2.3.1Overview
In Study 2a, it was found that goal intentions are indeed more frequently forgotten and generally more neglected if cognitive load is induced during an impression formation task. Thus, because implementation intentions are said to be activated automatically, without effort or conscious intent (Bayer et al., accepted; Gollwitzer, 1993, 1996, 1999), cognitive load should not influence the activation of the implementation intention. If-then plans should be in a heightened state of cognitive activation despite the cognitively demanding task conditions (see Achtziger et al., under review; Brandstaetter et al., 2001; Gollwitzer, 1999). Study 1 illustrated that implementation intentions improved the processing of information that is difficult to encode under conditions of cognitive load, as also found by Brandstaetter, Lengfelder, and Gollwitzer (2001). Nevertheless, the effects of cognitive load on directly remembering the implementation intention have not been investigated thus far. For this reason, an additional study was run to test whether an implementation intention can be activated during the encoding of information under cognitive load and thereby is able to support its superordinated goal intention. Furthermore, a comparison between awareness of the goal intention and the implementation intention while engaging in a dual task was investigated.
In this study, the material from Study 2a was used in conjunction with additional questions on the processing of the implementation intention.
It was hypothesized that goal intention participants would remember their respective goal intention only in the no load condition, not in the cognitive load conditions.
Implementation intention participants should remember their respective implementation intention equally well independent of cognitive load.
2.3.2Method Participants
Seventy-four female students of the Universität Konstanz participated in the experiment in exchange for 2.50 Euros. Their average age was 22.6 (SD = 2.93). The data of eight participants were excluded from analysis. Five of them had already participated in Study 1, which could have affected the results of this study. Two of them had already attended higher psychology courses about stereotyping and one participant was not a native German-speaker. Of the 66 participants included in the analyses, 22 comprised the no load control condition, 22 the
phonological loop load condition, and 22 the central executive condition. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions.
Design
The study followed a 3-factorial design with the factor Cognitive Load that was realized between participants (no cognitive load vs. phonological load vs. central executive load). As dependent variables, the answers to various questions regarding the goal intention and the implementation intention were measured.
Procedure and material
The procedure and materials were the same as in Study 2a, with the exception of differences in the goal manipulation. Participants were also told that they should form an impression of Frank. Beyond that, they were told that women would not only encounter problems when trying to being fair towards typical men, but also would have trouble realizing goals like “I want to form a non-stereotypic impression of Frank and thus take all of his activities into consideration” (Ich will mir einen vorurteilsfreien Eindruck von Frank bilden und berücksichtige dabei alle seine Aktivitäten). Therefore, it was important to support this goal with the implementation intention “And if I read something about Frank’s Sunday activities, then I will consider them in my judgment” (Und wenn ich etwas über Franks Sonntagsaktivitäten lese, dann lasse ich diese auch in meine Beurteilung von Frank eingehen). The goal intention and the implementation intention were presented on a sheet of paper, and participants highlighted the most important words of the goal intention as well as the implementation intention (see Appendix E, p. 160).
The manipulation of the phonological loop load and the central executive load was implemented the same way as in Study 2a, either repeating the German word ‘und’ (English: ‘and’;
phonological loop load condition) or generating random numbers (central executive load condition) synchronized to a metronome adjusted to a frequency of one beat every 1.5 seconds.
When participants had finished reading the information about the target person (either under cognitive load of the phonological loop, or the central executive, or under no cognitive load), they were asked to complete a questionnaire about their processing of both the goal intention (same as in Study 2a) and the implementation intention. These additional questions are listed below.
Dependent variables. Additional question asking for the awareness of the implementation intention: “How aware were you of this implementation intention while reading the description of Frank?” (Wie präsent war Ihnen dieser Vorsatz während dem Lesen der Beschreibung von Frank? see Appendix E, p. 161-168).
Manipulation checks. „Did you have the implementation intention: ‘And if I read something about Frank’s Sunday activities, then I will consider them in my judgement of Frank?” (Hatten Sie den Vorsatz: “Und wenn ich etwas über Franks Sonntagsaktivitäten lese, dann lasse ich diese auch in meine Beurteilung von Frank eingehen”?), “How important was it for you to realize this implementation intention?” (Wie wichtig war es Ihnen, diesen Vorsatz zu verfolgen?), “How much effort did you have to exert to act on this implementation intention?” (Wie stark bemühten Sie sich, diesem Vorsatz entsprechend zu handeln? see Appendix E, p. 161-169).
Participants answered questions by indicating either yes or no, by freely writing down their own answers, or by indicating their opinion on a seven centimeter (2.76 inch) analogue scale labeled not at all on the left-hand side and very on the right-hand side. Further questions and inquiries about their demographic information were the same as in Study 2a. Finally, participants were thanked, fully debriefed, and paid.
2.3.3Results
Manipulation checks
Participants were asked “How difficult was it for you to form an impression of Frank?”
in order to check for a successful cognitive load manipulation. The 3-factorial ANOVA (between: no load vs. phonological load vs. central executive load) showed a marginally significant effect of Cognitive Load, F (2, 65) = 2.67, p = .08, η² = .08, indicating that only participants in the central executive load condition (M = 3.91, SD = 2.02) reported more problems forming an impression of Frank than those in the no load condition (M = 2.41, SD = 2.26), t(63) = 2.31, p < .05. There was no difference between participants in the no load and those in the phonological loop load condition (M = 3.12, SD = 2.19), t(63) = 1.10, p = .28. In addition, there was no significant difference between phonological load participants and central executive participants, t(63) = 1.21, p = .23. Although these results show the tendency of what was expected, that is, that participants in the control group would report the least amount of problems, followed by those in the phonological loop load condition, and that participants in the central executive load condition would have the most problems, the results were not significant.
In order to check the successful implementation of the goal intention and differences between the load conditions, answers to the question “Did you have the goal intention of forming a non-stereotypic impression of Frank and thus take all of his activities into consideration?” were analyzed using chi-square tests5. Analyses showed that everyone in the
5 Preconditions of the chi-square test suggest that a maximum of 20% of the cells may be smaller than five. If this condition was not fulfilled in the analyses, because crosstabulations were too small, Fisher’s exact tests were used to calculate Fisher’s z (Bortz, 1999) indicated by a mere p-value.
control group (100%) and the phonological loop load group (100%) affirmed this question (N = 44), p = 1. The majority of participants in the central executive condition (86%) reported that they also held the intended goal intention, p = .12.
Answers to the question “How important was it for you to realize this goal intention?”
were analyzed by an ANOVA using the factor Cognitive Load (between: no load vs.
phonological loop load vs. central executive load). There was no difference between conditions, F(2, 63) = 1.01, p = .37, η² = .03 (no load: M = 5.66, SD = 1.13; phonological loop load: M = 5.16, SD = 1.34; central executive load: M = 5.49, SD = 1.10).
Likewise, answers to the question “How much effort did you have to exert to act on this goal?” showed no effect of Cognitive Load, F(2, 63) = 1.30, p = .28, η² = .04 (no load: M = 5.71, SD = 0.97; phonological loop load: M = 5.08, SD = 1.63; central executive load: M = 5.25, SD = 1.35).
In order to control whether participants adopted the implementation intention as a strategy to enhance the attainment of their goal, answers to the question “Did you have the implementation intention ‘And if I read something about Frank’s Sunday activities, then I will consider them in my judgment?” were analyzed using Fisher’s exact tests. There was no difference between conditions, indicating that no goal control participants (73%), phonological loop participants (86%), and central executive participants (77%) answered “yes, I had this implementation intention” equally often, p’s > .23.
Participants’ commitment to the implementation intention was collected with the question “How important was it for you to realize this implementation intention?” The respective ANOVA (Cognitive Load: no load vs. phonological load vs. central executive load) showed no difference between conditions, F < 1 (no load: M = 4.91, SD = 2.03; phonological loop load: M = 4.98, SD = 1.43; central executive load: M = 5.09, SD = 1.58).
An analysis of answers to the question “How much effort did you have to exert to act on this implementation intention?” also showed no effect of Cognitive Load, F < 1 (no load: M = 4.75, SD = 2.13; phonological loop load: M = 4.94, SD = 1.60; central executive load: M = 4.82, SD = 1.79).
Finally, t-tests for dependent variables were conducted concerning how important the goal intention in comparison to the implementation intention was and how much effort participants had to exert to act on their goal intention versus their implementation intention.
This was carried out to investigate differences in commitment and effort to the goal intention and implementation intention. Results showed that realizing the goal intention (M = 5.43, SD = 1.19) was more important to participants than realizing the implementation intention (M = 4.99, SD = 1.67), t(65) = 2.68, p < .01. Participants also exerted significantly more effort to act on the
goal intention (M = 5.35, SD = 1.35) than on the implementation intention (M = 4.83, SD = 1.83), t(65) = 2.48, p < .05.
Dependent variables
Consistent with Study 2a, answers to the question “What did you think about while you read the description of Frank?” were coded; one point was awarded if the goal intention was remembered and no point was awarded if the goal intention was not remembered. In addition, one point was awarded for having remembered the implementation intention and no point was awarded for forgetting the implementation intention. Both items were subjected to chi-square tests with the different conditions of the factor Cognitive Load (between: no load vs.
phonological loop load vs. central executive load). As expected, more participants in the no load control condition (41%) mentioned the goal intention than participants in the phonological loop condition (4.5%), χ²(1, N=44) = 8.29, p < .01, and those in the central executive condition (13.6%), χ²(1, N=44) = 4.13, p < .05. There was no difference between phonological loop and central executive participants, p = .306. The implementation intention analysis showed no difference between Cognitive Load conditions, p < .76. To reiterate, in each condition only 5%
mentioned the implementation intention, 95% did not.
To investigate differences in memory of the goal intention and the implementation intention, McNemar tests for dependent variables were conducted on the same question.
Combining all participants, the test revealed that more participants mentioned the goal intention (19.7%) than the implementation intention (4.5%), p < .01. In the no load condition, more participants mentioned the goal intention (40.9%) than the implementation intention (4.5%), p <
.02. There was no difference between goal intention (4.5%) and implementation intention (4.5%) in the phonological loop condition, p = 1, and no difference in the central executive condition (goal intention: 13.6%, implementation intention: 4.5%), p =.50.
Regarding the questions what kind of tasks were part of the experiment, equal numbers of participants mentioned the goal intention (χ² < 1; no cognitive load: 86%; phonological loop load: 86%; central executive load: 77%; across all conditions: 83%). However, there was a marginal difference between conditions that mentioned the implementation intention, χ²(2, N=66) = 3.55, p = .09 (one-sided; across all conditions: 61%). A further analysis showed that central executive participants (64%) mentioned the implementation intention more often than no load participants (45%), χ²(1, N=44) = 3.39, p < .05 (one-sided). No load participants (45%) mentioned the implementation intention as often as phonological loop load participants (64%),
6 The overall analysis revealed a significant effect of goal intention, χ²(2, N=66)=9.96, p < .01, but it was not valid because cross-tabulations were too small.
χ²(1, N=44) = 1.47, p = .23; there was no significant difference between central executive participants (64%) and phonological loop load participants, t < 1.
With regard to the question which of the tasks was the most important, a chi-square test between cognitive load conditions revealed no difference in answers, such that the goal intention was the most important task, χ²(2, N=66) = 2.75, p = .25 (no cognitive load: 50%; phonological loop load: 27%; central executive load: 32%; across all conditions: 36%). Also, participants in the different cognitive load conditions did not differ in their answers pertaining to the implementation intention, χ² < 17 (no cognitive load: 5%; phonological loop load: 9%; central executive load: 9%; across all conditions: 8%). When merging all participants together, a McNemar test revealed that participants regarded the goal intention instructions (36%) as more important than the implementation intention instructions (8%), χ²(N=66) = 12.00, p = .001.
After participants were asked if they were given the respective goal intention, they answered the question “How aware were you of this goal while reading the description of Frank?” These estimates were subjected to an ANOVA with the factor Cognitive Load (between: no load vs. phonological load vs. central executive load), revealing a main between-subjects effect of Cognitive Load, F(2, 66) = 3.19, p < .05, η² = .09. Participants in the central executive condition (M = 3.78, SD = 2.12) reported that they were less aware of the goal than phonological loop load participants (M = 4.82, SD = 1.81), t(63) = 1.86, p < .05 (one-sided) and no load participants (M = 5.13, SD = 1.61), t(63) = 2.41, p < .05 (two-sided). There was no difference between control and phonological loop participants, t < 1.
The awareness of the implementation intention was measured and analyzed in the same manner. However, in contrast to the goal intention analysis, there was no main effect of Cognitive Load, F(2, 65) = 1.92, p = .16, η² = .06 (no load: M = 4.76, SD = 1.97; phonological loop load: M = 5.45, SD = 1.39; central executive load: M = 4.40, SD = 1.97).
Comparing the reported awareness of the goal intention and the implementation intention directly, a t-test for dependent variables showed no significant difference, t(65) = 1.23, p = .22.
Considering the load conditions as a between-factor, a 2 between (Cognitive Load: no load vs. phonological loop load vs. central executive load) ¯ 2 within (Intention: goal intention vs. implementation intention) ANOVA revealed no significant effects (Cognitive Load: F(2, 63)
= 2.79, p = .07, η² = .08; Intention: F(1, 63) = 1.56, p = .22, η² = .02; Cognitive Load ¯ Intention: F(2, 63) = 2.00, p = .14, η² = .06.
7 However, cross-tabulations were too small and the chi-square test cannot be seen as valid.
2.3.4Discussion
While goal intentions failed to successfully improve encoding of stereotype-inconsistent information under cognitive load, implementation intentions have been shown to be an efficient self-regulation strategy to enhance the memory of stereotype-inconsistent information even under cognitive load (see Study 1). In a subsequent investigation regarding the encoding of goal intentions, Study 2a showed that the awareness of goal intentions and their retrieval are indeed neglected under conditions of cognitive load in comparison to no load. Thus, the present study was run to test whether the awareness of implementation intentions is impaired by cognitive load while the awareness of goal intentions is neglected (replication of Study 2a). Furthermore, it was tested whether goal intentions and implementation intentions are harder to retrieve after task completion when the task was run under conditions of cognitive load.
The data for the goal intention replicated the results of Study 2a in most instances: Most participants confirmed that they had been given the goal intention and mentioned it as a subtask of the current experiment (more than 80%). Thereby, load conditions did not bring about any differences. Also, the goal intention was equally important to all participants and acting on the goal was also described as equally effortful across conditions. Thus, the load manipulation did not influence commitment to the goal intention.
Concerning the implementation intention, equal numbers of participants in the different cognitive load conditions admitted having had the implementation intention afterwards.
However, more participants in the load conditions (almost marginally significant in the phonological loop condition, significant in the central executive load condition) mentioned the implementation intention as part of the experiment than participants in the no load condition.
Also here, no difference in importance or effort was observed between load conditions.
Although, participants indicated that it was more important for them to realize the goal intention than the implementation intention. This result confirms the notion that implementation intentions are subordinated plans supporting the realization of goal intentions (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999). Numerous studies have already shown that goal commitment is an important prerequisite of the successful realization of implementation intentions (Fujii, 2005;
Orbell et al., 1997; Sheeran, Webb, & Gollwitzer, 2005a; Sheeran, Aarts, Custers, Rivis, Webb, &
Cooke, 2005b).
For instance, Sheeran, Webb, and Gollwitzer (2005a) showed that the study behavior of participants was only successfully influenced by implementation intentions when the superordinated goal intention was strong. Moreover, Achtziger, Bayer, and Gollwitzer (under review, Study 2) manipulated goal commitment and found that implementation intentions did not have an enhancing effect on the retrieval of the specified cue in the implementation
intention if commitment towards the goal intention was low or if participants had already disengaged from the goal. Results of the present study further supported the assumption that commitment to the goal intention is important for the realization of implementation intentions.
Moreover, participants exerted more effort when acting on the goal intention than on the implementation intention. This is in line with recent research on the “automaticity criterion of the paucity of further conscious intent” of implementation intentions (Bayer et al., accepted, p.
4). Bayer and colleagues (accepted) showed in two studies that words were more cognitively accessible if a prime that was relevant for the execution of the intended behavior was presented subliminally beforehand (Study 1). Furthermore, the initiation of the goal-directed behavior was facilitated by the subliminal presentation of a critical cue and moreover, implementation intention participants reported having more fun than goal intention participants (Study 2).
Through the subliminal presentation of the critical cue, it can be assumed that the heightened cognitive accessibility of instrumental words and the initiation of the respective response were unconscious. Given that unconscious processes are said to be effortless (Bargh, Uleman, &
Bargh, 1989), this smaller effort participants exerted in realizing implementation intentions, as found in the present study, can be attributed to the automaticity of implementation intentions.
This conclusion also fits well with results of Achtziger and colleagues (under review, Study 1) who conducted a dichotic listening experiment which showed that cues that were specified in the if-part of an implementation intention attracted attention even though participants were instructed to ignore these words. Thus, the specified cue was very cognitively accessible despite strong distractions. These findings were stable over time (participants had to perform the dichotic listening task one day after specifying the cue).
In summary, whereas retrieving goal intentions from long-term memory requires a certain amount of cognitive resources (cf. Einstein et al., 2003; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000), implementation intentions are activated without further intent (Bayer et al., accepted), thereby requiring only a small amount of cognitive capacity (Brandstaetter et al., 2001).
The results regarding the dependent variables of the goal intention replicated the results of Study 2a: No load participants thought more about the goal intention than load participants (phonological loop load and central executive load); the no load participants were more aware of the goal than central executive load participants. Moreover, no load and phonological loop load participants again did not differ in their answers. In contrast, there was no difference regarding the implementation intention between no load and load participants on the questions what they thought about and how much they were aware of the implementation intention while reading the description of the target person. Whereas 61% of all participants mentioned the implementation intention as a subtask of the experiment, it was found that almost none (only
5%) of the participants reported considering the implementation intention when reading the description. The goal intention was therefore considered more often (20%)8.
These results confirm findings of previous studies establishing the effectiveness of implementation intentions. Through defining a specific situation in the if-component of the implementation intention, this situational cue becomes highly activated and hence is easily accessible in the sense that the anticipated opportunity is detected rapidly and accurately
These results confirm findings of previous studies establishing the effectiveness of implementation intentions. Through defining a specific situation in the if-component of the implementation intention, this situational cue becomes highly activated and hence is easily accessible in the sense that the anticipated opportunity is detected rapidly and accurately