The national frameworks in which Antarctic research was able to move from the planning stage to actual realization depended on a large number of factors, chief among which counted economic and political support. An examination of several expeditions that failed to make it is especially interesting at this point for the light it can throw on the various kinds of adversities that had to be faced and insurmountable hinders that might block the way. It becomes evident that na-tional as well as private entrepreneurial patronage was important, but these did not come without the prospects of a return in terms of real or symbolic capital gains. The symbolic-instrumental value of lending a hand to expeditions coming from Europe should not be underestimated in order to appropriately understand the function of generating recognition of the importance of science in Argentina and Chile, as well as “Antarctic consciousness” more generally in those two countries, as well as other countries of the Southern Hemisphere.
During the 1901-1916 period thirteen national expeditions were sent to Antarc-tica. Most of them had some assistance from their national governments, al-though contributions from scientific societies and wealthy donors were impor-tant. Many other expeditions were crippled by lack of funds, antagonisms or indifference from their own midst or external intervention. Funding not only determined the expedition´s viability and success but also influenced its sci-entific productivity. Dr. Lewander has raised the issue of whaling in connection with Nordenskjöld´s first expedition, as well as his efforts to a successful come-back as the Palander-Nordenskjöld expedition in the period 1912-191930 and a specialized historian of whaling31 has explored some useful perspectives on the role of the Antarctic whaling industry. It may be convenient to add that at the time of the 1901 Expedition, the Swedish Government transmitted Norden-skjöld´s interest in cooperating with Argentina, Chile and the Falkland Islands authorities, considering “that investigation on such prominent places may be accompanied by many practical results, for instance that of facilitating the fishery of whales and seals ”32.
Consider now some specific cases of expeditions that did not take place, and start with one where too many actors with mutually conflicting goals and inten-tions were involved. At the start of his personal narrative of the origins of the British National Antarctic Expedition, 1901-04, Sir Clements Markham mentions
“The first abortive campaign (1885-89)”. This initiative was not his “campaign”
since the merit belongs to the Melbourne Antarctic Committee, chaired by Baron Mueller and the announcement of the Government of Victoria that it would contribute five thousand sterling pounds for an Australian Antarctic Expe-dition, to be headed by Baron A.E. Nordenskiöld, provided the British
30 Lewander 2002: 97-114.
31 Basberg 2004: 25-38.
32 Nordenskjöld 1901: 75-76.
ment would make an equal contribution. The British Treasury refused to grant any money and the generous offer by the Swedish philantropist Baron Dickson to donate a similar sum was insufficient to warrant the success of any expedi-tion. At this particular time, a young German scientist who had heard in the Spring of 1897 the South polar plans of Baron Nordenskiöld felt : “..I would like to join him as well..”33 Sir Clements Markham’s comment was that the Govern-ment of Victoria had acted in bad faith. The final comGovern-ment he makes, which is that Sir Allen Young would have commanded the expedition if it had got beyond the “talking stage” points to the nature of the problem. It was too early to con-ceive an Australian Expedition led by a Scandinavian explorer, pursuant to a local initiative led by a German scientist (Mueller but perhaps also Neumayer, who became vice-chairman of the Melbourne Antarctic Committee, and was already in the wings).
Our second case points to difficulties deriving from a mismatch between natio-nal ambitions and individual personatio-nal ones. The Argentine-Italian Expedition of 1881-82, initially led by Giacomo Bove and subsequently by Luis Piedrabuena, intended to visit the Antarctic Peninsula and proceed to the Ross Sea. The Italian Government provided no funds for this endeavour but Bove found some support among Argentinian public figures such as Estanislao Zeballos and the Argentinian Navy. The expedition ended in Tierra del Fuego, rented a cutter from the Punta Arenas entrepreneur José Nogueira, the San José, captain Pritchard, wrecked at Bahía Slogget while the personnel was saved by the Allen Gardiner from the Protestant Mission. Not a glorious end, but useful geodetic, geologic, botanic and zoological research was performed mainly for the Mu-seum of La Plata, Bove is a tragic figure, he wanted to go to Antarctica at a time when Italian colonial ambitions aimed at Africa. When he was assigned to an African post he committed suicide.
The next two cases involve the negative impact of unforeseen events, e.g., the death of a possible patron and a natural catastrophe. The 1896 expedition planned by the Chilean Scientific Society, chaired by Federico Puga Borne, having as its leader Otto Nordenskjöld, with the logistic support of the Chilean naval ship Magallanes. Funds could not be raised in Chile or Sweden, Baron Dickson offered this time no money but support for the participation of two Swedish scientists. The main difficulty was the unsuitable vessel, the costs involved and the untimely death of Baron Dickson when discussions were still going on. Ten years latter the 1906 abortive Chilean National Antarctic Expedi-tion also fell through, but still there was some impact. A NaExpedi-tional Committee was established, funds were requested and approved by the National Congress to the amount of 150.000 pesos, a vessel would be bought in England and the Commander of the Expedition would be General Jorge Boonen, a charismatic figure in the Army. The 1906 earthquake shifted the appropriation but the Uni-versity of Chile was granted money to develop vulcanological and seismic studies. The first head of this Department, Count Montessus de Ballore, was a friend of Jean Charcot and scientists at the University of Chile cooperated with the analysis of observations made by Lieutenant Bongrain of the Pourquoi-Pas?
33 Drygalski 1989: 3.
Some of the preliminary results were presented jointly at International Geogra-phic Congresses34.
Well-planned expeditions with a strong and serious scientific thrust may also run afoul of great power politics and national chauvinism. A case in point is the Palander-Nordenskjöld Expedition. The minutes of the Swedish Committeee, deposited at the Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences in Stockholm contain some correspondence which shows the fragile nature of the project which has been examined by Lisbeth Lewander35. It had obtained a thousand pounds from the Royal Geographical Society on the basis of joint biological research to be carried by two members of the staff of the British Museum of Natural Science.
But the base would remain Swedish and be located at the Antarctic Peninsula or at Joinville Island. It was to be supplied by Norwegian and Chilean whalers from Deception Island36. However, a Swedish Whaling Company would act as an umbrella for the Norwegian and Chilean whalers. The project received successive blows: any application coming from a foreign whaling company was ruled out as unacceptable by the British authorities; biologic research at the Orkney Islands had already been planned by a formidable adversary, the marine biologist Johan Hjorst, also the main Norwegian negotiator with the British authorities. Finally, the Foreign Office acted decisively in favor of Shackleton´s enterprise, as was reported by the Royal Geographical Society whose preference lnitially lay with Nordenskjöld. While the official veto ad-dressed a British national, John Foster Stackhouse, who was a prestigious Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, it obviously inclined the balance against the Austrian Dr. Koenig, who had equipped Filchner´s vessel Deutsch-land. König and Stackhouse were rivals with Shackleton in the attempt to stage a transcontinental crossing of Antarctica, but endeavours at further exploration of the Weddell Sea planned by Nordenskjöld and probably by Bruce were also viewed as potential interferences with Shackleton´s grand design of a traverse that would link the Weddell and Ross Seas37.
These examples are not chosen randomly. They are intended to unveil some of the difficulties that intended Antarctic expeditions faced. On the other hand, funding has not been scrutinized in a thorough manner, thus avoiding some unwelcome conclusions. While funds were denied by the British Treasury for an early Australian expedition, they were requested from Commonwealth countries to support Scott´s Antarctic Expedition and at least one Australian State (Queensland) subscribed one thousand pounds for the fund38. A question that must also be asked is: to what extent were Shackleton´s Nimrod expedition and the Aurora, which carried the Ross Sea Party, in fact funded by the Govern-ments of New Zealand and Australia Funds provided by private donors could not hold sway when compared to the huge investment involved in revamping the Aurora for the Ross Sea Party´s rescue39.
34 González-Ferrán 1991: 38-39.
35 Lewander 2002: 97-114.
36 Letter from Captain Adolf A. Andresen to Dr. Nordenskjöld in the possession of Dr. Fred Goldberg of Stockholm.
37 Berguño 1989: 15-17.
38 Markham 1986: 8.
39 McElrea and Harrowfield 2004: 220-261.
Amundsen’s expedition may also be scrutinized regarding the return on real and symbolic capital invested. The expedition obtained a grant of 75.000 kroner from the Norwegian Department of Defense, but the project was really saved by Pedro Christophersen, a wealthy entrepreneur and one of the founders of the Sociedad Argentina de Pesca, who donated 150.000 kroner. There were some strings attached however. A condition was that the ship call at Buenos Aires or Montevideo, since Amundsen´s narrative of his conquest of the South Pole ought to be finished at don Pedro´s farm in Argentina.40
How can the support by countries and ports of call near the Antarctic be as-sessed? The Argentine Congress passed a law to provide all the necessary coal for Charcot´s 1903 expedition in Le Francais. The Chilean Sociedad Balle-nera de Magallanesdid the same for the Pourquoi-Pas? both in Punta Arenas and Deception Island. The vessel was repaired of very serious damage at a nominal cost in Montevideo. How can the rescue of the Nordenskjöld expedition or the Shackleton expedition be assessed, or how can supplies granted freely, as well as free transport by vessel or train, and other facilities such as com-munications by telephone or wire be estimated? This same question could be raised for expeditions supported at Hobart, Lyttleton or Cape Town. But the answer is that the presence in the Southern Hemisphere of expeditions coming from the Northern Hemisphere towards Antarctica was worth much more than the expenses incurred, provided that some recognition was extended to their cooperative assistance to Antarctic exploration and science.