Although the Defence Ministry, itself by 10 November 1950 had decided that the Swedish Air Force would participate in a mission outside Sweden’s borders, the government delayed its formal decision until summer 1951. Already in the Antarctic summer season of 1950/51 Captain Reinhold von Essen participated as an observer on the NBSX, since already earlier, unspecified when but presumably since 1945-46, there had been “talk of” participation of the Swedish Air Force37. The existence of this observership in 1950/51 has been mentioned, but not explained at any length in Swedish writings on the expeditions.
34 Some of the correspondence located in the Ahlmann collection, held at Royal Academy of Science, gives evidence of the degree of personal friendship.
35 Walford 1950.
36 Norwegian Parliament St prop nr 1 till nr 16, 21 May 1948.
37 von Essen 1952, Svenska Dagbladet 30 May 1951.
According to Swedish press the Swedish Air Force ordered the study of logistics and procedures of the flights carried out by the Norwegian company Wideröe in that same summer season. As for the next season 1951/52 the mission for the Swedish Air Forcewas twofold, firstly to act as a safety measure, to fly out the expedition members if embarking by sea were to be impossible. Secondly, the Swedish Air Force was tasked to make 24 over flights in Antarctica for air sur-veying and mapping purposes, partly to assist the Norwegians, partly for testing wireless and radio communication equipment. After discussions back and forth, in the end Ahlmann and Sverdrup had made a formal request to the Swedish Air Force to participate in the season of 1951/5238. The expedition would cover the costs for travels, fuel, equipment etc39. Nevertheless an additional sum of money would be requested from the parliament (195.000 Swedish crowns).
According to the Department of Ecclesiastics the total sum of 300.000 crowns already had been granted to the expedition, but not for the coverage of the Swedish Air Force expenses. The sum of 195.000 and the personnel was granted by a government decision 9 June 1951.
Due to sparse experience and little knowledge about radio communication and navigation in cold areas the Swedish Air Force during summer 1951 had also taken contacts with Air Force men from Norway, Great Britain and the United States who were located in various places in the Arctic. This was only one ex-ample of the increasing operative cooperation between neutral Sweden and the Western Allies. As part of the effort 1951/52 Sweden sent six men from the Swedish Air Force, under the leadership of von Essen to assist the NBSX for the up-coming summer season. The group brought two aircrafts, a Beech craft 18-R and a small SAAB Safire as well as field equipment for radio communi-cation. Details of the mapping activities are covered elsewhere40.
In an interview von Essen claimed that the main task for the Swedish Air Force was to test equipment in cold weather. The interview was made after his tour as observer but before the actual Swedish operation. He stated that it is evident that the Air Force did not provide resources for the sole purpose that six flying men would get abroad on a far away trip. The Air Force also expected good value for money by testing equipment41. In the formal report following the first visit of von Essen, i.e. from his observership in 1950/51, the reason for the Swedish Air Force participation in the expedition for the next season becomes even more clarified.
The original plan for von Essen in 1950 was to join the Norsel, in Göteborg Sweden on 16 November 1950, visit Maudheim and then proceed to Halifax, still aboard the ship. From there he would fly back home, at the expense of the Swedish Air Force. Additional knowledge on planes and flights, radio communi-cation and air surveys were to be sought from the Canadian Air Force. How-ever, the schedule for Norsel made a visit to Halifax impossible and von Essen stayed on at Maudheim. Instead Norsel left for Newfoundland and von Essen cabled back home to ask whether he could join. He urged his superiors to give
38 Ahlmann 6 April 1951.
39 Svenska Dagbladet 12 April 1951.
40 Liljequist 1993: 509.
41 Malmö Tidning 16 October 1951.
their permission for him to get in touch with the Air Force men that were at work surveying areas north of Hudson Bay. Apparently, he was not granted a tour to Canada (von Essen 1950 from Norsel, Cape Town).
The missions for the Swedish flying squadron for 1951/52 were rather well defined with one exception – the participation in air surveying. Records show quite clearly that Ahlmann and Sverdrup well in advance of 1950, before the Norwegian flights, had foreseen the air surveying led by von Essen, although it was not very clear on what distances they would fly. Nevertheless, in the von Essen report from March 1951 it is evident that the Norwegian flights were not too successful. Weather conditions had been difficult and flights had not been prepared in a proper way. Much work had to be undertaken anew and by now it was possible to state that the Swedish Air Force had been called upon! In 1950 von Essen further reported on planes and equipment and evaluated their func-tioning. He also mentioned the necessity of social competence due to the international character of the expedition, in particular on its way home aboard the ship. Von Essen concluded the necessity for him to undertake a trip to Canada before the next season to consult experienced persons with regard to flights in cold, desolate areas. The observations of the Wideröe operations had not been sufficient to guarantee safety and perfect positions (navigation) in relation to the planned air surveys. Finally von Essen reported on the testing of cold weather garments, including survival dress and goggles. Also he in a short passage mentioned the system of weather reports. Maudheim received infor-mation from Graham Land, from the subantarctic island and from the Norwegian whaling fleet. From all this it is clear that the Swedish Air Force, apart from assisting the NBSX also had its own rationale and agenda for participation.
There was a military goal of gaining knowledge and experience relating to the operations in extreme conditions as well as an increasing wish for closer in-sights to the process of military build-up in the Arctic. In this regard, firstly, the intensified work on weather system and lines of communications took place in both polar areas. Secondly, the actual militarization of the Arctic was a fact42. All in all operations were quite successful and afterwards the two planes were put on Norsel, so by 15 January 1952 the planes as well as the members of the NBSX -expedition were on their way back to Europe. The party left the ship on Canary Island took another vessel and arrived in Southampton on 18 February 1952. In relation to the arrival to and departure from Antarctica one may take note of the fact that the status of the Swedish flying squadron was not totally clarified – the Swedish Air Force themselves described the unit as travelling under civilian conditions, however requiring certain assistance from South African authorities when landing the planes in Cape Town for further transport towards Antarctica43.
Most historiography on the NBSX-expedition, including media reports from expedition members including von Essen himself claim (von Essen 1954) that it was the international status of the expedition that led to the respective nationa-lities of the air units. This argument is somewhat of a simplification considering
42 Wedin 1967, Claesson 1982.
43Kungl. Flygförvaltningen 8 September 1951.
all the planning efforts and political deliberations preceding the expedition. As argued above these international features were not at all evident in the initial stages of the expedition since the all Norwegian, or all-Scandinavian concept actually existed as the first option. For instance Ahlmann had been convinced of the Swedish Air Force participation well in advance of any British or Norwegian flights. Swedish literature on the NBSX does not tell in what manner it was seen as suitable for the Swedish Air Force to participate in this international event at these turbulent times. Further, there is no account of what preparations had been made in order to plant the idea in von Essen of a Swedish officer doing intelligence work up in the high North.