1) All-Pay Auctions

Potters et al.’s (1998) treatment of the two-player symmetric all-pay auction differs from our own in that they have a very coarse discrete strategy space of bids corresponding

Equilibrium bidding strategies in the first-price winner-pay auction and the all-pay auction with stochastic competition can be written as weighted average of equilibrium

There exist equilibria leading to higher payoffs than the upper bound for 1-memory strategies. Chance to have an equilibrium equals

We study the Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated bimatrix games where payoffs are determined by reactive strategies [1]; we consider limit of means payoffs.. Reactive strategies

One can use the same method to verify, for instance, that AllD and GRIM are evo- lutionary stable rules (GRIM cooperates only if both players cooperated in the previous round. If

When the Controller Status Register indicates that a Controller completion request is pending, the host processor should read the Transaction Status Register to

INEFFICIENCY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA BY. PRADEEP

 Rectalphylum.txt: the relative abundance on phylum level of single samples..  Rectalgenus.txt: the relative abundance on genus level of