Balancing AES: ecology, economics and farmers’ acceptance

regulations (Agri-GD, 2005), the EU opens another path to improve effectiveness and efficiency of AES.

Hence, this paper aims to determine whether local management concepts provide increased potential to improve environmental and conservation goals in the agricultural landscape by a simultaneously improvement of acceptance, economic efficiency and ecological efficacy of agri-environmental schemes. We use a socio-economic approach to analyse the driving factors and main requirements to the AES and give a short insight into the way AES are implemented today. After reviewing different types of organisations for this local manage-ment, we point at the chances of local strategies. With the experience from the socio-economic sphere of the “Bördeprojekt Wolfenbüttel” we demonstrate the positive impact of local management. Furthermore, we present factors of success for local AES-management strategies derived from the Bördeprojekt Wolfenbüttel and other environmental and nature conservation projects documented in the literature. Finally, we conclude with an outlook on options to implement a local management of the agri-environment and the idea of a nature conservation advisory service for farmers.

4.2. Balancing AES: ecology, economics and farmers’ acceptance

With every new programme period the EU initiates the programming and implementation of AES⁵⁸ in all German Länder (Land [sg.] - Länder [pl.]: in Germany also called Bundesländer, sometimes translated as federal states). Following the EU-regulations AES have to meet three needs:

1) AES are mostly directed towards farmers. Farmers participate voluntarily, so the pro-grammes must be acceptable to them. This means that schemes must fit into their every day farming activities and must compensate costs and losses derived from pro-gramme participation.

2) AES aim to improve environmental and conservation issues, so the programmes must generate positive ecological effects. The measures must be ecologically effective.

3) AES are funded by money from EU, federal government and Länder sources, so the programmes have to be administrated effectively and the money must be used effi-ciently.

The EU sets only the framework for the AES (so called contextual guidance, see e.g. Willke,

58 AES are a part of the EU rural development programmes, Programme period 1992-1999 Council Regulation (EC) 2078/1992; period 2000-2006: Council Regulation (EC) 1257/99; period 2007-2012: Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005.

1999, 39), and leaves the member states wide scope for the implementation. Here, we present two contrasting examples from German Länder how they have used this scope in the former period and characterise the resulting programmes (see also Wilson and Wilson, 2001, 201-204).

A) The Proland-Programme of Lower Saxony can be seen as an example for the imple-mentation of a limited set of agri-environmental measures uniform for the Land. In the former years, the farmers were able to choose between 4 and 10 measures⁵⁹ within the AES. The aim of the administration was to keep the programme small and concise.

The scheme has had no variations, top-ups, or restrictions concerning the spatial ex-tensions and was not menu-driven.

B) Alternatively, a Land can provide a menu-driven programme with a large set of meas-ures with multiple variability and top-ups. Within the Kulturlandschaftsprogramme of North Rhine-Westphalia or the MEKA in Baden-Wuerttemberg, for example the farmers can choose between at least 20 measures and variations. The countries or re-gions were allowed to define local aims and choose adequate measures, select varia-tions, and set spatial restrictions to compile a local AES.

Generally, the Länder are responsible for the correct implementation of the EU-framework. In case of misuse or inadequate implementation, the administrations carry a (high) financial risk.

The two strategies described above differ in their aims. In system A the efforts and costs of the administration for implementation, administration, and control are small and the pro-gramme is kept clearly arranged for the farmers. System B focuses more precisely on the ecological efficacy and practical requirements. It can be fitted into diverse local situations and covers many special conservation efforts. The drawback of system B is that the administration both at the Länder and at the local level requires more effort with the implementation, administration and control. Also, it is not easy for farmers to keep an overview about all possible combinations of the scheme.

But even the simpler Lower Saxony AES (System A) has been criticised for a lack of clarity The mid-term review of the programme shows that there is a lack of personal advice for the farmers. ML, 2003; Kap. 6, 23-24). The review positively highlights only one measure: the protection programme for rare arable weeds. It achieves the highest acceptance and most positive evaluation from the farmers. The farmers complimented the direct and personal advice given by the hosting employee of the administration.

59 This included subsidies for organic farming. Not counted were specialised sub-programmes of the Proland-Programme facilitating special conservation issues.

Hence, the challenge to implement all three requirements - acceptance, ecological accuracy and economic efficiency - has not been successfully achieved. Thus, a lack of effectiveness and efficiency as well as a poor acceptance by the farmers is observed (Arzt et al., 2002;

Deblitz, 1999; Jungcurt et al., 2004).

The economic efficiency aims at preventing windfall gains from paying overpriced meas-ures⁶⁰ and at keeping the transaction costs of implementation, administration and control low.

Economists normally try to apply this by installing a market. According to this, their proposal is to use calls for tenders and auction designs, and not to work with spatial or other limitation.

If enough farmers participate at the call for tender and present different offers, the administra-tion can choose those offers which are lowest in price. So, they hand out only relatively low grants and can contract a maximum area for reaching the protection target (examples for realising auctions see e.g. Cason and Gangadharan, 2004).

The ecological effectiveness demands to contract the most valuable and promising areas for conservation targets. This makes it necessary to have detailed information about the areas. To have or to develop locally adapted conservation targets is often connected with an inspection of fields. In most cases, this leads to a very limited and spatially fixed set of interesting areas from a conservation point of view. It is neither easy nor sure to get the appropriate areas under contract and this makes the measures expensive.

But no matter how the ecological and economic requirements are implemented, without farmers willing to contract, the best AES are worthless. So, the AES must be focused on acceptability⁶¹. Until now the aspect of acceptability is rarely put into account within the discussion on effectiveness of AES. Even though, Coleman et al. (1992, cited in Carey et al., 2003) argued that “policy measures which encourage positive attitudes to conservation will in long term be more effective than those do not.” As a reason, they point out how the positive shift in the attitudes increases willingness to implement additionally voluntarily and unpaid measures. AES not designed to change the farmers’ attitude will mostly be seen as temporary bribes, as Morris and Potter (1995) stated.

Regarding acceptance as a complex individual multi-step process (see also below and Prager, 2002; 12) it needs at least the same attention as the economic and ecological aspects of AES.

For participation to occur, the farmer must have a positive attitude towards AES. Then, he must have access to the programme information. Also, he needs advice in this phase of

60There are several authors pointing to the tendency of AES in Germany to overcompensate farmers apart from the allowed 20% incentive surplus (e.g. Ahrens et al., 2000).

61 For a definition of acceptability see e.g. Prager, 2002, 6-29; Lehmann et al., 2005, 27-30 present an actual literature review about the discussion on acceptability of AES.

checking the actual programme. The programme must fit into everyday farming activities. If all this is positively checked, the farmer still must apply for participation. Finally, if he has contracted, he will need support with the implementation and has to face the programme control. At every single step, one negative check will hinder him from participation. And even if he has contracted, every bad experience - a lack of support or negative experiences with the application and control process - will disincline him to participate the next time.

To meet all these demands, we propose to install regional management organisations for the