■ For poverty the Human Development Index (HDINEW in IFs) was used. The HDI provides for life expectancy, education and income.
■
■ For inequality the inverse of the Gini coefficient (GINIDOM in IFs) was used.96 The Gini coefficient is a measure of the statistical dispersion of inequality.
Absent from these variables are direct measures of armed violence and organised crime. The IFs tool includes a module on environmental change and impact, with the result that the impact of climate change is accommodated, as well as a module on international relations that provides some measure of global impact.
Each of these variables and indices is composite and individually complex.
Their use results in considerable loss of explanatory value and country context.
All suffer from substantial country data gaps. We acknowledge these issues, while still being confident in the forecast, given the underlying datasets and the reliability of data and compensatory mechanisms for when data is unavailable.
The first subsection presents a brief picture of Africa’s current trajectory and, where appropriate, that of the two subgroups: ‘more fragile’ and ‘more resilient’
countries. A second subsection explores the future of the ‘more fragile’ grouping as part of the ‘base-case’ forecast.
A third subsection explores the future from a reasonable best and worst forecast for the category of ‘more fragile’ countries. Here the results from the two scenarios are presented as probability limits of future options rather than each being presented as a separate storyline. It is hoped that the integrated representation of optimistic and pessimistic forecasts reflects back on the presentation of fragility as a self-reinforcing syndrome.
All figures in this section are in 2005 US dollars.97
Africa’s expected future: comparing ‘more resilient’ with
‘more fragile’ groups of countries
Key aspects of Africa’s expected future
The changes in the global demographic balance is evident from Figure 7, which
presents the changes in the size of the working age population from 2010, pointing to the substantial demographic dividend that could accrue to Africa if the continent is able to provide opportunities for its teeming young population.
The total African labour force will more than double to over 1 billion between 2013 and 2030. Hundreds of millions of youngsters will need to be educated, provided with health care, and found jobs, many of whom live in the group of
‘more fragile’ countries where prospects for such opportunities are limited or currently non-existent.
Africa’s total population will increase from slightly more than 1 billion people in 2010, such that by 2050, 23 per cent of the global population will be living in Africa. By 2025 more people will be born in African countries collectively than in China and India. This is because from 1960 to 2013 life expectancy improved by 15,7 years and fertility rates declined by 20 per cent, leading to strong population growth in Africa.
Figure 7: Population of working age (15–65 years) as a percentage of total
The IFs base-case forecast is that the African economy as a whole will grow at an average rate of around 5,6 per cent between 2010 and 2050, which will be significantly faster than the global growth average of slightly below 3 per cent (see Figure 8). This forecast of generally higher rates of growth in Africa has recently received considerable public attention and associated analysis. An
Sources: Historical data: UNDP. Forecast: IFs v6.7
56 58 60 62 64 66 68
2010 2030 2050
World Africa South-east Asia
Year
earlier monograph from the African Futures Project at the ISS (in partnership with the Pardee Centre) set out the authors’ views on the reasons for these improvements, ranging from the population dividend referred to, evidence of more responsible macroeconomic management and reform, improved agricultural output and industrial management, more stable political frameworks, more effective aid, targeted debt relief and increased domestic revenues, growth in remittances and foreign direct investment, the rise of the South (China in particular), and the extent to which Africa has been able to benefit from the commodities boom.98
Except for Angola and, eventually, Ethiopia, growth will be faster in smaller economies and countries with smaller populations.99 The fastest growth is also not expected to occur in large natural-resource exporters (with the exception of Angola and Equatorial Guinea). This bears out much research that countries rich in oil, minerals and other natural resources experience slower economic growth in the longer term than countries that are less well endowed – although there are always exceptions, such as Botswana.
Figure 8: GDP growth rates: Africa and the world (including Africa) (five-year moving average)
Source: IFs v 6.7
Africa World
3.0 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 6.5
4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
2010 2015 2020 2025
GDP Annual Growth Rate
2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Year
During this period the size of the African economy will increase almost ninefold in market exchange rate terms (from around $1 241 billion in 2010 to $3 498 billion by 2030 and $11 126 billion by 2050). Much as there is well-deserved excitement about the rise of Africa, it is important that future growth prospects needs to be placed in context, for the continent’s relative size as part of the global economy will continue to remain modest throughout. It currently constitutes around 2,5 per cent of the global economy, and this figure will have increased to roughly 3,8 per cent by 2030 and 6,5 per cent by 2050. GDP per capita grows steadily from $2 718 in 2010 to $4 141 in 2030 and almost $7 588 by 2050 – a growth rate slower than that of the global average, but steady and pronounced over time.