The year 2010 was indeed a turning point. Although the DPJ government has put more emphasis on engagement with China than hedging, China’s assertiveness has made Tokyo adopt a tougher policy towards China.
The JMSDF seeks deeper confidence building with China, while establishing a well-balanced defence posture in case these efforts fail. The main JMSDF area of operation is the TGT Triangle, where it will enhance its ISR activities. The adoption of engagement and emergency response strategies reflects the growing importance of peacetime operations and the rise of Chinese maritime power.
There is no doubt that the strategic importance of the south-western island chain is increasing but it is merely one of the primary focuses.33 As the “triple disaster” relief operation has demonstrated, the JSDF will deploy necessary forces anywhere on call under the dynamic defence concept. The perception of a shifting geographical focus from north to south may send a wrong message to Russia, which is re-activating mili-tary activities in Japan’s surrounding areas, especially in the Northern Territories.34
Still, the operational concept of south-western island defence is important and needs further deliberation. Obviously, the concept requires joint operations, as inter-service coordination—which is always difficult—is indispensable for remote island defence. Remote island defence also requires the introduction of amphibious capabilities to the JGSDF and more integration of land and naval power is essential.
Due to the lack of Chinese ASW capabilities, the expansion of Japan’s submarine fleet has a significant deterrent effect against the PLAN. To patrol the waters south-west of Japan, it is estimated that at least eight submarines are necessary. Typically, a submarine requires two back-ups, for training and maintenance. So a submarine fleet of 24 is ideal but the planned fleet of 22 provides more operational flexibility than the cur-rent fleet of 16. Japan is able to build a new submarine every year but
33 Senior Defense Ministry official, interview by Tetsuo Kotani, Tokyo, 12 October 2011.
34 Defense of Japan 2011. Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2011, 98–101. Accessed 21 February 2012. www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2010.html.
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the life extension of existing ones is also necessary, which may have a negative impact on its capabilities. Another problem is the recruitment and training of submariners because the NDPG increases the number of submarines without increasing the number of JMSDF personnel.35
It is important for Japan to achieve sufficient defence capabilities.
But can Japan buy all the items in the NDPG shopping list? Disaster reconstruction is expected to cost ¥25 trillion over 10 years, while the 2010 NDPG assumes an approximately ¥24 trillion defence budget in total for five years. The Japanese defence budget has been declining—
almost flat—for nearly a decade. But a rapid decrease is not expected either. The U.S.-Japan alliance is still the key. Tokyo and Washington have revised their common strategic objectives in June 2011 and included the maintenance of maritime security and freedom of navigation. Tokyo and Washington continue to encourage China’s responsible and constructive roles in regional security and its adherence to international rules and norms, while strengthening their ties with R.O.K., Australia, India and ASEAN. Tokyo and Washington has also agreed to strengthen alliance cooperation, integrating force postures under the NDPG and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.36
Washington announced a new strategic guidance in January 2012, with the U.S. strategic rebalance to the Asia Pacific region as its goal, recognising the challenges posed by the rise of China. Washington will maintain sustainable forces and power projection capability to counter Chinese A2/AD capabilities.37 This new guidance will require a more pro-active role for the JSDF in the region.
The presence of U.S. Marines in Okinawa is an important element of south-western island defence. On 8 February 2012, Tokyo and
Wash-35 Masao Kobayashi. “Sensuikan 22 sekitaiseino Kaijoboei.” [Maritime Defense under the 22-Submarine Force]. Gunji Kenkyu [Japan Military Review] (December 2011).
36 Hillary Rodham Clinton et al. “Towards a Deeper and Broader U.S.-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership.” Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee, 21 June 2011. Accessed 21 June 2011. www.mofa.go.jp/
region/n-america/us/security/pdfs/joint1106_01.pdf.
37 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.
Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, January 2012. Accessed 17 June 2014.
http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.
Chapter 7 Japan’s Changing Maritime Strategy in East Asia
ington announced that thousands of U.S. Marines would be transferred out of Okinawa even without the Futenma relocation.38 Given the adjust-ment of the base re-alignadjust-ment, both allies will need to re-invigorate the discussion on roles, missions and capabilities.
Partnership building is another important challenge. Japan and the United States have developed bilateral and trilateral partnerships with India and Australia, although ties between Japan and R.O.K. are still weak. Both countries are actively engaging with ASEAN as well. However, the new partnerships should not be regarded as a given because those new partners have strong economic relations with China. Given the security threat posed by Chinese military power, Tokyo and Washington need to continue military and diplomatic engagement with new partner countries to reassure them.
Beyond East Asia, security in the Strait of Hormuz remains an impor-tant challenge. Although Japan continues counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and established a JSDF base in Djibouti in July 2011, the DPJ government cancelled the JMSDF’s re-fuelling mission in the Arabian Sea. Given the Iranian nuclear crisis and the possible closure of this strategic strait, Japan needs to consider what it can do to keep the strait open.
ConClusion
The 2010 NDPG marks a departure from the Cold War force posture, providing a new focus in Japan’s national defence strategy. The intro-duction of the dynamic defence concept, with particular emphasis on the defence of the south-western island chain, reflects the necessity to check expanding Chinese maritime activities in the surrounding waters.
Japan is unlikely to contain China or appease Beijing blindly. Under severe fiscal constraints and a harsh security environment, Japanese defence planners recognise both challenges and opportunities in the rise of Chinese maritime power. Japan is going to build sufficient defence capabilities and partnerships to discourage Chinese assertiveness in
38 Sankei Shimbun, 8 February 2012. Accessed 8 February 2012. sankei.jp.msn.com/
politics/news/120208/plc12020819260022-n1.htm.
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the Asian littoral while encouraging Beijing to play more responsible and constructive roles. To that end, Japan needs to establish a dynamic defence posture to secure south-western Japan while expanding partner-ships in the South China Sea to promote freedom of navigation.
Chapter 8