Turkey under Military Tutelage
The military coup on 12 September 1980 has been the strongest military intervention in the history of modern Turkey. The military intervened by claiming that the recent governments were unable to end growing violence between various political factions (namely between the
32 Despite its liberal traits regarding civil liberties, the 1961 Constitution provided the military with political powers through the MGK. For a thorough discussion on the constitution, see: Özbudun (2000).
33 As discussed in Chapter 2, influential scholars O’Donnell (1992), Przeworski (1991) and Valenzuela (1992) argue that “destabilizing factors” such as tutelary power, reserved domains of policy, or deliberate distortions of the electoral system and political representation impede the consolidation of democracy.
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leftist and the rightist groups), and that the internal threats against the “unitary nature of the state” were rising (Heper and Evin 1994; Özbudun 2000). The military junta banned all political parties and put their leaders in prison, prohibited all forms of political activity, and strictly controlled CS. Gürbey aptly states: “While the 1960 coup was carried out to protect civil society from the repression of the state, the motivation behind the 1980 coup was to re-strengthen the state against civil society” (2006: 13). From September 1980 until the parliamentary elections in November 1983, the military junta controlled the country under martial law, which meant that military officers retained the ultimate decision-making authority at the local level (Poulton 1999: 48). The 2012 report of the ‘Research Commission on Military Coups and Interventions’ of the Turkish Parliament revealed that during the 1980-1983 military rule, 230,000 people stood trial for their former political activities in the State Security Courts (Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri, DGM)34, 517 were sentenced to death, and thousands lost their lives in prison as torture and mistreatment were widespread practices.35
The military junta drafted a new constitution in November 1982. The new constitution banned former politicians from politics and restricted civil liberties such as the freedom of association, assembly, and of expression to depoliticize the highly polarized society (Heper 2002;
Özbudun 2000). The 1982 Constitution also introduced a relatively high national electoral threshold (10 percent) and annulled the formerly used d’Hondt method of proportional representation.36 Most notably, the 1982 Constitution enhanced the prerogatives of the MGK compared to the 1961 Constitution (Özbudun 1994; Heper and Güney 2000; Sunar and Sayarı 1986). Article 118 of the Constitution stipulated: “According to the political agenda, the ministers and the persons concerned may be invited to the Council’s meetings for consultations”. Drawing upon this article, the MGK could reinforce its decisions on the elected governments and control policies concerning the national defense and the matters of internal security which was defined broadly (Cizre 1997; Demirel 2005; Heper and Güney 2000). It was, of course, the military that decided the timing and pace of the re-democratization of the political
34 State Security Courts (DGM) were established to try cases involving crimes against the security of the state and organized crime. One of the three judges in each DGM included one military judge. DGMs in general regarded all kinds of political activity as a threat to the state’s security.
35 For more information, see: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem24/yil01/ss376_Cilt1.pdf (rev. 15.07.2014)
36 D'Hondt system allocates seats to political parties in proportion to the number of votes received. With such a high threshold, the military elite aimed to keep the smaller parties, which were considered as the source of political instability in the 1970s, out of the Turkish Parliament.
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system and set the date for the first competitive elections in November 1983 (Demirel 2005; Evin 1994). But the military elite allowed only three newly formed political parties to run for the 1983 elections.37 Hence, the return to democracy took place in a seriously constrained political leeway.
Return to Democracy: The Limited Political Environment
The 1983 elections and its aftermath marked a significant turning point in the democratic development of Turkey. Contrary to the preferences of the military elite, the newly established Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) under the leadership of Turgut Özal won the parliamentary elections (Heper and Evin 1994; Özbudun 2000). During the military rule, Özal had served as the state minister responsible for economy and implemented economic reforms that transformed the inward directed Turkish economy (import substitution industrialization model) into an export-based economy (Heper and Evin 1994; Kalaycıoğlu 2002).38 Özal’s political success lied on his attractive economic projects and reforms aiming at integrating Turkey into the market economy (Öniş 2004: 118). The ANAP, as a politically conservative but economically liberal party, ruled the country until the 1991.
Özal realized that to improve Turkey's international image the return to a functioning democracy was necessary. In 1984, the parliament allowed some political parties that were banned by the military junta to run for municipal elections and lifted martial law in several Turkish provinces (Metz 1995). In September 1987, the bans on former politicians, who were overthrown in the 1980 coup, were lifted by a referendum, and they returned to politics with their older parties under new names (Heper and Landau 1991; Özbudun 1994). Meanwhile, the ANAP government changed the election law to increase its own advantage as a large party and sought to gain both from the high electoral threshold (10 percent) and from the way how extra seats were allocated to strongest political party.39 In November 1987, all political parties took part in the parliamentary elections, which were held under the most democratic conditions since the 1980 coup, and the ANAP was re-elected.
37 These were the Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi), the Populist Party (Halkçı Parti), and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP). The former two parties were established by the military elite.
38 Özal symbolized all the transformations that Turkey has gone through in the spheres of politics, culture, and foreign policy in the post-1980 era, see further: Heper and Landau (1991), Kalaycıoğlu (2002), Öniş (2004).
39 http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/index.php/EN/yd/icerik/14 (rev. 10.11.2014)
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In November 1989, Özal became the president of Turkey, and the ANAP furthered the institutional reform process with Özal’s directives.40 In April 1991, the Anti-Terror Law (No.
3713) entered into force by repealing Articles 141 (regarding membership in anti-system organizations such as communist parties), 142 (banning communist or separatist propaganda), and 163 (regarding membership in or propaganda for anti-secular organizations) of the Turkish Penal Code (Poulton 1999: 51). The Turkish Parliament also repealed Law 2932 that limited the use of Kurdish language. However, Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law was used by the state prosecutors to convict journalists, politicians, and human right activists for having used the word ‘Kurdistan’. In April 1993, thenewly elected government41 eliminated thestate’s monopoly on radio and television broadcasting (Article 133), and the establishment of private channels was allowed (Yazici 2011). Thanks to these constitutional amendments, the political realm became liberalized.
As noted above, the military-made 1982 Constitution has envisioned a depoliticized society by seriously limiting political participation and activities (Kalaycıoğlu 2007; Özbudun 1994). Article 33 of the 1982 Constitution, for instance, stipulated: “Voluntary associations, professional organizations, and trade unions are banned from engaging in all kind of political activity and having relationships with political parties”. Therefore, the connection between CS and political society was severely damaged, and the capacities and effectiveness of political parties in political processes were curtailed (Gürbey 2006: 14f.). Surprisingly, the limits on political participation led citizens to shift their attention to civilian politics and to engage in the civil society realm.
Expanding Public Space: CS as a Democratic Agent?
As discussed in Chapter 2, a vital and strong CS is essential for the consolidation of democracy.
Since the state has been strong in Turkey; i.e., it strictly controlled the public sphere, CS could not really unfold until the 1980s (Poulton 1999; Toprak 1996). But the economic transformation, rapid urbanization, the reduction of the state’s social-welfare policies, and spread of corruption
40 Although the president was regarded as a ceremonial figure in the Turkish Constitution, Özal wanted to act both as the head of the state and the ANAP. See further: Heper and Evin (1994).
41 The prominent politician of the former decades Süleyman Demirel came to power with his True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP). He formed a coalition government with the Social Democrat Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP) under the leadership of Erdal Inönü. The DYP-SHP coalition continued to govern until 1993, when Demirel became the president because of the sudden death of Turgut Özal.
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in the 1980s paved the way for the emergence of CSOs demanding more freedom, equality, and democracy in Turkey (Keyman and Içduygu 2003; Toprak 1996). From the mid-1980s on, the number of autonomous and self-organized associations, which were committed to civilian politics, has increased (Içduygu 2007; Toprak 1996).
Newly emerging feminist groups were the first group that had the courage of challenging the military dominance and voicing their demands for more freedom and gender equality (Arat 1994; Tekeli 1995).42 In 1987, feminist groups organized a mass demonstration condemning domestic violence, which was considered the first visible democratic opposition to the state-dominated public sphere (Arat 1994, 2000).Turkey also witnessed a slow growth in the number of CSOs whose areas of interests varied from environmental issues to human rights, and from religious groups, regional solidarity associations (hemşehri dernekleri) to cultural rights.
The main reason for the increase in the number of CSOs was the introduction of several constitutional reforms in 1995. Aforementioned Article 33, which restricted the relations between CS and political parties, was lifted (Özbudun 2000: 130). Moreover, public workers such as university staff were allowed to engage in political activities (Yazici 2011). Although Turkey faced serious political conflicts in the 1990s, the expansion of political rights and civil liberties led to the proliferation of different types of CSOs, and thus the pluralization of the civil society arena.
In the 1990s, CS came to be seen as a way of resisting the strong state and as a tool to push for consolidating democracy in Turkey. This idea was also positively influenced by the rise of contentious movements that played an important role in Central and Eastern Europe democratization processes. It was believed that CS would challenge the unequal power relations between the state and society. This radical perspective on CS (cf. Chapter 2) has been idealized in Turkey. But while praising the proliferation of CSOs, scholars have ignored the fact that political space in Turkey, in which CS was operating, was still limited. The leeway of CSOs was determined by the state’s stronghold. The state elites were inimical to all forms of expression other than the official Kemalist line and closely monitored the activities of CSOs that were critical of the Kemalist state (Özbudun 2000; Poulton 1999). Since the relationship between CS and political parties was in its infancy, political parties have not really represented the interests
42 Chapter 6 examines in great depth organized feminist women in Turkey.
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of CS, and the access of CSOs to political processes was almost non-existent. Notwithstanding the fact that the number of independent CSOs in Turkey have increased, CS could not substantially exert influence on the government.
While CS was struggling to fully integrate itself in the political sphere, the Turkish state was experiencing a serious legitimacy and identity crisis. The two core principles of the Kemalist state, Turkish nationalism and secularism, were contested by the resurgence of Kurdish uprisings and the political Islam (Ergil 2000; Özbudun 2000; Smith 2005; Somer 2007). Both the Islamist and the Kurdish movement have clamored for the recognition of their religious and ethnic identities and demanded inclusion in the political processes.
Challenges to Democratic Consolidation: The Rise of Kurdish Separatism and Political Islam
Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the Kemalist state elite (the military and the state bureaucracy) had suppressed the identity claims of the religious and ethnic segments of society by imposing a rigid understanding of secularism and ‘Turkishness’ (Öniş 2013: 105). This approach has led to major discontents within the religiously conservative as well as the Kurdish segments of Turkish society. While stressing the Turkishness of citizenship, the Kemalist state elite denied the existence of the Kurdish identity, which over the years resulted in several Kurdish insurrections (Satana 2012: 171). The most challenging one emerged in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup. In 1984, a separatist insurgency by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK), an extreme left-wing group set up by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978, began armed attacks on the Turkish security forces mainly in the Kurdish populated south-east of Turkey (Ergil 2000; Poulton 1999; Satana 2012). The PKK fought for the self-determination of the Kurds and initially demanded a separation from Turkey to establish a free Kurdish state.43 The PKK leadership saw the violent resistance as the only possible way to contest the limited political space for Kurds (Satana 2012: 172). The violent conflict between the Kurdish PKK and the Turkish military has escalated throughout the 1990s and cost more than 30,000 lives.
During the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, the Kurdish region witnessed the state of emergency, recruitment of Kurdish villagers to take arms against the PKK (known as “village
43 For an overview of the Kurdish question in Turkey, see: Ergil (2000), Kirisçi and Winrow (1997).
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guardians”), the burning down the villages, displacement of the Kurdish population from villages to the cities, and disappearances under police custody (Ergil 2000; Satana 2012). Even though the ban on the use of the Kurdish language in cultural activities was partly lifted in 1991, spoken Kurdish was a taboo in daily life. All these facts have escalated the Kurdish-Turkish conflict even further. While the PKK maintained its guerilla warfare, Kurdish human rights organizations, such as the ‘Organization for Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People’
(İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar için Dayanışma Derneği, MAZLUMDER, close to the Islamist circles) and
‘Human Rights Association’ (İnsan Hakları Derneği, IHD, close to the leftist circles), carried out an effective work on making torture and ill treatment in the Kurdish region publicly visible. They also criticized the Turkish state’s militaristic approach towards the Kurdish question. These CSOs faced pressure and censure imposed by the state authorities. Meanwhile, the Kurdish political parties were often banned, and their politicians were put in prison (Ergil 2000; Poulton 1999). Since the participation and inclusion of Kurdish citizens in the political system were hindered and the “tutelary power” (Valenzuela 1992) of the military shaped the daily lives of the Kurdish population, the Kurdish question became a major political problem for the consolidation of Turkish democracy in the 1990s.
In the same decade, Turkish democracy also faced the Islamist challenge. The rise of the political Islam was a boomerang effect of the military elite’s attempt to unify society under the banner of religion. Although the military considered itself the guardian of secularism, the military junta of the 1980-1983 decided to impose religion in public life to counteract the ‘alien ideologies’ such as Marxism and fascism (Gürbey 2006; Heper and Güney 2000; Poulton 1999).
Accordingly, the Turkish state by means of the constitution, the military, the government, and the bureaucracy promoted a conservative nationalist-religious ideology in social and cultural life that has been labeled “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” (Arat 1994: 245). The military junta, for instance, introduced compulsory religious education in primary and secondary schools, which is still in force (Article 24). The promotion of Islamic morals throughout the 1980s prompted the Islamist movement, and it began to develop its own political strategy for expanding the Islamist awakening.
The Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), under the leadership of prominent politician Necmettin Erbakan, embraced the urban poor who were hit by the economic and political instability of the 1990s. Erbakan’s RP promised to provide a “just system” (adil düzen)
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by referring to the fair distribution of wealth (Yavuz 2000: 35). The masses appealed to political Islam as a response to the rough urbanization, a backlash against globalization, and the erosion of cultural identity (Smith 2005: 314). In 1994, the RP won the local elections in major cities, including Istanbul and Ankara, and the parliamentary election in 1995. For the first time in Turkey’s history, an Islamist party had gained a majority in the electoral arena. Yet the RP’s success alarmed both secularist segments of society and the Kemalist state elite. Even though the RP formed a coalition government with the secularist center-right True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP), the secularist-Islamist tension within society became radicalized. At the MGK meeting on 28 February 1997, the military elite forced the RP-DYP government to enact several measures to prevent Islamist activities in public life in order to protect secularism. The 28 February intervention was called the “post-modern coup” in public debates, because it was not a direct military intervention, and unlike the previous coups (1960, 1971, and 1980) it was followed by a civilian government (Ozcetin 2009: 111). Since Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan hesitated to implement the MGK recommendations, he was later forced to resign from his office.
In 1998, the RP was outlawed by the Constitutional Court, and the party’s leadership were banned from political activity for a period of five years (Demirel 2005; Heper and Güney 2000;
Özbudun 2010). Paradoxically, the democratically elected RP was closed down in the name of secularism and “balancing” democracy, as the military defines it. The repercussions of the 28 February intervention determined Turkish politics in the years to come.
Clearly, to understand the points of divergences within CS and the conflicts in the political life in Turkey, one needs to take into account the dynamics of Turkish politics conveyed mainly by the Kurdish question and the Islamist movement. The best example is the fragmentation of organized women’s movement due to these two political cleavages. In the 1990s, women activists were not merely labeled “Turkish women with secular persuasion”, but referred as feminist, Islamists, Kurdish feminist, or Kemalist women (Arat 2008: 400).
Limitations on Democratic Consolidation in the 1990s
Drawing upon the theoretical approaches discussed in Chapter 2, scholars labeled Turkey a
‘defect democracy’ or a ‘hybrid regime’ in the 1990s (Heper 2002; Özbudun 2000).44 Despite
44 For brief definitions of hybrid regimes or deficit democracy, cf. Chapter 2.
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political reforms, Turkish democracy suffered from several deficits. As briefly discussed, the dominant role of the military in politics through the MGK had inhibited the effective power of the incumbent governments. Political crises have not been solved by means of democratic rules, but rather by the military’s interference in politics. Hence, elected governments lived under the shadow of possible military coups. This has, in turn, restricted the autonomy of the political society, i.e. political parties, political leadership, and elections. The recurrent military interventions and the Constitutional Court decrees to ban the political parties have disrupted party continuity and their organizational development as well as their capacity. Between 1990 and 2000, the Court has banned sixteen parties45, which made the party system weak and volatile. Moreover, the limited capacity to develop strong organizational roots within CS was a further obstacle for political parties to fulfill their roles as mediators between the state and CS.
The major problem was the lack of the rule of law. Even though the 1982 constitution stipulated that “Turkey is a democratic, secular, and social state governed by the rule of law”
(Article 2), basic rights of individuals such as right to freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were not protected. For instance, those who raised topics such as rights of the Kurdish minority have been subjected to a variety of extra-legal measures such as arbitrary arrest, threats, physical violence, or even murder (Poulton 1999: 58). In addition, the absence of the rule of law severely damaged the separation of powers. As mentioned above, the judiciary was acting in line with the Kemalist ideology, rather than protecting individual rights and democracy. Despite the extensive economic liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey had severe economic problems such as low productivity, high inflation, decreased wages, and unfair income distribution (Barkey 2000; Öniş 2004). The privatization of state enterprises has led to weakening of the bureaucratic apparatus with costly consequences that became evident with
(Article 2), basic rights of individuals such as right to freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were not protected. For instance, those who raised topics such as rights of the Kurdish minority have been subjected to a variety of extra-legal measures such as arbitrary arrest, threats, physical violence, or even murder (Poulton 1999: 58). In addition, the absence of the rule of law severely damaged the separation of powers. As mentioned above, the judiciary was acting in line with the Kemalist ideology, rather than protecting individual rights and democracy. Despite the extensive economic liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey had severe economic problems such as low productivity, high inflation, decreased wages, and unfair income distribution (Barkey 2000; Öniş 2004). The privatization of state enterprises has led to weakening of the bureaucratic apparatus with costly consequences that became evident with