SEKTION V: ISLAMWISSENSOHAFT
Sektionsleiter: Ulrich Haarmann, Freiburg
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURYTUNISIA
By Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, Berlin
The interaction between religion and politics can be studied in concrete terms
only through analysing the interdependence of the religious and political estab¬
lishments on one another. This reductionist approach to the problem is justi¬
fied not only by practicability. In my view, it is justified above all by the fact
that the men of religion in every society constitute a group of professionals
who have a vested interest in the maintenance of a political structure which
upholds the dignity of their profession and enables its member to advance their
material interests.
In the religious profession, as in other professions, the establishment con¬
sists of the leading practitioners who occupy the prominent posts and maintain
standards in the profession, and who act as the spokesmen of its other members
in dealings with the political leaders. In the Muslim society before the nine¬
teenth century, the religious establishment consisted of the holders of the re¬
cognized legal posts (hitat), such as the qädis and muftis ; the 'imäms of, and
the leading teachers in, the main mosques and madrasas ; and other persons
who had a recognized religious authority without holding officially recognized
posts, such as the heads of the Sufi tarTqas and family zäwiyas .
Unlike their counterparts in Medieval Europe, the members of the religious
establishments in Muslim countries were not united in a church. The rulers
therefore dealt with them as individuals and not as members of a legally recogni¬
zed institution. Because the position of the Muslim man of religion in the society
could not be defined through his rank in a church hierarchy, it depended on its
recognition by the political leadership. This was true not only of those employed
in legal or teaching posts, the appointments for which had to be made or sanc¬
tioned by the rulers. Even the Sufi sailjs and the heads of family zäwiyas would
come to have a recognized social position only when the rulers bestowed priv¬
ileges upon them, recognized the right of sanctuary in their zäwiyas. or acknow¬
ledged their importance in the society through persecuting them. In a sense,
therefore, the members of the Muslim religious establishments were distinguish
ed from other men of religion in their countries by the fact that the political
leaders recognized their social functions and positions.
Because the religious leaders in Muslim countries were not incorporated
in a church, they neither had institutional support in their dealings with the
rulers nor were they restrained in their political activities by institutional
control. Their political behaviour was consequently more influenced by consider¬
ations of personal profit and social influence than was the case in medieval
Europe. Together with the fact that their position was socially acknowledged
only when recognized by the rulers, the personal opportunism of the Muslim
men of religion enabled the rulers to use them as political instruments more
easily thsin was the case in Christian Europe. In the present study, I try to
illustrate in the context of eighteenth century Tunisia how, the members of the
religious establishment could be used as a prop for a politically and econom¬
ically oppressive regime.
1. The religious establishment under the beys
When the Ottoman Turks conquered Tunisia in 1574, the country had a conser¬
vative Malikite community dominated by a number of important urban families,
whose members distinguished themselves during the Hafsid period in govern¬
ment service and in teaching and legal posts. The fact that the Turks were Hana¬
fite and the Tunisians were Malikite did not present any great difficulty in the
first two decades after the Ottoman occupation. Viewing Tunisia as an advanced
military post in the confrontation with the Spaniards, the Ottoman Turks were
not interested in effecting major changes in its religious institutions. They
introduced changes in the structure of the judiciary only to the extent necess¬
ary for affirming Tunisia's submission to the Ottoman sultan.
At the end of the Hafsid period Tunis had four qä^is , one acting as head of
the judicial administration and having the title of Qadi al-Gamä'^a, who occup¬
ied a high rank in the state ( l). In the Hafsid period the mufti s came to have an
official position, and their legal opinions were officially recongnized as being
binding on the qa^Ts (2). After the Ottoman occupation a Turkish Hanafite qSji
sent from Istanbul took over from the Malikite Qadi al- Gamäla the headship
of the judicial administration of Tunisia. The Malikite qä4is in Tunis and in
the provinces became in theory his subordinates. But in practice the Malikite
qajrs acted independently of the Turkish qä4r , whose authority was rendered
weak by the fact that he knew little Arabic and was dependent even in matters
of the Hanafite rite on the advice of the Malikite muftTs. Thus the Malikite qagtrs
and muftts remained in charge of the administration of justice and the Malikite
institutions, especially the Zaytüna mosque, monopolized religious education.
The Ottoman pashas (governors) also continued the practice of the Hafsid sultans
of holding a maglis sar^j once a week to examine state matters in the light of
the Muslim law, and the Malikite qädis and muftTs constituted with naqibu
l-'a^räf , the Turkish qä^i , and the pasha the only members of the maglis (3).
It was only after the rebellion of 1591 and the emergence of the regime of
the deys that a rift between Tunisia's foreign rulers and its Malikite religious
establishment started to appear. The deys' regime was based upon the domin¬
ation of the Turkish and Turkified military class which no longer obeyed the
Ottoman sultan. Seeking to perpetuate the domination and the exclusively foreign
character of this class, the deys were not as much restrained in their dealings
with the Tunisians as the pashas had been. From the reign of Yüsuf Dey (1610 -
1637), they tried to bresik loose from total dependence on the Malikite religious
establishment through the recruitment of Hanafite judicial functionaries and the
creation of Hanafite institutions of learning. Yüsuf Dey built the mosque of Süq
at-Turk, appointed a Hanafite 'imäm in it and assigned waqfs for paying its
'imam , mu'a^dinTn and qurrä^ . Near this mosque, he had the Yusufiyya madrasa
and houses for students built. The sai)j and other functionaires in this school
were paid stipends and received free rations of bread (4). During the reign of
Yüsuf Dey Tunis had a Hanafite mufti for the first time. He was Ramadän Af andi,
a Turk who came to Tunis as qäji and was persuaded by the dey to stay on and
teach in the religious establishments he founded. Ramadan's student, Ahmad
aS-Sarlf, who was of Turkish origin, succeeded him as mufti , and was the first
Hanafite to sit in this capacity in al-Ma^lisu s-Sar'^i (5). From about this time
a group of Hanafite scholars, who were born in Tunis, and who in many cases
studied under Malikite teachers, appeared to share with the Malikites the
prestige of religious learning and to vy with them in official functions. The
growing importance of the Hanafite rite and the association of its leading spokes¬
men with the government is reflected in the composition of al-Maglisu s-Sar'i.
At the beginning of the Ottoman period four muftis , all Malikites, were members
of al-Maglis. By the middle of the seventeenth century the number of Malikite
muftis was reduced to two in order to admit Hanafites (6).
There is evidence of conflict between the Malikite religious leaders and the
deys from about the reign of Yüsuf Dey. The Malikite mufti Abu 1-Hasan al-
NafätT, finding himself hampered in the exercise of his functions by the ruling
class, went to Istanbul after performing the pilgrimage and returned with a
l;^att:i §arif which recognized him as chief muffi of Tunisia, and specified that
he could not be questioned concerning a fatwä he made: ( Gä' a wa ma'^ahu
t)attun sarifun mina 1-bäb l-^ali bi annahu lä yus^alu Can naggin 'aftä bihi wa
lä yuraddu mä bakama bihi ). Al-Nafätl quarelled soon afterwards with Yüsuf
Dey, and in order to escape persecution he went once more on the pilgrimage
and died on the way. His two brothers cAli and Muhammad, both of whom were
muftTs , quarrelled with Yüsuf Dey's successor »Ustä Muräd Dey (1637 - 1640)
and were both replaced in their functions by two other Malikites, Ahmad ar-
Rassä^ and Abü 1-Fadl al-Misräti. The recognition of Abu 1-Hasan äl-Nafäti
by the Porte as chief mufti initiated the practice that the muftTs. like the qä4Ts.
would have a recognized chief. The great humiliation of the Mälikites occurred
when a Hanafite, Muhammad b. Mustafä, became chief muftT for both the Mä-
likite and Hanafite rites. This practice was not continued and after Muhammad
b. Mustafä' s death in 1066 A.H. (1655-56 A.D. ) the Mälikites and Hanafites
had separate chief muftis (7).
The clear backing of the Hanafite rite by the deys, and the diminution of the
influence of the Malikite religious leaders, made the difference in religious
rite between the Tunisians and the Turkish military class important as a symbol
of politcal identity. Under the deys the important urban families lost their polit¬
ical influence in the country. As 1 showed in another study (8), the ruling elite
under the deys consisted of Turks and Christian renegades. Deprived of their
political influence, and seeing the foreign rulers upholding a rite to which they
did not belong, the important urban families came to view upholding the Mäli-
kite institutions and occupying positions in them as an act of national defiance
to the foreign military ruling class and a means of maintaining their social
position in the country. The following examples show how the social position
of the noble urban families of Tunisia became dependent upon their monopoly
of the important Malikite religious functions both in the seventeenth and eight¬
eenth centuries.
The Rassä^ family of Tunis produced viziers in the Hafsid period, and in the
Ottoman period held the imamate of the Zaytüna mosque until 1624. In later
years members of the family occupied teaching posts in the Zaytüna or served
in the judicial administration (9). The imamate of the Zaytüna mosque was
taken over by the BakrT familiy in 1624, because Abu Yahyä r-Rassä^, the
last of the family to occupy the post, not finding a suitable member of his
family learned enough to occupy it, recommended for the post Täju l-CÄrifTn
al-Bakrl. The BakrTs were wealthy and claimed descent from the third caliph
cujmän. They were able to keep the imamate of the Zaytüna in their family from
1624 until 1812, although several of them who held the post were incompetent
if not imbeciles, and had guardians (wagiys) who helped them in the ceremonial
part of their functions and prevented them from making contacts outside their
family so that the dignity of the post they held would not be compromized (10).
The ^ÄmirTs, who ranked in Tunis during the eighteenth century as being second
in social distinction only to the BakrTs, monopolized the deputy imamate of the
Zaytüna in the period when the BakrTs held the imamate (11). Another old and
noble family from Tunis was the Qassär, and its members monopolized the
post of mizwal of the Zaytüna. The mizwäl was the general superintendent of
this univer sity-mosque, who supervised its qurra' and mu'ad^inTn as well
as the agents of its waqfs , and walked before the 'imäm in official ceremonies
and handed him the sceptre ( al-ruml? ) of his office (12). The Fattäta, Gammäd,
SuwaysT, Misräti, and as-SarIf families also enjoyed social distinction in Tunis
and were associated with religious teaching or the judicial service (13).
Outside Tunis, the important posts of qäjt and mufti in Qayrawän were mono¬
polized by two old families, the Bü Räs and Saddäm, who traced their origins
to the Arab tribes that conquered Tunisia in the seventh century, ( qabä'ilu
l-fatlj ). and by a third distinguished family, at-TawTr. The heads of these
families constituted what was called in Qayrawan as ^ahlu s-sawra (14). In
1215 A.H. (1800-1801 A.D. ), we see them closing ranks against Hammüda
Bey's appointment of *^Umar AbQ Hudayba as qäjl of their city because he did
not belong to them (15). A fourth distinguished Qayrawän family was the
GaryänT, and Ibn Abi d-Diyäf says in the biography of one of its members,
Muhammad b. ^Ubayd (d. 1801), that because he was in charge of the family
zäwiya he did not need to seek a judicial appointment ( käna mustafcniyan ^an
1-hitat bi zäwiyatihi )(16 ). In Bäjä (Beja) members of the Samädhi family,
who had an important family zäwiya in the town, provided social and political
leadership and were revered by some of the tribes in its neighbourhood (17).
In Süsa (Sousse), the important town of the Sähil, the posts of muftT , qäglT .
and 'imäm were monopolized by the families of al-Hadda, al-Raygl, and al-
Saqqä (18). These families were the pillars of the Malikite religious establish¬
ment. The expansion of this establishment under the Husaynid beys sometimes
enabled persons of less social distinction to share the prestige of religious
functions with them, but their domination over this establishment does not
seem to have been much reduced by its expansion.
The economic context of the Husaynids' religious policy
"This kingdom is like a cow milked by persons of different ranks, while you
(the bey) hold her by the horns. No Muslim who believes in God and the Day
of Judgement would doubt the corruption of the governors ... We (in the
central administration) all receive gifts from the governors, some in gold
and silver, and others receive animals, clothes, or food." (19).
This statement is attributed by the nineteenth century historian Ahmad b.
AbT d-Diyäf to Hammüda b. ^^.bdu l-'^AzIz, a Malikite jurist and historian
who served as bäs-kätib for about ten years under ^All Bey (1759-82) and
his son Hammüda Bey (1782-1813). It was not made with the hope that the
bey's piety would lead him to stamp out corruption and economic oppression.
It was made, as shall be explained further below, in the context of advising
Hammüda Bey to limit corruption by institutionalizing it, so that the governors
would need to bribe only the bey instead of having to bribe 'courtiers and offic-
ials as well. In his al-Kitäbu l-Bä§I Ibn CAbdu l-^AzTz attributes the following
statement to his pious employer ^AIT Bey: "1 have compelled myself to avoid
all (illegitimate) desires and evil acts for fear of the fire (of hell) except for
this practice, namely the taking away of money (from my subjects) illegitima¬
tely, for 1 could not reconcile giving it up with the maintenance of power. "(20).
The first quotation shows that the man of religion Ibn ^Abdu I-CAzTz was aware
that he served a corrupt and economically oppressive regime. The second that
the pious bey had to place the requirements of political survival before his
religious scruples.
The economic structure of Tunisia in the eighteenth century enabled a small
number of local Tunisian families and foreign groups whose interests were
interwoven with the authority of the beys, to exploit the country's resources.
The foreign groups consisted of the Turkish troops and the kuluglis (the off¬
spring of Turkish soldiers and local women), the European mercantile com¬
munities, the Jews (especially the European Jews), and a large number of
individual adventurers who made a career in the service of the beys. The beys
either needed the services of these foreign groups or, as in the case of the
European mercantile communities, were compelled to accept their presence.
The employment of an elite army of Turks was a heritage of the Ottoman
administration, which was preserve J because the beys needed an affective fight¬
ing force from outside the Tunisian society through which they could enforce
their authority over the Tunisian leaders. Although these troops had lost the
control over the administration which they had had in the first half of the seven¬
teenth century, and had become a permanently employed army of mercenaries,
they were the partners of the Husaynid beys in the exploitation of Tunisia since
a large part of the revenue from taxation went to maintain them. Although they
sometimes rebelled against the beys, they had a vested interest in the preserv¬
ation of the regime upon which their livelihoods depended. They also had a
vested interest in the regime's autonomy from Istanbul, since political sub¬
mission to the Porte would reduce these soldiers to the position of regular
Ottoman troops and deprive them from their privileged position. The number
of the Turks varied according to the beys' resources and requirements. Ham¬
müda Bey raised their number to 11,000 towards the end of the eighteenth century
in preparation for his military confrontation with the regency of Algiers (21).
The kuluglT community appeared on the margin of the Turkish military caste.
In the seventeenth century the kuluglis were not usually recruited into the army.
The Husaynid beys organized large units of kuluglT soldiers and gave them the
same pay as the Turkish soldiers. Husayn b. '^Ali, the founder of the dynasty,
initiated the practice of having the kuluglis garrison the important coastal
towns. In 1740, when he was defeated after five years of conflict with his ne¬
phew °A1T Pasha and killed, the kulufells garrisoned all important positions
along the Tunisian coast: Bizerta, Porto-Farina, Hammämät, Süsa, and Mah-
diyya. The kuluglis of Mahdiyya "formaient 1' elite de I'oudjak de Tunis et
jouissaient d'une grande estime." (22). This was said by Muhammad a§-§agTr
b. Yüsuf, the great historian of the first half of eighteenth century Tunisia,
himself a kulugli who entred the army during the reign of Husayn b. '^Ali and
served in his home town of B5j5. The Husaynid beys trusted the kulu&lls be¬
cause, unlike the first generation Turks, they had families and property in
the country and therefore they would not join in a rebellion as lightheartedly
as the Turks. The kuluglis also did not consider themselves to be Tunisian and
therefore could be trusted to remain loyal to the beys in their confrontation
with Tunisian leaders. They were zealous adherents of the IJanafite rite which
in Tunisia after the Ottoman occupation became the symbol of belonging to the
foreign ruling class.
The Jews living in Tunisia, whose number was put at 10,000 in the 1730s (23),
at 30,000 in the 1780s (24), and at about 100,000 (25) at the end of the century,
consisted of two separate and often antagonistic groups: the native and the
European Jews. The two groups lived in the same quarter of Tunis and used
the same synagogues, but were distinguished from one another by wealth and
social habits. The European Jews, the wealthier of the two groups, came most¬
ly from Leghorn (Livourno) in Italy. They lived, decorated their houses, and
dressed like European Christans, from whom they could be distinguished only
by their long beards (26). The Jewish community did not have the advantage
of consular protection which the European merchants had, and its members
had to pay 10% duty on the goods they imported whereas the European merchants
paid only 3%. But they had the advantage of being established in the country
and having connections amongst the beys' favourites. A great part of Tunisia's
foreign trade was in the hands of the Jews who, amongst other things, imported
the fine Spanish wool used by the makers of the säsiyya (fez) in their trade.Most
of the beys' treasury officials were Jews. The Jewish community also handled
most of the business of money-lending. Ibn Yüsuf says that all the soldiers in
the »ujäg of Tunis borrowed from the Jews. Receiving an interest of 10% on
the money he lent, the Jewish creditor received an authorization to cash the
pay of the soldier indebted to him, and would advance him more credit only
when the first debt and the interest had been repaid (27).
There is a general agreement amongst eighteenth century European observ¬
ers that the European merchants living in Tunisia during the eighteenth century
were better treated by the rulers than those in the two neighbouring regencies
of Algeria and Tripolitania. This was noted by the English consul in Algiers
Thomas Shaw who visited Tunisia in 1727 (28) and by various Frensh travel¬
lers and officials. European merchants were able to settle and trade in Tunisia
because the major European countries forced Tunisia's rulers to suspend pira¬
tical attacks on their ships. The peace treaties between the European countries
and Tunis were also treaties of commerce, providing for the establishment
of a funduk in which the country's nationals lived and had their warehouses,
a chapel, and a tavern; and also for the duties to be paid on the goods export¬
ed and imported by them and the port dues their ships paid. Compelled to allow
the European merchants to settle and trade in Tunisia, the beys learnt to co¬
operate with them in exploiting the country's resources.
Whereas the beys depended on the Turks and kuluglis for the defence of
their regime, left the management of their finances to the Jews, and willy-nilly
allowed the European Christians and Jews to dominate the country's foreign
trade, in the central executive and technical services they depended on slaves
who were either Georgians or European renegades, and sometimes on
Europeans who retained their adherence to the Christian faith and con¬
nections with their home countries. Loyalty to the bey and ability usually
enabled a slave to rise to the highest positions in the central administra¬
tion. Husayn b. ^AIT had as a brother-in-law a Genoese renegade called
Mustafä, who was his kahiya and chief treasurer (29). Under ^AIT Bey
a Georgian slave also called Mustafä married the bey's daughter and became
one of the pillars of the state. He served as baznadär under ^ait Bey and
Hammüda Bey, and when the latter was young his education was entrusted
to Mustafä. Before this vizier and ex-slave died in 1800, he turned his immense
fortune into a waqf for the benefit of other mawäli who like himself came to
Tunis in search of a career (30). MacGill's description of Hammuda Bey's
style of government explains why he and his predecessors preferred to rely
in the central administrative functions on slaves: "He (Hammüda Bey) gives
up his power of governing to none; holds the reigns in his own hands; rewards
and chastises from the highest to the lowest. Those about him who have any
influence are either renegades or slaves; but though apparently they have pow¬
er, yet in reality their influence over him is very limited." (31). It was in
order to keep the important executive functions in the hands of persons entire¬
ly dependent upon and loyal to themselves that the beys took slaves into their
service, and sometimes adopted them into their family. By contrast the free
Christians were employed in strictly technical areas for which local expertise
could not be found. Under Hammüda Bey the supervision of new constructions
and fortifications in the ports were entrusted to a Dutchman called Humbert (32)
and the bey's physician was a European called Frank. The commander of the
Tunisian artillery at the time of the 1807 war with Algeria was Moreau a
deserter from Napoleon's army who enjoyed English protection (33).
Of a population of slightly over a million which Tunisia had in the eighteenth
century, only about 20% lived in urban centres of more than 20,000 inhabit¬
ants (34). The largest of these was Tunis, which had a population of about
120,000 (35). The greater part of the burden of supporting the beys' regime
and the foreign groups associated with it rested upon the 80 per cent of the
population which lived in the rural areas. The rural population consisted of
pastoralists and of peasants practising subsistence agriculture or living from
simple crafts and petty-trading. The goods produced by the craftsmen con¬
sisted of articles designed to satisfy the simple needs of the inhabitants of
the countryside, such as pottery, ropes, shoes, jibbas, and a cloth called
sif säri (36). There are references in the sources to weekly markets held out¬
side the big towns, such as that held on the slopes of Gabal Wislät at which
the mountaineers exchanged the cloth woven by their women with articles
produced by the tribesmen living nearby (37). There were also annual markets,
such as that held at Bü Sadlra near Bäjä on the occasion of the arrival of the
summer maljalla (the column of troops sent out to collect the taxes), at which
goods from the far south, such as dates from the GarTd, were exchanged with
the produce of the north (38). This eighty per cent of the Tunisian population,
living at subsistence level was the milch cow through which the beys paid
their officials and Turkish and kuluglT troops, through which the European
merchants made a large part of their profit, and through which the beys could
also finiance an elaborate religious establishment.
The desire of the Husaynid beys to act in apparent harmony with the require¬
ments of the Muslim law made them limit themselves to forms of direct taxa¬
tion for which some religious justification, no matter how tenuous, could be
found. The regular direct taxes collected were the magbä (poll-tax), the
tithe levied on crops, cattle, and trees, and the gizya levied on the Jews (39).
The function of collecting the taxes was associated with the institution of the
beylicate from the time it was a minor executive affice at the beginning of
Ottoman rule. After the beys became the rulers, they kept the function of
collecting the taxes directly in their own hands. The bey or his heir-apparent
led the maljalla which toured the north in the winter and the south in the summer
to gather the taxes from the qä' dis (provincial governors). Ibn Yüsuf describ¬
es the pomp and ceremony which accompanied the departure of the mahalla from
Tunis: it was a public display of pageantry and military strength (40). While
in the north the chief of the mahalla had his headquarters in the Bardo of Bäjä,
and while in the south in Qayrawän. While there the chief of the mahalla ad¬
ministered justice, received the hommage of tribal chiefs and other notables,
and ensured that his troops dealt with those who had indicated their desire to
rebel by refusing to pay the taxes to their qä' ids. The authority of the bey in
the countryside was<thus reaffirmed once a year, and the connection between
the acceptance of this authority and the payment of the taxes was emphasized.
The income from the direct taxes was not sufficient to meet the needs of
the beys' government. Consequently various other devices were developed to
increase the beys' revenue, devices from which the peasants particularly
suffered. The Husaynid beys inherited from the seventeenth century Murädist
beylicate the practice that the beys not only collected the taxes, but also used
the machinery of tax collection to buy the peasants' crops and sell them to
the European merchants. Tunisia's exports consisted, apart from the säsiyya
sold in the eastern countries of the Mediterranean, almost exclusively
of agricultural produce. Through buying the produce from the peasants and
selling it to the European merchants the Murädist beys obtained a large part
of the revenue they used in asserting their authority over the deys. Husayn
b. ^AIT, who served under three Muradist beys before he rose to power, and
was for some time the faaznadär of one of them (41), developed this practice
into a tightly knit monopoly. Frictions often occurred in the course of the
business dealings between the European merchants and the beys. But both
sides were aware that their roles were complementary. The beys were aware
that they could derive the maximum profit from their monopoly of foreign
trade only through the presence of the European merchants and the network
they had built of selling the produce abroad, and the European merchants ap¬
preciated the advantage of having the beys' agents to gather the produce and
bring it over to Tunis or to ensure its delivery to them at other ports.
The crops were usually bought by the bey's agents before harvesting, a
system whisch was known as al-mustarä . This meant that the bey fixed the
price to the peasants in advance, regardless of possible fluctuations from
which they might benefit. Because in bad years the peasants could not com¬
pensate for their small harvests by receiving higher prices for their produce,
when their harvests did not enable them to deliver all the crops they had been
paid for in advance, they had to sell their animals and equipment to repay
what they owed the government (42). Trying to encourage the peasants to cult¬
ivate more lands, OAIT Bey exempted them from selling their crops before
harvesting (43), but they still had to sell their produce to the bey's agents at
the time of harvesting. The only gap in the beys' monopoly on the selling of
crops consisted of the Genoese settlement in Tabarqa and the French settle¬
ment at Cap Negre (Tamkart) near Tabarqa (44). The tribes of Nahd, Wis-
läta, Makna, and HrümTr sold their produce to the Christins in these two
settlements, and the prosperity of Bäjä, where the tribesmen spent the money
they obtained from trading with the Christians, depended on the continuation
of this trade. In order to close this gap in his monopoly over foreign trade
CAIT Pasha had his son Yünis attack these two settlements in 1742 by surprise,
and take all the Europeans living in them captive. The historian Ibn Yüsuf, who
lived in Bäjä, describes the misery into which the tribes of the north and the
inhabitants of Bäjä were reduced as a result of the disappearance of these settl¬
ements (45).
Besides controlling directly the sale of the most impotant items of produce
- wheat, barley, olive oil, and wool - the bey secured a fixed revenue from
other items of produce through granting to others a monopoly on trading in
them, and through the system of farming out what we now call indirect taxes
or excises. All the beewax and hides produced in Tunisia had to be sold to a
company of Jews. In return for making the sale of these items to merchants
outisde the company illegal and enabling the company to pay a fixed price for
them, the bey received a fixed annual sum from the company (46). Until the
reign of °AIT Bey a group of bakers who provided the bread for the troops
had the monopoly of selling bread from early morning until sunset, presumably
in order to compensate them for providing the bread intended for the army at
a low price. Other bakers could sell only after sunset (47). There were also
monopolies on trading in salted fish and corals (48). Furthermore, all locally
produced goods, and all food provisions sold in the markets, including meat,
wheat, butter, and fruits were taxed. The tax on each was farmed out to an
officer carrying the title of gä'id who paid a fixed annual sum to the bey (49).
The extortionist economic policy upon which the Husaynid regime was built
could not have functioned without the cooperation of Tunisia's big families, who
provided the qä' ids through whom the bey administered the country and exploit¬
ed its resources. Although in some cases the title " qä'id " was given to such
persons as the chief of the Jewish or Andalusian communities, or to tax-farmers
of specific commodities sold in the markets, it was commonly associated with
provincial administration. The qä' ids were not paid officials, but local notables
to whom the bey delegated power and in this way reinforced their authority over
other local leaders. In return the qä' ids administered their districts (qiyäda
pl. qiyädät) on behalf of the beys and satisfied the latters' fiscal demands.
The big tribes, such as the DrTd whom the beys especially favoured, had their
own q5' ids , who were usually the heads of their chiefly families (50). An
isolated community such as that of the Berbers of Gabal Wislät had as qä' ids
for most of the eighteenth century the members of a local distinguished family
which had a zäwiya in the Gabal. But the rest of the qä'ids were members of
urban families who usually administered their own towns and the countryside
around it, including the tribesmen living in it. The few references to the family
background of qä' ids which one finds in the sources suggest that under the
Husaynids the qä' ids were not drawn from amongst the aristocratic urban
families whose social distinction had become associated with the religious
posts. Rather the qä' ids seem to have been drawn mostly from families which
had some inportance, but which did not occupy the primacy in the Tunisian social
order. The career of a qä' id was in some cases itself the means of advancing
a family in the social order. For example, the Asram family of Qayrawän,
although claiming descent from the Yamanite tribes which conquered Tunisia
in the 7th century, remained outside the exclusive circle of Qayrawän' s im¬
portant families until some of its members were appointed qä' ids by the hu¬
saynid beys (51), The Naqbl family of Tunis became wealthy in the seventeenth
century, but acquired social distinction only after some of its members served
as qa' ids under the Murädist beys and Husayn b. ^AIT (52). The Sibä^T family
of Tunis also enhanced its social position through the appointment of a member,
al-Häj '^AIT, as qä' id of MunastTr by Husayn b. "^AIT. (53)
Because the function of the government outside the big towns was almost
entirely limited to collecting the taxes, the size of a qiyäda depended on its
wealth. In the more prosperous north and the Sähil, the qiyädät were smaller
than in the semi-arid south. The qä' id kept his own retainers, and controlled
the various parts of his qiyäda through local leaders whom the bey appointed
as Saibs . The qä' id assessed and collected the tithe on the crops and sent it
to Tunis. According to Poiron, a French naval official who had a long associat¬
ion with Tunisia, the qä' ids obtained much of their revenue from what they
embezzled in the process of assessing the tithe (54). The qä' id also collected
the magbä and delivered it to the-chief of the Mahalla when it arrived in his
district. But the qä' ids had other means of embezzlement which became an
inseparable part of Tunisia's system of provincial government. As the bey's
deputies, they acted as judges and could impose fines. Ibn AbT d-Diyäf says
that the fines which the eighteenth century qä' ids levied were determined not
by the nature of the offences they tried, but by how much they hoped to extort
from the offenders. The qä' ids also acted as agents for collecting fines impos¬
ed by the beys on groups in their districts, and were authorized to add up to
10 per cent to these fines as a fee for collecting them (haläs). When a new
qä' id was appointed, each saifa in his qiyäda was expected to collect for him
a welcoming gift ( 4a.Yfa ) in cash levied on the people he commanded. Once a
year the qä' ids toured the tribal settlements in their qiyäda . and each saifa
was expected to collect for him a gift ( wahba ) (55).
The qiyädät system operated from the beginning of the Husaynid dynasty.
It enabled the beys to govern the country and exploit its resources without
burdening the treasury with the requirement of having to pay salaries to provinc¬
ial administrators. From the beginning of Husaynid rule, the extortion of the
qä' ids was accepted as a part of the system, and the beys only ensured that
they derived some profit from this extortion. Writing in about 1730, the French
consul Saint- Gervais says that Husayn b. ^AIT knew the qä' ids well, and took
from those who became rich wholesale what they had stolen piecemeal (56).
As the statement attributed to Ibn ^Abdu l-°AzTz, which 1 quoted above, suggests,
various courtiers and officials in the beys' service received gifts from the qg' ids
in order to intercede on their behalf with the beys. This was the practice which
Ibn ^Abdu l-'^AzTz wanted yammüda Bey to regulate. Hammüda Bey's response
to this advice was to require the notables who aspired to become qä' ids to pay
a price for the post. The price was negotiated with the gäljibu 1-täbaO (the guard¬
ian of the seal ), who was authorized to agree on behalf of the bey about the price
and to receive a fixed commission for himself. The only limitation imposed by
Hammuda Bey on the qä' ids' extortion was that it should not lead to riots or
complaints. This condition in fact meant that the qä' ids had still to pay bribes
so that complaints against them would not reach the bey's ears.
The religious policy of the ljusaynids
Upon coming to power in 1705, husayn b. ^AIT, the founder of the Husaynid
dynasty, confronted a complicated problem of political identification. Ibrähim
as-Sarif, the Turkish soldier who in 1702 usurped power from the last of the
Muradist beys, Muräd III, and killed all the members of the family, revived
the fears of the Tunisians that political power in their country would revert xo
the Turkish military class. The Murädist beys were not completely Tunisian,
but after the first of the family to become bey (Muräd 1, d. 1631) they were
all born in Tunisia and some had Tunisian mothers. Furthermore, they were
able to increase their power and transform the beylicate from a minor executive
office into Tunisia's ruling institution through curtailing the political power of
the Turkish troops. The French merchant and amateur historian, Nicolas Be-
ranger, who was in Tunisia from 1684 to 1707, says that the last Murädist bey
was a cruel and debauched ruler. Nevertheless the Tunisians perferred him to
the more worthy Ibrahim as-larlf because they considered him (Muräd) to be
a "Maure" like themselves (57). Ibrähim as-SarIf was defeated and taken
captive in 1705 by the army of Algiers. But it soon became known that the dey
of Algiers wanted to restore him to power in Tunis as a tributary ruler. To the
Tunisians, this meant that the foreign military regime would not only be restor¬
ed, but its local authority would also be strengthened by its dependence on the
deys of Algiers. Husayn b. caIi gained power through leading Tunisian resist¬
ance to the attempt by the dey of Algiers to restore Ibrähim as-Sarif to power.
The Turkish troops in Tunis, who stood to profit from Ibrähim aS-Sarif s restor¬
ation could not be trusted not to join forces with the Algerian army. For this
reason, as Beranger's account shows (58), Husayn b. ^ait kept them inside
the walls of Tunis, and fought the Algerian army at a distance from the capital
with a locally recruited army. When the Algerian army retreated, the Turkish
troops refused to accept Husayn b. ^aH's authority, and recognized as ruler
one of their leaders, al-Asfar Dey. This last attempt by the Turkish troops to
recover political power failed because Husayn b.<=AlT was secure in the protec¬
tion of some of the important tribes, especially the DrTd, and the Turkish troops
realized that the dey did not have the power to collect the taxes and pay them
their salaries.
Husayn b. <=a1T was himself half Tunisian: his mother belonged to one of the
tribes living near al-Käf (Le Kef) where his father had served as a sipähi
(cavalry) officer (59). As a kuluglT . and because of his past services under
the Muradist beys, he understood the political sentiments which made the
Tunisians refuse to be ruled by a group of uprooted foreign soldiers. His exper¬
iences in 1705 also made him aware that his political survival depended on the
support of the local Tunisian leaders, and also that this support was conditional
upon these leaders being able to view him as a national ruler. What this con¬
dition meant in concrete terms was that Tunisia's national leaders should
become convinced that the new beylical regime set up by Husayn b. ^ait would
be one which safeguarded their position in the society and material interests.
The tribal chiefs and the less important urban families could be made to identi¬
fy their position and interests with the Husaynid regime through their appoint¬
ment to the posts of qä' ids and Saibs. But the urban Tunisian aristocracy had
come to identify their social position with the Mälikite teaching institutions
and judicial functions, and had come to consider the patronage of these institut¬
ions as the symbol of rejecting Turkish military rule. At first, the main aim
of Husayn b. °AIi' s religious policy seems to have been to reassure and win the
loyalty of Tunisia's important urban families. The further development of this
policy by him and his successors made it achieve more elaborate political
purposes, but the aim of assuring the Malikite leaders over the political identi¬
ty of the regime remained a constant feature of this policy.
While trying to win the confidence of the Mälikite leader, the I^usaynid beys
could not turn their back on the Hanafite rite. For like the Murädist beys in
the seventeenth century they recognized the Ottoman sultan's nominal sovereign¬
ty over Tunisia, although in all other respects they acted as sovereign rulers.
Furthermore, they were militarily dependent on the Turkish troops and kuluglis.
who viewed their attachment to the Hanafite rite as a symbol of their separate
identity from the Tunisians. Consequently until the reign of OAli Pasha (1740 -
1756), who usurped power from his uncle Husayn b.^AH through Algerian help,
the head of Tunisia's judicial administration continued to be a Turkish qädi
sent from Istanbul. When CAIT Pasha discontinued this practice, a local Hana¬
fite qädi occupied'the nominal headship of the entire judicial hierarchy (60).
Maintaining the nominal supremacy of the Hanafite rite, while sponsoring the
Mälikite teaching institutions and restoring to the Mälikite qädTs and muftis
the authority they had lost in the seventeenth century, enabled Husayn b. CAIT
and his successsors to keep the question of their own political identity un¬
resolved. By identifying the establishments of the two rites with their regime,
and creating the conditions which gradually reduced the antagonism between
them, the Husaynid beys were able to maintain the dual character of their
regime as being both national Tunisian and also foreign. They were also able
to keep the Turkish soldiers and kuluglTs loyal while depriving them of poli¬
tical power, and to keep the Tunisians submissive while subjugating them to
economic oppression and extortion-.
Saint-Gervais, who was French consul in Tunis from 1729 to 1733, i.e. in
the period when Husayn b. ^AIT had consolidated his authority, says about him
that, although he enjoyed absolute power, his political sense made him consult
both the diwänu l-^askar and al-Maglisu s-Sar^T ( chara ) before undertaking
any important action. He adds that the bey had the Qui ama ( les juges ) pro¬
nounce an opinion in conformity with his wishes before he issued his orders.
He spent money on the building of mosques, respected the marabouts, and show¬
ed hatred for the Christians. Saint-Gervais concludes that this policy "le font
passer dans I'esprit du peuple pour un Marabout, et regarder des Grands
comme un zele defendeur de la loi; ce qui le rend respectable, etlemet ä I'abri
des entreprises, qu'on pourroit former contre lui" (61). The Tunisian authors
provide details about Husayn b. CAlT's dealings with the men of religion and
his readiness to spend money on religious institutions and their personnel,
details which enable us to enlarge the brief but accurate picture drawn by the
French consul. But unlike Saint-Gervais, these authors do not show any great
awareness of the political purposes achieved by the bey's religious policy or
rather their sense of religious and social propriety prevented them from
attributing considerations of political utility to the bey's acts of piety. 1 have
explained above how the religious policy followed by Husayn b. ^All and his
successors was related to the question of their political identity. In order to
be able to explain how it also served as a prop for their politically and econom¬
ically oppressive regime, it will be necessary to examine in some detail three
important aspects of this policy: 1) the bey's financial contributions to the
building of schools and mosques and to the members of the religious establish¬
ment; 2) the participation of the ^ulamä' in the administration of justice; and
3) the role of the men of religion as intermediaries with the rulers, especial¬
ly in the function of raf^u 1-ma^äIim .
1. The bey's religious donations
The beys of the Husaynid dynasty made financial arrangements for the up¬
keep of old mosques, zäwiyas . and madrasas and for the payment of regular
salaries to the teachers and ' imäms and other persons who officiated in these
institutions. They also donated money for the building of new mosques and
madrasas which usually carried their names. The donations of Muslim rulers
to religious establishments were common acts of piety. Viewed in the context
of the bey's position as rulers who depended on a Hanafite military class in
enforcing their authority over the Tunisian community, while trying to induce
the Mälikite leaders of this community to identify themselves with beylical
authority, viewed in this context the beys' religious donations would appear
as necessary acts of politics. Through them the beys made the members of
the Mälikite and Hanafite religious establishments their beneficiaries and there¬
fore they came to have an interest in the continuation of the beylical regime.
Husayn b. ^All's concern after coming to power to reassure the Mälikite
leaders over the political orientation of his regime led him to channel all his
religious contributions to the Mälikite institutions. At the Zaytüna mosque, the
mainstay of the Mälikite religious establishment, he created a new teaching
post and twelve new posts of qurra ' , and paid all of them salaries. Near a
mausoleum he built for his family in Tunis, he constructed a new madrasa,
al-Madrasa al-Husayniyya, for which he created a waqf specifically intended
to support Mälikite students. He had three taverns in Tunis owned by Europeans
demolished, and on their site he constructed a madrasa and houses for Ma¬
likite students (62). Qayrawän, the exclusively Mälikite holy town of Tunisia,
profited considerably from the bey's donations. He had its walls, which had
been destroyed in 1699 by the last of the Murädist beys, rebuilt. Fifty mosques
and zäwiyas in Qayrawän were repaired and provided with new mats and oil.
A new madrasa was also constructed in Qayrawän, and two süqs were built
whose revenue went to support the teachers and students of this madrasa. Hu¬
sayn b.'^AlT built new madrasas all having waqfs intended for supporting Mä¬
likite teachers and students in each of the following towns: Süsa, Gafsa, al-
Käf, and Bäjä (63).
Husayn b. °AlI's successors during the eighteenth century all made con¬
tributions to the promotion of religious learning. But because reassuring the
Mälikite leaders about the political identity of the regime was no longer a
pressing requirement, after Husayn b. ^AIT the beys sponsored the Hanifite
as well as the Mälikite institutions. Even ^AIT Pasha who, as we shall see
below, excluded the °ulamä' from association in his authority as supreme
judge, found it necessary to contribute to religious learning. He had two Ma¬
likite madrasas. the madrasa of Hawwänat °Ä6ür, and al-Madrasa al-Sulay-
mäniyya, constructed. He also built a madrasa and a mosque for the Hana¬
fites (64).
After the restoration of the Husaynids, and particularly during the reign
of '^AIT Bey, the Mälikite and Hanafite teachers and students were assured a
regular revenue from the state. This pious ruler made the usual contribut¬
ions in the form of building schools and creating waqfs for the members of
both rites. He constructed the madrasa of Sabät ^Ajam in Tunis. The head of
this school was a Mälikite Saifa whose first assignment was to teach the Muh¬
tasar of äaih Halil.The head of the school was accommodated in a house which
used to belong to ^usayn b. ^ah^ and was paid 46 nagiris a day. The school
had two other teachers, a Mälikite who taught the Arabic language, the ' ugSlu
l-fiqh . and ^iimu 1-kaläm , and a Hanafite Saifa who taught Hanafite fiqh .
Stipends were provided for eight Hanafite students who studied under the Hana¬
fite teacher, and for thirty Malikite students. *^A1T Bey built another madrasa
near his father's mosque, which had two teachers, one Hanafite and the other
Malikite. Each was paid half a riyal per day and had eight students who also
received daily stipends (65).
^AIT Bey's most significant contribution to the advancement of religious
learning was his assigning the revenue from the gizya on the Jews for paying
the teachers and students. Records were drawn of the recognized teachers and
students in each town, and were all paid stipends from the combined revenue
of the gizya on the Jews living in their town and the waqfs attached to teach¬
ing institutions. In Qayrawän non-Muslims were not allowed to reside. Be¬
cause the inhabitants of the island of Girba, where many Jews lived, were
öärigite, the gizya of the island was diverted to the funds from which the
scholars of Qayrawan were paid (66).
The contributions made by the Husaynid beys to the advancement of religious
learning served primarily the purpose of gaining the goodwill of the prominent
urban families. Only the large towns profited from these contributions, and
because the important urban families dominated the religious institutions sub¬
sidized by the beys, they were the main beneficiaries of their contributions.
The assigning of the gizya levied on the Jews for paying teachers and students
in the religious institutions assuaged the hostility of the active religious
leaders towards the Jews and towards the bey's raliance on them in financial
matters.
2. The ^ulamä' and the administration of justice
R. Brunschvig has pointed out that in Tunisia under the Hafsids and in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the administration of justice was ulti¬
mately the responsibility of the rulers. It was a responsibility which they
performed themselves or delegated to the qädis and the muftTs (67). In Tunisia
during the eighteenth century, neither the rulers nor the Culamä' seem to have
considred the independence of the judiciary from the executive to be possible
or even desirable. The piety of the rulers and their desire to uphold justice
did not consist of surrendering their functions as judges to the religious judic¬
ial hierarchy. On the contrary, the rulers were considered pious and just only
if they themselves administered justice and took a direct interest in how it was
administered by the qädis and the muftis. One of the acts of piety for which
Hammüda b. ^AbdO l-^AzTz praised his employer OAIT Bey was that he him¬
self acted as a sarT^a judge: "wa bäsara fasla 1-qadäyä s-Sar^iyya bi nafsihi
1-karTma." (68). The husaynid beys' reputation of being pious rulers rested
among other things on the fact that they spent time administering justice person¬
ally, had the qädrs and muftTs adjudicate cases which they did not feel com¬
petent to adjudicate, and reserved important cases involving the death sentence
to a supreme court over which they presided, but in whose work the qädTs and
muftTs participated.
Saint-Gervais says that the chief members of the judicial hierarchy in Tunis
during the time when he was there (1729-33) were: the Turkish qädi sent from
Istanbul who was changed every three years, the chief Hanafite muftT and two
other Hanafite muftTs. the Malikite qädT and three Malikite muftTs. He adds
that the Turkish qädi was the head of the judicial hierarchy, but in practice
he did nothing beyond affixing his seal to judgements made by others and recei¬
ving a fee for doing so. The Hanafite chief muftT was the subordinate of the
Turkish qädi, but was recognized as chief over the other five muftTs (69).
The formal supremacy of the Hanafite over the Mälikite rite was thus main¬
tained, but it is clear from the accounts of Ibn Yüsuf and Ibn ^Abdü l-^AzTz
that the authority of the Mälikite qädTs and muftTs was considerably enhanced
during yusayn b. °AlT's reign. The judge whom Saint-Gervais described as
the Mälikite qädi of Tunis, was referred to by Ibn ^Abdü l-^AzTz in the context
of discussing the administration of justice under Husayn b.cAlT as Qädi 1-Ga-
ma^a l-Mälikl (70). This suggests that Tunis had more than one Mälikite qädi,
and that one of them was recognized as the chief of the Mälikite judicial hier¬
archy. Ibn Yüsufs account of the functioning of the supreme court during °A1T
Bey's reign suggests that the Mälikite and Hanafite chief qädis were treated
by the bey as equals. And although the Hanafite qädi continued to levy a fee
for affixing his seal to important judicial documents, he had to content him¬
self from the time of Husayn b. ^All with a fixed fee determined by the bey (71).
What we know about the judicial system of Tunisia in the eighteenth century
is limited almost entirely to its central organs operating in Tunis. The bio¬
graphies of the men of religion in Ibn AbT d-Diyäf, Muhammad an-Nayfar, and
Muhammad b. Sälih al-Kinänl contain references to the offices of qidi and
mufti in the other big towns of the country. But there is nothing in the bio¬
graphies to enable us to know the relative power of the muftTs and qädTs vis-
ä -vis one another. Nor do these biographies enable one to determine if a line
of demarcation between the authority of the holders of these two posts and the
juducial powers of the qä' ids existed. But there are references to persons
from outside Tunis going to Tunis to appeal against a judgement pronounced by
the provincial qädis or the qä' ids .
Persons wronged by their qä' ids or local qädTs went to Tunis to seek just¬
ice primarily from the bey. All the Husaynid beys set some time every day
to receive litigants. The aggrieved could seek justice from the bey during
this time, or through other channels which 1 shall discuss below under raf^u
I-mazälim. The great hope of the aggrieved to receive justice centered on
al-Maglisu s-Sar°T. In Tunisia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
offices and institutions retained their historical designations even after their
functions had changed. This is true in the case of al-Maglisu s-Sar^r which
in the eighteenth century was no longer what it had been in the Hafsid period
and at the beginning of the Ottoman period, namely a consultative council
examinig general matters of policy. Under the Husaynids it became something
of a supreme court, adjudicating criminal cases and examining appeals brought
before it by the defendants. Thanks to Ibn Yüsuf and Ibn °Abdu 1-OAzTz, we
have enough details to understand the proceedings in this court during the
reigns of Husayn b. ^AlT and his son OAIT Bey, as well as its transformation
during the reign of OAIT Pasha. That this court continued to function until the
end of the eighteenth century is clear from a reference to it made In 1792 by
the English consul Perkins Magra, who says: "This court which meets every
Sunday, is composed of the Muftes and ecclesiastics, the laws of the Coran
are their sole guide . It is the only shelter for the subject against the
despotism and hastiness of the prince. Any culprit can claim being tried by
this court, provided he calls sharalla (the justice of God) before the Bey had
pronounced sentence. " (72)
In spite of its title, this court was ultimately a beylical court and not one
which could act independently of the bey. For this reason it could not have
been a very affective shelter against the beys' despotism, although the par¬
ticipation of the qidls and muftTs constituted some restraint on the beys'
abuse of authority and ensured that, in cases where the beys' political in¬
terests were not involved, the Islamic judicial principles would be upheld.
There is even a reference to a case in which a Tunisian sued ^AIT Bey, and
the latter surrendered his presidency of the court and appointed someone to
defend his side in the case. The bey, however, was not found guilty (73).
Of some importance in determining the extent that the court could be a shelter
against the beys' despotism, is the fact that they chose its members and
controlled its proceedings. Under Husayn b. ^AI"! this court met in the even¬
ings of Monday, and was reserved to murder cases. It was attended by the
qädi of Tunis (our source, Ibn Yüsuf, does not say whether this qädT was the
Mälikite or Hanafite qädT ), the qädi of the Bardo (the bey's palace outside
Tunis) who was a Mälikite from the time of Husayn b. ^AlT's accession to
power, and those religious scholars who had been invited by the bey to stay
in the Bardo to entertain him on the night before. The scholars present would
deliberate the case, and the qädT of Tunis would sum up and recommend a
verdict to the bey. If the qädT of the Bardo challenged the advice of the qädT
of Tunis, the bey would ask his ' imäm . al-Häj Yüsuf Burtagiz, to state his
opinion. Only then would he pronounce his stentence (74).
Under ^AIT Bey, al-Maglisu s-Sar^T became more clearly a supreme court
and court of appeal than during his father's reign. A lower sarTOa court,
consisting of the chief Hanafite and Mälikite qädTs - was permanently in session.
These two qädis examined cases and pronounced judgements, and when neces¬
sary sought the adv'ice of the muftTs. They referred cases of special import¬
ance to al-Maglis. This court met on Sundays in the Bardo and was presided
over by the bey himself, and on Thursdays in the hall of the dey's court in Tunis
and was presided over by the dey. At a later date in "AIT Bey's reign a third
session of al-Maglis was held in the hall of the sari^a court where at other
times the two chief qädis administered justice alone. The composition of
al-Maglis during OAIT Bey's reign seems to have become more fixed than
under Husayn b. ^aiT. The two chief qädTs of Tunis and all the muftTs were regular
members. When the court met in the Bardo, the qädT of Bardo also parti¬
cipated in its work (75). The fact that this court could meet without the bey
presiding over it, also suggests that it could operate during CAIT Bey's reign
with greater independence than it did under Husayn b. CAIT. But under ^am-
müda Bey, al-Maglisu s-Sar^i lost the relative degree of independence it had
enjoyed during ^All Bey's reign. Quoting the account written about Hammuda's
reign by his physician Dr. Frank, Brunschvig says this bey constantly inter¬
fered in cases brought before al-Maglis, and determined the kind of verdict
that was given through calling in more witnesses or consulting jurists who
were not members of al-Maglis. Brunschvig concludes: "Au total, sous ce
regne, la magistrature religieuse de la capital, tout en gardant un certain
prestige, etait d'ordinaire eclipsee par la haute figure du Bey." (76) Thus
it seems that the ability of al-Maglisu s-Sar*^i to act independently depended
on the predilections of the bey. It was in the interest of the beys that the
"religious magistracy" should retain its prestige as long they could control its operation.
CAIT Pasha was the only ruler of Tunisia during the eighteenth century who
deprived the religious magistracy of its prestige by emphasizing his own
authority as supreme judge and refusing to allow the qadTs and muftTs to part¬
icipate in his exercise of it. Having captured power through Algerian help,
he feared that the leaders of the Tunisian society, many of whom had cooperated
with his uncle, would betray him to his cousins who had followed his example
by placing themselves under the protection of the ruler of Algiers. His inabili¬
ty to place much trust in the loyalty of Tunisia's leaders was reflected in his
hope of being able to build his authority upon the support of the Turkish troops
alone, and in his treacherous acts of suppression against the Tunisian leaders.
In 1735 CAIT Pasha occupied the capital with Algerian help and his uncle re¬
treated to Qayrawän where he held out for another five years. An anonymous
French writer who was in Tunis in 1735, says that °A1T Pasha told an assembly
of Turkish troops and local notables that his intentions for the government of
Tunisia were "de remettre le Gouvernement sur l'ancien pied, c'est a dire
que les Turcs reprendront leur autorite sur les Maures." (77) Ibn Yüsuf
attributes to cait Pasha the statement: "Je suis comme le maitre d'un jardin
qui, debout au milieu de ses choux, leur coupe la tete dps qu'ils grandis-
sent". (78). "=A1T Pasha's victims consisted of the religious leaders who
gained importance under his uncle, and other notables whose only guilt was
that they were influential. These included his father-in-law Bü °AzTz, a tribal
chief who contributed mucb to his gaining power.
CAIT Pasha's performance of his functuons as judge reflected his desire to
present himself as a ruler to whose exercise of power the consent of the Tu¬
nisian leaders was irrelevant. The practice initiated by hlusayn b. ^AIT, of
the ruler setting some time every day for receiving those of his subjects see¬
king justice from him, lapsed under CAIT Pasha. The participation of the qädTs
and muftTs in the supreme court also ceased. °A1T Pasha had the hall in the
Bardo where his uncle had held his court demolished, and had in its place a
sumptuous courtroom, which became called al-mafakama . constructed. The
new hall of justice was decorated with marble and elaborate woodwork, and
the Pasha sat in it on a throne of marble with a small dome overhead, istead
of the sofa on which his uncle had sat when he presided over the court. The Pasha's
entry into al-maljkama was announced by a sawTs saläm in a few Turkish words
which few understood, and all present had then to stand up and fix their eyes on
the ground until the Pasha sat on his throne. Ibn Yüsuf says that all defendants
who appeared before "^AIT Pasha were found guilty (79).
The change which took place in the character of the supreme court under
Cait Pasha highlights the political implications of the participation of the
religious scholars in its proceedings during the reigns of the other beys. The
Husaynid beys were absolute monarchs, who ruled through a central administ¬
ration dominated by Turks, slaves, and other foreigners. This structure had
no place in it for Tunisians except in clerical functions. The participation of
the religious scholars in the work of the supreme court was a means of as¬
sociating them with the beys' authority in the limited area of criminal law,
without substantially restricting the judicial or political powers of the beys.
3. The religious leaders as intermediaries with rulers:
The intercession of the men of religion with rulers on behalf of ordinary
citizens was a common practice in the Muslim society. Through it the men
of religion helped in the rectification of individual acts of injustice and also
increased their own social authority. To the rulers the granting of favours
on the basis of such intercession was a means of reducing political tension
in the society, since it made them appear to be amenable to the influence
of men in whom the ordinary citizen placed more trust than in political leaders.
This practice was also an instrument through which rulers influenced the
structure of leadership, because the knowledge that a religious leader had
influence with the rulers increased his authority at the expense of his oppo¬
nents. Because the practice of intercession by the religious leaders was com¬
mon in the Muslim society, illustrating it by reference to the numerous record¬
ed instances of its occurrence in eighteenth century Tunisia would not add to
our understanding of the Husaynids' religious policy. What is of significance,
however, is the fact that the Husaynid beys institutionalized the practice of
intercession so that it was carried out by men of religion holding an official
function in their palace or otherwise associated regularly with them. Con¬
sequently the men who sought to rectify grievances generated by the political
system had a recognized place in it. They could help in alleviating individual
acts of injustice, but they could not challenge the system itself or the basic
injustices upon which it was built.
Husayn b. °A1T institutionalized intercession in the period when he was
preoccupied with consolidating his authority. He had a learned jurist or a
prominent man of religion, in whom he had personal trust and upon whom he
bestowed favours, reside in the Bardo and act as a channel in raf^u l-ma?;a-
lim. This scholar advised the bey on matters of the Muslim law, and usually
attended the supreme court in the capacity of the bey's coimsellor. Ibn Yüsuf
provides us with information about three of the men who performed this function.
The first was al-Häj Yüsuf Burtagiz, a distinguished Hanafite jurist whose name
suggests that he was of Portuguese origins. Burtagiz was Husayn b. ^All's
'imäm and was in charge of his library. When old age prevented Burtagiz from
performing his functions at the Bardo, the bey appointed him to the posts of
chief mufti of Tunis and 'imäm of the Muhammad b. Muräd mosque. Ibn Yü¬
suf says that the 'imäm of this mosque was considered the saifau 1- Isläm of
the country. Before he obtained this honourable form of retirement, Burtagiz
was the channel through which grievances reached the oey's ears. He had a
special cham jer in the Bardo where he received persons seeking to present
their grievances before the bey. According to Ibn Yüsuf people came from
remote parts of the country and asked Burtagiz to intercede with the bey on
their behalf (80).
After Burtagiz' retirement, his place as the recognized intermediary with
the bey was taken over first by Saih ^aglr Däwüd, who came from Näbil (Na-
beul), and^then by STdl ^AIT Sayib, who came from Bäjä, both of whom were
Mälikite. Sailj Sagir did not seem to have stayed a long time in the Bardo, but
his help in interceding with the bey was sought after his return to Näbil. This
religious dignitary knew how to use his influence with the bey to advance his
material interests. The inhabitants of Näbil provided free labour for the con¬
struction of his pleasure-garden, and he sold silver to the jewellers of Tunis
which he claimed that his knowledge of alchemy enabled him to transform from
murcury. When Husayn b. '^Ali led the winter mahalla and took up residence
in Qayrawan, he usually sent his personal carriage to Näbil to bring Saih §agTr
to him. Husayn b. ^All's overthrow was a disaster to this sailj, for CAII Pasha
imprisoned him and he had to purchase his liberty with 40.000 piastres, besides
the sums he had to pay to those who interceded on his jehalf (81).
