 1789-1989, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-versity Press, 2005; Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
19. Bull, The Anarchical Society; Butterfield and Wight, Diplomatic Investigations.
20. All democracies are not the same. A liberal democracy has the following attributes: a representative govern-ment with the separation of powers across executive, legislative, and judicial branches as defined in a constitution;
legal equality for all citizens; the rule of law; the protection of private property and minority rights; free market economics; individual liberty and freedom of expression; and a free press. Under this definition, Iran may be a democ-racy, since it holds periodic elections, but it is not a liberal democracy.
21. Moravscik, “Taking Preferences Seriously.”
22. Bull, The Anarchical Society.
23. Butterfield and Wight, Diplomatic Investigations.
24. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, New York: HarperCollins, 1989.
25. Butterfield and Wight, Diplomatic Investigations; Bull, The Anarchical Society; Ikenberry, After Victory.
26. Ikenberry, After Victory.
27. Bull, The Anarchical Society; Butterfield and Wight, Diplomatic Investigations.
28. William Shawcross, Allies: The U.S., Britain, Europe, and the War in Iraq, New York: Public Affairs, 2004, pp.
107-155; George W. Bush, Decision Points, New York: Crown Publishers, 2010, pp. 223, 226-233, 237-247, 252; Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, New York: HarperCollins, 2008, pp.
313-315, 335-341, 356.
29. Butterfield and Wight, Diplomatic Investigations.
30. Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989; Stephen Kras-ner, ed., International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983; G. John Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3, Winter, 1998-99, pp.
43-78; Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Institutions,”
International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 4, Autumn, 2001, pp. 761-799; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence;
Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1, October, 1985, pp. 1-24.
31. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power; Krasner, International Regimes; Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order”; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Institution”; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence.
32. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War”; John J. Mearsheimer, “The Future of the American Pacifier,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 5, September/October, 2001; Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”; Richard K. Betts, “Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1, Summer, 1992; Walt, The Origin of Alliances.
33. Helga Hafterndorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Space and Time, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999; John S. Duffield, “NATO’s Functions after the Cold War,”
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 109, No. 5, Winter, 1994-95; Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptabil-ity: NATO After the Cold War,” International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 4, Autumn, 2000; Rebecca R. Moore, NATO’s New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007.
34. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutional Theory,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer, 1995, pp. 39-51; Keohane, Nye, and Hoffman, After the Cold War.
35. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Institutions”; Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
36. Gruber, Ruling the World.
37. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princ-eton University Press, 2005; Ikenberry, After Victory.
38. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence; Martha Finnemore, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be,” World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 1, January 2009, pp. 58-85.
39. Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance, Westport, CT: Praeger Publish-ers, 2004, pp. 111-112.
40. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 391-425; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cam-bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999; John Gerard Ruggie, “International regimes, transactions, and change:
embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order,” International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1982; Peter J.
Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
41. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 247.
42. Ibid., p. 135.
43. Ibid., pp. 247-312.
44. Mark L. Haas, “The United States and the End of the Cold War: Reactions to Shifts in Soviet Power, Policies, or Domestic Politics?” International Organization, Vol. 61, No. 1, Winter 2007, pp. 145-179.
45. G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Sys-temic Consequences,” World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 1, January 2009, pp. 1-27.
46. Benjamin Miller, “The International System and Regional Balance in the Middle East, in Paul, Wirtz, and Fort-mann, Balance of Power.
CHAPTER 10
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM