Agri-environmental programming

5.2.1 Process and responsibilities

In Germany it is the responsibility of the Länder to implement the Council regulation on support for rural development (EAFRD). Funds from this so called second pillar of the common agricultural policy (CAP) are among the most important sources for the development of rural regions. For example, in Lower Saxony the budget for 2000-2006 was more than 1.1 billion Euros with approximately 50% coming from the EU.

There are three levels of administration and policy making in Germany. The federal level (Bund), the state level (Länder) and the local level (municipalities). Regarding agri-environmental policy making, the European Commission (which we are not going to investi-gate) and the Länder are the major players. Although the federal level does play a role by providing additional funds, the Länder are responsible for regional and structural planning and agri-environmental policy (Grafen and Schramek, 2000). With the implementation power delegated to the individual Länder, each of them has developed their own set of schemes

adapted to their specific environmental problems⁷⁶.

Programme planning is a major task of the Länder ministries. In most German Länder the ministry for agriculture leads the compilation of the Rural Development Programme, includ-ing the agri-environmental programmes as a part or sub-programme. While in Sachsen-Anhalt the agriculture and environment sectors are placed within one ministry, Lower Saxony has two separate ministries for these functions. In the latter case therefore, a number of conserva-tion measures are administrated by the environment ministry.

After the EU has adopted a new regulation the Member States are obliged to start their planning process. Any funds the EU spends within the second pillar of the CAP need to be co-financed. That means that the EU contributes 50-75% of the money depending on the area classification (e.g. Sachsen-Anhalt is classified target area 1 and receives a share of 75% from the EU). The remaining amount has to be raised by the individual Länder. Both Länder under investigation utilise the option of obtaining federal funds to reduce their financial burden. The instrument of the ‘Common Task for the Improvement of Agricultural Structures and Coastal Protection’ (or ‘GAK’) has been used to co-ordinate Länder policies with those of the federal level. If a Land has opted to offer part of its agri-environmental schemes under the GAK there is an additional federal contribution of 60%. In turn, the federal government determines the funding conditions for measures co-financed under this federal scheme. This structure leads to the complex influence of European, federal and state regulations.

When preparing agri-environmental schemes at state level, not only these regulations on different levels need to be considered but also the interests of different stakeholders. The Länder government strives for a balanced programme. The top agricultural authority develops the programme but cannot decide autonomously. Council regulation 1698 requires close consultations in the implementation of the EAFRD assistance: with competent regional, local and other public authorities, economic and social partners and other bodies representing civil society as well as non-governmental organisations, including environmental organisations (as specified in article 6). Apart from this official requirement the programming authority has an incentive to involve stakeholder groups to have access to the information necessary for scheme development and coordination. Scheme ‘development’ mainly refers to alterations made to existing schemes rather than formulation of completely new ones. Because the recent programming period is the second continuation of an existing programme initiated in 1992, the administrations minimise their efforts and their risks by adapting their formerly approved programme to the demands of the new European and federal regulations. The challenge is to

76For an introduction to the issues and tools of assessing environmental problems via indicators see e.g. Piorr, 2003

promote the schemes and to enhance their acceptance, economic efficiency and ecological efficacy by adapting them to local characteristics.

Although the programming process in different Länder may vary in detail, the overall procedure is similar. We can distinguish between a drafting and a coordination phase. There are no formal rules as to who is to be involved at the drafting stage. However, it is common practice for the programming department to involve administrative organisations on the same and on lower levels. They include neighbouring departments within the ministry or relevant departments of other ministries (e.g. environment or conservation departments) as well as advisory bodies (e.g. Landesanstalt für Landwirtschaft, regional offices for agriculture) and Agriculture Agencies (Ämter für Landwirtschaft; in Lower Saxony called Agriculture Chamber, Landwirtschaftskammer). In some cases, experts may be consulted by the adminis-trative authority and influence the process during this phase.

Another set of actors involved are interest groups. The representatives of agricultural associa-tions have frequent contacts with the relevant ministry departments and thus form an agricul-tural policy network. The involvement of agriculagricul-tural interest groups is largely informal and non-regulated. This corporatist participation or network corporatism (Wessels, 2000) is characteristic of German politics, in particular in the area of policies dealing with agriculture.

In contrast, public participation or citizen participation is uncommon at this level. The selection of who can participate depends on the (actual or anticipated) influence of the association, personal characteristics of the group’s representative and the decision of senior staff in the ministry. The Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung (management and public relation rules) of the ministries only define in broad terms that “relevant stakeholder groups shall be involved”. The term comprises major interest groups and top organisations of relevant unions and associations, local interest groups and other parties with the legal right to participate (e.g.

Ministerium des Inneren, 1998). All of this input is channelled through the responsible technical departments within the ministry, e.g. the Departments for Nature and Soil Conserva-tion, the Department for Forestry, or the Department for Water and Waste.

Subsidies

Figure 5.1.: Actors involved in the development and implementation process of agri-environmental programmes on state level (figure by the authors, following Prager, 2006)

The draft of the programme is then presented to the above-mentioned authorities who can now formally comment on the draft. The EU Commission will check whether the draft proposal meets the existing requirements. If so, the programme is agreed upon and notified, marking the beginning of the implementation phase. During the implementation phase the farmers have contacts with the agricultural agency (for some measures also with the local conservation authority), the extension services and their associations. Those interactions are in general the only way that feedback from the farmers can be transported back into the ministry for consideration in future programming processes. Figure 5.1. illustrates the present policy making process.

This apparent top-down approach continues to be the prevailing approach in Germany. Other countries experience a similar situation. For example, Smithers and Furman (2003) judge agri-environmental programmes throughout North America over the past two decades as reflecting a „top-down“ approach. Potter (1998) claims that this strategy has formed the basis for many agri-environmental programmes not only in North America, but also in the Euro-pean Union over the past three decades. At the same time, attempts are being made to modify or supplement this top-down approach. Examples are the Ontario Environmental Farm Plan Programme (Smithers and Furman, 2003) and the Land-care movement in Australia (Wilson, 2004).

5.2.2. Conflicting interests

The process outlined above introduces the different stakeholders into the policy making process. Each of the stakeholders belongs to a group that has particular objectives regarding the output of this process, the agri-environmental schemes. Figure 5.2. assembles some of the

demands associated with administration, nature conservation, government and farmers.

EU and

federal government

reaching programme aims while minimising control efforts

feasible and financially attractive measures Manageable requirements

Improve natural environment in agricultural landscapes Measures with high ecological effectiveness

Maintain extensive land management Reduce the share of Länder funds

Legally sound measures Low control efforts

EU and

federal government

reaching programme aims while minimising control efforts

feasible and financially attractive measures Manageable requirements

Improve natural environment in agricultural landscapes Measures with high ecological effectiveness

Maintain extensive land management Reduce the share of Länder funds

Legally sound measures Low control efforts

Figure 5.2.: The diverse demands from different stakeholder groups (figure by the authors).

The EU governs the AES by setting a framework and gives Member States the space they need to implement them. In the process of rural development programming the Länder also have to compile the regulations determining AES. The development and implementation of these regulations is carried out in an area of conflict between the following dimensions:

1. AES are directed towards farmers. Farmers participate voluntarily so the programmes must be acceptable for them. This means that they must fit into their every-day farm-ing activities and must compensate costs and losses derived from programme partici-pation.

2. AES aim to improve the state of the environment so the programmes must generate positive ecological effects. The measures must be ecologically effective.

3. AES are funded by money from EU, federal government and Länder sources, so pro-grammes and funds have to be administrated effectively and accountability ensured and demonstrated.

The acceptance of programmes is a prerequisite to achieving any effects at all due to the

voluntary nature of the schemes. If farmers do not enter schemes, no change in production systems will occur, and no activities for the enhancement of biodiversity will be implemented.

If only a small number of farmers sign an agreement, effects will be marginal. A similar effect can be expected, if farmers enrol but do not implement activities in an appropriate way. In order to achieve any measurable effects it is necessary for a critical number of farmers to enrol in the programme and implement the measures accordingly. Farmer uptake of pro-grammes, measured in number of agreements, is sometimes also called farmers‘ „acceptance“

of schemes. A high „acceptance“ is also the goal of policy makers: they want to develop schemes that actually deliver the money to farmers and land managers. Farmers‘ enrolment is the consequence of many different factors. Yet, it does not automatically imply the individual farmer‘s acceptance of a programme if acceptance is understood as the successfully com-pleted process of perception, evaluation, trial, and adoption as well as adaptation of an innovation (Prager, 2002).⁷⁷ If a participant approves of the scheme’s objectives and is convinced that the chosen practices contribute to these objectives (i.e., he or she is accepting them), the quality of how and the extent to which the practices are implemented will be positively influenced. This in turn has an impact on effectiveness.

The common claim of the Länder administration is that it is responsible for the correct implementation of the EU-framework. In case of misuse or inadequate implementation, the Länder administration carries a considerable financial risk (i.e. if it fails to secure accountabil-ity and comply with EU regulations and guidelines the Land has to repay European funds).

They also have to regard the ecological efficiency of the measures. Since investigations questioned the ecological effects of the programmes (see e.g. Kleijn et al., 2001, EU-Court of Auditors, 2000, Kleijn and Sutherland, 2003) current and upcoming evaluations always ask for the ecological impact. Administrations spending money through programmes like the AES that should improve the environment have to be able to demonstrate positive impacts.

In times of deregulation, cutbacks of administrations and the crisis of the public budgets, it is essential for the administration to minimise their costs and efforts for the implementation. The so-called transaction costs - the costs for implementation, administration and control of the programme - have to be minimised without neglecting the ecological and political aims.