gefördert vom
Stefan Luckner Institut IISM
Universität Karlsruhe (TH) luckner@iism.uni-karlsruhe.de
• Performance-based payment does not always increase prediction accuracy
• DV-based payment scheme performs worse
•
Widely-used rank-order tournament works fine
• Possible explanations: motivation, risk aversion CONCLUSION
than fixed payment
RESULTS: PREDICTION ACCURACY
Trading Price Prior to Match
Relative Frequency of Outcome
20 40 60 80 100
20 40 60 80 100
FP(CC = 0.34) RO(CC = 0.84) DV(CC = 0.19)
Trading Price Prior to Match
Relative Frequency of Outcome
20 40 60 80 100
20 40 60 80 100
FP(CC = 0.34) RO(CC = 0.84) DV(CC = 0.19)
FIELD EXPERIMENT
• How well is information aggregated in prediction markets?
• How to design incentives schemes for prediction markets?
• Do prediction markets with performance- related incentives perform better than markets with fixed payments?
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
• 20 markets for 20 matches
• 3 groups of users with different incentives FP: Fixed payment of 50 Euro
RO: Rank-order tournament
DV: Deposit value / 10.000 20 students per group
•
S
S T O C C E R C E R
T R A D E Y O U R E X P E C T A T I O N S
A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON MONETARY INCENTIVES IN PREDICTION MARKETS
SERVICES:
OPINION RESEARCH MARKET RESEARCH FORECASTING
Prediction Markets are a promising approach for forecasting uncertain future events
• Psephology
• Prediction of sports events
• Assessment of product innovations
• Decision support
• ...
