Since the summer of 2010, Chinese analysts have had a tense debate on whether China should regard the South China Sea as its core inter-est. While some less well-known scholars applauded the notion of core interest, many prominent Chinese analysts cautioned that China should refrain from labelling the South China Sea as such immediately after the notion surfaced in American and Japanese media in 2010. Han Xudong, a senior security analyst at the National Defence University, did not sup-port the idea of including the South China Sea as one of China’s core interests.24 Da Wei, an America watcher at China Institutes of Contem-porary International Relations (CICIR), argued that China should stick to a “minimalist definition” of core interest.25
Peking University Professor Zhu Feng believed that the media in Japan and the United States had misinterpreted China’s rhetoric of core interest in relation to the South China Sea. He argued that the Chinese officials used the term “core interest” in the context that the resolution of the South China Sea dispute through peaceful means concerns China’s
24 Liaowang Zhoukan [Outlook Weekly], 25 July 2010; and Xinhua News Agency, 25 July 2010.
25 People’s Daily, 27 July 2010; and Global Times, 27 July 2010. See also Willy Lam,
“Hawks vs. Doves.” Category: China Brief, Willy’s Corner, Home Page, China and the Asia-Pacific, Foreign Policy, Military/Security.
Chapter 5 China Debates Its South China Sea Policy
core interest.26 Analysts at the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at CASS similarly contended that such remarks about “core interest” neither had any official source nor were substantiated by any official.27 Chinese ana-lysts believe that the American definition of the South China Sea being a U.S. “national interest” was a direct response to the reported Chinese rhetoric of “core interest”.28
It seems likely that Chinese officials have never linked the South China Sea issue with China’s core interest. When asked in Japan about whether Chinese officials used the term “core interest” during his visit to China in March 2011, former U.S. official James Steinberg said, “I didn’t come away from our visit there as a decision that they were now defining the South China Sea as a core interest.”29
Despite the fact that prominent scholars in China do not support the idea of regarding the South China Sea as China’s core interest, tensions in recent years have certainly further facilitated the growth of Chinese nationalism. A survey by the official website of the People’s Daily in January 2011 found that 97 per cent of nearly 4,300 respondents agreed that the South China Sea should be regarded as China’s “core interest”.30
Multilateralism?
In the process of negotiating the implementation guidelines of the DOC, China has succeeded in persuading ASEAN countries to drop words such as “multilateral” and “international” in the final document. Beijing regards this as a success in its diplomacy.31 China also resisted for almost half a year
26 Zhu Feng. Interview by Li Mingjiang, Beijing, May 2011.
27 Zhang et al. [“Four Changes in Regional Security Situation and China’s Responses.”]
28 CASS and SIIS scholars. Interviews by Li Mingjiang, CASS, Beijing, and SIIS, Shanghai, June 2011.
29 Yoichi Kato. “Interview/James Steinberg: U.S. Leadership Restored in 10 Years After 9/11.” Asahi Shimbun, 23 September 2011. Accessed 17 June 2014. ajw.
asahi.com/article/views/opinion/AJ2011092111598?page=5.
30 Edward Wong. “China Hedges Over Whether South China Sea is a ‘Core Interest’
Worth War.” New York Times, 30 March 2011. Accessed 17 June 2014. http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/world/asia/31beijing.html.
31 Zhong Feiteng et al. “Nanhai Ce: Jieshi Quan Yu Haiquan Yi Ge Buneng Shao.”
[South China Sea Policy: Interpretation Rights and Maritime Rights Must not be Excluded]. Huaxia Shibao [China Times], 8 August 2011.
RSIS Monograph No. 32 Navigating the Indo-Pacific Arc
the request by regional claimant states that it should sign the implementa-tion guidelines with ASEAN. China’s MFA has repeatedly announced that China is only agreeable to bilateral negotiations in the territorial disputes.
But in the course of the debate in the past few years, dissenting views on how China should handle the South China Sea are often heard. Pang Zhongying, an academic at Renmin University, for instance, argued in August 2010 for a multilateral approach, saying that the South China Sea dispute could be better resolved through multilateral means, involving ASEAN, the United States, Japan and the United Nations.32
In response to Pang Zhongying’s idea of allowing a multilateral approach, Liu Zhongmin, a long-time analyst on the South China Sea, countered that on the substantive issue of sovereignty over the islands and the demarcation of maritime zones, Beijing should always stick to bilateral talks. Only non-traditional security issues, such as the safety of navigation and counter-piracy, could be addressed multilaterally.33
Zhang Yunling of CASS argued that the situation in the South China Sea has undergone significant changes, and therefore China should not adhere to its traditional line of thought. He proposed that it might be wise to discuss some concrete measures on the demarcation of the EEZ in the South China Sea in accordance with UNCLOS. Relevant parties can discuss and identify disputed and non-disputed areas, with no party engaging in exploitation in the disputed areas, though joint development can be discussed. In order to avoid conflict, disputed islands and reefs may not be entitled to any EEZ.34 Zhang’s ideas are quite different from official Chinese positions.
Other scholars have urged the separation of traditional and non-traditional security issues in the South China Sea, arguing that China could
32 Pang Zhongying. “Nanhai Wenti, Bufang Huange Silu.” [No Harm in Changing Thinking on the South China Sea Issue]. Global Times, 2 August 2010. Accessed 17 June 2014. http://www.360doc.com/content/10/0803/17/363711_43422399.
shtml.
33 Liu Zhongmin. “Nanhai Wenti, Buneng Jiandan Tan Duobian.” [South China Sea Issue: Impossible to Simply Discuss Multilateralism]. Xinhua, 4 August 2010.
Accessed 17 June 2014, http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.
com/world/2010-08/04/c_12408834.htm.
34 Zhou Biao and Jiao Dongyu. “Nanhai Boyi Xiyibu.” [The Next Step in the South China Sea Game]. National Defense Times, 17 August 2011.
Chapter 5 China Debates Its South China Sea Policy
choose to achieve a breakthrough in pushing for cooperation in various non-traditional security arenas, such as the safety of navigation and marine envi-ronmental protection. These analysts note that at a previous ARF meeting, China proposed several cooperative initiatives, including hosting a seminar on freedom of navigation and setting up three special technical committees on marine research and environmental protection, safety of navigation, search and rescue, and countering crimes at sea. China also agreed to con-tinue to implement the three projects that had been agreed upon.35