Goal Intentions

1.3.1.1 Motivational mental representations

Goals are defined as mental representations of desired end states that can take the form of behaviors (e.g., to eat more vegetables and fruits), events (e.g., to get a health certificate from the doctor), processes (e.g., to have a normal blood pressure), or outcomes (e.g., to stay healthy and fit over a lifetime). They impact evaluations, emotions, and behaviors (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996) and are obtained by the perceived feasibility and desirability of actions and end states (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Locke & Latham, 1990).

The mental representation of a goal is assumed to be organized as knowledge structure like cognitive structures in general (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000b; Shah & Kruglanski, 2003). Thus, goals consist of interconnected memories, knowledge activation is necessary for their operation, and the accessibility of goals varies across time and situation (Anderson, 1983b; Bargh &

Gollwitzer, 1994; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007;

Neely, 1991).

However, goals are also characterized by their own meanings and are not all created equal (Kruglanski, 1996; Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996). They remain active or even increase in strength over time, until the goal has been reached, whereas constructs that are non-motivational always remain at the same activation level or decrease in activation over time (Anderson, 1983b;

Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996). Furthermore, it is assumed that the knowledge structures of goals are represented mentally in a hierarchical order (Aarts &

Dijksterhuis, 2000b; Kruglanski, 1996) from concrete (plans, means, strategies) to abstract with the representation of the individual’s motivation on the top of the hierarchy (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).

According to Gollwitzers research (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1996, 1999; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006, for review), goal intentions serve as self-instructions to attain a certain goal or to conduct a specific behavior. Having the format “I want to attain/become X” goal intentions can be either very precise (e.g., “I want to clean the kitchen this evening”) or quite abstract (e.g., “I want to be

live in harmony with my family”). However, behaviors and means that are required to achieve the desired end-state are not specified in the goal.

How strongly people feel compelled towards their desired goal depends on the importance of the goal attainment and the value of the end state of the desired behavior or outcome (Kruglanski, 1996). The higher the importance and the value the higher the commitment (Brehm

& Self, 1989; Wright, 1996).

However, although commitment may be high, people often fail to reach their respective goals due to various problems in action initiation and goal striving. Possible reasons therefore include people failing to get started with goal striving by forgetting to act on the goal, failing to seize the opportunity to act, or because they fail to initiate the intended action (e.g., Gollwitzer &

Brandstätter, 1997; Orbell, Hodgkins, & Sheeran, 1997). Unwanted influences can additionally prevent further goal striving (e.g., Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998). Moreover, some people strive for several goals simultaneously, thereby overextending themselves (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998;

Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996) or they fail to disengage from unproductive goal striving (review by Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 2003).

For instance, Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000a) found in a study about travel habit that goal-directed actions to take a certain travel mode were hard to suppress under mentally demanding conditions. They conclude that attentional resources are needed to control habitual responses by goal intentions. Further, Milne, Orbell, and Sheeran (2002) ran a longitudinal study to investigate the effect of a motivational intervention on exercise behavior. They found a significant effect of intention to engage in immediate exercise, but the intention did not increase subsequent behavior.

1.3.1.2 Processing of goal intentions

Intentions exhibit a greater self-commitment (Klinger, 1977) and hence, they are more likely to acquire working memory and suspend competing action tendencies than loosely held wishes. As soon as suitable conditions relevant for the intention occur, the intention is activated in working memory and goal-directed action is initiated (provided no antagonistic behavior tendencies are activated).

In ACT theory (Anderson, 1983b), goals are suggested to be source nodes of permanent activation that are linked to other goals via task constraints. They are attended to one by one the first goal to appear will be approached first, than the next, and so on. They do not require active maintenance, but are stored in a special memory state in which they need to be actively inhibited to eliminate them from working memory (Anderson, 1983b, 1993).

On the other hand, Altmann and Trafton (2002) developed the goal-activation model to show that goal-directed behavior does not require specialized memory structures, but is explicable by

“general memory mechanisms of activation and associative priming” (p. 66). First, to activate a goal, it has to be encoded and rehearsed while plans or mental simulations continue. Then it reposes until it is retrieved from memory through associative priming by environmental cues or mental representations in long-term memory (e.g., procedural knowledge). Thereby, the availability and selection of cues is not only important at the goal setting stage, but also for retrieval of the goal.

However, most often intentions cannot be executed immediately, but rather are scheduled in the future and thus have to be stored in long-term memory (Brandimonte, Einstein, &

McDaniel, 1996; Goschke & Kuhl, 1996). Foremost, to keep the intention in mind, a stable mental representation of the intended activity has to be established. Thus, having encoded the relevant information in memory once, it must be strategically maintained until the appropriate conditions for performing the adequate goal-directed behavior are encountered (prospective memory). Finally, if the right moment occurs, one must remember what actions need to be taken (retrospective memory; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993, 1996).

While storing the representation of an intention in long-term memory, it can be thought of as a declarative memory structure comprising several components (e.g., desired outcome, action plan, means). The intention is thereby highly activated and accessible (Goschke, 1996; Kuhl, 1983). Goschke and Kuhl (1993, 1996) demonstrated this intention superiority effect in numerous studies in which participants had to memorize two different action scripts. They were told that they would later have to act on the one script, but not on the other one. A subsequent recognition test showed that words that were associated with the significant script (the one participants were told to act on later) were remembered better than words associated with the unregarded script. Results indicate that memory content associated with the intention is more highly activated than irrelevant information. Furthermore, the intention should come to mind more often, provided that his process is not completed. Thus, adequate opportunities to engage in intention-relevant behavior should not be missed (Goschke, 1996).

Similarly, Zeigarnik (1927) demonstrated better recall of behaviors that could not be completed in the course of action than completed ones. She concluded that incomplete intentions seem to produce a certain kind of tension that is hindered until the intention can be accomplished. However, this effect could not be consistently replicated, leaving many conceptual and methodological questions open (Butterfield, 1964; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, Hicks, &

Bink, 1998b).

Although, in many real-world situations, circumstances are very demanding (e.g., in the work setting, child care), and thus many people fail to remember their goal at the right moment or in response to the appropriate cue. Such prospective memory failures are very common

(Reason, 1990). Mc Daniel, Robinson-Riegler, and Einstein (1998) suggest that the strength of the association between the cue and the associated memory trace determines successful prospective remembering. Thus, “if the cue does not automatically interact with a memory trace, then that memory trace is not retrieved unless another memory module initiates a strategic memory search” (Cohen & Gollwitzer, 2006, p. 162).

Einstein and colleagues (Einstein et al., 2003) examined three different theoretical views about the demands of prospective memory in a series of three studies. They delayed intentions under cognitively demanding task conditions and collected data about prospective remembering.

They ultimately found that it is neither easy for the cognitive system to maintain an intention in working memory over brief delays (minimal demands view), nor does it require a plethora of resources (prohibitively expensive view). Moreover, they determined that moderate resource demands are required for prospective memory tasks (active maintenance view). During the delay interval, the intention is periodically activated by the participants via an associative relationship between the intention and the ongoing activities. Thereby, the ongoing task context works as a cue for the activation of the intended action. Additionally, since the intention is incomplete, it is strategically retrieved from long-term memory until the intention can be completed (cf. Ellis, 1996; Kvavilashvili, 1987). Consequently, resources are purely required to choose and interpret the retrieved intention, which is cued by the context (Einstein et al., 2003; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000).

1.3.2Implementation Intentions