In the 1990s, these three Islamist women’s CSOs pursued their struggle on two fronts. First, they contested the Kemalist state’s understanding of secularism and rejected its control over religion.
The Kemalist secularism required Turkish citizens “to leave their religious beliefs behind in the private sphere” (Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008: 798). Therefore, the Kemalist state discouraged all religious symbols and practices in the public sphere (Marshall 2005; Ozcetin 2009). Second, these organized Islamist women contested the patriarchal structures of the Islamist movement. They realized that Islamist male politicians instrumentalized the visibility and the dynamism of organized Islamist women only for their political purposes, but in reality, they believed that women should primarily fulfill their domestic duties. Organized Islamist women thus criticized the gender roles ascribed to them as ‘housewives and mothers’ and argued that women can reconcile their family and everyday life (work or university) with Islamic duties (Marshall 2005;
Saktanber 2002). BK, for instance, publicly criticized the patriarchal perspectives and policies of the Diyanet and organized seminars on feminist readings of Islamic texts (Akman 2008: 85).
As mentioned previously, in the aftermath of the 28 February 1997 military intervention, the headscarf ban was strictly applied in public institutions. More than a hundred thousand students and ten thousand public servants were deprived of their status (AKDER 2010: 16). All three Islamist women’s CSOs – GIKAP, BKP, and AKDER - argued that the headscarf ban is a violation of the basic rights of women, as it hinders women’s participation in the educational, professional, and political life. Therefore, the struggle against headscarf-related discrimination against women was the most important issue on their agenda. In addition to organizing public protests calling for lifting the headscarf-ban, members of BKP, GIKAP, and AKDER held public events to discuss and publicize their right to wear headscarves in public institutions as a matter of ‘right to education and work’ and ‘freedom of religion’ (Marshall 2005; Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 2008). In other words, they based their arguments on a universal human rights discourse (Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008: 792). BKP emphasized that the participation of women, veiled or not, in educational and professional life will strengthen women’s status within Turkish
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society.146 These Islamist women had nothing in common with the traditional image of Muslim women as uneducated, passive, and devoted to the family; on the contrary, they were publicly visible, politically active and educated women (Arat 2005; Göle 1996b).
Islamist women’s demand to be recognized as equal citizens, free to claim entitlement to education, work and political participation, was a fully democratic claim (Seckinelgin 2006: 751).
However, Turkish public opinion in the 1990s did not consider these Islamist women with headscarves as democratic agents. The secularist state elite, the media, and the Kemalist segments in society made headscarves into “the object of fear of Islamization” (Ozcetin 2009:
113). They have not tolerated the presence of Islamist women activists in the public sphere.
Turam rightly argues that Islamist women became the “scapegoat’” of the tension between Islamist politics and the Kemalist state (2008: 479).
While the headscarf issue was a priority for organized Islamist women, they have also paid attention to the issue of women’s rights. Before forming their organizations, a group of women from BKP and GIKAP participated in international meetings such as the Beijing UN Conference on Women (1995) and Istanbul Habitat II Conference on Human Settlements (1996).
As they discussed women’s problems with other women activists from different parts of the world, they acknowledged that women, independent of their social, cultural, religious, or ethnic identity, experience discrimination because of their gender. Accordingly, both GIKAP and BKP began to develop their arguments from a woman’s perspective. They began to criticize the headscarf ban not only as the state’s interference in the religiosity of its citizens, but also as a violation of women’s rights to education and work.
In the 1990s, Islamist women’s CSOs were not very active in the issue of violence against women. They emphasized improving women’s status in their families, but without focusing on domestic violence. In the second half of the 1990s, they addressed the state’s violent acts towards women with headscarves, but only few Islamist women activists referred to the issue of domestic violence. The reasons for Islamist women’s groups’ lack of interest in this issue can be explained as follows: First, they were primarily occupied with asserting themselves as citizens in the strictly secularist public space and as individual actors within the Islamist movement. Hence,
146 Personal communication with H. Tuksal,October 2010, Ankara.
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they rather focused on the question of social and political inclusion. Second, Islamist women’s CSOs were newcomers within the broader women’s movement; thus, they were inexperienced in framing women’s problems and finding solutions. Third, they neglected the issue of violence because the experts in the area were feminist CSOs, with whom Islamist women were not in a dialogue.
Islamist women’s CSOs in the 1990s brought about a variety of political and cultural debates in Turkey. Most importantly, they led to a reconsideration of the Kemalist understanding of secularism and the secular public sphere. Interestingly, the efforts of Islamist women activists led organized feminists to realize that religious women were prevented from participating in public life because of their gender identity, while Islamist men could enjoy public life without facing any kind of discrimination. Feminists in Turkey normally criticized the Islamist doctrines regarding the covering women’s bodies, on the ground that these doctrines suppress women’s sexuality. In contrast, Islamist women activists claimed that wearing a headscarf “frees them from being sexual objects” and enables them to participate in public life (Marshall 2005: 110). Accordingly, some feminists began to understand and defend Islamist women’s claims. These feminists argued that women might be able to participate in public life regardless of their style of dress (Arat 2008: 412). Conversely, secularist Kemalist women disliked the visibility of Islamist women in the public sphere and considered them a
‘threat’ to Turkish secularism.147
At the end of the 1990s, there were more than 300 Islamist women’s CSOs including associations, foundations, cultural clubs, and other groups. Islamist women activists were divided among themselves with regard to their approaches to women’s issues (Marshall 2005:
107). The “orthodox” groups interpreted women’s role and gender relations in society in traditional Islamic terms, whereas “non-orthodox”, or “reformist”, groups supported women’s participation in public and political life (Akman 2008: 75; Marshall 2005: 107). But both sides have agreed that Islam requires veiling and expressed a commitment to Islamic duties.
Organized Islamist women have managed to establish themselves as an important group within the broader scope of organized women in Turkey, but they have not always found a
147 Chapter 9 discusses in detail how Kemalist women activists approach the headscarf issue and Islamist women’s activism.
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common ground on which to work on women’s issues together with other women’s groups (Arat 2008; Marshall 2005). However, the democratized political realm in the aftermath of Turkey’s acceptance for EU membership candidacy (1999) provided Islamist women’s organizations with opportunities to interact with the broader women’s rights movement in Turkey. During the political reform process for the EU candidacy, the most important topic on women’s rights movement was reforming the Civil Code.
The Process of Amending the Civil Code
The working and lobbying groups dealing with the revision of the Civil Code were dominated by feminist and secularist Kemalist women, who had been working on the Civil Code since the 1980s. The Islamist women’s CSOs considered here were not included in these groups. But during the nationwide campaign launched by WWHR in 2001 (cf. Chapter 6), activists of BKP and AKDER supported the draft proposal on equal property sharing in case of divorce. After the new Civil Code was enacted in January 2002, organized Islamist women were involved in promoting the new Code. To this end, they organized meetings and seminars that informed women on their rights in marriage. Fatma Benli, a member of the advisory board of AKDER, emphasized in our interview: “The important thing is to inform society about changes in the laws pertaining to women’s lives. If society acknowledges that women have equal rights, then we can have real change”.
During the amending process of the Civil Code, the cooperation among different women’s CSOs displayed that a women’s coalition can overcome barriers among organized women. Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal from BKP was well known in feminist circles, and she worked with women activists from diverse groups on different platforms. In December 2001, after the USA invaded Afghanistan, BKP joined the anti-war platform called the ‘Permanent Women’s Platform for Peace’ with women from feminist, leftist, and Kurdish CSOs and parties in Ankara.148 This platform stressed that since women and children suffer most in wars, it aims to challenge militaristic violence and the oppression of women and to struggle against rising nationalism and racism (Işık 2004). This experience helped BKP develop closer relations with secular feminists, leftist and Kurdish groups. In the midst of the political reform process for EU candidacy, the
148 http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?p=137 (rev. 21.02.2014)
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parliamentary elections took place in November 2002 and the newly formed Islamist AKP came to power.