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Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Sektion Fachbereich Psychologie
Effects of Motivation and Distraction on the Processing of
Stereotype-Relevant Information
Dissertationsschrift
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doktor der Naturwissenschaften
(Dr. rer. nat.)
vorgelegt im April 2008 von
Verena Michalski
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 15. Juli 2008
1. Referent: Prof. Dr. Peter M. Gollwitzer 2. Referentin: PD Dr. Sabine Heim
Konstanzer Online-Publikations-System (KOPS) URL: http://www.ub.uni-konstanz.de/kops/volltexte/2008/5987/
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-59875
… liebe Anja, für die großartige Betreuung meiner Promotion! Es war und ist toll, so eine engagierte und motivierte Chefin zu haben. 1000 Dank, Frau Dr. 80er!
… Herr Prof. Gollwitzer, dass ich an Ihrem Lehrstuhl promovieren und von Ihrem Wissen und Ihren Erfahrungen im Bereich der Motivationsforschung so viel profitieren und für mein Leben mitnehmen durfte!
… liebe Sabine, dass Du Dich dazu bereit erklärt hast, das Zweitgutachten für meine Doktorarbeit zu schreiben. Es ist mir eine große Freude!
… lieber Lehrstuhl für Sozialpsychologie und Motivation für alles, was wir gemeinsam erlebt haben, für die vielen Tipps und Anregungen meine Arbeit betreffend, die praktische Hilfe bei Computerproblemen, Programmierungen, Korrekturlesen, organisatorischen Dingen und vielem mehr; natürlich nicht zu vergessen die geselligen Brunchs, Käffchen, Geburtstagssekte, Pizza und DVD-Abende, Kongressreisen und die kleinen Schwätzchen zwischendurch. Es hat Spaß
gemacht, mit Euch zusammen zu arbeiten!
… an alle Versuchsteilnehmer, die bei meinen Studien mitgemacht haben und an alle Hiwis, die diese dazu gebracht haben und für deren weiteren Einsatz im Rahmen meiner Promotion.
… der Forschergruppe „Grenzen der Absichtlichkeit“, an der ich das interdisziplinäre Arbeiten hautnah miterleben durfte und der DFG für die Finanzierung meiner Stelle.
…allen, denen ich im Laufe meiner Promotion begegnet bin und die mir mit einem Lächeln oder ein paar netten Worten entgegengekommen sind.
… meiner Familie und meinen Freunden für die moralische und emotionale Unterstützung außerhalb der Universität. Danke, dass es Euch gibt!
… lieber Norbert, für Dein Sein, Dein Dasein für mich und für Deine Liebe. Du bist das Beste, was mir je passiert ist!
…lieber Gott, für Deine unendliche Liebe und Güte, mit der Du mir jeden Tag begegnest.
CONTENTS
Zusammenfassung... 1
Abstract... 2
1 Introduction...3
1.1 Stereotypes...4
1.1.1 Definition and Effects...4
1.1.2 Stereotyping ...5
1.1.2.1 Impression formation models ...6
1.1.2.2 Processing of stereotype-relevant information subject to cognitive resources ...7
1.2 Memory...10
1.2.1 Working Memory (Baddeley, 1986)...10
1.2.1.1 Functions and structure...10
1.2.1.2 Components of working memory (Baddeley, 2000a)...12
1.2.1.2.1 Central Executive...12
1.2.1.2.2 Phonological Loop ...13
1.2.1.2.3 Visuospatial Sketchpad ...14
1.2.1.2.4 Episodic Buffer...14
1.2.1.3 Working memory capacity...15
1.2.1.3.1 Central Executive load...15
1.2.1.3.2 Phonological Loop load...16
1.2.1.3.3 Visuospatial Sketchpad load...16
1.2.2 Long-term memory...17
1.2.2.1 Functions and structure...17
1.2.2.2 Retrieval ...18
1.3 Intentions and goal achievement...18
1.3.1 Goal Intentions ...19
1.3.1.1 Motivational mental representations ...19
1.3.1.2 Processing of goal intentions...20
1.3.2 Implementation Intentions...22
1.3.2.1 Plans as self-regulation strategies ...22
1.3.2.2 Processing of implementation intentions ...23
1.4 Summary and theoretical implications for the studies...25
2 Studies... 26
2.1 Study 1: Specific effects of implementation intentions on the processing of stereotype-relevant information under cognitive load...26
2.1.1 Overview ...26
2.1.2 Method ...28
2.1.3 Results...32
2.1.4 Discussion ...44
2.2 Study 2a: Effects of cognitive load on long-term memory of goal intentions...52
2.2.1 Overview ...52
2.2.2 Method ...53
2.2.3 Results...55
2.2.4 Discussion ...57
2.3 Study 2b: Effects of cognitive load on long-term memory of goal intentions and implementation intentions...60
2.3.1 Overview ...60
2.3.2 Method ...60
2.3.3 Results...62
2.3.4 Discussion ...66
2.4 Study 3: Long-term memory effects of the processing of stereotype-relevant information under cognitive load...70
2.4.1 Overview ...70
2.4.2 Method ...71
2.4.3 Results...74
2.4.4 Discussion ...78
2.5 Study 4: False teeth or cigarette lighter? The influence of visual load on long-term memory for stereotypic information...81
2.5.1 Overview ...81
2.5.2 Method ...82
2.5.3 Results...86
2.5.4 Discussion ...90
3 General Discussion... 93
3.1 The present research...93
3.1.1 Overview ...93
3.1.2 Findings ...94
3.2 Implications for stereotyping research...96
3.3 Implications for goal-intention research...100
3.4 Implications for implementation intention research...101
3.5 Limitations and future research...104
3.6 Conclusions...105
4 References... 106
5 Appendix... 123
Appendix A: List of Tables and Figures...123
Appendix B: Tables ...124
Appendix C: Material of Study 1 (in German) ...126
Appendix D: Material of Study 2a (in German)...150
Appendix E: Material of Study 2b (in German)...160
Appendix F: Material of Study 3 (in German)...170
Appendix G: Material of Study 4 (in German)...183
Zusammenfassung
Wissenschaftliche Ergebnisse sprechen dafür, dass man die Stereotypisierung anderer Personen schwer verhindern kann. Eine Möglichkeit Stereotype zu kontrollieren besteht darin, stereotyp-inkonsistente Informationen, d.h. Informationen, die den eigenen Erwartungen über die Zielperson widersprechen, zu verarbeiten (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Pettigrew, 1998).
Allerdings ist dies nur möglich, wenn ausreichend kognitive Ressourcen zur Verfügung stehen.
Wird kognitive Belastung induziert, werden diese Informationen häufiger vergessen als stereotyp-konsistente Informationen (see Sherman & Frost, 2000; Wigboldus, Sherman, Franzese, & van Knippenberg, 2004a), auch wenn man sich das Ziel gesetzt hat, sich einen vorurteilsfreien Eindruck von einer bestimmten Person zu bilden (Pendry & Macrae, 1994). Da erfolgreiches Zielstreben allerdings selbst kognitive Ressourcen verbraucht (Norman & Shallice, 1986), ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass es nicht ausreicht, sich ein Ziel zu setzen, um stereotyp- inkonsistenten Informationen unter kognitiver Belastung Beachtung zu schenken. Dafür ist eine Intention gefragt, die selbst keine kognitiven Kapazitäten benötigt. Da sich Vorsätze als solch eine Art von Intentionen erwiesen haben, die automatisch realisiert werden können (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999), wird vorgeschlagen, dass mit Hilfe von Vorsätzen die Verarbeitung stereotyp- inkonsistenter Informationen trotz kognitiver Belastung unterstützt werden kann.
Um diese Annahme zu testen, untersuchte die vorliegende Dissertation die Effekte kognitiver Belastung auf die Verarbeitung von Informationen, die entweder inkonsistent oder konsistent zum Altersstereotyp waren. Es wurde gemessen, inwieweit sich die Teilnehmer noch an die verschiedenen Informationen im Langzeitgedächtnis erinnern konnten. Mittels Entwicklung verschiedener experimenteller Paradigmen wurden die Informationen über die Zielperson entweder schriftlich auf einem Blatt Papier, als Verhaltensweisen am PC oder als visuelle Informationen in Form von Gegenständen präsentiert. Dabei fanden verschiedene Formen der kognitiven Belastung Anwendung (kognitive Belastung der Zentralen Exekutive, der Phonologischen Schleife bzw. des Visuell-räumlichen Skizzenblocks).
Studie 1 konnte zeigen, dass Vorsätze die Verarbeitung stereotyp-inkonsistenter Informationen unabhängig von kognitiver Belastung verbesserten. Darüber hinaus wurde die Spezifität (Studie 1) und Automatizität (Studie 2b) von Vorsätzen demonstriert, während sich Ziele als Ressourcen abhängig erwiesen (Studie 1, Studie 2a). Für Studie 3 und 4 wurden neue Paradigmen entwickelt, um die generelle Wirkungsweise von Vorsätzen, d.h. nicht nur die Verbesserung einer einzelnen Information, sondern mehrerer gleich verteilter inkonsistenter und konsistenter Informationen, zu untersuchen. Die gefundenen Ergebnisse replizierten die vorangegeangenen Resultate nur teilweise. In diesem Bereich ist also noch weitere Forschung notwendig.
Abstract
Research has shown that stereotyping other persons is difficult to control. One strategy of stereotype control is processing stereotype-inconsistent information, that is, processing information that is in contrast to current stereotypic expectations about a target person (Fiske &
Neuberg, 1990; Pettigrew, 1998). Restricting stereotypes by processing stereotype-inconsistent information can be easily realized if cognitive resources are available. However, if load is induced during the processing of this information, it is more often forgotten than stereotype-consistent information (see Sherman & Frost, 2000; Wigboldus et al., 2004a). This neglect of stereotype- inconsistent information is observed even if goals are formed to acquire a stereotype-free impression of the target person (Pendry & Macrae, 1994). As Norman and Shallice (1986) maintain that successful goal pursuit requires cognitive resources, it is not surprising that setting goals is not sufficient for processing stereotype-inconsistent information under load. Thus, supporting the processing of stereotype-inconsistent information under load should be improved by an intention that does not require cognitive resources. As implementation intentions are proven to be realized automatically (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999), it can be suggested that by means of these if-then plans the processing of stereotype-inconsistent information can be supported even under conditions of cognitive load.
In order to test this assumption, the present dissertation investigated the effects of cognitive load on the processing of stereotype-inconsistent and stereotype-consistent information. Participants were thus presented with information that was either inconsistent or consistent with stereotypes of elderly people and long-term memory tests measured memory of the different types of information. Different experimental paradigms were established.
Information regarding the target person was either presented as a verbal description on a sheet of paper, as behavioral information on a computer screen, or visually in the form of pictures of objects. Thereby, different kinds of cognitive load were applied (central executive load, phonological loop load, and visuospatial sketchpad load, respectively).
Results of Study 1 showed that implementation intentions successfully improved memory on stereotype-inconsistent information independent of cognitive load. Furthermore, specificity (Study 1) and automaticity (Study 2b) of implementation intentions’ effectiveness was demonstrated, while the realization of goal intentions proved to be dependent on cognitive capacity (Study 1, Study 2a). Study 3 and 4 were conducted to establish new paradigms testing the overall effects of implementation intentions on the processing of not only one, but equally distributed items of inconsistent and consistent information. Results partially replicated prior findings, thus still more thorough investigation is necessary.
1 Introduction
Imagine yourself walking down the streets in your hometown. You see mothers pushing their children in baby strollers, old people sitting on a park bench feeding the doves, and youngsters playing basketball on a basketball court. Isn’t this a wonderful ordinary and harmonious picture of the world around you? Now imagine a father pushing a baby stroller, old people sitting on a park bench with their laptops, and a youngster walking around very slowly talking to his dog. What are you thinking about now? Maybe: “The poor guy, his wife must have died and now he has to care for his newborn!” or: “What is this? Old people using laptops?
Wow!” or: “Something must be wrong with this youngster. Maybe he is blind, because he is walking and talking to a dog?” Suddenly, the world around you is not as harmonious as before.
Things are not as they should be and explanations are being made about why everything is the way it is.
Yet in 1922, Lippmann introduced stereotypes as ‘pictures in your heads.’ He suggested that when forming an impression of others, people rely on simplified images and pictures that already exist in their heads. He argued, “For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define first and then see” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 81). Thus, women are expected to push a baby stroller, but not men. Young people use a laptop, but not old people, youngsters play basketball, but do not talk to their dogs. Our common world already exists in our heads and everything that differs demands an explanation.
Until today, many insights have been gained regarding the underlying processes of stereotyping, for example the destructive potential of stereotypes, processes describing how stereotypes arise, or how they perpetuate. Recently, in the last twenty years, social cognition research has become more interested in investigating working memory processes and its role in impression formation. For instance, Macrae, Hewstone, and Griffith (1993) investigated load effects on the processing of stereotype-relevant information and on judgment of the target person. Further, Stangor and Duan (1991) found influencing effects of the number of groups presented on the recall of stereotype-incongruent and stereotype-congruent information.
Nevertehless, research on the prevention of stereotyping is still in its infancy.
The dissertation at hand tied in with investigations about working memory as well as long-term memory processes in the course of impression formation. It specifically investigated possible influences of cognitive load on the encoding, storing, and retrieval of information that contradicts previous held beliefs about the characteristics of certain groups. It did not merely stand still thereby, but went a step further in investigating possible obstacles in the stereotyping
process. Accordingly, how can stereotyping be hindered and how can information that helps individuate a person be accounted for in the impression formation process?
Hence, in more detail, the studies presented here investigated the influence of cognitive load of the central executive, the phonological loop, and the visuospatial sketchpad (Baddeley, 1986) on the processing of stereotype-inconsistent and -consistent information. Further, the successfulness of the self-regulation strategy of forming implementation intentions to inhibit stereotyping was compared to a mere goal setting strategy. To give a short overview, the most important issues for understanding these phenomena will be discussed in the introduction section. How stereotypes arise and perpetuate, how stereotypic information is processed and whether it can be changed will be discussed in the first run. Further, a short review of memory distinguishing working and long-term memory will be undertaken to finally present the concept of implementation intentions by an overall insight in motivational goal attainment models.
1.1 Stereotypes
1.1.1 Definition and Effects
In general, stereotypes are seen as assumed characteristics (e.g., attributes, behaviors) about groups based primarily on that group’s membership (e.g., Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994;
Stangor, 2000). They are generally shared by those with a common cultural background (Hinton, 2000) and “overgeneralize, misattribute, prescribe, and often condemn the behavior and personal characteristics associated with these categories” (Operario & Fiske, 2004, p. 121).
Stereotypes originate from endeavors attempting to deal with the overwhelming amount of information that challenges our human information processing system. They are derived among other things from social learning, for example lessons learned from our parents, our friends’
experiences, or images in the media, and provide a framework for explaining the social world around us. Additionally, people tend to categorize persons into groups on the basis of common attributes like race, gender, religion, clothing, and so forth (Brehm, Kassin, & Fein, 2005). In the first instance, this may be a very adaptive and energy saving process, however, in the long run, it can be the breeding ground for rash decisions and ultimately, unjustified condemnations. This can happen because people not only categorize, they also classify themselves as either members or non-members of the categories they form. Consequently, groups in which a person feels a sense of membership, belonging, and identity (ingroup) is seen as different, or often as ‘more significant’, than groups in which a person does not belong to (outgroup). It has been shown that people have more positive reactions to ingroup versus outgroup stimuli presented unconsciously
(Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990), and allocate more rewards to ingroup members than outgroup members (Brewer, 1979) as well as engage in more cooperative rather than competitive behavior with ingroup members (Schopler & Insko, 1992). Further, being involved in an ingroup leads people to overestimate differences between members of a foreign group and also to underestimate differences between members of the ingroup (outgroup homogeneity effect; Spears, 2002; Wyer, Sadler, & Judd, 2002). Members of the outgroup are ‘all alike’, but ingroup-members are individuals with different characteristics (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Linville & Jones, 1980). The outgroup homogeneity effect can be found in various cultures around the world (e.g., Linville, 1998), indicating that stereotyping is an overall phenomenon.
Stereotypes survive and self-perpetuate for different reasons. On the one hand, stereotypes facilitate our every-day life, helping us save cognitive resources by providing a heuristic. In this regard, we can quickly and easily form an impression if we do not have to take into account every little detail about the behaviors or characteristics of the counterpart (McGarty, Yzerbyt, & Spears, 2002). Furthermore, stereotypes help to maintain positive self-esteem by being a member of a certain ingroup. On the other hand, stereotypes endure through illusory correlations, that is, overestimation of the association between variables that are only slightly or not at all correlated (Sherman, Hamilton, & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1989; Stroessner & Plaks, 2001). The association between novel or deviant variables are overestimated as well as the association between variables that are already expected to correspond (Brehm et al., 2005). For example, attractive people are said to be successful, too. This pairing seems to complement another better than being attractive but unsuccessful.
People also maintain their stereotypes through attributions made about other people and their behaviors. For example, taking only into account the role of personal causes, no situational factors (fundamental attribution error; Wigboldus, Sherman, Franzese, & van Knippenberg, 2004b;
Woodside, 2006). Subtyping, contrast effects, confirmation biases, and self-fulfilling prophecies are further self-made mechanisms that bias our perception of, and reactions to, other persons or groups and additionally foster the continuation of our stereotypes (e.g., Brehm et al., 2005; Chen
& Bargh, 1997). Even if we do not personally agree with these beliefs, stereotypes can bias our thinking, feelings, and behaviors towards members of groups in which popular stereotypes exist.
They can sometimes be activated without our awareness (automatic) and can operate at an unconscious, implicit level (Blair, 2001; Devine, 1989).
1.1.2 Stereotyping
Stereotyping means to use a stereotype as a basis for the assessment of an individual and to apply this judgment interchangeably with other members of the relevant social group (Leyens et
al., 1994). Examples for explanations how the process of stereotyping takes place will be explained in the following section.
1.1.2.1 Impression formation models
In the last few decades, more than one impression formation model has been established to explain the process of stereotyping (e.g., Biernat, Manis, & Kobrynowicz, 1997; Bodenhausen &
Macrae, 1998; Brewer, 1988; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Devine, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990;
Madon, Guyll, Hilbert, Kyriakatos, & Vogel, 2006; Stapel, 2007).
In her dissociation model, Devine (1989) divides the impression formation process in two phases: meeting a target person activates the social stereotype automatically, regardless of whether or not the perceiver holds this stereotypic beliefs. However, in the second phase, the perceiver can decide if he wants to apply the activated stereotype or control it volitionally to make an adequate impression of the target person.
Bodenhausen and Macrae (1998) break the stereotyping process down to three phases: in the first phase, the target person is categorized, that is, classified into a certain social group, like a woman, a foreigner, a student, and so forth. This process can be influenced by the current context (cf. Biernat & Vescio, 1993; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978), by the chronic accessibility of this category (cf. Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988), or by the perceiver’s current goals (cf., Achtziger, 2003; Bruner, 1957). Second, the interpretation on basis of personal beliefs influences stereotype absorption. If the perceiver agrees with the activated category having certain characteristics, the stereotype will be activated. Hence, the perceiver may only notice information that is consistent with the activated stereotype and ignores stereotype-inconsistent information (cf. Bodenhausen, 1988; Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985). Conversely, if the perceiver rejects the stereotype, stereotyping can be controlled. Finally, in the third phase, social standards influence the reaction of the perceiver and thus, the application of the stereotype. The target person will either be discriminated by the perceiver if discrimination fits the standard of the perceiver’s social group; or the perceiver will not discriminate the target person, if the standards of his or her ingroup forbid discrimination.
Madon, Guyll, Hilbert, Kyriakatos, and Vogel (2006) investigated how motivational and situational factors affect the stereotyping process and consequently developed the stereotype validity model. This model postulates that perceivers rely more on stereotypes if the information about the target person matches the current stereotype of the social group the target belongs to. If information that contradicts a certain stereotype is presented, then the stereotype appears unreliable and thus, the target person will be judged as less stereotypic. Attention moderates this effect insofar as more attention leads to a more accurate assessment of the match between the
stereotype and the target person. Less attention complicates the evaluation of the match, and the perceiver has to accordingly regress the match to the mean.
The interpretation comparison model (Stapel & Koomen, 2001; Stapel & Suls, 2007) also attaches importance to the match between the given information and the activated stereotype.
The model predicts that stereotype-relevant information does not necessarily cause a stereotypic impression of the target person. It instead depends on the manner in which the stereotype- relevant knowledge is used by the perceiver. When the information matches the target person’s social category, it serves as an interpretation frame and thus assimilation effects occur (i.e., stereotyping of the target person). Conversely, when the information is used as a comparison standard (e.g., exemplars of a social category like ‘Heidi Klum’) against which the evaluation of the target person is conferred, contrast effects can result (Stapel & Koomen, 1998). Studies done by the model’s authors (Stapel & Koomen, 2001) have actually shown that priming participants with an interpretation mindset produces assimilation during impression formation whilst priming them with a comparison mindset leads to contrast effects. Thus, knowledge accessibility can also be externally influenced from the outside.
All in all, the different models demonstrate that the impression formation process is not easily described in terms of a unifying concept. Different situational and motivational modalities influence the way in which people use their present knowledge to interpret stereotype-relevant information. For example, in the last few decades research has been influenced by the dispute about memory of stereotype-inconsistent and -consistent information dependent on cognitive demands (for reviews, see Fyock & Stangor, 1994; Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor &
McMillan, 1992). Because memory of inconsistent and consistent information serves as a dependent variable in this dissertation, the following section will discuss different conceptions on the encoding and processing of these kinds of information.
1.1.2.2 Processing of stereotype-relevant information subject to cognitive resources One way to attenuate stereotype-based judgments is to take into account stereotype- inconsistent information, that is, information that contradicts the current stereotype (e.g., 'fast' or 'healthy' for the stereotype of elderly; e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). On the one hand, it has been discovered that people generally attempt to confirm their impression by seeking information that is consistent with their expectancies. Consequently, information that validates prior expectancies is stored and remembered preferentially (e.g., Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 1979; Snyder & Swann, 1978). On the other hand, other researchers have discovered that more
attention is focused on unexpected information than well-known stimuli (e.g., Brewer, Dull, &
Lui, 1981; Erber & Fiske, 1984; Macrae et al., 1993).
These contradictory findings suggest that more than just the kind of information (inconsistent or consistent with common expectancies) is responsible for the processing of stereotype-based information. Meanwhile, different variables have attracted interest, including instructions for the task (e.g., Wyer, Bodenhausen, & Srull, 1984), nature of the target persons, for example, group vs. individual (e.g., Srull, Lichtenstein, & Rothbart, 1985), motivation (e.g., Dunton & Fazio, 1997a; Plant & Devine, 1998; Wyer, 2007), type of memory probe task (e.g., Sherman & Frost, 2000), strength of expectancy (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), type of information, that is, behavioral vs. trait information (e.g., Hastie & Kumar, 1979), social environment (e.g., Carnaghi & Yzerbyt, 2006), and cognitive resources (e.g., Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Sherman, 1999; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Sherman & Frost, 2000), to name just a few.
Of notable interest for this dissertation is the amount of cognitive resources that are available through the processing of stereotype-relevant information.
Existing person memory models predict different processes in encoding and memorizing social information. Schematic information-processing models assume that the processing of social information is guided by schemata. Information that is congruent with the existing schema will be preferentially encoded and retrieved from memory than information that contradicts former expectations. Thus, stereotypes work as filter that facilitates the encoding and representation of stereotype-consistent information compared to stereotype-inconsistent information (e.g., Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Garst, 1998; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). Especially when capacity is low, consistent information is relatively easily understood, because it fits with a schematic framework. In contrast, inconsistent information is difficult to comprehend under such conditions and therefore receives little attention (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1988; Macrae et al., 1994; Stangor & Duan, 1991). By means of memory tests different studies showed that when people are asked to judge or respond to different kinds of information, these schemata are used in the previously described way (e.g., Clark & Woll, 1981; Stangor, 1988).
The associative network model suggests that stereotype-consistent information is more strongly associated with the present stereotype in an associative network, thus resulting in better memory of congruent information than information that is irrelevant to contents of the stereotype.
Information that contradicts the expectations is not ignored, but is actually better remembered. It has to be processed more extensively than congruent information as it has to be considered in relation to the target person and other available information. It must furthermore be integrated into pre-existing beliefs about the target person. This effortful cognitive process (Bodenhausen et
al., 1999; Brewer, 1988) is called inconsistency resolution or incongruency effect. It results in many cognitive associations between incongruent items and other kinds of information that help people retrieve the inconsistent information from memory (Hastie, 1980; Hastie & Kumar, 1979;
Srull, 1981; Srull & Wyer, 1989). However, if cognitive resources are low, stereotype-incongruent information cannot be connected with other available items, which results in a long-term memory disadvantage instead of a benefit (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Schloerscheidt, & Milne, 1999).
Garcia-Marques and Hamilton (1996) developed the twofold retrieval by associative pathways (TRAP) model to dissolve both the contradictory mechanisms of the incongruency effect (incongruent information is remembered better under impression formation instructions; Hastie
& Kumar, 1979) and the expectancy-based illusory correlation effect (information that is congruent to expected information is remembered better; Hamilton & Rose, 1980). In this model, an exhaustive and a heuristic retrieval mode are distinguished. The exhaustive mode is an effortful search process that navigates through the associative memory using the last retrieved item as cue for the next one. Through its resource consuming characteristics, this mode is affected by cognitive load. The heuristic mode on the other hand uses memory traces and the salience of cues for the retrieval output and thus is not directly dependent on cognitive resources.
Garcia-Marques, Hamilton, and Maddox (2002) illustrated in a recall task (in which the exhaustive mode is active) that stereotype-inconsistent information was recalled better than stereotype- consistent information, provided that incongruent items became more densely associated with other items. However, this effect disappeared under cognitive load.
In contrast to these models, Sherman, Lee, Bessenoff, and Frost (1998) propose an encoding flexibility model of stereotype efficiency. They postulate that even under cognitive load stereotype- inconsistent information is encoded preferentially. While the details of the consistent information are well-known and thus easily comprehendible when capacity is low, the remaining attentional resources can be redirected to encode the inconsistent information, that is, information that is more difficult to understand. As a result, stereotype-consistent information is encoded conceptually (i.e., extraction of the gist or meaning of the stimulus) and attention is allocated to the stereotype-inconsistent information to extract perceptual details (i.e., extraction of information of the physical details of the stimulus). Nevertheless, the meaning (i.e., the semantic aspect) of the inconsistent information is neglected when capacity is low.
Another line of research (Carnaghi & Yzerbyt, 2006; Yzerbyt, Coull, & Rocher, 1999) has shown that cognitive capacity is required to discard stereotype inconsistencies (e.g., by subtyping).
Because information that is incongruent with prior expectations fosters additional processing at the encoding stage (Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Sherman & Frost, 2000; Srull & Wyer, 1989), people with low cognitive resources are not able to dismiss the inconsistent information and thus have to
change their stereotype. Instead of opposing these contradictory conceivabilities of the different models, Yzerbyt, Coull, and Rocher (1999) try to integrate the findings: “After all, stereotypes seem to take advantage of both the absence or the presence of cognitive resources. In the first case, the unique features of the target are scarce to thoroughly examine the incoming data. In the second case, the stereotype persists despite the inconsistency because perceivers have all the necessary resources to build a case against the typicality of the target” (Yzerbyt et al., 1999, p.
459).
1.2 Memory
As previously described above, cognitive resources influence the encoding of stereotype- relevant information. In this dissertation, the effects of cognitive load on the motivational and volitional processing of stereotype-inconsistent and -consistent information were investigated.
While encoding of information depends mainly on the limited capacity system of working memory, storing and retrieval is supported by long-term memory which has an extensive and enduring capacity (Buchner & Brandt, 2003). Therefore, both concepts of memory will be further introduced.
1.2.1 Working Memory (Baddeley, 1986) 1.2.1.1 Functions and structure
Conscious goal attainment is supervised by controlled working memory processes, which are thus also responsible for the realization of goal intentions under cognitive resource demands.
If working memory capacity is limited, then the resources required for the controlled processing of stereotypic information are lacking. For a better understanding of the processes involved in suppressing cognitive control, working memory will be discussed in further detail.
Working memory is assumed to work as limited capacity system which temporarily stores task-relevant information and maintains current concerns in an activated state in the service of cognitive processes, including novel as well as familiar skilled tasks (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, &
Conway, 1999). It is therefore heavily involved in processes that require reasoning, such as reading, writing, or performing computations (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Furthermore, it controls the goal striving process and the realization of intentions by allocating cognitive resources (Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Kluwe, 1997).
Working memory is closely linked to long-term memory, in that it consists primarily of currently activated long-term memory representations. Additionally, contents of working memory can be extended to long-term memory representations that are adherent to activated retrieval
cues and thus can be quickly enabled (Miyake & Shah, 1999). Hence, working memory is involved in the control, regulation and maintenance of task-relevant information. Thereby, relevant knowledge is recalled from long-term memory, manipulated, and recombined. Working memory further detects new information and interprets it, solves problems, encodes results of cognitive operations into long-term memory, and controls actions via goals (Baddeley, 2000a;
Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980).
In 1974, Baddeley and Hitch proposed to divide the current unitary short term memory system into three different subsystems: an attentional control system with limited capacity (central executive), and two subsidiary slave systems. These are the phonological loop, which is responsible for encoding and manipulating acoustic and verbal information, and the visuospatial sketchpad, which has a similar function for visual and spatial material. These components were assumed to work together as part of a unified working memory system that facilitates the performance of numerous complex tasks. Due to explanatory gaps, Baddeley later revised his working memory model by adding a fourth component, the episodic buffer. The episodic buffer acts as a storage system that holds integrated episodes or scenes, providing a limited capacity interface between systems using different codes (Baddeley, 2000b, 2001). The current Baddeley working memory model is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The current multi-component model of working memory (Baddeley, 2000b).
Central Executive
Episodic Buffer
Language Visuo-spatial
Sketchpad
Visual
Semantic Episodic
Long-term memory
Phonological Loop
1.2.1.2 Components of working memory (Baddeley, 2000a) 1.2.1.2.1 Central Executive
Initially, the central executive was conceived as a limited capacity pool of general processing resources (Baddeley, 1986). Still today it is the least understood system of all working memory components.
The ‘head’ of working memory is considered an attentional system for complex decision and control processes including regulation of intentional thought and behavioral processes (Kluwe, 1997). It is assumed to be responsible for controlling attention by focusing on relevant information and processes, inhibiting irrelevant (often automated) processes, dividing attention between concurrent tasks, planning sequences of subtasks to attaining goals, scheduling processes in complex tasks (requires switching attention between different parts), and updating and checking contents of the working memory to determine the next sequential step (Baddeley, Chincotta, & Adlam, 2001).
Further, the central executive is accountable for supervising the three slave-systems of working memory (phonological loop, episodic buffer, and visuospatial sketchpad), for example by allocating information (Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Gathercole & Baddeley, 1993) or connecting long-term memory with information from the slave systems (Vandierendonck, De Vooght, &
Van der Goten, 1998). Altogether, the activation of the central executive requires attention, consciousness, and intentional control. Because these processes require a high amount of cognitive resources, functions of the central executive are limited (Baddeley & Logie, 1999).
One possibile way to uncover the processes that proceed the central executive is to look at the supervisory attentional system, which was developed by Norman and Shallice (1986), and serves as a model for the control system of working memory. In this model intentional action control is described as being necessary only in situations in which new or unexpected stimuli occur. For habits or stereotyped skills (like typing or driving a car) action schemata exist that guide the behavior with minimal attention, cognitive resources, and control. Therefore, resources that can be saved allow one to act on tasks requiring attention and conscious control simultaneously, for example typing and thinking about the next steps to take (Baddeley, 1986; Gathercole &
Baddeley, 1993). Nevertheless, control by the central executive is essential in some cases. For example, when no action script exists to guide behavior or when habitual responses have to be broken (Norman & Shallice, 1986).
In her dissertation, Achtziger (2003) applied the functions of the central executive to the impression formation process. If stereotype-inconsistent information occurs in connection with the assessment of a person, no action schema is available to interpret this information. Thus, the
central executive has to explain this incongruent information, for example by interpreting and integrating it in the pre-existing picture of the target person. To inhibit the application of a pre- existing stereotype, the central executive has to diligently consider information contradicting the stereotype to get an individuated impression of the person and suppress information confirming the stereotype (cf. Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Consequently, the central executive determines, on the one hand, which kind of information about the target person will reach working memory to be further processed and which kind of information will be inhibited (Achtziger, 2003).
To conclude, the central executive is heavily involved in encoding and interpreting stereotype-inconsistent and suppressing stereotype-consistent information thereby consuming a large amount of cognitive resources. Additionally, the central executive is principally involved in the attainment of goals by goal intentions insofar that it controls attention, consciousness, and cognitive resources (cf. Baddeley, 1996; Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Norman & Shallice, 1986).
1.2.1.2.2 Phonological Loop
The phonological loop is assumed to deal with phonological information and is thus involved in processes like learning to read, language comprehension, and vocabulary acquisition (Baddeley, Gathercole, & Papagno, 1998). It is assumed to consist of a temporary phonological store and a subvocal articulatory rehearsal process (Baddeley, 2000b; Baddeley & Logie, 1999). If any auditory or visual presented verbal information appears in working memory, it enters the phonological store which works as an ‘inner ear’ that represents information as phonological memory trace. The articulatory rehearsal process repeats the incoming items on a loop to prevent them from decay and therefore is known as the ‘inner voice’. If rehearsal of this memory trace is prevented, that is, the process of subvocal rehearsal is disturbed, the memory trace decays within a few seconds and the information is then lost (Baddeley, 1992, 2000a; Gathercole & Baddeley, 1993).
Evidence for the phonological store is provided by the phonological similarity effect (Baddeley, 2002; Baddeley, 2003b). This effect shows that lists of items that sound similar (e.g.,
‘cab’ and ‘cat’) are more difficult to remember than items that sound different (e.g., ‘cat’ and
‘day’). Similarity of meaning, however, has little effect on serial recall (Baddeley, 1966; Conrad &
Hull, 1964). The word length effect argues for the articulatory rehearsal process whereby sequences of long words (e.g., ‘university, alligator, opportunity’) are remembered less than lists of short words (e.g., ‘bar, sum, wit’). This effect reflects the faster articulation of short words that can be rehearsed more often in a particular time period while longer words take longer to be articulated and thereby are more likely to be forgotten. Thus articulation duration may not exceed
two seconds before it decays (Baddeley, 2002; Baddeley, Thomson, & Buchanan, 1975). If rehearsal is prevented through articulatory suppression, the worth length effect disappears.
1.2.1.2.3 Visuospatial Sketchpad
Like the other systems of working memory, the visuospatial sketchpad is only capable of maintaining and manipulating information temporarily. It is important for spatial orientation, the planning of spatial movements, and is the solution to visuospatial problems (Kruley, Sciama, &
Glenberg, 1994; Sims & Hegarty, 1997). Thereby, it is a workspace in which spatial, visual, and possibly kinaesthetic information (e.g., shapes, colors, location, or speed of objects in space), accessed either through the senses or from long-term memory, can be integrated into a unified representation for guiding future behavior (Baddeley, 2003b).
Logie (1995) postulated that the visuospatial sketchpad works similar to the phonological loop in the visuospatial area and can also be divided into two different components: the visual cache, which is supposed to store information about form and color, and the inner scribe, which is assumed to deal with spatial and movement information. Furthermore, the inner scribe retrieves and rehearses information in the visual cache and transfers it to the central executive.
Supporting evidence comes from the physical examination of patients with right hemisphere damage indicating visuospatial neglect (Della Sala, Logie, Beschin, & Denis, 2004):
“One type of patient cannot report the contents of their visual left hemifield, but show no occlusion when describing a familiar view from memory, while other patients show the opposite:
normal visual attention coupled with neglect of the left hemifield when describing a scene from memory” (Baddeley, 2003a, p. 834-835).
1.2.1.2.4 Episodic Buffer
Although conceptualized as a temporary storage system of limited capacity, the episodic buffer is capable of integrating information from a variety of sources into a single complex structure. It uses a common multidimensional code to feed information from the phonological loop and the visuospatial sketchpad into long-term memory and retrieve information from it (Baddeley, 2000b; Baddeley, 2002). Thus, the buffer is connecting both working memory and long-term memory systems. Thereby it is controlled by the central executive which can influence the content of the buffer by allocating attention to particular kinds of information (Baddeley, 2003b). Further, it plays an important part in prose recall and guiding future actions like planning a route between two places (Baddeley, 2000b; Baddeley & Wilson, 2002).
Because the episodic buffer was not examined in this dissertation, it will not be described or discussed further.
1.2.1.3 Working memory capacity
Working memory capacity is generally considered to possess only finite processing facilities (see Einstein, McDaniel, Williford, Pagan, & Dismukes, 2003). It is speculated that the necessity for extra resources can cause a deficit in processing efficiency and social performance. Several empirical studies link cognitive load effects to the components of working memory by examining the effects of presentation modality on working memory load (Goolkasian, 2000; Mayer &
Moreno, 1998: Mayer, Moreno, Boire, & Vagge, 1999; Mousavi, Low, & Sweller, 1995). For example, Anderson, Reder, and Lebiere (1996) postulate in the ACT-R theory that the amount of attention that can be distributed over source objects is limited and thereby impacts retrieval from long-term memory.
A commonly used measure to test these assumptions are dual-task paradigms in which both tasks require a certain amount of source activation (e.g., Baddeley, 1986, 1996; Macrae et al., 1994). Participants simultaneously perform two concurrent tasks that require the same kind of cognitive resources under different task instructions: if resource demands in one task have an impact on the second task’s performance, it is seen as an indicator that a certain amount of cognitive resources is required for conducting the primary task. Additionally, estimating the residual resources or capacity not used in the primary task is also obtainable (e.g., Ogden, Levine,
& Eisner, 1979).
In Baddeley’s working memory model (1986), the structure is suitable to block one component separately without using resources from another one. To investigate visual processing, for example, it is possible to impose resource demands on the visuospatial sketchpad without blocking linguistic resources of the phonological loop.
The present work examined the role of cognitive load on working memory processes ruled by the central executive, the phonological loop, and the visuospatial sketchpad by means of a secondary task designed to disrupt attention-demanding processes. Different dual task paradigms were used to interfere specifically with the different working memory components (Baddeley et al., 2001). Thereby, the primary task was always an impression formation task paired with an unexpected memory task.
1.2.1.3.1 Central Executive load
Resources of the central executive have been investigated in a large variety of studies including laboratory designs with healthy participants (e.g., Baddeley, 1996; Gathercole &
Baddeley, 1993; Macrae et al., 1999) as well as neuropsychological studies examining patients with frontal lobe fractions (e.g., Brugger, Monsch, Salmon, & Butters, 1996; Della Sala, Gray,
Baddeley, Allamano, & Wilson, 1999; Shallice & Burgess, 1991). It was consistently found that the generation of random strings of numbers (e.g., 2-6-1-3-8-0) or letters (e.g., E-W-C-L-I-G) demands central executive resources. Cognitive control and conscious intent are necessary for this task, in that people tend to generate commonly used strings of letters or numbers like ‘1-2-3- 4-5’ or ‘A-B-C-D-E’ automatically. Random generation requires attentional and controlled interruption of this automatic habit. This control is provided by the central executive (Baddeley, 1986; Robbins, Anderson, Barker, & Bradley, 1996).
In the present studies participants were asked to generate random single digit numbers and articulate them aloud one by one after the beat of a metronome, while they were working on their primary task. The metronome was adjusted to one beat every 1.5 seconds, which barely allows enough time for participants to generate numbers and conduct a primary task simultaneously without making too many mistakes (see Achtziger, 2003; Robbins et al., 1996).
1.2.1.3.2 Phonological Loop load
Verbal encoding that is processed by the phonological loop can be reduced by articulatory suppression, which disrups the articulatory rehearsal process (Gathercole & Baddeley, 1993). In 1974, Baddeley and Hitch showed that the repetition of simple words, such as ‘the’ can block verbal reasoning. Incoming verbal information cannot be repeated and thus transformed into a phonological code. Consequently, the information cannot be saved in the phonological store and decays after a short time (Baddeley, 2000a; Gathercole & Baddeley, 1993).
Articulatory suppression was induced in this dissertation by repeating the German word
‘und’ (English: ‘and’) synchronized with a metronome that was adjusted to a frequency of one beat every 1.5 seconds. Participants were asked to articulate ‘und’ aloud while reading a verbal text.
1.2.1.3.3 Visuospatial Sketchpad load
A concurrent visuospatial task disrupts representations in the visuospatial sketchpad by competing for storage capacity or rehearsal processes and therefore reduces the perceived vividness of visual imagery (Baddeley & Lieberman, 1980).
Whilst blocking the central executive and the phonological loop are common experimental methods, load of the visuospatial sketchpad has been examined to a lesser extent. Some previous studies have found that memorizing a grid of dots used visuospatial sketchpad resources (Kruley et al., 1994; Phillips & Christie, 1977; Sims & Hegarty, 1997). Kruley, Sciama, and Glenberg (1994), for example, adopted a paradigm by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) in several studies coupling text comprehension with pictures. In their studies, they used a 4 ¯ 4 rectangular grid containing either three (Study 1) or five (Studies 2a and 2b) dots that were randomly dispersed in the 16 cells
to block visuospatial resources. Participants had to memorize the pattern of dots for later verification. It was found that the concurrent visuospatial task was impaired by the picture, implying that both elements were competing for the sketchpad’s storage capacity or rehearsal processes. By a motion verification task, Sims and Hegarty (1997) also used a visuospatial secondary task which consisted of 4 ¯ 4 grids containing three randomly distributed dots. They replicated the findings of Kruley and colleagues (1994) indicating that the paradigm is suitable for blocking visuospatial sketchpad resources.
For blocking the visuospatial sketchpad in this dissertation, a 5 ¯ 5 matrix was used, in which five points were randomly distributed. Participants had to memorize the arrangement of the dots until they were asked for recognition of the grid. The cognitive load was supposed to disrupt the encoding of the presented pictures of stereotype-relevant objects.
1.2.2Long-term memory 1.2.2.1 Functions and structure
Long-term memory is known to include both our memory of recent facts, which are often quite fragile, as well as our memory of older facts, which have become more consolidated (cf.
Landauer, 1986). Three main processes that take place consecutively are included: encoding, storage, and retrieval of information. The effectiveness of retrieving information depends on how deeply it has been encoded, and hence on how well it has been organized in ones memory.
Encoding refers not only to the information being memorized, but also to its environmental, cognitive, and emotional context. Also, using mnemonic devices to associate ideas and images helps us create links that facilitate encoding (Parkin, 1999). The active process of consolidation that makes memories less vulnerable to being forgotten is storage. Memories of older facts have been associated with a larger amount of pre-existing knowledge and are thus more consolidated than memories of recent facts (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). The retrieval of memories involves active mechanisms that make use of encoding indexes. In this process, information is temporarily copied from long-term memory into working memory, so that it can be used there. The more a memory has been encoded, elaborated, organized, and structured, the more easily it will be retrieved. Thus, forgetting can be caused by failures at any of these stages: poor encoding, insufficient consolidation, or difficulties in retrieval.
The structure of long-term memory is further divided into two memory systems: explicit (declarative) memory and implicit (non-declarative or procedural) memory. The former is often referred to as “knowing what” whereas the latter is referred to as “knowing how” (Buchner &
Brandt, 2003). The declarative memory itself comprises two components: semantic and episodic memory. Episodic memory refers to knowledge about personally experienced events that are
distinct in time and space. Semantic memory on the other hand consists of knowledge about facts that were learned in the past. This knowledge is timeless, shared with others, and does not involve conscious recollection (Tulving, 1972).
1.2.2.2 Retrieval
Retrieval of information from long-term memory is traditionally divided into two categories: recall and recognition. Recall involves actively reconstructing the information, whereas recognition only requires a decision as to whether one thing among others has been previously encountered (Sherman, Stroessner, Loftus, & Deguzman, 1997). Recall is more difficult because it requires the activation of all the neurons involved in the relevant memory. In contrast, recognition, even if a part of an object initially activates only a portion of the neural network concerned, may then suffice to activate the entire network (Anderson, 1983a). Stereotypes, for example, provide a useful network for the activation of stereotype-consistent information. Once a source node is activated (e.g., the stereotype associate with ‘women’) and the process of spreading activation is initiated, the activation is iteratively passed to other items linked to the source node (e.g., stereotyped characteristics of women: ‘emotional’, ‘weak’, ‘attractive’). Thus, stereotypes per se can serve as retrieval cues to stereotype-consistent information (Dijksterhuis &
van Knippenberg, 1996; Rothbart, Sriram, & Davis-Stitt, 1996).
In an experimental design, no external cues are offered in a free recall task. The participant is completely left to devise his or her own strategy for searching his or her memory to devise the answer. If a stereotype was associated with the items remembered during the encoding phase, the stereotype could be used as a strategy to recall the requested information. In a cued-recall test, an external retrieval cue is provided by the experimenter, but the items have to be generated via the participant’s own volition. Most conveniently, a recognition test simply requires the participant to identify a given item as old or new.
1.3 Intentions and goal achievement
Referring to chapter 1.1, it has been shown that suppressing the application of stereotypes is difficult. One determination factor of stereotype application is the individual’s motivation. If a person is highly motivated to set aside stereotypical beliefs, it may be possible to overcome prejudiced behavior (cf. Achtziger, 2003; Fiske, 2000). Nevertheless, while most people strive to achieve their goals, for example being open-minded, there are numerous reasons why goals are not often realized. For instance, an adequate plan translating this goal into action may be absent.
To help deal with this and other problems, Gollwitzer established the concept of implementation intentions, which are supportive plans that define when, where, and how goal-oriented action
should be implemented (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999). Thereby, implementation intentions are formed in the service of goal intentions.
In the present dissertation, the helpfulness of implementation intentions as plans for goal- directed action to be open-minded is examined. Thus the concept of goal intentions and implementation intentions will be introduced in the next section in greater detail.
1.3.1 Goal Intentions
1.3.1.1 Motivational mental representations
Goals are defined as mental representations of desired end states that can take the form of behaviors (e.g., to eat more vegetables and fruits), events (e.g., to get a health certificate from the doctor), processes (e.g., to have a normal blood pressure), or outcomes (e.g., to stay healthy and fit over a lifetime). They impact evaluations, emotions, and behaviors (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996) and are obtained by the perceived feasibility and desirability of actions and end states (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Locke & Latham, 1990).
The mental representation of a goal is assumed to be organized as knowledge structure like cognitive structures in general (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000b; Shah & Kruglanski, 2003). Thus, goals consist of interconnected memories, knowledge activation is necessary for their operation, and the accessibility of goals varies across time and situation (Anderson, 1983b; Bargh &
Gollwitzer, 1994; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007;
Neely, 1991).
However, goals are also characterized by their own meanings and are not all created equal (Kruglanski, 1996; Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996). They remain active or even increase in strength over time, until the goal has been reached, whereas constructs that are non-motivational always remain at the same activation level or decrease in activation over time (Anderson, 1983b;
Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996). Furthermore, it is assumed that the knowledge structures of goals are represented mentally in a hierarchical order (Aarts &
Dijksterhuis, 2000b; Kruglanski, 1996) from concrete (plans, means, strategies) to abstract with the representation of the individual’s motivation on the top of the hierarchy (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).
According to Gollwitzers research (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1996, 1999; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006, for review), goal intentions serve as self-instructions to attain a certain goal or to conduct a specific behavior. Having the format “I want to attain/become X” goal intentions can be either very precise (e.g., “I want to clean the kitchen this evening”) or quite abstract (e.g., “I want to be
live in harmony with my family”). However, behaviors and means that are required to achieve the desired end-state are not specified in the goal.
How strongly people feel compelled towards their desired goal depends on the importance of the goal attainment and the value of the end state of the desired behavior or outcome (Kruglanski, 1996). The higher the importance and the value the higher the commitment (Brehm
& Self, 1989; Wright, 1996).
However, although commitment may be high, people often fail to reach their respective goals due to various problems in action initiation and goal striving. Possible reasons therefore include people failing to get started with goal striving by forgetting to act on the goal, failing to seize the opportunity to act, or because they fail to initiate the intended action (e.g., Gollwitzer &
Brandstätter, 1997; Orbell, Hodgkins, & Sheeran, 1997). Unwanted influences can additionally prevent further goal striving (e.g., Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998). Moreover, some people strive for several goals simultaneously, thereby overextending themselves (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998;
Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996) or they fail to disengage from unproductive goal striving (review by Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 2003).
For instance, Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000a) found in a study about travel habit that goal- directed actions to take a certain travel mode were hard to suppress under mentally demanding conditions. They conclude that attentional resources are needed to control habitual responses by goal intentions. Further, Milne, Orbell, and Sheeran (2002) ran a longitudinal study to investigate the effect of a motivational intervention on exercise behavior. They found a significant effect of intention to engage in immediate exercise, but the intention did not increase subsequent behavior.
1.3.1.2 Processing of goal intentions
Intentions exhibit a greater self-commitment (Klinger, 1977) and hence, they are more likely to acquire working memory and suspend competing action tendencies than loosely held wishes. As soon as suitable conditions relevant for the intention occur, the intention is activated in working memory and goal-directed action is initiated (provided no antagonistic behavior tendencies are activated).
In ACT theory (Anderson, 1983b), goals are suggested to be source nodes of permanent activation that are linked to other goals via task constraints. They are attended to one by one the first goal to appear will be approached first, than the next, and so on. They do not require active maintenance, but are stored in a special memory state in which they need to be actively inhibited to eliminate them from working memory (Anderson, 1983b, 1993).
On the other hand, Altmann and Trafton (2002) developed the goal-activation model to show that goal-directed behavior does not require specialized memory structures, but is explicable by
“general memory mechanisms of activation and associative priming” (p. 66). First, to activate a goal, it has to be encoded and rehearsed while plans or mental simulations continue. Then it reposes until it is retrieved from memory through associative priming by environmental cues or mental representations in long-term memory (e.g., procedural knowledge). Thereby, the availability and selection of cues is not only important at the goal setting stage, but also for retrieval of the goal.
However, most often intentions cannot be executed immediately, but rather are scheduled in the future and thus have to be stored in long-term memory (Brandimonte, Einstein, &
McDaniel, 1996; Goschke & Kuhl, 1996). Foremost, to keep the intention in mind, a stable mental representation of the intended activity has to be established. Thus, having encoded the relevant information in memory once, it must be strategically maintained until the appropriate conditions for performing the adequate goal-directed behavior are encountered (prospective memory). Finally, if the right moment occurs, one must remember what actions need to be taken (retrospective memory; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993, 1996).
While storing the representation of an intention in long-term memory, it can be thought of as a declarative memory structure comprising several components (e.g., desired outcome, action plan, means). The intention is thereby highly activated and accessible (Goschke, 1996; Kuhl, 1983). Goschke and Kuhl (1993, 1996) demonstrated this intention superiority effect in numerous studies in which participants had to memorize two different action scripts. They were told that they would later have to act on the one script, but not on the other one. A subsequent recognition test showed that words that were associated with the significant script (the one participants were told to act on later) were remembered better than words associated with the unregarded script. Results indicate that memory content associated with the intention is more highly activated than irrelevant information. Furthermore, the intention should come to mind more often, provided that his process is not completed. Thus, adequate opportunities to engage in intention-relevant behavior should not be missed (Goschke, 1996).
Similarly, Zeigarnik (1927) demonstrated better recall of behaviors that could not be completed in the course of action than completed ones. She concluded that incomplete intentions seem to produce a certain kind of tension that is hindered until the intention can be accomplished. However, this effect could not be consistently replicated, leaving many conceptual and methodological questions open (Butterfield, 1964; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, Hicks, &
Bink, 1998b).
Although, in many real-world situations, circumstances are very demanding (e.g., in the work setting, child care), and thus many people fail to remember their goal at the right moment or in response to the appropriate cue. Such prospective memory failures are very common
(Reason, 1990). Mc Daniel, Robinson-Riegler, and Einstein (1998) suggest that the strength of the association between the cue and the associated memory trace determines successful prospective remembering. Thus, “if the cue does not automatically interact with a memory trace, then that memory trace is not retrieved unless another memory module initiates a strategic memory search” (Cohen & Gollwitzer, 2006, p. 162).
Einstein and colleagues (Einstein et al., 2003) examined three different theoretical views about the demands of prospective memory in a series of three studies. They delayed intentions under cognitively demanding task conditions and collected data about prospective remembering.
They ultimately found that it is neither easy for the cognitive system to maintain an intention in working memory over brief delays (minimal demands view), nor does it require a plethora of resources (prohibitively expensive view). Moreover, they determined that moderate resource demands are required for prospective memory tasks (active maintenance view). During the delay interval, the intention is periodically activated by the participants via an associative relationship between the intention and the ongoing activities. Thereby, the ongoing task context works as a cue for the activation of the intended action. Additionally, since the intention is incomplete, it is strategically retrieved from long-term memory until the intention can be completed (cf. Ellis, 1996; Kvavilashvili, 1987). Consequently, resources are purely required to choose and interpret the retrieved intention, which is cued by the context (Einstein et al., 2003; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000).
1.3.2Implementation Intentions 1.3.2.1 Plans as self-regulation strategies
Intention formation is an important prerequisite of action because planning implies to establishing behavioral strategies which are utilized to attain a goal. Therefore, various behavioral scripts, tactics, and alternatives are considered that help decide which intentions are favored over others (Austin & Vancouver, 1996).
One kind of planning involves the formation of implementation intentions as Gollwitzer identified them in his theory of intentional action control (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999). Provided that people feel a strong commitment towards their goal and are highly motivated to achieve their goal (Gollwitzer, 2006), implementation intentions have been shown to be a powerful self- regulation strategy helping people achieve their goals even under adverse conditions (e.g., low processing capacity or low self-regulation; for summaries, see Achtziger & Gollwitzer, 2007;
Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). Although an implementation intention is subordinate to a goal intention, it is much more effective and less resource consuming. It specifies when, where, and how goal-directed behavior should be initiated by defining a specific situation (external or
internal) and linking it to a concrete term of action. It thereby takes the form: “If I encounter situation X, then I will do Y.” For example, by holding the goal of becoming a famous piano player (“I want to become a famous piano player”), the appropriate implementation intention might be: “If I have finished eating dinner in the evening, then I will practice the piano for at least two hours.”
Effects of implementation intentions supporting goal striving have not only been found in basic research studies, but also in many applied studies in various fields (e.g., health care, sports, clinical disorders; e.g., Abraham, Sheeran, Norman, Conner, de Vries, & Otten, 1999; Achtziger, Gollwitzer, & Sheeran, 2008; Bayer & Gollwitzer, 2007; Lengfelder & Gollwitzer, 2001;
Michalski, 2004; Paul, Gawrilow, Zech, Gollwitzer, Rockstroh, Odenthal, Kratzer, & Wienbruch, 2007). For instance, Luszczynska, Sobczyk, and Abraham (2007) found in a study on weight reduction that women who supported their goal of losing weight with an additionally implementation intention lost significantly more weight than participants in the control group.
1.3.2.2 Processing of implementation intentions
The structure of implementation intentions as if-then plans, which serves two different functions facilitate the activation of goal attainment. In the ‘if-component’, a specific internal or external situation or cue is determined. This is assumed to create a highly activated mental representation of this situation making it cognitively easier to access and thereby consuming very little cognitive resources if any (Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer, Bayer, & McCulloch, 2005). This again facilitates attention allocation to and better recall of the situation that was defined in the implementation intention. Additionally, the specified situation is detected faster than incoherent situations (cf. Achtziger & Gollwitzer, 2005).
Moreover, other classical studies (e.g., Malzacher, 1992; Steller, 1992) such as Aarts, Dijksterhuis, and Midden (1999) have demonstrated the cognitive availability of the specified situation defined in an implementation intention. Responses to words related to a plan (implementation intention vs. unrelated planning condition) in a lexical decision task were reliably faster for participants in the implementation intention condition than participants in the control condition. Thus, without being aware of it, target words were recognized faster and thus were more cognitively accessible for participants who had formulated an implementation intention.
This shows that the mental representation of the specified cue becomes highly activated and thus is more easily accessible as soon as the critical situation, defined in the if-part of the implementation intention, is encountered (Gollwitzer, 1999).
In the ‘then-component’ of the implementation intention, a certain plan has already been defined to guide future behavior. It is no longer necessary to deliberate about the pros and cons
