P o lic y F o rm u la tio n :
Where Ig n o ra n t Armies C lash By N ig h t
von P e te r deLeon
Many p o lic y analysts have argued th a t implementation programs should be incorporated in the fo rm u la tio n o f p o lic ie s , an exercise c a lle d p o lic y design. This paper examines the p o te n tia l o f the p o lic y design procedures drawing upon examples o f p o lit ic a l c o rru p tio n . Although p o lic y design may have some inherent d i f f i c u l t i e s , i t at le a s t forces the p o lic y a n a lyst to th in k beyond narrow a n a ly tic confines and place a proposed program in to a so cia l and p o lit ic a l c o n te xt.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
V ie le P olicy-F orscher v e rtre te n die A n s ic h t, daß Durchführungsprogramme in die Formulierung von P o lic ie s eingebaut werden s o llte n ; diesen Anwendungsbezug nennt man 'P o lic y -D e s ig n '. Das Paper untersucht die P o te n tia le von 'P o lic y -D e s ig n ' anhand e in ig e r B e is p ie le p o litis c h e r K o rru p tio n . Obwohl 'P o lic y -D e s ig n ' e in ig e immanente Probleme haben könnte, zwingt es l e t z t l i c h doch die P o licy-F o rsch e r, über die engen analytischen Grenzen hinauszudenken und ein b e a b sich tig te s Programm in einen sozia le n und p o litis c h e n Kontext zu s te lle n .
WHERE IGNORANT ARMIES CLASH BY NIGHT
Peter deLeon
Graduate School of Public Affairs University of Colorado - Denver
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the various ascribed failures of the War on
Poverty programs, policy research and analysis seem to have been convenient whipping boys for a wide range of critics in the
public policy research communities. These have ranged from government sponsors, particularly in the Reagan Administration, to policy researchers in think tanks and academe to the popular media. Thematically, the choir chants that if the disease cannot be relieved, the blame must lie with faulty physicians. Asserted remedies have been almost as numerous as the attributed
shortcomings. Problems in policy implementation have often been cited more in description than prescription.1 Some observers reference the artificial (but understandable) separation of
’•facts" and "values" while others claim that such a separation, however lamentable, is inevitable.2 *4 A third school blames the
1The literature (as opposed to the light) in this areas is immense; two of the better, more recent reviews are, inter a l i a . Helen Ingram, "Implementation: A Review and Suggested Framework,"
in Aaron Wildavsky and Naomi B. Lynn (eds.) , Public Administration:
The State of the Field (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1989), and Paul Sabatier, "Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation Research: A Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis, " Journal of Public P o l i c y . Vol, 6, No. 2 (1987), pp. 21-48.
20ne of the first and still most cogent explications of this is Martin Rein, Social Science and Public Policy (Baltimore, MD:
Penguin, 1976); on a more theoretical level, see Frank Fischer, Politics, Values, and Public Policy: The Problem of Methodology
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980). A more pessimistic appraisal is offered by Douglas Amy, "Why Policy Analysis and Ethics Are Incompatible," Journal of Public Policy and Management. Vol. 3, No.
4 (Summer 1984), pp. 573-591.
natural sciences model and its positivist orientation for
affixing the policy sciences to standards it can never hope to obtain, while others cite rising expectations as the culprit.
Not surprisingly, solutions to these dilemmas are much less apparent than the noted shortfalls. Recently, for example, policy design proposals have gained a respectable visibility,3 while other policy scholars take on a more conceptual basis of broadening the involvement of relevant stakeholders in the policy process, or what some have called "participatory policy
analysis."4 However variant the criticisms and their subsequent recommendations might be, the aggregate consensus implies that there are serious maladies affecting the policy sciences' corpus and the way it addresses policy problems. The theory is weak, the tools are inadequate, and the data deficient; it is little wonder that the recommendations are flawed. Throughout the policy sciences' c o u ture, ash cloth and hirsute seem to be the accepted mufti for its acolytes.
This paper advances the thesis that such vestments, while perhaps fashionable, are nonetheless ill-suited for the
prevailing conditions. This is not to suggest that the putative charges against the policy analysis community (somehow measured in units of alleviating perceived social shortcomings) are
incorrect or, at best, ill-measured. Nor that important
improvements cannot be proposed, maybe even implemented. What
3Among others, see Davis B. Bobrow and John S. Dryzek, Policy Analysis By Design (Pittsburgh; University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987) ; and Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram, "Systematically
•Pinching' Ideas: A Comparative Approach to Policy Design,"
Journal of Public Policy. Vol. 8, No. 1 (1988), pp. 61-80; some cautions are expressed by Peter deLeon, "The Contextual Burdens of Policy Design," Policy Studies J o u r n a l . Vol. 17, No. 2 (Winter 1988) , pp. 297-309.
4John Forester (ed.). Critical Theory and Public Life (Cambridge, MA; The MIT Press, 1987), brings the philosophical tenets of the Frankfurt School, especially Jurgen Habermas, to explicitly public policy questions.
these criticisms, however cogent and sincere, tend to overlook is the magnitude and difficulty of the problems policy programs and analysts are required to address. Simply, the '’deficiency"
resides at least as m u c h — probably more— with the problem than with the approach. To paraphrase Kaplan's wonderful
admonishment, it scarcely matters what size hammer one has when one is faced with a screw or, as in so many cases, one even lacks the proverbial nail. This paper then, without dodging the often- justified charges of methodological sophistries and theoretical deprivations within the policy sciences arena, proposes that the root causes of many noted policy failures lies more in the malady and less in the remedy. This diagnosis is suggested not so much as an excuse than an explanation, and as a partial note of
optimism against what many might view in Arnold's words as an otherwise
...darkling pain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight Where ignorant armies clash by night.
The thesis of this argument is that the policy process or, most immediately, policy design, however laudable its intentions, is inflicted with significant "start up" costs in terms of the assignments its practitioners are assigned or choose, for
whatever reasons, to address. And that these costs can be easily render a policy "solution" helpless or perhaps even
counterproductive despite the best conceived and intended plans of its progenitors. If this is even partially true, then the rending of garb and ripping of epaulets is at least premature, for if the policy sciences can still salvage something from its Deweyian and positivistic heritages, it is that its practitioners do have the capability to learn and that "next time," things
might be better. However arguable this assumption (contemporary planning measures for the next energy crisis and recurring
welfare crises might give one p a u s e ) , its possible validity and signficant payoff make the policy sciences' game worth the
candle. Let us therefore examine a few representative cases in
which the stakeholders (and their hardly ignorant armies)
inevitably clash in such manners as to make successful resolution of the "conflict” highly unlikely in light of the concepts and tools currently employed and, even more important, the systemic obstacles which the proposed policy must overcome. We can then turn to a discussion of how the concept of policy design might begin to address this dilemma.
A FEW EXAMPLES
Selecting examples to demonstrate a thesis is inevitably a troublesome assignment, both conceptually and practically, for counter examples are almost always available. Methodologically, the choice of a limited number of illustrations is continually suspect, for they can be easily chosen to validate rather than test the hypotheses. For this reason, let me draw upon a public policy issue in which there is little debate over its merits, no open argument over its relative worth or publicly contending proponents, namely, political corruption. If I can demonstrate that the presence of political corruption, as disavowed,
disreputable, and actually illegal as the situations may be, presents an example of how difficult policy problems (in this case, the eradication of corrupt practices) can be, then I can argue by deduction that the more legitimately contentious policy issues might indeed present problems to the policy analyst which defy present-day approaches.
Incidents of political and financial corruptions have long fascinated political scientists, sociologists, and economists, as well as the public at large. Of late, they have been of interest to policy researchers due to the simple realization that
corruption can impose significant (usually hidden) costs upon the resources and execution— i.e., the effectiveness— of public
p r o g r a m s . . They produce a set of institutional, psychological, and financial "friction costs" which could undermine a program in
various ways.5 The magnitude of these "costs" are matters of irresolvable dispute; organized crime is loathe to issue public profit and loss statements detailing its conduct of doing
business, in which bribery might well be a sizeable component.
Still, few would claim that corruption is absent. Undoubtedly, it is a widespread and expensive proposition, especially if its toxins poison the always fragile credibility the public assigns to governance and its administrators. One might justifiably wonder why this covert and inequitable "tax" is permitted to exist. Why are not public policies secured with laws which
prevent cheating on welfare payments, which a recent report from the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human
Services sets at over one billion dollars,6 or the greedy
profiteering from public housing subsidy programs? Where are the safeguards which deter egregious conflicts of interest and which guarantee equal access (or protection) under law?
The answer is that such laws and statutes are on the books and inspector generals abound, but the conditions which
encourage— some might say insist upon— corrupt activities are so deep-seated and inherent in the body politic that the existing laws are only effective on the margin. For instance, in New York City, real estate developers invest such vast amount of capital into construction projects that they cannot afford any
unnecessary building delays. Hence, it is not surprising that they have found ways to "grease" the permit and building systems, that is, to eliminate bureaucratic bottlenecks by making illegal payments to building inspectors, permit personnel, union
5These phenomena are most thoroughly articulated in the context of the developing nations; in the American political environs, see Michael T. Johnston, Political Corruption and Public Policy in America (Monterey, CA: Cole Publishing Co., 1982); and Peter deLeon, "Public Policy Implications of Systemic Political Corruption," Corruption and Ref o r m . Vol. 3 (1989-forthcoming).
6Anonymous, "Fraud in Welfare Put at $1B," New York T i m e s . December 7, 1987, p. 17.
officials, and any other group which might otherwise block or delay their projects. The scenario is not hypothetical. Ronald Goldstock, the director of New York S t a t e ’s Organized Crime Task Force sets the stage:7
Corruption is wide spread, especially in
Manhattan, because real-estate developers and contractors are "vulnerable to anyone who has the power to cause delays" at construction sites... Routine construction problems in Manhattan contribute to the delays, [thereby]
increasing pressure on developers to bribe city inspectors or union officials to avoid further slowdowns and to recover their
initial investments. The routine problems cited by Mr. Goldstock include assembling real-estate parcels and removing tenants, jurisdictional disputes among unions and traffic congestion.
These "expediters" certainly include but are not limited to members of organized crime.8 The problem is much more integral t o — indeed, woven throughout— the fabric of the entire system.
Again, in Goldstock's review,9
Corruption is so embedded in New York City's multibillion-dollar construction industry that a permanent investigative agency may be needed specifically to uproot it,... Mr.
Goldstock, whose agency is investigating the industry, said the elimination of organized- crime racketeering would not alone solve such problems as payoffs to municipal inspectors, bid-rigging among contractors and bribes to union officials for special contract favors and the hiring of lower-paid non-union
workers. "Even if you indict and convict every mobster involved in corruption," Mr.
Goldstock said in an interview, "under current conditions someone else will come
7Mr. Goldstock is quoted by Selwyn Raab, "Anti-Crime Unit Urged for New York Builders," New York T i m e s . January 6, 1987, pp.
1, 15, at p. 15.
8John J. Goldman, "Mafia Dominates Building Trade in N.Y., Study Finds," Los Angeles T i m e s . May 20, 1988, Sec. I, pp. 1, 11.
9Raab, "Anti-Crime Unit Urged for New York Builders," p. 1.
along, recognize the potential and become the new predators. "
The key phrase here is that the causal conditions are
considered routine situations and problems, yet they are ever-so- conducive to on-going incidents of illegal activities. Clearly these represent multiple and repeated cases of corruption, pure and patent, in which manifest opportunity temptingly reinforces whatever motivations attributable to simple personal greed. No public official would openly support them. Yet the practices are condoned, in fact, virtually demanded by the system. They
certainly have an influence, that is, inflict a cost on housing and economic development policies. Their existence substantiates the observation that the context of policy programs is crucial in any policy exercise. That the two stances— a general
condemnation of corruption juxtaposed with its sure acceptance—
are orthogonal makes any public policy program that operates in this context all that more difficult.
Let us now turn to another example of "corrupt” but
repeatedly observed and perhaps encouraged behavior in the public sector. The 1987 allegations of illegal conduct in naval weapons systems procurement procedures offer a supporting set of
observations. However "wrong" these activities might have been, they were easily predictable. For years, a major complaint
regarding arms procurements is that they would inevitably consume excessive amounts of resources between the time a project would first be considered and the initial operating capability of the system.10 One of the more prominent reasons blamed for these delays was the government-issued and -enforced development and acquisition regulations, many of which were designed to assure equal access to development and procurement contracts for all
10These complaints do not address, of course, the consistent problems of cost overruns and performance reductions; Nick Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988) , discusses these particular problems in the context of the B-l bomber.
qualified bidders. The ubiquitous "red tape" enveloped— some would say ensnared— the entire process.11 Red tape was a source of frustration to virtually all defense contractors and, as it turned out, for Defense Department officials eager to field their desired new weapons systems with minumum delay.
As the number of major weapons systems open for bid declined during the 1980s, the competition for these systems among defense contractors (large and small) intensified. After all, these were contracts which could conclusively decide a corporation's very existence. It is little wonder then that corporations
aggressively sought to acquire whatever advantages they could, which, in the case of the pending Pentagon allegations, meant buying illegally obtained insider bidding information.
Contractors were implicitly abetted in these activities by the policies of the Reagan Administration, which urged free market competition and restoring American military strength as quickly as possible.12 This mandate was apparently understood by some Navy Department officials to mean that contracts should be
awarded as expeditiously as possible, deliberately setting aside regulations and by-passing the bureaucracy designed to protect the equity of the procurement and acquisition systems. These regulations and officials were seemingly perceived by the
perpetrators as obstructionist impediments which unnecessarily delayed the Administration's mandated goals. The reasons were straightforward: red tape took time and time was of the essence;
better to sacrifice fairness in favor of expediency because the Navy could not otherwise afford to "pay the costs" imposed by delays. The cure was similarly straightforward: The dilatory
11For a generalized statement of the phenomenon, see Herbert Kaufman, Red Tape: Its Origins. Uses and Abuses (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1977).
12Daniel M. Weintraub and Melissa Healy, "Scandal's Roots Traced to Basic Reagan Policy Goals," Los Angeles T i m e s . July 4, 1988, Sec. I, pp. 1, 16, 18.
bureaucracy was to be shortcircuited, thereby circumventing (or what I would view as corrupting) the system so carefully crafted to protect all the participants. Specifically, Reagan's newly appointed Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, abolished the Naval Materiel Command in 1985 and centralized its acquisition
responsibilities under his office. As one report ironically headlined, "Procurement Reform May Have Led Way to Scandal" and then elaborated:13
When John F. Lehman Jr. took the helm in 1981, it was clear where he was steering the Department of the Navy. He had a mandate from the n a t i o n ’s newly elected President to create a historic 600-ship force, and he would let nothing— and no one— stand in his way.
The issue here goes beyond whether or not corruption
existed. Although indictments have yet to be handed up in these cases, it is almost certain that there were some serious
miscarriages of justice consciously committed against public laws and regulations, i.e., the public weal. Nor is there much public sympathy for the alleged perpetrators or their actions, even by the military's staunchest supporters. Corruption, even its
faintest whiffs, is not publicly acceptable. The relevant facts, however, indicate that not only were these acts of corruption tolerated, but they were actually engendered and later
facilitated by the system itself, a system nominally designed to prevent the very acts it apparently encouraged. Decades of
development and procurement reforms, the realization of certain public chastisement, and the threat of severe penalties were not able to deter these defense contractors and sympathetic officials from their nefarious rounds.
A final recent example of corruption is the set of the
13William C. Rempel, "Procurement Reform May Have Led Way to Scandal," Los Angeles T i m e s . Sec. I, June 20, 1988, pp. 1, 15, at p. 1. Secretary Lehman has rejected his critics' charges of mismanagement; see John H. Cushman, "Former Navy Chief Defends Policies," New York T i m e s . September 17, 1988, p. 5.
Reagan Administration's actions generally known as the Iran- contra affair.14 This is a more interesting and debatable
example, for it falls outside the usual conception of corruption having a monetary or profit motive, i.e., human greed. Whatever the excesses of Lt. Col. Oliver North and Adm. John Poindexter, personal financial gain was not among them. Still, I would argue that "Iranamuck" constituted political corruption (perhaps for ideological reasons), for the Poindexter/North policies
deliberately violated consensually held institutional and legal expectations. They studiously concealed the suspect actions of one branch of the government (the executive branch's National Security Council) from another (Congress) which has oversight responsibilities.15 Their reasoning was brusquely unequivocable:
in Adm. Poindexter's words (testimony of July 20, 1987), ''I
simply did not want any outside interference." His rationale and actions are difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in the case of Immigration and Nationalization Service v, C h a d h a :16
There is no support in the Constitution for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in complying with explicit constitutional standards may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the President... With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to
preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.
14This account is largely based upon the Tower Commission report [John Tower et a l . , President's Special Review Board (New York: Bantam with Times Books, 1987)], and the Congressional hearing. Obviously there is yet much more to be learned about this entire incident.
15See Elizabeth Drew, "Letter from Washington," The New Y o r k e r . Vol. 63, No. 18 (June 22, 1987), pp. 75-92, p a s s i m .
16Cited by Morton H. Halprin, "Lawful Wars," Foreign P o l i c y , No. 72 (Fall 1988), p. 184.
The self-perceived legitimacy of the Administration’s practice extended even to the avowal that an act of Congress— the Boland Amendment— did not apply to the NSC or the President since
neither was explicitly named in the ’’constricting” legislation.
The tenuous nature of the Poindexter explanations and practices was neatly captured by the July 23rd testimony of Secretary of State George Schultz: "I don't think desirable ends justify the means of lying, deceiving, of doing things outside our
Constitutional processes.”
That nobody within the government profited from the Iran- contra affair does not imply that it was an innocent
organizational peccadillo, a "costless” circumstance, for corruption can have other adverse effects, most pointedly, a lethal decay in the delicate public faith that graces and legitimates governmental officials, processes, and decisions.
President Reagan suffered a precipitous decline in his popularity as a direct result of the Iran-contra revelations; only 26% of the Americans surveyed responded that the President was being truthful when he said he had no knowledge of the arms transfer, even after Admiral Poindexter testified that he never told the President of the N S C ’s activities.17 As I have written
elsewhere, "In a democratic society, this is a witch's brew. To violate blatantly the democratic ethos with corrupt activities produces a serious decline in public support of government, a perilous (albeit unestimatable) price to pay."18
Again, in the context of this paper, there is little cause to debate whether Iran-contra represented a corrupt act. (Its legalities are yet to be determined, let alone tried and
17From a New York Times/CBS News Poll; Richard J. Meislin, "A Majority in New Poll Still Find Reagan Lied on the Iran-Contra Issue,” New York T i m e s . July 18, 1987, pp. 1, 6. Fifty-six percent responded that they thought the President was lying while the remaining 17% had no opinion.
18deLeon, "Public Policy Implications of Systemic Political Corruption."
appealed.) Its extremely covert nature demonstrates that its proponents were well aware that their perfidious actions would not jibe with the expectations of the American people. Public disapproval would have been highly likely. If one accepts the testimony of Adm. Poindexter, he consciously hid these
activities— especially the Nicaraugan involvements— from the President. Col. North kept the knowledge of his machinations from the relevant NSC personnel, to say nothing of the State and Defense department bureaus. Yet the NSC cabal persisted in their worrisome policies. The question, then, is why would they
initiate and implement actions which could be construed as a
corruption, a legal violation of the Constitution they were sworn by their officers' oaths to uphold?
Upon reflection, these rather dubious actions can be
understood in the prevailing political environment. We need only to remember the intense political pressure that the Reagan
Administration found itself under in the mid-1980s, as its
declared war on terrorism was proving to be a costly and losing campaign, 271 dead Marines in Beirut and hijacked airliners representing a series of humiliating defeats for the out- manuevered Administration.19 Perhaps the greatest continuing
embarrassment was long-term imprisonment of the American hostages in the Middle East. A strident public was insistent in its
demand for their release. The President's repeated public
rhetoric towards that goal was reinforced to his staff by his own observation that he brought up the hostage release issue at 90 percent of his NSC briefings.20 It was not surprising that well- meaning subordinates might take the President at his word, even
if it meant not telling him and adopting highly questionable— if
19David C. Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism (New York: Harper
& Row, 1988), present an account of this campaign.
20Reported by Geoffrey Simon, "Misunderstanding Terrorism,"
Foreign P o l i c y . No. 67 (Summer 1987), p. 110.
not outright illegal— tactics and— even more problematic—
violating his pledge and apparent policy never to deal with
terrorists. (The opportunity was, of course, exacerbated by the concomitant opportunity to divert the Iranian funds to another contentious Administration foreign policy goal, the support of the Nicaraguan contras.21) Thus, in the context of the times, the "corrupt" act appears entirely explainable, if still not persuasively excusable.
Therefore, for a third time, we find that the perceived characteristics of the "system" moved individuals to commit acts which could be easily construed as corrupt and to incur "costs"
which were surely great to all involved. The point to be made here is not that corruption can occur— it indisputably does for completely discernable and maybe predictable reasons22— nor that it cannot extract significant costs— it does. Rather, our brief discussion of corruption is meant to illustrate the proposition that public policy problems— in this case, the presence of
corruption, a practice no one condones or exonerates— are not amenable to easy analytically derived solutions. Klitgaard attempts this task in the context of three Third World nations, but his recommedations are— by his admission— only temporary stopgaps, effective only as long as specific persons remain in place and on guard.23 Corruption has no public lobby nor is there "two sides to every issue" here.
The public sector confronts few "easy" issues, for it is only when individual and the private sector problems grow too large or cumbersome or difficult that one turns to the public
21The pervasiveness of that policy is documented by Robert Parry and Peter Kornblub, "Iran-C o n t r a 1s Untold Story," Foreign P o l i c y . No. 72 (Fall 1988), pp. 3-30.
22See fn. 5, su p r a . for an elaboration.
^Robert E. Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1988).
sector, or when private needs become public goods.24 The problem, I contend, overwhelms our knowledge and our capabilities. To return to the driving assumption of my argument, the inability of the policy community to resolve a problem might be more due to the intractable nature of the
problem itself than the shortcomings of the proffered approaches.
If this condition is true for a political and social phenomenon which is publicly indefensible (i.e., corruption), then the posited proposition is probably applicable for that much larger class of public policy problems in which legitimate differences of opinion and argument do obtain (e.g., environmental protection vs. economic development; national security issues; and social welfare p r i orities).
In short, there are a set of "wicked' policy problems, ones to which our current set of paradigms and approaches are hard- pressed to handle. Dror has described these circumstances as an exercise in "fuzzy gambling," which he characterizes as
operating25
in an unstable casino, where not playing is itself a game with high odds against the player; here the rules of the game, their mixes of chance and skill, and the payoffs change in unpredictable ways during the
gambling itself; where unforeseeable forms of external "wild cards" may appear suddenly
(such as a terrorist attack or distribution of diamonds by prodigal millionaires); and where health and life of oneself and ones'
loved ones may be at stake, sometimes without one knowing it.
The policy research community is destined-albeit by c h o i c e — to exist in this Alice in Wonderland environment. . The central question hen is how can it best structure and position itself to
24A more rigorous depiction of this transition is presented by Albert 0. Hirschman, Shifting Involvements (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1982) .
25Yehezkel Dror, "Policy-Gambling: A Preliminary Explor a t i o n , "
Policy Studies J o u r n a l . Vol. 12, No. 1 (September 1983), p. 9.
operate in circumstances that are best characterized by
complexity, risk, and uncertainty, "where ignorant armies clash by night.” Which leads us to a discussion of policy design as a possible— albeit only partial— remedy.
POLICY DESIGN
The definition os "policy design" is presently a matter of minor dispute. Ingraham sets out a somewhat generic
description:26
An emphasis on policy design will raise new questions, directed towards a new set of concerns: the match between problems and solution, the consideration of possible
policy options, and the extent to which more rigorous consideration of the components of design can realistically be incorporated into existing policy processes....
Dryzek defines it as "the process of inventing, developing and fine-tuning a course of action with the amelioration of some problem or achievement of some target in mind,"27 while Schneider and Ingram point out that policy design can be both a verb
("referring to the process of formulating policy alternatives”) and a noun ("describing the content [i.e., product] of
policy") .28 Linder and Peters seemingly subscribe to the second definition when they claim that "in the context of policy
problems, [policy] design involves both a systematic process for generating basic strategies and a framework for comparing
26Patricia W. Ingraham, "Toward More Systematic Consideration of Policy Design," Policy Studies J o u r n a l . Vol. 15, No. 4 (June 1987), p. 611.
27John S. Dryzek, "Don't Toss Coins in Garbage Cans: A Prologue to Policy design," Journal of Public P o l i c y . Vol. 3, No.
4 (October 1983), p. 346.
28Schneider and Ingram, "Systematically 'Pinching' Ideas...,"
p. 62; also see i d e m .. "Filling Empty Boxes: A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Policy Design," paper presented at the Western Political Science Association meeting, San Francisco, February 1988.
them. ',29
In cognitive terms, policy design calls for a expanded
search network with multiple frames of disciplinary references, a larger set of policy participant, and an emphasis on policy
"pinching’' as opposed to "blue sky" innovation.*30 In the more operational terms of Lasswell's policy process, policy design calls for the intellectual and political integration of the policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation tasks, that is, a recognition that the policy process is a seamless,
iterative system rather than a sequential set of progressions or transitions between discrete stages. Its proponents suggest that a well-articulated policy design can provide a common framework and set of criteria for developing and more accurately assessing the relative worth of an expanded menu of alternative, often competing programs.
Naturally policy design is not without its problems, the most difficult of which is how it treats the problem environment or context. If each problem is unique, then there is scant
learning experience (i.e., "pinching") and little opportunity for the development of a manageable set of policy design guideposts, let alone a theory. Policy scholars consistently warn of the dangers involved in transferring "pinched" programs from one context to another: Skocpol argues that the fundamental organization of the American political system renders any comparison to European social welfare program senseless;31 everybody knows that what happily plays in Peoria might easily
^Stephen H. Linder and B. Guy Peters, "From Social theory to Policy Design," Journal of Public P o l i c y . Vol. 4, No. 3 (1984), p.
253.
30Bobrow and Dryzek, Policy Analysis by D e s i g n , and Schneider and Ingram, "Systematically 'Pinching' Ideas...," respectively.
31Theda Skocpol, "A Society Without a 'State'? Political Organization, Social Conflict, and Welfare Provision in the United States," Journal of Public Poli c y . Vol. 7, No. 4 (Oct/Dec 1987), pp. 349-371.
bomb in Birmingham. Nor has sufficient attention been paid to the time component; policymakers and particularly elected
representatives do not always have the luxury of leisurely, expanded policy search opportunities in a world in which even simple satisficing might not be an option. A greater number of participants would place a greater strain on the already-fragile policymaking system. Lastly, the difficulties of true
multidisciplinary research are well-documented.32
Still, these reservations should not lead us prematurely to discard policy design into March's metaphorical garbage can of incipient ideas waiting— perhaps forever— to be used. Rather, one can more usefully ask how the policy design concepts might
(or might not) be applied. This would be one preliminary and constructive means to test their relevancy and utility. To refer to the earlier examples, it would seem that political corruption would be a plausible litmus test. If policy design can provide a
"policy handle" on a problem that is seemingly so inherently and systemicly "untouchable", then it would be likely that it could be gainfully employed across a wider spectrum of policy
applications. So one can ask, how might a policy design approach cope with the problem of political corruption, given that it
cannot be eradicated?
The initial step is the open recognitions that corruption can (n.b., not will) occur and, if it does, it will extract significant tariffs on the effectiveness of the proposed programs. Moreover, certain types of public policies might
encourage its existence. As Bardach has pointed out, regulation provides fertile grounds for corrupt activities,33 a condition we observed in battlegrounds as diverse as New York City real estate
32For an elaboration of these reservations, see deLeon, "The Contextual Burdens of Policy Design."
33Eugene Bardach, "Social Regulation, Rules, Inspections, and Penalties," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1988.
and the Department of Defense. The first question is then, can the costs of corruption be tolerated, if not necessarily
accepted? Is the citizenry willing to grant the policeman on the beat an occasional free lunch in exchange for his continued (and surely underpaid) vigilance, in other words, to treat it as a hidden municipal "tax" to pay for public services rendered, or, from the shopowner's perspective, another "cost of doing
business"? Or, in the case of weapons systems development, to substitute celerity for equity? If the answers are negative, then the second question is what can be done?
In response, a policy design approach would build into the policy the realization that corruption can take place and then incorporate measures for, first, detecting its presence (via a designated evaluation process) and, second, for imposing
meaningful (i.e., deterring) penalties. For instance, if the types of allegations against defense contractors and consultants described earlier in this paper were found to be true, penalties might be applied against the system which encourages individual contractors to break the rules; that is, punish all independent consultants, just not the few guilty parties (who would naturally be punished to an even greater extent). While this type of
penalty might appear unfair (e.g., why punish the entire body because of a few isolated felons?), but some form of these overarching and indiscriminate sanctions already exist on an informal basis. New Defense Department regulations resulting from the Paisley accusations will make working for the Pentagon more troublesome for virtually all consultants. If the systemic penalties were heavy, well advertised, and enforced, they could conceivably produce peer pressures among corporations which would have a greater effect across the defense industry than the
dilatory indictment and minor sentencing of a single individual or company.
Similarly, this perspective would also have clear
implications because policy implementation for it would affect
what types of programs were put into place and what types of resources they would need.34 Finally, the policy design
perspective would affect program evaluation, because it would require that the programs be closely watched to determine if the corruption sanctions were to be levied.
The essential point here not that policy design can eliminate or even curtail political corruption. That would impute an unfair standard for assessing the value of policy design. We have used the corruption example to illustrate that policy design represents more than just a new product or policy.
Rather, it is a continuous process, by which policies are
proposed and adjusted, of both information and action. As such, perhaps policy design is a minor misnomer, for design— like
architecture— implies something that, once set, is relatively immutable, that is, in (often literal) concrete. It implies that we know more than we in fact know in terms of problem definition, intervention, and effect.35 Rather, Miller's concept of a
"design science" might be more applicable,36 one that stresses (1) commitment (utilizing all resources
and changes that are not
constrained for specific reasons);
(2) ideas (spelling out the implications of goals for behavior); and
34Schneider and Ingram, "Filling Empty b o x e s . . . emphasize the need to match implementation resources to policy requirements; also see i d e m . . "Improving Implementation Through Policy Design: Framing Smarter Statutes," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September
1988.
35See Linder and Peters, "From Social Theory to Policy Design."
36Trudi C. Miller, "Conclusion: A Design Science Perspective"
in Trudi C. Miller (ed.), Public Sector Performance: A conceptual Turning Point (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1984) , Chap.
9 at p. 260.
(3) follow-through (using feedback and open-ended, dynamic m o d e l s ) .
A final important point insists to be made. In spite of its iterative, almost groping nature (evaluation informing, then
shaping implementation, etc.), policy design should not be
mistaken for incrementalism or muddling through. It is much more holistic in intent and practice. Policy design calls for a clear vision and statement of policy purpose, a requirement that
"muddlers" are reluctant to assume. At its best, policy design overcomes the conservative mien generally attributed to policy research. In this light, it could generate and execute the radical and innovative policies that are beyond the operational capabilities of the strictly incremental or marginalist approach.
In the political milieu which must increasingly combat the daunting with the daring, this would be no trivial
accompli s h m e n t .
In summary, regardless of what it is called, the policy design perspective must explicitly incorporate diversity and dynamics into its model of the policy process, in recognition of the immensely complex, uncertain, and changing environment,
Arnold's world that
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
a world in which public sector policies must per force operate and, with diligence, affect.37
SOME CLOSING OBSERVATIONS
This paper has argued that there is a wide class of policy problems which, if not actually intractable, are highly resistent to the more traditional and practiced policy analytic
perspectives. Part of their immunity can certainly be attributed
37A point articulated by Bjorn Wittrock and Peter deLeon,
"Policy As a Moving Target: A Call for Conceptual Realism," Policy Studies R e v i e w . Vol. 6, No. 1 (August 1986), pp. 44-60; also see Dryzek, "Don't Toss Coins in the Garbage Can..."
to the nature of problems and the political/social context in which they exist. Simple policy initiatives— even the
expenditure of vast amounts of resources— have not alleviated them; witness the continuing struggle for civil rights a full thirty years after Brown v. the Board of Education or the
inability to define a national industrial policy. Other basic shortcomings lie in our fundamental lack of understanding as to what causes and motivates— let alone what might cure— the
problem. Surely policy design will not provide the analytic or procedural Rosetta Stone that will translate all our good
intentions into effective policies and benevolent solutions.
But, if carefully constructed, the process and product of policy design can offer a more integrated perspective for determining what we know and, perhaps just as important, what we need to know. Both of these should have salutary effects on improving public policymaking and, secondarily, stilling the chorus of complaints.
The concern, then, is not so much the promise. Alas, promises are easily made and just as easily forgotten, even within the rarified policy research communities. The
disappointments of evaluation research and implementation
analysis stand in rueful testimony to dashed promises. Rather, those interested in policy design must develop its concepts to stretch beyond the rather innocuous, unexceptional claims that it can "improve the quality of the debate, as proposals, frameworks, and their adherents confront one another in the policy arena."38 While this is a worthwhile and probably obtainable goal, it
attainment hardly seems worth the candle. Operational measures, such as the statutes and criteria proposed by Schneider and
Ingram, and Ingraham's practical typologies must be advanced so that they can be vetted by exposure to or immersion in
38Bobrow and Dryzek, Policy Analysis by Des i g n , p. 210
substantive issue areas.39
Policy design advocates must also address the question of whether their paradigm presently implies a general theory, perhaps a middle range theory, or (most modestly), a set of
useful typologies and checkpoints. While the first might be the most academically challenging, it would appear that the last might be the most attainable and relevant to the quotidian (as opposed to quixotic) world of the policy analyst. This is not to suggest that a skillfully elaborated theory of policy should be intellectually shunted aside in lieu of immediate relevancy.
Rather, it is to suggest that in the case of policy design, the concept should be approached inductively, that a number of
workable applications need to be examined carefully before we can safely begin to articulate even a middle range theory. For
instance, what are the operating parameters inherent to an
expanded number of participants, or the behavioral limitations to the approach?
To reiterate, policy design advocates should not posture nor portend exaggerated hopes, lest they be embarrassingly pummelled by events and thereby cast further aspersion upon the policy sciences as a discipline and a profession. There should be little hope or cause in a pluralist polity to eliminate
legitimate differences and their resulting clashes. It is more plausible that good policy design can regulate or structure and as a result ameliorate conflicts by illuminating the darkling plain and thus relieve the armies of their ignorance. But this hypothesis, however laudatory and hopeful, should not be excused from accepted test and validation procedures at the earliest opportunity. In other words, policy designers should first and most emphatically address their best scrutinies to their own proposals.
39See Schneider and Ingram, "Improving Implementation Through Policy Design,"; and Ingraham, "Towards More Systematic Consideration of Policy Design,; respectively.
