The Rank and File

The examination of power-knowledge as self-forming activity for the rank and file will emphasize the disciplining effects of the military heterotopia as an extension of the statist and

bureaucratic discourses. First, the concept of the heterotopia is discussed, then three bureaucratic power-knowledges are covered: the complaint system, ethics training, and secondary conscientious objection.

The Military Heterotopia

The military, whether in garrison or on expedition, exhibits the same inside-outside, us-other tensions as do states. It is a figurative line of razor wire where personnel are on familiar ground inside and vulnerable to unfamiliar forces outside. In broader terms, exceptionalist and timeless values are thought to exist inside the military while naïveté and ignorance prevails among politicians and the general public.

Military personnel, moreover, believe their selfless sacrifices are enjoyed by citizens who too often take them for granted. When added to advantages between Canada and other regions, personnel on expedition have a more extreme sense of exceptionalism compared to the local, foreign population. Thus, most military personnel presume to occupy a moral and a physical space that stands apart from its domestic and foreign environments. Foucault (1986) uses the term heterotopia to describe such a place. Heterotopias can exist for things either held in high esteem, loathed, or forbidden. They help define something present in both the subject and the host society by creating the illusion that it is absent or set aside. Foucault refers to heterotopias that sequester adolescents, the physically and mentally ill, the old, and the criminal. In the West, the military has been a place of honour for the well disciplined, young, healthy, and heroic, and as a refuge for the unemployed, the aimless, and the aggressive.

Heterotopias are often total institutions where all, or much, of the individual’s time and activities are controlled and power-knowledge is concentrated and magnified. The categories of power-knowledge most evident in heterotopias are Foucault’s conceptualizations of panopticism, bio-power, and

pastoralism (Foucault, 1980). Indeed, the military is one of the primary examples used by Foucault to illustrate his ideas of societal discipline, along with mental asylums, efforts taken by municipalities to combat the plague, and the Christian inquisition. Panopticism refers to a web of practices and

technologies that make surveillance sufficiently widespread and intrusive that the person internalizes the disciplining effect and no longer needs continuous supervision. It can work through education, policing,

security cameras, architecture, tax returns, and so forth. In the military, it quite evident in drill, inspections, barrack design, mess behaviour, military law, and so forth. Bio-power is another set of practices that organizes and classifies individuals and the population according to age, gender, health, rates of hospitalization, the classification of diseases, public hygiene, and so forth. State authorities use the data to enhance labour productivity and mobilize military force. Military bio-power is applied through close monitoring of physical fitness and physical or psychological injuries, the wearing of uniforms, haircut and make-up style restrictions, the use of serial numbers, and daily reports on personnel ready for duty. Pastoralism is similar to the relationships between clergy and congregations where individuals examine their souls and confess in order to be blessed or avoid damnation. Pastoralism in the military manifests in exhibitions of such things as patriotism and a readiness to use weapons on others; judgment via performance appraisal and summary trials; reviews of family and marital relationships; and the selection of who is to be counted in or out of the promotion stream. All of these self-forming activities have a powerful cumulative effect.

The military heterotopia’s power to homogenize and control behaviour has marked repercussions on discipline and civil-military relations. If military personnel gravitate toward a shared identity, they will be confident that their narratives, moral codes, and processes are best and that they are fully capable of working without interference. Heterotopian exceptionalism also exists in smaller groupings. There is also room for the development of wide variety of local moral codes, modes of subjection, and self-forming activities that might not contribute to the discipline and cohesion of the larger unit or formation. They can adopt unique forms of greeting, initiation rites, binge drinking schedules, and a strong loyalty limited to one another. For example, the military commissioned a report from an anthropologist to analyze the culture of the unit involved in the Somalia scandal and for the personnel involved in the incident at Bakovici in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. It was found that “exaggerated” sub-unit cohesion interfered with the functioning of larger formations, the expedition, and the military institution as a whole (Winslow, 2004: 8). Winslow found that recruits are most concerned about avoiding ostracism within their primary sub-group to the detriment of the military or state interests. She cites research on strong

primary group bonding that indicated a propensity to hide any wrongdoing from outsiders, including their own superior officers. It is a tight “we-they” standpoint that can lead to resentment when outsiders interfere (Winslow, 2004: 8). This also leads to an environment where superiors narrow their focus on the behaviour of their subordinates and ignore the acts of personnel in other units. These tendencies, Winslow observed, become more pronounced on expeditions. She suggests that the torture killing of the Somali man might have occurred partly because the perpetrators felt so secure in their small group that they did not expect to be held accountable. In such a context, Winslow advises that discipline, professionalism, and the role of junior leaders close to the primary groups are of the primary importance (Winslow, 2004).

Separate aspects of the military heterotopia itself conform to the us-other discourse. In garrison, the normal and the transgressive are juxtaposed at the same location. On one hand, there are well kept residential areas, more orderly than the most civilian communities, complete with chapels for mainstream denominations, married quarters for those the military defines as married, schools, community centres, shopping, and other elements of a small town. Nearby, often within hearing distance, are military training areas with firing ranges, parking lots of armoured fighting vehicles, and soldiers on field exercises.

Barracks separate families from junior personnel and the unmarried. There are rites of passage for visitors who are subject to inspection and required to present identification cards at guarded entry gates.

Temporary or mobile heterotopias have the same effect. The military stages displays of personnel, equipment, and stunts for recruiting and brand advertising in venues such as shopping malls, schools, fairgrounds, and sport stadiums. Like foreign expeditions, temporary displays generate many of the same psychological reactions such as pride and protest.

There are references in official reports and manuals that support the idea of the military as heterotopia. The Office of the Auditor General Report of 1999 (OAG, 1999: article 26:14), noted that Canadian Forces personnel “perceive themselves as distinct from the rest of society.” The authors of Duty with Honour believe that military members accept “a unique and distinct identity within Canadian

society,” so that “[t]hey are members of Canadian society, yet in subtle ways they are apart from it”

(CFLI, 2003: 77). The ethos manual also declares that military professionals monopolize a special body

of knowledge and have the right to be a self-regulated institution (CFLI, 2003: 50-52, 59). On the topic of exceptionalism, Duty with Honour states that Canada’s military ethos “distinguishes a member of the Canadian profession of arms from ill-disciplined irregulars, mercenaries or members of another armed force that lack defining values” (CFLI, 2003: 22). Cotton refers to executive officers as “beleaguered warriors” and “defenders of the faith,” who believe there was once a golden age for the military ethos and what remains of it today is still is enough to set them apart from and above civilian society (Cotton, 1997:

3).

Complaint System

The Canadian Forces complaint system is a power-knowledge that supports the advantage of the executive category over the rank and file. Complaints processing relies heavily on rules and regulations, delays, and a complex division of authority that make the system quite difficult to understand and navigate. At no point is the complainant provided with adequately independent, staffed, and expert advocacy services. Similarly, there is no review or oversight office with the authority to reverse a decision by or impose a remedy on the Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces. Thus, the complaint system is able to protect the executives’ careers by reducing the risk that malfeasance and errors will be exposed, enforce obedience when decisions may be self-serving, and make it easier to deny fair treatment within social contractarianism. If ordinary personnel attempt to behave ethically when it is against the desires or orders of the executives, the complaint system strictly limits their opportunity to explain and justify decisions and actions.

The primary means of official complaint in the Canadian Forces is the internal grievance system.

Complainants first submit a grievance to their commanding officers who attempt to deal with it themselves or forward the matter to the senior officer responsible for the issue. If the grievor is not satisfied with the results, the grievance is forwarded to the Final Authority, who is nominally the Chief of the Defence Staff (CFGB 2010b). The Final Authority’s power to adjudicate, however, has been

delegated to the Director General Canadian Forces Grievance Authority, an executive officer in the

Regular Forces (CFGB 2010a). Grievors are provided with no legal advice or representation from the Defence Department and are left to hire a civilian lawyer at their own expense (CFGA 2010b: article 2.10). Outside of the internal grievance system, a complainant can turn to civil courts or the Federal Human Rights Tribunal, if the issue falls within their limited jurisdictions. Once they have submitted a grievance, it is mandatory that grievors have a uniformed “Assisting Member” of their choice, or one appointed by the chain of command, but this person is not an expert in law or the grievance system and is limited to explaining procedures and helping with research and the writing of the submission (CFGA 2010b: article 5.3). The Assisting Member “is not permitted to speak formally on behalf of, or in any way officially represent, the grievor within the grievance process” (CFGA 2010b: article 5.3). The executives, consequently, have an enormous advantage in terms of resources and expertise.

Military executives also have the advantage of captive oversight committees. What were supposed to be independent, external offices staffed with independent minded civilians were eventually established with no more than advisory powers. Firstly, the Somalia Commission Report of 1997, articles 40.34 and 40.36, recommended that the Chief of Defence Staff have no adjudicative powers in the grievance process and there be created an Office of the Inspector General with wide ranging authority to investigate misbehaviour and provide redress to complaints (Somalia Report 1997). An Inspector General’s office was never set up, and as we saw above, the Chief of Defence remained the Final Authority in the existing grievance system. Instead, other oversight committee’s were established, including the Canadian Forces Grievance Board, the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces Ombudsman, and the Military Police Complaints Commission. Their shortcomings will be discussed in this section. These organizations were initially staffed with some independent minded civilians but during the following the decade that followed they were replaced with former military personnel who can be considered members of the military community. Michel Drapeau, a well known critic of the Canadian Forces and a retired colonel who says he holds military officers in high regard, nevertheless is concerned that the practice placing such people in positions of oversight is contrary to

Canadian values and warns that the hierarchy will continue to be “inward looking and insular,” and

“either frustrate or evade civilian oversight” (Drapeau, 2009).

The first review body involved in the complaints system that claims it is external is the Canadian Forces Grievance Board. It was authorized by Parliament in 1998 because the grievance system’s many levels of review were considered “slow and unresponsive” and the process was perceived “as being too closely linked to the chain of command and lacking any external input” (CFGB 2001: 4). Its 2002 Annual Report requests more resources to address a growing backlog (CFGB 2003: 3). The additional resources were not forthcoming. Instead, the new chair announced the following year that greater efficiencies would be sought via a new management structure (CFGB 2004: 3). In the 2005 Annual Report, the Chair, Ms.

Laurin, declared that most of the case backlog in their office had finally been cleared, but in the 2007 Report, she referred to a continuing point of delay elsewhere (CFGB 2006: 3; CFGB 2007: 2). The outgoing chair expressed a desire for “more timely decisions at the Final Authority level” [i.e., the Chief of the Defence Staff’s delegated authority] (CFGB 2007: 2). Ms. Laurin also called for an expanded mandate so the Board could review all grievances and had begun discussions with the Canadian Forces toward that end (2007: 2). All told, the Board sees only about 40 percent of all grievances (CFGB 2007:

6). According to the 2009 Annual Report, however, the mandate remained the same whereby the Final Authority was only obligated to forward grievances dealing with administrative matters such as disciplinary fines, demotion, and release; pay and benefits including medical and dental services; and allegations of conflict of interest, harassment, and racism (CFGB 2009). The Final Authority may forward other files at its discretion. In its 2010-2011 Report on Plans and Priorities, the Board was still hoping to negotiate with the Final Authority to obtain the right to review all grievances (CFGB 2010c). As already mentioned, its reports to the Final Authority are not binding. When the Board does recommend that the grievance be satisfied and it is denied, limited reasons are given and the core issues are often not addressed (Ombudsman, 2003).

The first Chair of the Grievance Board was Mr. Paul André Massé 1999-2003, who had been a member of the military from 1967 to 1973 and a member of Parliament in the Liberal Party from 1979 to

1984 (CFGB 2001: 36). While in Parliament, he was on several committees related to the military and foreign affairs. Other members of the Board had no comparable military backgrounds and could be viewed as external to the military community and its cultural acclimation. The first Vice-chair was Ms.

Diane Laurin who also served as Chair from 2003 until 2008. Ms. Laurin’s background was in law and the Montréal municipal government and police force. She had worked on projects that included public morals, labour negotiations, work relations, and professional ethics (CFGB 2001: 37-38). The first two Part-time Members were Ms. Naomi Z. Levine, a lawyer, chartered mediator, investigator, and

harassment consultant; and Ms. Wendy E. Wadden, a lawyer active in the governance of universities and the law profession and a specialist in working with perpetrators of family violence (CFGB 2001: 39) The membership soon began to change. The Vice-Chairperson from 2004 to 2010 (the present) has been James Price, a former Judge Advocate General lawyer and military officer beginning in 1981. He was appointed to a military judgeship from 2000 to his retirement in 2004 (CFGB, 2010a). The shift to a completely ex-military executive was completed with the appointment of retired Lieutenant Colonel Bruno Hamel in 2008. The Part-time Vice Chairperson is now Denis Brazeau, a retired colonel. The three Part-time Board Members, meanwhile, are Mike Auger, a retired lieutenant colonel; C. Fred Blair, who worked in the Judge Advocate General group of the Canadian Forces from 1972 until 1999; and Carina Anne De Pellegrin, a graduate from the Royal Military College and a member of the Canadian Forces for nine years (CFGB 2010b).

The oversight body at the second level of review that claims to be at arms length is the

Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces Ombudsman, established in 1998 (Ombudsman, 2010a). The Ombudsman’s office has a very narrow mandate regarding the assistance it can provide and the remedies it can recommend. Rather than act as an advocate for the individual, it is obligated to remain neutral and safeguard the rights and prerogatives of the military as much as those of a military member. A complainant wanting someone to argue their case must hire a lawyer with their personal resources. Not only can the Ombudsman not impose a settlement, it does not have the mandate to criticize the content of a policy (DAOD 5047-1: Sections 3, 34, 36). It can only comment on whether the processes were

correctly observed. The Ombudsman also cannot review or comment on the findings of complaints that have been closed by the military’s internal grievance system or intervene if the complainant finds that the grievance process appears to be unnecessarily delayed. Mostly, the Ombudsman is a source of

information for members who are required to research and state their own case. That process, however, is complex and time consuming. Individuals must choose among twenty-three general areas that can be considered as grounds for a complaint. They are then expected to consult with or submit complaints to 50 different persons, offices, hotlines, websites, regulations (often several times each), and acts of Parliament before, instead of, or in addition to, contacting the Ombudsman. What follows is the complete list

provided in the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) section of the Ombudsman’s website:

“Unit orderly rooms; chain of command; commanding officers; any available military officer; military chaplains; military social workers; Chief of Defence Staff; Director General Military Careers; Director Accounts Processing, Pay and Pensions; Reserve Pay Hot Line; the Canadian Forces Member

Assistance Program; Defence Counsel Services hotline; Summary Trial Review Authorities; Court Martial Appeals Court; Canadian Forces Provost Marshal;

Military Police Complaints Commission; the streamlined Redress of Grievance process; the Canadian Forces Grievance Manual; Director Canadian Forces Grievance Administration; Canadian Forces Grievance Board; local, district and national offices and inspectors for the Canadian Forces Housing Authority; the Harassment/Sexual Assault hotline; Centre for the Support of Injured and Retired Members and their Families hotline; local, district and national officers of

Veterans Affairs Canada; Veterans Review and Appeal Board; Bureau of Pension Advocates; local Post-Deployment Clinics (for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder);

Directorate Quality of Life; Maritime Life Assurance Company; the President of the Service Income Security Insurance Plan; the Public Service Health Care Plan Trust; the Ombudsman’s Mandate; the booklet “The Code of Service Discipline

and Me”; Canadian Forces Administrative Orders; Defence Administrative Orders and Directives; Queen’s Regulations & Orders (at least twenty-five times); the National Defence Act; Members of Parliament; the civil court system;

and the Supreme Court of Canada.”

Ombudsman (2007a)

Potential complainants are warned on ten occasions that military personnel can only contact the Ombudsman if the “circumstances are compelling.” The Ombudsman’s website hotlink defining the word

“compelling” leads to another site that lists 18 Ministerial Directives and two appendices. A brief definition of the word finally appears under a section entitled “Existing Mechanisms” consisting of three sub-sub-paragraphs to an article. The Ombudsman’s site also warns or infers that there are at least eleven types of situations for which the potential complainant cannot contact the Ombudsman at all.

“compelling” leads to another site that lists 18 Ministerial Directives and two appendices. A brief definition of the word finally appears under a section entitled “Existing Mechanisms” consisting of three sub-sub-paragraphs to an article. The Ombudsman’s site also warns or infers that there are at least eleven types of situations for which the potential complainant cannot contact the Ombudsman at all.