Military activity in the South China Sea has been increasing over recent years. Naval exercises have become more frequent, including those involving non-regional navies. Claimant countries are also more actively patrolling in the area, although there is an emerging preference for using maritime security forces other than navies. Both Taiwan and the Phil-ippines have garrisoned their claimed features in the South China Sea predominantly with coastguard personnel.
28 Sam Bateman. “Perils of the Deep – The Dangers of Submarine Proliferation in the Seas of East Asia.” Asian Security 7, No. 1 (2011): 61–84. Accessed 17 June 2014. DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2011.548213.
Chapter 6 Confidence-Building Measures for the South China Sea
China has followed the trend towards using civil-agency patrol ves-sels rather than warships in the disputed areas. China recognises “the quite sophisticated and encouraging notion that strong coast guards might, by their versatile nature, actually serve as cushions between navies, helping to mitigate the possibility of inter-state conflict in East Asia”.29 When a Chinese fishery administration vessel was deployed to the South China Sea in March 2009, China claimed that this “did not violate a regional peace agreement”, and that by sending a fishery vessel rather than a warship, it was acting “in the most moderate manner”.30 A second fisheries patrol vessel was sent a few days later.31
It is also noteworthy that countries participate in the Regional Coop-eration Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) mainly through their coastguards rather than their navies. There are now 17 Contracting Parties to ReCAAP, and of these, only three countries have their navies as a focal point for contact:
Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand—countries that do not have a separate coastguard.
As an example of what can be achieved, the Philippines and Vietnam have recently reached an agreement between their coastguards to set up a hotline for information sharing on incidents at sea, marine protection, and prevention of smuggling, drug trafficking, piracy and illegal immi-gration in the South China Sea.32 The two agencies have also signed a
29 Lyle J. Goldstein. Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea – Challenge and Opportunity in China’s Improving Maritime Enforcement Capabilities. Newport, Rhode Island:
China Maritime Studies Institute, Naval War College, April 2010), 4. Accessed 17 June 2014. https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute/Publications/documents/CMSI_No5_web1.pdf.
30 Li Xiaokun. “Patrol Ship’s Trip ‘Shows Restraint’.” China Daily, 17 March 2009. Accessed 17 June 2014. www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/17/
content_7585087.htm.
31 Zhang Xin. “2nd Ship to Patrol South China Sea.” China Daily, 28 March 2009.
Accessed 17 June 2014. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/28/
content_7625985.htm.
32 Delon Porcalla and Aurea Calica. “Philippines, Vietnam Push Multilateral Spratly Approach.” Philippine Star, 27 October 2011. Accessed 17 June 2014. www.
philstar.com/headlines/741361/phl-vietnam-push-multilateral-spratly-approach.
RSIS Monograph No. 32 Navigating the Indo-Pacific Arc
memorandum of agreement on the establishment of a hotline.33
The United States could help in demilitarising the South China Sea by making greater use of the U.S. Coast Guard and other civil maritime agencies in the South China Sea rather than convening naval exercises or deploying additional naval assets to the region. The latter activities send all the wrong messages to China and suggest that the United States is in fact taking sides in the disputes. They give the impression that the United States is allowing its tensions with China over Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula to spill into Southeast Asia.
Similarly, India should exercise restraint in its naval deployments into the South China Sea. India has deep fears about the increasing strategic influence of China, including in the Indian Ocean region, and has identi-fied increasing Chinese naval power as the principal reason for its own defence modernisation.34 India’s links with Japan, Taiwan and Vietnam have only served to fuel Chinese concerns of strategic containment.
The United States could offer the services of its non-military agencies in supporting the initiatives put forward by China for cooperation on search and rescue, marine scientific research and marine environmental protection.35 For example, the U.S. Coast Guard already has some per-sonnel deployed in Southeast Asia but they are thin on the ground and heavily over-shadowed by U.S. naval activities. As we have already seen in the region, coastguards and cooperation between them offer excellent potential to overcome sensitivities between navies and to develop the types of regime that the region so desperately needs.
33 Evelyn Macairan. “Coast Guard to Sign Agreement with Vietnam Police.”
Philippine Star, 24 October 2011. Accessed 14 June 2014. www.
philstar.com/metro/740301/coast-guard-sign-agreement-vietnam-police; “Philippines, Vietnam Sign Bilateral Agreements.” Sun Star, 27 October 2011. Accessed 17 June 2014. www.sunstar.com.ph/
davao/business/2011/10/27/philippines-vietnam-sign-bilateral-agreements-187482.
34 Medcalf et al. Crisis and Confidence, 20.
35 Robert J. Papp et al. “Maximize Military Partnerships.” Proceedings 138, No. 3 (August 2009): 76–77.
Chapter 6 Confidence-Building Measures for the South China Sea
ConClusion
The first priority with regards to the South China Sea should be to work towards the establishment of a cooperative management regime. This should embrace requirements for: (i) the safety and security of shipping;
(ii) the preservation, protection and conservation of the marine environ-ment; (iii) the exploration and exploitation of marine resources; (iv) the prevention of illegal activity at sea; and (v) the conduct of marine scien-tific research. These are all existing obligations of littoral countries under UNCLOS, the DOC and the Guidelines for implementing the DOC.
However, claimant countries in the South China Sea remain fixated on their sovereignty claims allowing a “tragedy of the commons” to develop.
A regional Track 1 organisation should oversee the necessary coop-eration. Membership should be restricted to the littoral countries that have demonstrable rights and duties in the sea. Other stakeholders could have observer status. The organisation might also have a role in crisis management.
Operational MCSBMs are the other priority in the South China Sea, governing navigational rights and freedoms in an EEZ and measures to mitigate the risks of incidents between naval forces, particularly subma-rines. Other CBMs, such as broad military-to-military dialogue, naval ship visits, hotlines, exercise observers and personnel exchanges should be encouraged.
Chapter 7