HUG pre 87-1
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES
WISSENSCHAFTSZENTRUM BERLIN FÜR SOZIALFORSCHUNG
Forschungsabteilung
‘’Normbildung und Umwelt”
Reichpietschufer 50 D-1000 Berlin (West) 30
Tel.: 25 491-0
* Professor G. Scim em i is Deputy D irector of th e Environm ent D ire c to ra te of th e O rganisation for Econom ic C o-operation and D evelopm ent (OECD) in Paris. The opinions expressed in this paper a re those of th e author, and do not necessarily rep resen t th e views of th e OECD.
To be published in: U.E. Simonis (Ed.): P rev en tiv e Environm ental Policy, F ran k fu rt a. M., New York: Cam pus, 1987.
HUG - Potsdam er S tr. 58, 1000 Berlin (West) 30, Tel.: (030) - 26 10 71
I n t h i s p a p e r t h e a u t h o r f i r s t i n t r o d u c e s a p r e c i s e w o r k i n g d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e t e r m a n t i c i p a t o r y p o l i c y . On t h i s b a s i s , c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f a n t i c i p a t o r y p o l i c y a r e t h e n d e s c r i b e d , i n c l u d i n g a d v a n t a g e s a n d l i m i t a t i o n s . T h e r o l e o f t h r e e e l e m e n t s o f a n t i c i p a t o r y p o l i c y i s a n a l y s e d i n m o re d e t a i l , i . e . o f t e c h n i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y , p o l i t i c a l v i a b i l i t y , a n d d e m o n s t r a b l e e v i d e n c e . T h e a u t h o r t h e n i d e n t i f i e s a n d e l a b o r a t e s u p o n v a r i o u s c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n w i t h w h ic h d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s m ay t r y t o i m p l e m e n t a n t i c i p a t o r y s t r a t e g i e s o f e n v i r o n m e n t a l p o l i c y .
UMWELTPOLITIK UND PRÄVENTIVE STRATEGIEN
Zusammenfassung
I n d i e s e m B e i t r a g v e r s u c h t d e r A u t o r z u n ä c h s t e i n e m ö g l i c h s t p r ä z i s e D e f i n i t i o n d e s K o n z e p t s a n t i z i p a - t i v e r ( p r ä v e n t i v e r ) U m w e l t p o l i t i k zu g e b e n . D a n a c h w e r d e n d e r e n M e rk m a le n ä h e r b e s c h r i e b e n , e i n s c h l i e ß l i c h d e r V o r t e i l e u n d G r e n z e n d e s K o n z e p t s . D ie R o l l e v o n d r e i E l e m e n t e n d e r U m w e l t p o l i t i k - t e c h n i s c h e R a t i o n a l i t ä t , p o l i t i s c h e R e l e v a n z u n d e i n d e u t i g e r S c h a d e n - w i r d d e t a i l l i e r t u n t e r s u c h t . A b s c h l i e ß e n d b e s c h r e i b t d e r A u t o r d i e H a n d l u n g s o p t i o n e n , i n d e n e n p r ä v e n t i v e S t r a t e g i e n i n d e r Um
w e l t p o l i t i k d u r c h g e s e t z t w e r d e n k ö n n e n .
1. INTRODUCTION
I n S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 6 t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r E n v i r o n m e n t a n d S o c i e t y o f t h e W i s s e n s c h a f t s z e n t r u m B e r l i n h a d c a l l e d u p o n a n u m b e r o f e x p e r t s t o d i s c u s s t h e c o n c e p t o f a n t i c i p a t o r y p o l i c i e s i n i t s v a r i o u s a s p e c t s . T he s u b j e c t h a d b e e n p r e v i o u s l y r a i s e d on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s (OECD, 1 9 7 9 ; EEC, 1 9 8 3 ; S i m o n i s , 1 9 8 4 ; OECD ( b ) , 1 9 8 4 ; J ä n i c k e , 1 9 8 5 ; O 'R i o r - d a n , 1 9 8 5 ; F a i r c l o u g h , 1 9 8 5 ; W e i d n e r , 1 9 8 6 ) , w h e r e t h e e x p r e s s i o n w a s u s e d i n a v a r i e t y o f m e a n i n g s . I n o r d e r t o a v o i d a m b i g u i t i e s , a p r e c i s e w o r k i n g d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e t e r m i s a d o p t e d i n t h i s p a p e r . On t h i s b a s i s c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f a n t i c i p a t o r y p o l i c i e s , i n c l u d i n g a d v a n t a g e s and l i m i t a t i o n s , a r e t h e n d e s c r i b e d .
A t t h e 1 9 8 4 OECD C o n f e r e n c e o n E n v i r o n m e n t a n d E c o n o m i c s , a t t e n t i o n h a d b e e n c a l l e d t o t h e r o l e o f " d e m o n s t r a t e d d a m a g e , s c i e n t i f i c c e r t a i n t y a n d p u b l i c s u p p o r t "(OECD ( a ) , 1 9 8 4 ) a s r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k f o r a n t i c i p a t o r y p o l i c i e s . I n t h i s p a p e r I s h a l l a n a l y s e t h e s e t h r e e e l e m e n t s i n som e d e t a i l , u s i n g a s a b a s i c r e f e r e n c e t h e n o t i o n o f t h e E n v i r o n m e n t a l P o l i c y L i f e C y c l e a s d e v e l o p e d b y t h e H o n . P i e t e r W i n s e m i u s , t h e D u tc h M i n i s t e r f o r t h e E n v i r o n m e n t ( W i n s e m i u s , 1 9 8 4 ) . I t h e n i d e n t i f y a n d e l a b o r a t e
u p o n v a r i o u s c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n w i t h w h ic h d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s may t r y t o i n f l u e n c e t h a t f r a m e w o r k i n s u c h a w ay a s t o f a v o u r im p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a n t i c i p a t o r y s t r a t e g i e s a n d i n c r e a s e t h e c h a n c e s f o r t h e i r s u c c e s s .
2. DEFINITIONS: DAMAGE AS THE KEY PARAMETER
A d i s c u s s i o n o n " a n t i c i p a t o r y p o l i c i e s " r e q u i r e s , f i r s t o f a l l , a p r e l i m i n a r y a g r e e m e n t o n t h e m e a n in g o f w o r d s . T h i s n e e d i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e i n t h e c a s e o f o u r s u b j e c t , s i n c e
several distinct definitions of terms, such as "anticipat
ory", "preventive", "reactive" and "curative" have been ad
vanced, either implicitly or explicitly, in recent litera
ture, giving rise to ambiguity. In order to allow for a fruitful exchange of views between experts who are likely to differ in terms of background, specialisation and experience, it may help if the simplest, least controversial, and most widely accepted definitions are retained, at least as a com
mon point of departure. This does not exclude further refine
ments and even modifications of the initial positions, once the discussion has sufficiently advanced over common ground.
Based on these premises, the following definitions seem suit
able and will be adopted for the purpose of this paper:
- "Anticipate-and-prevent" strategies are those that result in action being taken before environmental damage occurs, their principal aim being to avoid such damage.
- "React-and-cure" strategies are those that result in action being taken after the damage has occured, their principal aim being to restore environmentally sound conditions.
Strategies in this class may also include the collection of compensatory payments from those responsible for causing damage, as well as transfer of compensatory payments (in
demnities) to victims of that damage.
3. POLICY CHOICE: CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES
There are clear advantages in the neatness of such defi
nitions. Simplicity and straightforwardness, however, may mask to some extent the inherent complexity of the matter.
When defined in this manner, anticipatory policies and reac
tive policies may be seen as alternative extremes: A rec-
ommendation in favour of anticipatory policies might, then, be misunderstood as suggesting that it would always be poss
ible and advisable to opt for them and discard the opposite option, no matter what particular environmental issue is at hand. In reality, the choice between anticipatory action and post-fact reaction (a choice presumed in this context to be in the hands of a social agent acting in the overall interest of the community) is limited in several ways.
The first obvious constraint has to do with the particular history of a specific environmental process or event, with the state of affairs existing when the question of choosing the best strategy first arises. In a large number of cases, namely where damage has already occured and where there is no reason to expect further damage to occur in the future (e.g., when an obsolete industrial plant has closed down, leaving its immediate surroundings highly contaminated), a remedial strategy is clearly the only conceivable option. To ignore similar situations inherited from the past and to concentrate action exclusively on tackling future problems would be an entirely fallacious interpretation of the anticipatory prin
ciple and would lead to a serious misallocation of effort.
In several other cases where no damage at all has occurred as yet but where some damage may be reasonably expected in the future (e.g., an initiative or proposition to launch a sub
stantial investment project impinging upon an environmentally sensitive area), the choice between preventive or remedial action is entirely open. In such situations, the anticipatory principle is clearly intended to encourage the first option.
* Instances of purely reactive policy, or purely anticipatory policy are useful conceptual references, but such "purity" is rather exceptional. Considering the "reaction" model first, one realises that the need to repair past damage frequently arises while damage is still occurring (e.g., long before the
decommissioning of a power plant or the total depletion of a quarry). In such common cases, the authorities while promot
ing the necessary repair and compensation actions will also, presumably, adopt appropriate measures intended to prevent damage from occurring again. Their action, therefore, while essentially reactive, will also incorporate a forward-looking component that reflects an element of anticipation (though it may come at a regrettably belated stage of the polluting pro
cess) .
Similarly, one also finds real-life instances of purely
"anticipatory" policies to be more the exception than the rule. No matter how timely, vigorous, competent, and imagin
ative efforts to reduce environmental impacts seldom succeed in eschewing damage entirely. Even the most prudent approach may often leave behind some residual, hopefully marginal im
pact, for which some sort of compensation-cum-rehabilitation action will be required. In this fashion, an element of reac
tion will inevitably intrude into what would be otherwise a case of pure anticipation.
One suggestion, therefore, might be to abandon the view of anticipatory policies and reactive policies as two mutually exclusive classes and to recognise that most policies ac
tually include a mixture of prevention and cure. The focus of the argument will then turn to the balance between the an
ticipatory and the remedial component within each policy ac
tion. Acceptance of such a view will facilitate useful inter
pretation of the anticipatory policy principle. It then will not be advisable to reject policies of one class outright and to embrace policies of the second class indiscriminately.
Rather, the direction of policy development and policy adop
tion should be shifted, to the extent possible, away from the reactive model and towards the anticipatory one.
4. BASIC ADVANTAGES OF ANTICIPATORY POLICIES
T h e b a s i c a r g u m e n t i n f a v o u r o f a n a n t i c i p a t o r y p r i n c i p l e c o n s i s t s i n t h e e v i d e n c e , g a t h e r e d t h r o u g h a l a r g e n u m b e r o f e v e n t s , t h a t e f f o r t s a im e d t o p r e v e n t e n v i r o n m e n t a l d a m a g e h a v e g e n e r a l l y b e e n m o re c o s t - e f f e c t i v e ( e s p e c i a l l y fr o m t h e c o l l e c t i v e v i e w p o i n t ) t h a n e f f o r t s t o r e p a i r i t . When t r a n s l a t e d i n t o f i n a n c i a l t e r m s ( s o m e t h i n g n o t a l w a y s e a s y t o d o ) t h e d i f f e r e n c e w as o c c a s i o n a l l y e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t .
C u r r e n t e x a m p l e s i n c l u d e p o w e r s t a t i o n s w i t h i n s t a l l a t i o n s t o a v o i d e i t h e r t h e g e n e r a t i o n o r t h e d i f f u s i o n o f n o x i o u s e f f l u e n t s i n t h e a t m o s p h e r e ( s o c i a l l y c h e a p e r t h a n c u r i n g r e s p i r a t o r y a i l m e n t s a n d r e p a i r i n g d a m a g e t o p r o p e r t y , m o n u m e n t s , a n d v e g e t a t i o n i n t h e a f f e c t e d r e g i o n ) ; c h e m i c a l p l a n t s e q u i p p e d w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e w a s t e t r e a t m e n t a n d d i s p o s a l f a c i l i t i e s ( s o c i a l l y c h e a p e r t h a n r e c l a i m i n g i n a p p r o p r i a t e d u m p in g s i t e s o r t h e d i s l o c a t i o n o f e n t i r e s e t t l e m e n t s ) ; o i l t a n k e r s b u i l t a n d o p e r a t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h e n v i r o n m e n t a l s a f e t y s t a n d a r d s ( s o c i a l l y c h e a p e r t h a n c l e a n i n g o i l s l i c k s w i d e l y d i s p e r s e d o v e r w a t e r b o d i e s ) .
C o u n t e r - e x a m p l e s i n c l u d e d r a m a t i c c a s e s w h e r e p r o v i s i o n s f o r p r e v e n t i o n p r o v e d t o b e i n a d e q u a t e o r a l t o g e t h e r a b s e n t , t h u s l e a d i n g t o m a j o r i n c i d e n t s a f t e r w h i c h n o o p t i o n w a s l e f t e x c e p t t o r e p a i r , e v e n t u a l l y a t e n o r m o u s e x p e n s e ( D o n o r a , S e v e - s o , Amoco C a d i z , B h o p a l ) .
A d i f f e r e n t k i n d o f a d v a n t a g e c o n c e r n i n g a n t i c i p a t o r y p o l i c i e s i s t h e l i k e l i h o o d , a g a i n b a s e d o n e x t e n s i v e e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t t h e y w i l l h e l p t o a v o i d c e r t a i n u n d e s i r a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n a l e f f e c t s w h ic h t y p i c a l l y a c c o m p a n y r e m e d i a l a n d c u r a t i v e a c t i o n . I f o n e c o u l d a s s u m e t h a t t h e c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e n e c e s s a r y r e m e d i a l a c t i o n w o u ld a u t o m a t i c a l l y h a v e t o b e b o r n e b y t h e o r i g i n a t o r s o f d a m a g e ( a p o s i t i o n r e p r e s e n t i n g a l e g i t i m a t e e x t e n s i o n o f t h e p o l l u t e r - p a y s p r i n -
ciple), and that equitable compensation would be automati
cally granted to the victims, such distributional issues would not emerge. Reality, however, is often different. For a variety of reasons, polluters manage to escape or reduce the payment of their debt to society. Victims are not always, or not entirely, compensated. Public authorities are often forced to intervene in order to re-establish equity, either legally by stripping polluters of ill-gotten gains (Bradley, 1986), or financially, in order to spare injustice at least to the victims. Inasmuch as equity is a social a value, soci
ety in each of these cases either suffers a loss, or pays a price, that must be added to the "technical" cost of reha
bilitation considered under the previous paragraph.
5. THE STRUGGLE FOR ANTICIPATORY POLICIES
The case for anticipatory policies has been elaborated upon extensively and eloquently in a considerable number of recent articles, essays, official speeces, and declarations. There seems therefore to be no need to insist on this aspect, if repetition has to be avoided. A more relevant question in the context of the present discussion would be to ask why, de
spite all evidence, the anticipatory component of environ
mental policies is still insufficiently developed. More specifically, what difficulties and obstacles stand in the way of progress towards a more favourable balance between anticipatory and curative efforts? Two considerations may help to introduce this discussion.
5.1 Anticipatory Policies; Theory or Practice?
F i r s t , a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e , o r p r i n c i p l e s , u n d e r l y i n g t h e n o t i o n o f a n t i c i p a t o r y p o l i c i e s h a v e a p r a c t i c a l r a t h e r t h a n a t h e o r e t i c a l d i m e n s i o n . I t i s q u i t e d i f f i c u l t t o d e m o n s t r a t e , o n c e a n d f o r a l l , i n p u r e l y a b s t r a c t t e r m s , t h e a d v a n t a g e o f a v o i d i n g d a m ag e i n s t e a d o f r e p a i r i n g i t . I t i s t h e r e f o r e v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t o v a l i d a t e , a p r i o r i , s u c h p r i n c i p l e s , t h u s e n d o w in g th e m w i t h u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y a n d e x o n e r a t i n g t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r o f t h e n e e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e s p e c i f i c n a t u r e o f e a c h c a s e b e f o r e s e l e c t i n g t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c o u r s e o f a c t i o n . E x a m p le s e x i s t , a l t h o u g h t h e y m ay n o t b e com m on, w h e r e a " r e p a i r - a n d - c u r e " s t r a t e g y m ay m ake s e n s e i n t e r m s o f s o c i a l c o s t s a n d b e n e f i t s . C o n s i d e r t h e c a s e o f a r o a d p r o j e c t c u t t i n g a c r o s s a t r a c t o f v a l u a b l e f o r e s t l a n d . One o p t i o n c a n b e t o b u i l d a s u r f a c e r o a d , e v e n i f t h i s e n t a i l s t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f a n u m b e r o f t r e e s a l o n g t h e r o u t e a n d t h e c o s t o f r e p l a n t i n g a n d r e l a n d s c a p i n g t h e a d j o i n i n g t e r r i t o r y a f t e r t h e d i s r u p t i o n c a u s e d b y t h e w o r k s . A n o t h e r o p t i o n m i g h t b e t o b u i l d a t u n n e l u n d e r t h e t r e e s , t h u s l e a v i n g t h e l a n d s c a p e u n d i s t u r b e d . T h e f i r s t o p t i o n w o u ld n o t p r e v e n t t h e d a m a g e ( a l t h o u g h i t w o u ld i n c l u d e r e p a r a t i o n , t o som e e x t e n t ) ; t h e s e c o n d o p t i o n m i g h t a v o i d t h e d a m a g e e n t i r e l y , b u t w o u ld p r o b a b l y e n t a i l a m uch l a r g e r c o n s t r u c t i o n i n v e s t m e n t . T h e q u e s t i o n o f w h i c h o f t h e tw o w o u ld b e p r e f e r a b l e , i n t e r m s o f o v e r a l l s o c i a l w e l f a r e , d e p e n d s e n t i r e l y o n s p e c i f i c c i r c u m s t a n c e s . I t c a n n o t b e s e t t l e d t h r o u g h a d i s c u s s i o n o f p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s f e a t u r e i s , o f c o u r s e , common t o p o l i c y a r e a s o t h e r t h a n t h e e n v i r o n m e n t . V a c c i n a t i o n i s g e n e r a l l y s u p e r i o r t h e t h e r a p y , b u t n o t f o r e v e r y d i s e a s e , n o r i n e v e r y c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
To sum u p , o n e m u s t a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s , n o m a t t e r how t h o r o u g h l y c o n v i n c e d t h e y m ay b e o f t h e v a l u e o f a n t i c i p a t i o n a n d i t s s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r r e m e d i a l a c t i o n , m ay w e l l h a v e t o b e a r t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f o n a c a s e - b y - c a s e b a s i s .
They can hardly hope to overcome the resistance of conflict
ing interests by merely appealing to general principles.
5.2 Anticipatory Policies and the Concept of Policy Life Cycle
The second consideration concerns the set of constraints on decision-making, not so much because of historic circum
stances (as previously discussed) but because of the techni
cal and political prerequisites for action those constraints represent. A useful introduction to this aspect of the sub
ject is provided by Winsemius (1984), "The Environmental Challenge of the Advanced Industrial Societies: Managing the Environmental Policy Life Cycle". In this study, the author explores what may be called a "policy cycle" as applied to environmental matters. Winsemius identifies four successive phases: (1) Recognising the problem; (2) Gaining control; (3) Solving, and (4) Maintaining control. Over time (see Fig. 1 ), a critical parameter rises and falls wavelike along the ver
tical axis, defined as "perceived magnitude of the environ
mental problem".
It appears from the diagram suggested by Dr. Winsemius that the crucial passage from gaining control to solving the prob
lem occurs at the peak of the perceived magnitude wave. One implication of this theory, clearly shown in the diagram, is that the perceived magnitude of the problem has to have reached a certain critical level, or threshold, in order for action to be taken.
Figure 1: The Environmental Policy Life Cycle (Winsemius, 1984)
1. 2. 3. 4.
6. TECHNICAL RATIONALITY, POLITICAL VIABILITY, AND DEMON
STRABLE EVIDENCE
In the context of the present discussion on anticipatory pol
icies, it may be helpful to reinterpret the concept of per
ceived magnitude of the problem by taking its principal com
ponents and determinants into account: "technical rational
ity", "political viability", and "demonstrable evidence".
(a) Technical rationality. In order to undertake specific ac
tion, the decision-maker will want to make sure that the amount and quality of technical knowledge and understand
ing of the issue under consideration is advanced enough to allow for an indisputable and sufficiently precise as
sessment of the resulting, or expected, detrimental ef
fects. In order for a decision to be "technically
rational" (and demonstrably so), a certain critical level of technical understanding and knowledge must have been reached. (This concept of "critical level" will be exam
ined again below.)
(b) Political viability. In order to undertake a specific ac
tion, the decision-maker will want to make sure that the public (and in particular his or her political constitu
ency) is sufficiently aware of the problem so that a de
cision, once taken, can rest on solid and sustained sup
port from public opinion. In order for a decision to be
"politically viable", a certain critical level of public awareness must have been reached. (This concept of "cri
tical level", too, will be examined again below.)
(c) Demonstrable evidence. It goes without saying that both technical understanding of a given problem and public awareness can develop only on the basis of a certain amount of evidence. In fact, evidence is a precondition for the previous two. In principle, "evidence" can be gathered in a number of ways, such as through experiments in a laboratory, comparisons and analogies between simi
lar events, logical inference, and so on. One must con
cede, however, that one of the strongest, possibly the strongest, form of evidence is that derived from the ob
servation of actual damage. Damage, no matter how re
grettable its occurrence, generally has at least the virtue of providing the opportunity to collect factual data for further scientific research and of having the potential to impress public opinion with the reality of clear and present danger. The demonstration effect of damage, both technically and psychologically, cannot be realistically ignored in a discussion of anticipatory en
vironmental policies (Caccia, 1986).
Failure to create the conditions of "technical rationality"
and "public awareness" are, undoubtedly, the major stumbling blocks for anticipatory policies. Policies undertaken in the absence of such conditions are open to doubt and criticism.
They will almost certainly be declared to be "exaggerated",
"excessive", "premature" or "misdirected" and will thus im
pose an unjustified burden upon society or at least upon cer
tain of its components. A combination of these accusations is often voiced by interested parties, and it is quite difficult for policy-makers to defend their position under such circum
stances, especially if this has to be done in the absence of
"demonstrable damage" (which could simply mean "in advance"
of its occurrence). This difficulty is eloquently illustrated in the current intergovernmental debate over car emission control and in the automobile industry's claim that the Euro
pean Community's approach has been adopted "on the basis of unproven and suspect evidence". The necessity of reaching the thresholds of technical rationality and political viability before taking action on a given environmental problem may therefore be worth looking into in detail.
7. BASIC CONDITIONS FOR POLICY ACTION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME
One can look at the three factors mentioned above as concomi
tant processes in time: the acquisition of technical know
ledge; the development of public awareness; and the accumu
lation of damage. The time sequence of these processes, es
pecially the relative timing of their critical stages, has a decisive impact on the timeliness of policy adoption — a notion central to the whole issue of anticipatory environ
mental policies.
To illustrate, one may redraw the diagram suggested by Dr.
Winsemius, retaining time along the horizontal axis but re
placing the perceived magnitude function with three separate functions: Level of Technical Knowledge, Level of Public Awareness, and Level of Damage. The relative position and the shape of these functions in the diagram will depend on the specific circumstances under consideration. A common, but by no means the general, case is illustrated in Fig. 2 .
Figure 2: Factors of the Environmental Policy Life Cycle:
Damage, Technical Knowledge, Public Awareness
Line Di“D2 indicates accumulation of environmental damage over time. In the event described in the diagram, the accumu
lation of damage, be it natural or man-made, starts at a given point in history, between time 0 and time 10. At that time in the case illustrated in Fig. 2, neither the scien
tific community nor the public is aware that anything of im
portance is happening. Line indicates the process of
gathering technical knowledge. In the case illustrated, this process does not start until some time after damage has begun to accumulate (between time 10 and 20) and proceeds gradu
ally. Throughout that phase the public is still largely un
aware of the hazard. Between time 20 and time 30, while tech
nical knowledge increases further, public perception starts to rise, as indicated by the line P^-P2 . Between time 30 and time 40, the technical understanding of the issue reaches the critical level, t, thus ensuring the first of the two con
ditions required for policy action, technical rationality.
Why is this level reached so late? Perhaps a considerable length of time was required to collect data and complete re
search. Perhaps the accumulated damage had to reach a minimum level (D^) in order for the basic information to become available to analysts. In any event, public awareness, which has only risen to level P^, is still insufficient to warrant action. Finally, between time 40 and time 50 public awareness also reaches the critical level p, at point P 2- Maybe this increase in public awareness resulted from a well-orches
trated campaign. But chances are that both the increase in damage (from to D 2 ) and the increase in technical know
ledge (from to T2 ) may have heightened public awareness.
At any rate, only at that time is the second condition of ef
fective decision-making, political viability, also fulfilled.
Only at that stage, therefore, can action be undertaken to avoid the occurrence of further damage.
Anyone who has taken the trouble to follow recent develop
ments in environmental policies will be able to recall a num
ber of instances where the process evolved very much in con
formity with this scheme. In this sense, and in spite of the schematic nature, the diagram may thus be considered to be a faithful representation of real events.
In another sense, however, Fig. 2 may be misleading. It may indeed lead one to believe that the sequence of events must
invariably and precisely follow the pattern indicated on the diagram. Furthermore, it may create the false impression that there is no way to influence the state of affairs until every condition for action has "spontaneously" matured and reached its respective, predetermined, critical threshold. If this were the case, there would be little scope in advocating an
ticipatory policies, or, to be more precise, to advocate a better balance between the anticipatory and the remedial con
tent of each policy. In each case, this precise balance would appear to be predetermined by elements beyond the control of the decision-maker. This sort of "fatalist" stance (passively waiting until "the time is ripe for action") is undesirable and avoidable. In order to explore opportunities for an "ac
tive" anticipatory approach, one may consider two questions of considerable practical importance.
First, what is the likelihood that situations such as the one illustrated in Fig. 2 will actually occur? Second, if they are likely, can anything be done to improve the situation? In order to reply to the first question, I will analyse the rel
ationships between the occurrence of environmental damage, the level of technical knowledge, and public attitudes. In order to respond to the second question, I will discuss the decision-maker's capacity to influence the elements that have a bearing on the framework: (1) to shift and/or reshape the damage function and/or the technical knowledge function and/
or the public opinion function; and (2) to alter either both of the critical levels of technical understanding (t) and public awareness (p).
8. THE SEVESO EFFECT
The answer to the first of these two questions depends on the nature and importance of connections between the occurrence of damage, the generation of technical information, and the arousal of public concern, all of which eventually prompt re
sponsible authorities to take action. (The existence of such connections, as hypothesised in the previous paragraph, is the reason for showing the damage function, D i-D2' in 2 through _5) . This chain of events is frequently observed. Per
haps the most eloquent reference in this respect is the so- called Seveso Directive of the European Communities, the very title of which alludes to the major environmental accident that triggered the development and adoption of the act. More recently, the dicision to establish the fist Federal Environ
mental Ministry in Germany (1986) was induced specifically by the impact of the Tchernobyl nuclear accident.
In a 1985 article, provocatively titled "Do Environmental Disasters have a Good Side" (Popkin, 1985), Roy Popkin of the EPA's Office of Public Affairs systematically investigated the matter, drawing on a variety of sources. According to Popkins' findings, London's 1952 "killer fog", the subsequent Beaver Commission Investigation, and England's 1956 Clean Air Act appear to be directly interrelated. Concern over Los Angeles smog was also found to be a decisive factor behind the allocation of funds for research on its cause and allevi
ation, work that eventually lead to a series of clean air legislation. The author also found an obvious relationship between the establishment of the Superfund and the common furor and national media hype in the late 1970s over the im
pact of abandoned toxic waste (Love Canal, Times, Beach, and Kentucky's "Valley of Drums"). Other cause and effect rel
ationships might exist between episodes such as Kepone pol
lution of Virginia's James River, PCB contamination of the Hudson River and other waters, and PBB contamination of dairy
cattle in Michigan and the passage of The Toxic Substances Control Act in 1976.
An interesting finding of Popkin's survey is that while crisis or disastrous environmental situations may indeed oc
casionally have a direct, nation-wide impact (federal level), they have much more clout at the state and local level, in
fluencing governments to upgrade water quality or air emis
sions standards, improve treatment facilities, or take other environmental protection measures.
9. SCIENCE AND PUBLIC OPINION
On the other hand, Popkin (1985) cautions that the demonstra
tion value of environmental disasters should not be over
estimated. Unlike natural disasters, environmental disasters
"are usually extremely slow to become apparent, and the harm they cause is often projected in a long-term futuristic sense. Environmental dangers may take decades to reach the stage where a national problem becomes obvious. To the en
vironmentalist or scientist, the dangerous situation may have been there all along, but it can rarely be seen in dramatic TV news footage or newspaper features ...
Lacking a continuing series of dramatic events like earth
quakes, tornadoes, and floods to build their case, environ
mentalists must, therefore, build a case with scientific re
search and credibility [my emphasis]. They must track national or regional patterns that can become the concern of state and national agencies and legislative bodies. Overflow
ing sewers and polluted rivers in one area need to be linked in the public mind with similar situations elsewhere. And, because of our national penchant for viewing dangers in the short term, environmentalists need to find ways to create public awareness and concern about problems such as increases in cancer incidence or shortages of safe drinking water that may develop 10, 20, or more years down the road."
These considerations call attention to different kinds of connections: those linking the process of gathering technical information with the process of increasing public awareness.
In Fig. 2, technical knowledge and public awareness are re
presented as two separate functions of time; they may indeed differ in terms of their take-off points, their slopes, as well as the moments when they reach their respective critical levels. Such differences create problems for anticipatory policies, since both technical rationality and political vi
ability have to be sufficiently developed at a certain point in time before policy decisions are likely to be made. Ana
lysts tend to agree that such differences are often quite relevant, in content as well as in timing, reflecting the basic diversity between scientific understanding and public perception of the same issues.
As an illustration, one could mention the fact of existing discrepancies in the substantive apprectiation of environ
mental risks. Scientists will go to great lengths trying to identify a broad range of risks and can even measure them with considerable precision. Still "... laymen find some risks more acceptable than others, for reasons that have nothing to do with numbers. Risks over which they have no control — like radioactive clouds from the Ukraine — are less acceptable than bigger risks they run voluntarily by smoking, driving or rock climbing. An isolated nuclear ac
cident that may kill many people seems worse than the thousands of car crashes that happen every month — but they kill, at most, just a few at a time" (The Economist, May 10, 1986) .
Reconciling scientific understanding with the public percep
tion then may pose considerable problems for the public pol
icy-maker. A specific difficulty is that the relationship be
tween scientific evidence and public perception is frequently affected by important time lags.
Fig. 2 illustrates a case in which scientific knowledge an
ticipates public awareness, a situation especially likely where the phenomenon under consideration, including the damage it causes can be detected only by sophisticated scien
tific equipment or where the nature of the process under examination requires great scientific expertise.
The rather sudden upsurge of world-wide ecological awareness that took place in the early 1970s was preceded — and to a large extent prompted — by a number of important findings, initially confined to the scientific community, even to indi
vidual researchers and restricted scientific circles, which only reached the public at large after a considerable lapse of time.
Such situation, however, should not be generalised. In spite of the conceptual and experimental difficulties inherent in a number of environmental issues, the public is sometimes quite capable of jumping ahead, so to speak, of final scientific results. O'Riordan (1985) cites "acid deposition, eutrophic
ation, radioactive waste disposal, nitrification of water supplies, and CO2~induced atmosheperic warming" as issues on which public awareness anticipated research and political action, and notes that "... in every case the scientific arguments are not resolved, yet there is public clamour for political action".
Whichever may come first, a substantive time gap between technical rationality and political viability is obviously an undesirable retarding factor in the formulation of policy de
cisions. Whatever can be done to coordinate and synchronise these two basic preconditions of policy action will consider
ably help the decision-maker's anticipatory effort.
10. OPPORTUNITIES TO INFLUENCE THE BASIC CONDITIONS FOR POLICY ACTION
As intended by Dr. Winsemius, the concept of the "Environ
mental Policy Cycle" is only descriptive. However, he is keen to note that it should "... not only help to discuss the ways in which policies tend to develop. It also indicates the man
ner in which these developments can be influenced by policy
makers" .
A similar statement also applies to the present discussion. A glance at Fig. 2 helps one to visualise several modalities allowing for the improvement of conditions and the shift of balance from remedial to anticipatory policies. These are:
- Delaying damage (i.e., sliding the D^-D2 curve towards the right);
- Accelerating technical knowledge (i.e., sliding the T^-T2 curve towards the left and/or raising its slope);
- Increasing public awareness (i.e., sliding the P-^-P2 curve towards the left and/or raising its slope);
- Reducing the minimum requirements in terms of technical knowledge (i.e., lowering the level of threshold t);
- Reducing the minimum requirements in terms of public aware
ness (i.e., lowering the level of threshold p ) .
These various courses of action all have the effect of making policy decisions possible at a stage when the level of damage (Df, D2 ) is still relatively low. (For an illustration see Figures 3, 4, and 5).
However, what is easy to draw on a diagram may be difficult to implement in practice. In the remainder of this essay I will briefly indicate the possibilities open to decision
makers and discuss the difficulties associated with each of the courses of action just listed.
10.1 Delaying Damage
This course of action, illustrated in Fig. 3, moves the orig
inal D^“D2 Ü ne (see Fig. 2 ) to position —D 2 ' to in<^icate a postponement. Damage accumulation, which in Fig. 2 was shown to begin between time 0 and 10, does start in Fig. 3 until after time 20.
This option presupposes the ability to deliberately delay the inception of a well-defined initiative while counting on a recognisable tendency for scientific research, or public awareness (or both) to advance at a significant pace (based
on ongoing laboratory work, mass-media effects, or other fac
tors). An agent in charge of environmental protection, may adopt this sort of defensive stance in an attempt merely to gain time. For example, institutional provisions exist that allow public bodies to delay decisions up to a certain point.
The issuance of a licence, a permit, or some other authoris
ation may then be deferred until the time when adequate in
formation becomes available. This presumes that information in a specific domain (e.g., impact of noise on human health) will "spontaneously" continue to develop quite independently of the occurrence of damage, until it reaches what has been called the critical threshold. It also presumes that there is little anyone — either environmentally responsible auth
orities or polluters — can do to accelerate. In other words, the accumulation of information is supposed to depend upon the autonomous and undisturbed rate of progress on the scientific front.
There are severe weaknesses in this approach. First, although it is sometimes possible to postpone the commencement of a polluting activity, it is generally much harder to interrupt such activities after they have started. Second, to retard an initiative normally entails economic costs or the loss of advantages, for the proponent as well as for society at large. Delay per se also sheds an unfavourable light upon a public service. Moreover, there is a paradox in the idea of basing an anticipatory strategy upon dilatory tactics.
The most dangerous aspect of the "gaining time" approach stems from the risk of ignoring or underestimating important links that exist between damage, technical knowledge, and public awareness. The result, then, would merely be to post
pone the whole sequence of events in the hope of some favour
able development, only to face exactly the same problem a few months or years later, probably under similar if not worse
circumstances.
10.2 Accelerating the Generation of Technical Knowledge and the Development of Public Awareness
These two courses of action are represented in Fig. 4, where both the Ti-T2 an<^ the •Pi-P2 Ü nes (see Fig. 2 ) have been bent upwards.
Figure 4: Accelerating the Generation of Technical Knowledge and the Development of Public Awareness
It is, of course, essential to distinguish, indeed to con
trast, genuine "acceleration" strategies with other strat
egies which, while allegedly sharing the position that "more information, more awareness is needed" call for a pro
longation rather than an acceleration of the respective ac
tions. Genuine acceleration can be prompted through a variety of approaches and methods and depends a great deal on the specific nature of the issue at hand.
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) are being increasingly applied to specific initiatives (especially investment pro
jects). They entail concentrated efforts, implemented over a short period of time and focused on such initiatives so as to learn as much as possible about their development. Such exercises are intended to allow the appropriate action to be taken before any damage has occured. In that sense they can be classified as typically anticipatory policy instruments.
Over the last few years considerable effort has been made to institutionalise and standardise EIA procedures, both nation
ally and internationally. Such effort may not have greatly enhanced the scientific information contained in the assess
ments. Their value is, rather, that an appropriately struc
tured process, legitimised by standardisation and insti
tutionalisation and mandating public participation might be able to ensure both the amount of technical information and the level of public acceptability needed to make anticipatory policy possible.
The direct involvement of the public in the procedure, as well as the official character of the assessment, help con
siderably to minimise the time lag that might otherwise de
velop between obtaining the required technical data and their general public acceptance as being adequate and credible. A similar interpretation can perhaps be advanced for the even more recent efforts to standardise and institutionalise En
vironmental Risk Assessments (Bohnenblust and Schneider, 1984). Despite scepticism that these may ever succeed (in view of their high complexity due to the intricacies of pro
bability concepts and measurements), one could certainly see the potential advantage for decision-makers to produce state
ments whose technical accuracy and publicity would be in
herently legitimised and ensured by virtue of the very pro
cess adopted.
Because the technique of environmental impact assessments is particularly fitting for specific projects it allows for the
"accelerating effort" to be narrowly targeted, and permits the burden of such efforts to be largely imposed upon the initiators themselves. In several other instances, however, the need for anticipatory policies may emerge from environ
mental deterioration, the origins of which are multiple and dispersed both over time and space. In order to accelerate both the gathering of information and the development of pub
lic awareness, the authorities may find it necessary to take an active role in stimulating scientific research and dis
seminating information on well-defined issues. Public re
sources being limited, priorities will inevitably conflict and change over time.
A recent example is the switching of priorities in the United Kingdom from the study of the effects of radon in buildings to the problem of leukemia clusters close to nuclear power stations. Several months after the radon study had been undertaken and while a report was expected early in 1986, re
sponsible authorities (as the U.K. National Radiological Pro
tection Board) indicated that there was as yet no evidence that the radon issue required urgent attention, whereas this is the case for leukemia clusters near to nuclear instal
lations. Resources for research were reallocated accordingly, as well as the schedule for scientific work in these two fields.
Such arbitrations are inherently difficult. They must be made, by definition, in advance of complete information.
Similar dilemmas impinge on the setting of priorities within environmental information activities, since these also entail costs. As C. Cooper (1981) demonstrated, there is no way for a public agency to decide upon the amount of funding for pub
lic information on the basis of the benefits that are ex
pected to accrue from improved public awareness:
"... the reason why the state must put resources into dis
seminating information to people is because it does not know in advance how this information will affect their subjective valuation of the environmental damage, and hence the marginal benefits derived from abatement. On the other hand, because it does not know this in advance, it cannot determine in ad
vance what additional benefits will flow from the improvement in people's information. But then there is no way of deter
mining how much expenditure is justified in disseminating the information: the amount spent on dissemination of information must not exceed the social benefits derived from it, but these social benefits are unknowable by definition until after the information is disseminated."
Finally, one must keep in mind that a number of significant environmental hazards have been detected by research under
taken on the initiative of individual researchers and insti
tutes long before environmental authorities had even sus
pected that there is a problem. Anticipatory research of this kind plays a crucial role in the environmental domain. Suf
ficient resources must continue to support this area of work, although the potential "user" is in no position either to orient the effort towards specific targets or to predict the cost-effectiveness of such an investment except by inference and analogy derived from other sources, or from previous ex
perience .
10.3 Lowering the Thresholds for Technical Knowledge and Public Awareness
These two options are illustrated in Fig. 5, where threshold lines t and p have been lowered to levels t 1 and p 1 , respec
tively.
Figure 5: Lowering the Thresholds for Technical Knowledge and Public Awareness
As shown in Fig. 4 , steepening the slope of T^-T2 and of P.^-
?2 has the effect of attaining the critical levels t and p, respectively, at a stage when D is still relatively low. In other words, accelerating the process of gathering technical information and promoting public awareness allows minimum re
quired levels to be reached in both domains earlier than would otherwise the case. This acceleration, in turn, enables one to make a decision whose technical rationality and poli
tical viability are reasonably sound — before significant damage occurs.
But what about these minimum requirement levels? How could, or should, such thresholds be established? The problem is certainly not unique to environmental matters and may have more to do with political, sociological, and perhaps psycho
logical factors than with strictly technical ones. Consider technical knowledge first. Whatever the issue at hand, ad-
ditional information will always be obtainable through con
tinued statistical surveys or research. The decision, how
ever, on how much information is enough will inevitably fall upon the individual decision-maker, even if the scientific community (or part of it) is ready to say "we know enough".
The decision-maker will have to proceed, based on his inti
mate conviction, supported, of course, by all scientific evi
dence available.
One frequently observes decisions on a certain issue being taken by a particular authority and not by others, or by a particular government rather than another, not because they differ in terms of available information but because they differ in the judgement of how much knowledge is enough. As a matter of principle, the legitimacy for a decision-maker to exert his judgement in this respect cannot be disputed.
Eventually, however, this leeway can deliberately be ex
ploited by opposing parties, representing diverging interests in a dispute over the appropriateness or the timeliness of attacking a given problem. At a minimum, one is at least en
titled to guess that trade or other domestic interests might influence that judgement. It cannot be too surprising, there
fore, to find that two countries A and B, sharing one border
line and also sharing the most complete body of information available on an issue such as acid depositions, may still come to opposite conclusions on whether or not such knowledge is sufficient to warrant vigorous air pollution control measures. Neither should it be too astonishing to find that their positions are reversed when asbestos rather than sul
phur oxide is at issue. Here, the commercial relationship works in the opposite direction. What is "enough knowledge"
for country A will not be enough for country B.
In situations like these, it does not seem too realistic to insist that "science shall have the last word". Still more intriguing, the "not enough information" argument may have two
cutting edges, as illustrated by current international dis
putes of considerable importance. Certain countries have re
cently been arguing against prompt action to reduce sulphur emissions from power plants, allegedly because of a scarcity of data on the resulting damages. At the same time, the same countries have been arguing for an immediate stop to whaling because information on the size of the whale population is said to be scarce (New Scientist, June 1986).
The problem of determining thresholds for public awareness can be described very much along the same lines. A given level of public support may be deemed sufficient for action by a decision-maker who enjoys confidence by his constituency and who has established a high standard of credibility and responsibility. The same level may not be enough (or may not be felt to be enough) if the authority in charge lacks these qualities. Under similar circumstances, the decision is very much of a political nature. Based on a strong personal con
viction of the reality and significance of a potential en
vironmental hazard, a vigorous decision-maker will be able to act at a relatively early stage with respect to the develop
ment of public awareness, whereas a weaker authority might use the notion of insufficient public awareness as a reason or pretext to defer action.
11. CONCLUSIONS
Throughout the foregoing discussion an attempt has been made to concentrate on the issue of anticipation in very specific terms: anticipation of what? (decisions), with respect to what? (damages). Deliberately accepting a rather rigorous starting point has inevitably narrowed the scope of the sub
ject. For example, a variety of approaches frequently dis
cussed in association with environmental policies, such as
the so-called multi-media approach or the integration between sectoral policies, have been virtually ignored. This is not because they are considered irrelevant but because such ap
proaches could advantageously apply to remedial policies as well, not exclusively to anticipatory policies.
On the other hand, such a specific approach sheds light on certain fascinating aspects that sometimes remain obscured by the great deal of talking one tends to hear about anticipat
ory policies these days. Part of the message from this con
ventional preaching seems intended only to convince the con
verted, or to convert the faithful. With the advantages of anticipatory policies being self-evident (so the argument goes), doubts about the subject can only be raised with frau
dulent intentions and should simply be dismissed. A more con
structive approach is to identify difficulties objectively and not ignore the obstacles that decision-makers must expect to encounter.
The first such difficulty is the decision-maker's obligation to prove convincingly that each of his decisions is in
deed timely. An excess of anticipation is likely to be a rare event. But as long as a premature decision is not inconceiv
able, each case will need to be demonstrated on its own merits.
Another difficulty in the formulation of anticipatory policy is linked with the very crucial advantage of anticipatory de
cisions: their implementation before the occurrence of damage, that is before the painful but fruitful educational experience of suffering the consequences of pollution or other environmentally detrimental processes.
A third problem stems from the fact that any sort of antici
pation depends, to a greater or lesser extent, on human capa
bilities for forecasting and on the limitations thereof:"la dimension du futur c'est 1'ignorance, le risque, l'incerti-
tude et le pari" (Sartre, 1983). It would be futile to pre
tend that anticipatory environmental policies are immune from such threats. (The evaluation of the long-term climatic ef
fects of CC>2 emissions is a classical case in point.) On the other hand, the advantages of anticipation in terms of re
source savings and sparing of effort are often far greater than the disadvantages of marginal forecasting inaccuracies.
This need to come to terms with the future is not unique to environmental policies. "Gouverner c'est prevoir." Given the recognised generality of this precept, why is it that the anticipatory approach is advocated so energetically today in the area of environmental policies? is it really more necess
ary there than in other policy areas such as health or edu
cation? This is a question that policy analysts must have en
countered, but, strangely enough, it has hardly been dis
cussed.
One explanation might be that environmental problems and es
pecially their perception are rather new phenomena. According to Dasman (1972) "... it is particularly in the sciences that deal with living things — the social sciences ... and ecol
ogy — that our knowledge is most inadequate ... (and) in most areas concerned with man's relationship with the bio
sphere our knowledge lags" behind most other scientific do
mains. If this is true, then the sudden discovery of an enor
mous backlog of existing problems may have so far forced policy-makers to focus on, and be absorbed by, the past and present so intensively that they have lost sight of the future. If this is the case, then emphasising anticipatory environmental policies must be specially requested in order to bring environment in line with public action in other domains where collective interests are at stake and where the history of policy development has a longer record. In this interpretation the anticipatory approach will be,more than anything else, a necessary and important step for environmen
tal policies towards maturity.
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