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The Participation and Inclusion of Islamist Women’s CSOs in the AKP Era

Some members of BKP were founders of the AKP.149 The party came to power with the promise of removing constraints on civil rights and freedoms, including the headscarf ban, and offered a golden opportunity for Islamist segments of CS to integrate in the political system. Not surprisingly, Islamist women’s CSOs hoped to solve the problems arising from the headscarf ban.

They believed that it would be easier to interact and cooperate with the Islamist AKP than with previous Turkish governments.

In the decade since the AKP came to power, organized Islamist women have widened their scope in the struggle for women’s empowerment. Although the primary focus of Islamist women’s CSOs has been discrimination against religious women because of the headscarf ban, they have also engaged in strengthening women’s equal rights and combating violence against women.

Violence against Women

Organized Islamist women first joined the struggle against violence against women in the 2000s, especially during the process of amending the Turkish Penal Code. They began to engage in campaigns against domestic violence and developed their own ways of preventing violence against women. Like other women’s group, they used a human rights framework and declared that domestic violence is a violation of human rights. In combating violence against women, Islamist women organizations have emphasized three important points: 1) improving existing laws regarding violence against women, 2) increasing the cooperation between local state institutions, such as municipalities and governorates, and CSOs in establishing women’s shelters, and 3) raising women’s awareness of their legal rights. The amendment to the Penal Code was an important step in the struggle against violence against women.

149 Fatma Bostan Ünsal from the executive committee of the BKP is a founding member of the AKP.

172 The Reform Process of the Turkish Penal Code

When the Women’s Platform on the Turkish Penal Code prepared legal proposals to make gender-sensitive amendments to the Penal Code, Fatma Benli from AKDER participated in this working group and drew attention to the discrepancy between the existing laws in the Penal Code and the requirements of the CEDAW treaty. Likewise, Fatma Bostan Ünsal from BKP was also active in the Women’s Platform (Alemdar 2013: 144). It was the first time that Islamist women CSOs worked together with secularist Kemalist women’s CSOs.

During the reform process, some legal proposals encountered strong resistance from religiously conservative MPs. Both Benli and Akbulut from AKDER underlined in our interview that it was important to lobby AKP politicians by conveying the views of politically active Islamist women, who were seen by Islamist politicians as their own clientele. GIKAP was indirectly included in the reform process since AKDER is one of its member organizations. As a result of the intensive advocacy and lobbying activities of all women’s groups and the pressure rising from the EU accession process, the majority of the proposals of the Women’s Platform were accepted (cf. Chapter 5).

After the ratification of the revised Penal Code in September 2004, BKP also joined the

‘Ankara Women’s Platform on the Penal Code’, which was coordinated by the influential feminist CSO ‘Flying Broom’ (Uçan Süpürge). The BKP was invited to the meeting of the Ankara Platform that was formed to promote the amended Penal Code. Safiye Özdemir from BKP contributed to the preparation of the public statement and presented the views of BKP: “We have worked a lot, struggled a lot, and the achievements are our success. But women of this country deserve more.

For more freedom, for more democratic Turkey we must continue our struggle!”150 Like other women’s CSOs, BKP also published brochures, posters, and CDs presenting the changes in the Penal Code and sent them to different regions in Turkey.

All three CSOs have promoted the new laws in the Penal Code. Fatma Benli from AKDER, for instance, prepared reports explaining the new regulations and laws protecting women and children from violence. She also prepared a detailed brochure on the Penal Code. Similarly, BKP listed the new laws in the Penal Code on its website and worked to inform women about their

150 http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?p=145#more-145 (rev. 17.03.2014)

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rights in cases of domestic violence.151 GIKAP welcomed the new regulations such as the removal of the notion of ‘consent of the child’ in sexual abuse, harsher sentences for ‘honor killings’, and the clarification of the definition of sex crimes. Islamist women’s CSOs have also organized meetings to discuss the new laws and their benefits for the family. Some traditionalist Islamist women from GIKAP were not necessarily advocates of new provisions such as ‘decriminalizing adultery’. They rather stressed the regulations that deal with sexual offences against women and children.152

After the revision of the Penal Code, Islamist women’s CSOs began to engage in the struggle against domestic violence and underlined the importance of women’s shelters for protection of women and children from violence.

Women’s Shelters

None of the Islamist women’s CSOs analyzed here run a women’s shelter. However, they participate in the annual meetings of the aforementioned Assembly of Women’s Shelters and Counseling/Solidarity Centers (cf. Chapter 6). There they participate in workshops, acquire the latest information about the extent of violence against women in Turkey, and exchange ideas with other women’s rights organizations and state officials on how to better protect women and children from violence. Özgür Sunata from the feminist group Purple Roof claimed in our interview that there were minor disputes between Islamist and Kemalist women activists in the working groups at the Assembly. This was mainly because Kemalist women were showing their disapproval of headscarves, which did not fit the image of a ‘modern’ Turkish woman. Organized Islamist women, especially the AKDER and BKP, have avoided these kinds of confrontations.

Islamist women’s CSOs are pleased with the new regulations aimed at protecting women and children from violence, but they argue that the AKP government needs to be stricter in the enforcement of the laws. Both BKP and AKDER underline on their websites the need to establish more women’s shelters in Turkey. In this regard, they welcomed the enactment of Article 14 of the Municipality Law (No 5393) that requires municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants to establish women’s shelters. Neslihan Akbulut from AKDER pointed out in our interview:

151 Ibid.

152 http://gikap.org/t2.html (rev. 19.11.2014)

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“The most effective action against domestic violence is to enable women to move away from the violent environment, in other words, to provide women with shelters. Although municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants are required to establish women’s shelters, the number of women’s shelters in Turkey is low, and municipalities that fail to implement the law face no sanctions. If the political parties in the Turkish Parliament are sincere in this policy, they need to push the local authorities and impose sanctions.

Most of the time, women experiencing violence, including the ones who apply to AKDER, think that they cannot live alone because they are dependent on their husbands’ income.

Therefore, state institutions should offer women guarantees enabling them to live on their own. This is why AKDER sees women’s shelters as vital in rehabilitating women and enabling them to get on with their lives in a healthy way.”

One of the member organizations of GIKAP, the ‘Association of Compassion’ (Şefkat Derneği, ŞEFKAT-DER) has a women’s shelter in Konya, a major province in Central Anatolia. It has helped approximately 6,000 women and children who were poor, homeless, victims of violence and prostitution, homeless children, or orphans.153 ŞEFKAT-DER collects donations through a variety of activities, offers educational courses for women, helps children in the shelter in their homework, and informs schools about the sensitive situation of these children. It has also directed many needy women to other women’s organizations.

Further Efforts for the Prevention of Domestic Violence

Despite the positive legal changes in the Penal Code, violence against women, especially domestic violence, continues to be a major problem in Turkey. Organized women have thus pointed to the need to revise the aforementioned Law on the Protection of the Family (No. 4320).

The law was amended in 2007, but did not provide protection for non-married women. This implied that women with religious marriages (imam nikahı) could not benefit from this law.

Islamist women’s CSOs argued that women, married (religiously or legally) or not, can be victims of violence, and that they have to be protected under any circumstances. Therefore, they joined the aforementioned ‘Stop Violence Platform’, where they worked together with feminist, Kurdish, and secularist Kemalist women’s CSOs (cf. Chapter 6).

153 http://www.sefkatder.org/hakkimizda.html (rev. 25.03.2014)

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During the process of amending Law 4320, Fatma Benli from AKDER, for instance, worked on several legal proposals pertaining to violence against women. She defined different forms of violence and prepared highly detailed reports on laws and regulations relating to domestic violence. Similarly, legal experts from BKP were also active in the process and participated in the working group on Law 4320. These Islamist women activists tried to balance between women’s CSOs and officials of KSGM. After long disputes between women activists and officials, on 8 March 2011, the new Law to Protect Family and Prevent Violence against Women (6284) was enacted. Fatma Benli from AKDER argued in our interview that the new law provides extensive protection and assistance to victims of violence, but she agrees with feminist organizations that the law emphasized ‘the protection of the family’, rather than ‘the protection of women as individuals’.

On the issue of violence against women, BKP is the most engaged Islamist women’s CSO.

It emphasizes two important points in combating domestic violence against women: the importance of the state’s responsibility and raising men’s awareness of violence against women.

In July 2007, BKP participated in the workshop of KSGM’s first National Action Plan to Fight Domestic Violence against Women (2007-2010) (cf. Chapter 5). Initially, participants from various state institutions, CSOs, and universities defined different forms of violence. As Nurşen Orakçı from BKP explained, the participants then discussed short and long-term plans to reduce domestic violence against women with the representatives of KSGM.154 They pointed to several problems in the implementation of the project and worked on developing alternatives and solutions for combating domestic violence. BKP actively participated in drafting the first National Action Plan against Domestic Violence.155 One of its main tasks was to train state officials in gender equality and the issue of violence against women. In this regard, BKP assisted in the trainings given by KSGM to the personnel of Diyanet. Moreover, in 2014, BKP embarked on a new project called “Its Subject is Man” in cooperation with the Maraş branch of the Union of Personnel of Diyanet, which is supported by the influential Turkish CSO Sabancı Foundation and the UNDP.156

154 http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?p=8#more-8 (rev. 26.03.2014)

155 Ibid.

156 Sabancı Foundation is endowed by one of the wealthiest families in Turkey. For further information about the mentioned project, see: http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?p=689 (rev. 26.03.2014)

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Fatma Benli from AKDER stated in our interview that she, as a lawyer, supported three projects dealing with the violence against women in 2011, two of which were in Ankara. She said that: “To combat violence against women, both CSOs and state institutions have to develop concrete solutions. In particular, state institutions talk about the urgency of the problem, but do not act accordingly. For instance, they do not implement laws correctly”. Benli argued that the Supreme Court (Yargıtay) and the Council of State (Danıştay) of the Turkish Republic have not changed their sexist views on women’s bodily rights, and that judicial personnel still see women as a symbol of the family’s honor. For instance, both the Supreme Court and the Council of State still want evidence of the family’s intent in cases of ‘murder following customary law’

to understand the background of the murder. However, the decision to kill a female member of the family is usually taken in a family gathering, and this collective decision is not easy to prove.

Fatma Benli thus argues that murder in the name of customary law needs to be classified as an

‘aggravated homicide’ in the Penal Code, and that the sentence of the perpetrator may not be reduced in any circumstances.

In sum, Islamist women CSOs joined the struggle to eliminate violence against women and children. But a prominent women’s rights lawyer from the ‘Izmir Women’s Solidarity Association’ (Izmir Kadın Dayanışma Derneği) claimed that Islamist women’s CSOs in general are not well organized in dealing with the issue of violence against women.157 As discussed above, Islamist women’s organizations are not as persistent as feminist or Kemalist women CSOs are, but they work for the recognition of the domestic violence as an ‘unacceptable practice’ among religious segments of society. Encounters with legal experts from Islamist women’s CSOs equip more traditionalist religious women with up-to-date information about their legal rights and improve their ability to be vocal or to act against domestic violence. As mentioned in Chapter 6, Altınay and Arat (2009) underline the efforts of women’s organizations in raising public awareness of domestic violence, and Islamist women’s CSOs have arguably contributed to this effect.

Women’s Rights and Gender Equality

In the last decade, Islamist women activists have paid a great deal of attention to strengthening women’s rights and gender equality. As mentioned above, they actively participated in the

157 Personal interview with Sevgi Binbir, September 2011, Izmir.

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reform process of the Penal Code and lobbied the AKP politicians to push for changes. However, they assert that the most important step in strengthening women’s rights is to inform women of their existing rights both in the Civil and Penal Code. To this end, AKDER launched a national project in 2011, which aimed to supervise women’s groups in different regions of Turkey in their struggle for women’s empowerment.158 AKDER thereby aimed to equip these women’s CSOs with necessary information about the existing laws and regulations on women’s rights. Likewise, BKP worked with the aforementioned Sabancı Foundation on empowering women in accordance with the UNDP’s gender equality strategy, which aims to empower women and girls to fully realize their rights in all spheres of life.159

As mentioned above, the Civil Code provision regarding equal share of property in case of divorce applies only to marriages that took place after the renewal of the Civil Code in 2002.

Like feminist CSOs, Islamist women’s CSOs have criticized this regulation and advocated the application of this law to all marriages. In this regard, AKDER provides legal counseling for women and helps them with issues such as property sharing and custody after divorce. Fatma Benli from AKDER is also a prominent advocate of amending the law on property sharing. At the time of our interview, she was working on a case in which her female client could not acquire half of the property because she was married before 2002. She stated that if her client’s claim was not accepted in the Turkish courts, she would apply to the CEDAW committee. If the CEDAW committee decides that her client is discriminated against, then Turkey as a signatory state has to reconsider and revise the law concerning property sharing. Fatma Benli also provides free legal services to women applying to the Istanbul Bar Association. Other than AKDER, both GIKAP and BKP also direct women to legal experts in case of divorce, or inform them by individual correspondence about their rights according to the Civil Code.

In order to raise awareness of gender equality, both BKP and AKDER were supportive of the KSGM’s project on training the personnel of Diyanet on gender equality and domestic violence and emphasized the need to overcome traditional customs inhibiting gender equality (KSGM 2012: 14). Since 2009, KSGM in cooperation with BKP and AKDER has educated 2,400 public servants of Diyanet on gender equality and women’s rights (Ibid.).Moreover, both AKDER

158 Personal interview with Neslihan Arıkan, October 2011, Istanbul.

159 http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/womens-empowerment/gender-equality-strategy-2014-2017/ (rev. 28.03.2014)

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and GIKAP are members of the KSGM commissions dealing with women’s education and health and have thereby direct influence in policy-making and implementation processes.

Furthermore, Islamist women’s CSOs pay special attention to women’s education. They see women’s education as crucial in enabling women to acquire economic and social independence (Ozcetin 2009: 113). To this end, they provide financial support to female students and girls from poor families. As the interviewees stated, BKP and AKDER also offer educational courses and programs for women, such as English course, computer usage, music or handicrafts, to strengthen women’s personal development. Likewise, GIKAP organizes workshops on youth and consumption, education, social media and social responsibilities.160 Some organizations under the umbrella of GIKAP have also organized seminars on Western and Islamic sciences and created working groups on women’s and human rights.161

As discussed in the previous chapter, KADER has demanded introduction of a minimum 30 percent gender quota system in political parties and elections laws. In different occasions, BKP and AKDER have supported the introduction of political quotas and approved of KADER’s efforts to support and train female candidates with headscarves in local and parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, none of the Islamist women’s CSOs considered here have been directly engaged in encouraging women to participate in politics.

Islamist women’s CSOs also stress that health facilities are essential for the well-being of women and children. They have drawn attention to the poor condition in health facilities, which increases infant mortality rates and endangers women’s health. GIKAP and AKDER, for instance, organize educational seminars on family and health and offer information about sexual health and reproductive rights with the aim of strengthening families.162 These activities have been conducted with the help of women from other CSOs that work on physical and mental health in Turkish society. With regard to women’s reproductive rights, the most contentious issue is access to abortion. Unlike feminist women, who see the right to abortion as a fundamental part of woman’s right to control her own body, Islamist women in general are against abortion,

160 http://gikap.org/3g.html (rev. 29.03.2014)

161 One of the well-known organizations under GIKAP is the ‘Hazar Education, Culture, and Solidarity Association’

(Hazar Eğitim Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği) that organizes educational seminars and invites publicly acknowledged academics, authors, and journalists to panel discussions on human rights, see: Çaha (2008).

162 Personal interview with N. Arıkan, see also: http://gikap.org/evtem.html (rev. 29.03.2013)

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except under certain circumstances such as rape, or if the mother’s life is endangered. However, in the summer of 2012, when there were intense public debates about abortion in Turkey, they supported the claims of feminist CSOs.

Islamist Women and the Abortion Debate

As mentioned in the previous chapter, abortion was not a public debate since the military legalized it in 1983. But, on 26 May 2012, Prime Minister Erdoğan gave a speech at the third

As mentioned in the previous chapter, abortion was not a public debate since the military legalized it in 1983. But, on 26 May 2012, Prime Minister Erdoğan gave a speech at the third