2010 was a turning point for Japan’s maritime strategy. By the beginning of the year, the U.S.-Japan alliance—the backbone of Japan’s global posi-tioning for more than half a century—was in crisis. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took over the reins of the government from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in August 2009, calling for an “equal alliance”, with then Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama pledging the re-location of a U.S. Marine Corps air station at Futenma out of Okinawa while propos-ing to Beijpropos-ing that the East China Sea be a sea of “fraternity”. Hatoyama expected closer ties with Beijing to bring more security than the alliance.
Although it was a technical issue, the mishandling of the re-location of the base damaged trust between the two allies. Hatoyama had to step down in May due to his mismanagement of the alliance.3
The DPJ’s foreign policy vision turned out to be naïve. The DPJ government learned that Japan lived in a dangerous neighbourhood. In March 2010, the South Korean warship Cheonan was suddenly sunk in the Yellow Sea, apparently by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine. In July, China strongly opposed a planned U.S.-R.O.K. naval drill in the Yellow Sea, criticising the expected participation of the U.S.
aircraft carrier George Washington. China was able to claim a political victory by persuading Washington to hold back the carrier from exer-cises in the Yellow Sea, while conducting its own live-fire exercise in the troubled waters.4
In April, a Chinese fleet of ten warships passed through the Miyako Strait between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako. The fleet was unprecedentedly large, and during the demonstration cruise, Chinese helicopters buzzed around the Japanese destroyers monitoring the cruise.
This incident was a wake-up call for the Japanese defence community on Chinese maritime ambitions. In June 2011, then Minister of Defense Toshimi Kitazawa delivered a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in
3 For DPJ’s alliance (mis)management, see Tetsuo Kotani, “Turbulent Changes:
The Democratic Party Government and Japan’s Foreign Policy.” Russia in Global Affairs 8, No. 4 (October – December 2010).
4 Raul Pedrozo. “Beijing’s Coastal Real Estate: A History of Chinese Naval Aggression.” Foreign Affairs Snapshot, 15 November 2010. Accessed 16 February 2012. www.foreignaffairs.com/print/66956.
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Singapore that emphasised the importance of the ocean as part of the global commons.5 Kitazawa, referring to dangerous manoeuvres by the Chinese helicopters in April, called for accident prevention at sea and an emergency communications mechanism. Kitazawa concluded his remarks with a reference to the revision of the NDPG and emphasised the importance of “seamless operations” for “effective response” to “nebulous conditions” that are neither peacetime nor wartime.6
An incident that occurred in the East China Sea had a greater impact on Japanese perception of China. In September 2010, a Chinese fishing boat conducting illegal fishing in Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands rammed two Japanese patrol boats. The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) detained the skipper and his crew under Japanese law but Beijing protested on the grounds that the Senkaku are Chinese territory.
Beijing pressured Tokyo by breaking off negotiations on the East China Sea gas fields, suspending the export of rare earth metals and arresting four Japanese employees in China.
The government under former Prime Minister Naoto Kan misman-aged the incident. Given Chinese pressure, Tokyo released the Chinese skipper but Beijing demanded an apology and compensation from Tokyo, while a series of anti-Japanese demonstrations took place in Chinese cities. According to a poll conducted by a Japanese newspaper after the release of the Senkaku incident video, 89 per cent perceived Chinese assertiveness and 78 per cent saw a Chinese threat, while 75 per cent appreciated the deterrent effect of the U.S.-Japan alliance.7
China was also assertive in the South China Sea through which sea lanes critical to Japan pass. In March, Beijing told Washington that it now regarded the sea as its “core interest”, a status hitherto reserved for
5 Toshimi Kitazawa. “New Military Doctrines and Capabilities in Asia.” Speech at the 10th IISS Asia Security Summit/The Shangri-La Dialogue 2011, Singapore, 4 June 2001. Accessed 17 June 2014. www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youjin/2011/06/04b.
html.
6 Toshimi Kitazawa. “Japan’s Policies Regarding the Ocean as a Global Commons.”
Speech at the 9th IISS Asia Security Summit/The Shangri-La Dialogue 2010, Singapore, 5 June 2010. Accessed 27 February 2012. www.mod.go.jp/j/press/
youjin/2010/06/05b.html.
7 Yomiuri Online, 7 November 2010. Accessed 27 February 2012. www.yomiuri.
co.jp/feature/20080116-907457/news/20101107-OYT1T00390.htm.
RSIS Monograph No. 32 Navigating the Indo-Pacific Arc
Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan.8 China was constantly harassing Vietnamese, Filipino and Indonesian fishermen in the disputed waters, and issued a unilateral fishing ban in April. China was also challenging U.S. presence in the South China Sea. Given this Chinese assertiveness, then U.S. Sec-retary of State Hillary Clinton announced the United States’ interest in freedom of navigation and open access to the maritime commons at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July. China responded by conducting the largest military exercise in the South China Sea, involving ships and aircraft from all of its three regional fleets.
In addition to Chinese assertiveness, Russia also attempted to justify the occupation of the Northern Territories. Russia conducted the Vostok 2011 naval drill on the island of Etorofu in July. The Russian President’s first-ever visit to Kunashiri in November was a clear departure from the 1993 Tokyo Declaration, angering the Japanese public. Seemingly, Russia and China were synchronising pressure against Japan to eliminate Japanese influence in the region by leveraging on Japan’s diplomatic weakness.9
Meanwhile, Kan’s advisory council on defence concluded its report in August to provide guidance on the new NDPG.10 The report re-affirmed the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, making a list of recommenda-tions, including the relaxation of a ban on weapons exports, the exercise of collective self-defence, dynamic defence of remote islands, the rein-forcement of Japan’s submarine fleet, and the upgrade of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities such as outer space and cyberspace situational awareness.
Japan’s 2010 defence white paper, for the first time, referred directly to China’s military build-up and activities as a “matter of concern” that needed to be carefully watched.11 The white paper pointed out that China
8 Pedrozo. “Beijing’s Coastal Real Estate.”
9 Kotani. “Turbulent Changes.”
10 “Japan’s Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era:
Toward a Peace-Creating Nation.” Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era (Japan), August 2010. Accessed 22 February 2012. www.kantei.go.jp/
jp/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo_e.pdf. Hatoyama rejected the report submitted by the blue-ribbon advisory council established by Prime Minister Taro Aso of LDP, and formed this council.
11 Defense of Japan 2010. Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 10 September 2010. Accessed 21 February 2012. www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2010.html.
Chapter 7 Japan’s Changing Maritime Strategy in East Asia
was “increasing its activities in waters close to Japan”. The white paper also mentioned measures to strengthen Japan’s military posture in the south-western islands (Ryukyu island chain), where there were no forces permanently deployed west of Miyako Island.
The Kan administration was harshly criticised for its mismanage-ment of the territorial issues from within and without the DPJ. It was therefore natural for the Kan administration to forge a closer partner-ship with the United States. During the APEC summit in Yokohama in November 2010, Kan and U.S. President Barack Obama agreed to deepen the U.S.-Japanese alliance.
This string of incidents in 2010 set the environment under which the 2010 NDPG was adopted. Japanese defence planners and the general public saw those incidents as evidence that Beijing and Moscow had become more assertive in the regional seas. Particularly, Japan and other regional countries such as R.O.K., Vietnam, the Philippines as well as the United States perceived Chinese assertiveness in the Asian littoral in a palpable sense. In this sense, 2010 was a turning point, and the JMSDF’s maritime strategy was integrated into Japan’s national security strategy.