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ON OPTIMALITY CRITERIA

Yu. A. Rozanov

December 1975 "W-75-159

Working Papers are not intended for distribution outside of IIASA, and are solely for discussion and infor- mation purposes. The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of IIASA.

2361

I

Laxenburg International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis

Austria

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One of the future trends in optimal control theory, as well as in decision theory, is likely to concern more stable, robust, and reliable solutions in cases of uncertainty of con- sidered systems. The first step in this direction may be the development of new and more flexible criteria of optimality.

One of the possible criteria is suggested below with a hope of

the future development of the corresponding optimization technique.

The typical situation is the following:

The system considered is characterized by some (abstract) parameter 8

e:

8 which is not known exactly. It is assumed

that in a case of the system 8 one has to maximize some benefit f(8,u) choosing a proper "decision" u

e:

U. The decision u

=

u(8) which is good enough for the system 8 may be absolutely wrong

for another system 8', 8'

t-

8, and the difficulty is to chose a reasonable decision u E U taking into account the possibility to make a blunder in our estimation of the real parameter

e e:

8.

A number of observations lead us to suggest the following criterion of optimality: for some function g(8,·) we have to maximize its "expected" value

Eg (., f) =

fg fe,

f (8 ,u)l P (d8) -r maximum

L' J

u E U (1 )

The main point is that we have to adjust the proper "utility function" g not only with respect to the probability distri- bution of the real benefit f(8,u) but also with respect to the parameter 8 e: 8 itself. Here P means some preference measure (not necessarily probability distribution); in the most interesting cases i t can be interpreted as the a priori distribution of 8 E 8. Let us consider a few examples.

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-2-

1. In the case where the function g(8,·) does not depend on 8, we deal with the criterion upon which most

developed theories are based.

2. Suppose that we are satisfied with the decision u if for all 8ee the real benefit f(8,u) is such that the pair [8,f(8,u)] belongs to some "admissible set"

f ~e x (-00,(0). The admissible set f may, for example, consist of all pairs(8,y)of the type

( 8 ,y): y > max f ( 8 , u) - s ( 8 ) uEU

where s(8) ~ 0 is some acceptable boundary. Of course, there can be no u E U such that

[8, f (8, u)]

~

f for all 8 E e

In this case a preference function P(u) can be defined as

P(u)

=

P{8:[8,f(8,u)] e:f}

(2 )

( 3)

and the optimality criterion might be as follows:

P(u) -+ maximum

uEU (4 )

Obviously the criterion (4) can be represented in the form (1) by using the corresponding utility function

__ {1

if (e,y)Ef}

g(8,y)

O i f (8,y)~f

3. If we take the admissible set

r

of the form (2) with s(8)

=

0, then the criterion (4) seems appropriate for risky decision making of the type "all" or

"nothing." We choose the decision u0 such that

(4)

(5) -3-

Probability of {f(8,u?) = maximum f(e,U)}= maximum U€u

That is, we maximize the probability of having the maximum of the real benefit f(8,u).

4. For another specific admissible set

r,

the criterion (4) gives us the well-known minmax principle developed in game theory for cautious decision making. Let

f = lim inf f(8,u) u 8 E 00

be the lowest boundary of our benefit concerning some set 00 E 0 under the decision u. Suppose that we are interested to receive at least the maximum of possible values f u ' u E U

f .... maximum

u ue:u

(6)

.Obviously the decision u EU satisfies this minmax criterion if and only if

f(u,e) ~M for almost all 8

e:0

0

where

M = sup f uEU u

Now i t is easy to verify that by choosing the ad- missible set as

r

= 80 x (B,co)

we can represent the minmax criterion (6) i.n the form (4) as well as in the form (1).

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-4-

5. The general criterion (1) with its proper specifica- tions (2)-(6) seems to be useful for a multicomponent

(vector) optimization. In this case the discrete parameter 8 is identified with the corresponding component considered; and the preference measure

P(8),8 ES, can be recognized as "Pareto coefficients"

in the equation

Eg ( • , f) =

:I:

g [ 8 , f ( 8 , u) ] P ( 8 ) 8ES

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