In earlier section we presented our view of the sequencing debate, and a dis-cussion on the up-front investment that should be made in security in particular as a prerequisite for investment in other sectors such as poverty alleviation, infrastructure or governance. Analysis would indicate that engagement in four broad areas (governance, poverty, inequality, and efforts to reduce conflict/
violence) should proceed in unison. Although development is not possible without security, the quest for security first is often a search for the Holy Grail, and the exact nature of ‘sufficient’ security is unclear. Current international practice is at odds with this view, particularly when reviewing the amounts earmarked and spent on peacekeeping (the UN’s approved budget for 2013/4 is
$7,54 billion, with 8 of the 15 peacekeeping missions in Africa).135 These amounts are in stark contrast to the amounts available to the Peacebuilding Fund and other sources of support in so-called post-conflict situations. The Peacebuilding Fund works in 17 African countries with a total budget equivalent to that of a modest peacekeeping mission.136 Politics is essentially about the allocation of scarce resources, and in ‘more fragile’ countries a proportionate amount needs to be spent on security, but no more.
Conclusion
Different to various indicators and measures of state failure, fragility and the like, this study has adopted a deeply structural approach to what it terms the
fragility syndrome. Thinking about fragility in Africa over the long term is aided by the findings that emerge from efforts to forecast trends. Futures analysis that presents the costs of conflict in the long term and highlights the potential gains made if conflict is reduced can help inform present decisions about the urgency of conflict prevention; the reduction of poverty, inequality and exclusion; and gains in governance effectiveness and degree of democratic inclusion.
This study only touched on the potential role of regional organisations such as the AU, the Southern African Development Community, the Economic Community of West African States and the East African Community. Despite considerable progress, particularly in conflict management and prevention at the continental level, none of these organisations has been able to develop a suffi-cient set of shared values and the ability for common action to forge an effective security or development community. All remain hostage to very limited levels of national support and capacity, although the current model of infrastructure-led development presents a realistic future pathway. Regional integration is inevitably a slow process and the study recognises the important role that these organisations play in normative congruence, even if this is currently limited in practical implementation. The weakness of regional organisations should not, however, detract from the importance of adopting a regional approach in efforts to alleviate the symptoms or causes of fragility.
Increasingly, there is appreciation of the need for the greater integration of local, national and regional or transborder structures in Africa for promoting security. For example, gains have been made in contexts such as the Mano River Union in efforts to take a more holistic approach.
Futures forecasting with tools such as IFs is best suitable for country- and regional-level data analysis and as a result there is a loss of granularity at sub-sidiary levels. For this reason this study has not substantively looked at substate or city-level fragility, and the recommendations presented earlier are the poorer for that. In this regard the 2012 report of the Crisis States Research Centre entitled Meeting the challenges of crisis states137 is recommended as an important comple-mentary study that goes beyond the present analysis. An increased number of African countries are additionally adopting federal and decentralised models of governance, including greater financial autonomy provided to subnational regions, larger metropolitan areas and cities, which offer new opportunities for engagement by organisations such as the World Bank, the AfDB and others.
There is increased evidence that inequality in many ‘more resilient’ African
countries is growing, including in many of the continents larger and more stable countries such as South Africa and Kenya. Nigeria, Africa’s most populace country, was not included as part of the more fragile grouping, despite the debilitating poor governance, substate fragility and violence that it is experiencing at present, particularly in its northern regions. While such countries are characterised as
‘more resilient’, realistically they too are vulnerable to subnational fragility in the years ahead and are not impervious to national-level crises. The potential that this has for the future is worrying, and the resort to populism in Zimbabwe at the cost of economic growth is a warning of the toxic impact that unsustainable policies can have on the livelihoods of ordinary people. These are challenges that appear to be building up in South Africa, a state that impacts more widely on the region than any other due to its trade links into southern and eastern Africa, while the recent escalation of terrorism in Nigeria and Kenya bodes ill for the future for these two regional powers.
Helping fragile and conflict-affected states is difficult, often suffers setbacks, and is necessarily a long-term enterprise. According to the AfDB’s research, average income levels in Africa’s fragile states (based on the bank’s list of these countries) rose by only $33 per person from 2005 to 2011,138 and all evidence points to multiple and complex challenges to exiting the fragility trap. The present study’s forecast would reaffirm the view that much of Africa is witness-ing a long process of state formation and statebuildwitness-ing, together more recently with rapid economic growth that could simultaneously address many of the deep drivers of fragility (such as poverty) while accentuating others (such as inequality). Thus the 2013 Africa progress report finds that ‘economic growth is driving an increasingly unequal pattern of wealth distribution and weakening the link between growth and poverty reduction’.139 Economic growth and the broader concept of ‘development’ are not a panacea for reducing fragility, but they are essential prerequisites.
Policy measures necessarily have limited ability to respond to deeper or root-cause drivers due to the longer time horizons and systemic nature of interrelated problems. These relationships only change gradually over time and provide limited ‘policy leverage’. This rather obvious statement points to the need to think innovatively about how future-related analysis can help inform the priorities and interventions of external partners in the coming years, and how country-specific futures modelling can also be especially helpful in working with national stakeholders on long-term development planning.