This section surveys the relationship between postmodernism and military social science. The relationship is then examined in the context of two of the more prominent organizations dealing with Anglo-Western military affairs: the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society for the U.S.
and Canada, and the Royal Military College of Science in the UK. Both sponsor the publication of scholarly journals, host international conferences, and have an extensive relationship with military institutions. The chapter ends with a review of writing on military ethics that make no mention of postmodernism.
Postmodernism and Military Social Science
After the Cold War, military social scientists in the Anglo-West debated the usefulness of postmodernism as an analytic method. Two schools of thought emerged. The first is interested in sociological and political trends in military institutions and their host societies as if a postmodern age is synonymous with a post-Cold War era. This school includes Battistelli (1997); Moskos and Burk (1998);
Dandeker (2000); Moskos, Williams, and Segal (2000); Pinch (2000); Williams (2002); Gibson (2004), and Segal and Enders (2008a). They focus on changes in geopolitical strategies, the nature of expeditions,
military professionalism, public attitudes, mainstream media, conscientious objection, sexual orientation, and the roles of women, spouses, and civilian employees. They tend to downplay the potential of
postmodernism as an analytic method and sometimes treat it as a curiosity. Booth, Kestnbaum, and Segal (2001), for example, are amused by Baudrillard’s approach to simulacra and war in the media. Gibson (2004), meanwhile, briefly acknowledges that postmodernism is a form of post-positivist thinking, but then writes about social trends and intelligence gathering methods in the post-Cold War years. The second and much less prominent school advocates the use of postmodern critique to study cultural assumptions, behaviour patterns, and institutional characteristics. This school includes the work of Foster (2004), Morgan (2003), Coker (1998), Phillips (1999), and Ridderhof (2002). Foster (2004) recommends that the military develop a postmodern ethos in order to question authority and act autonomously, not rely. A postmodern culture would also prepare individuals for the compression of time and space in terms of media, tactics, and governance (Foster, 2004: 93-94). Morgan (2003) describes the psychological effects that postmodern thought can have on individual soldiers and potential recruits. Coker (1998) raises the same issue of cynicism and disillusionment, but is more concerned with the idea of poetic irony post-Cold War. While interesting to read, his work does not add anything new about postmodernism and the
military. Phillips (1999) recommends using postmodern analysis of cultural constructs as a new way of reviewing military leadership doctrine. Ridderhof (2002) would like to see Derrida’s textual
deconstruction techniques applied to military documents and manuals as a means of uncovering cultural assumptions. Phillips and Ridderhof, however, do not demonstrate how their ideas would work and what they might find.
Booth, Kestnbaum, and Segal (2001), meanwhile, argue against both schools. They believe that the first overstates the effect of post-Cold War sociological trends and maintain that Western militaries are still quintessentially modern. If the concept of postmodernism is to be useful, they argue, it should be approached as a methodology. Although the authors advise keeping an open mind, they nevertheless misinterpret postmodern analysis and conclude that it is of little value. Their reasoning is further
discussed immediately below. In the end, they opt for modern social science applied to a modern post-Cold War period.
There is a reason why so many researchers in military affairs have such difficulty with
postmodernism. They are working with significant misunderstandings and fear. Moskos and Burk (1998:
166), for example, simply state that postmodern nihilism is a place where they simply “prefer not to go.”
Williams (2002: 273) warns that military commanders “would make a grave error if they became
postmodern in the sense of rejecting empirical experience.” Booth, Kestnbaum, and Segal (2001: 466) are worried by the proposition that postmodernism is “relativism that sees all knowledge as conditional and without foundation…” and that it “embraces ‘indeterminacy rather than determinism, diversity rather than unity, difference rather than synthesis, complexity rather than simplification.’” It may be that their study of postmodern philosophy has been cursory and limited to literature aimed at social scientists. Booth et al (2001: 466), for instance, took their quote from Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions (Rosenau, 1992). Rosenau (1992: 110) also writes that postmodernists “doubt that a conception of reality need exist at all.” She blames the postmodern belief that “you can say anything you want” as a cause of peace protests, environmentalism, feminism, anarchy, animal rights, gay and lesbian orientations, and the popularity of psychokinesis (Rosenau, 1992: 137: 144-155). She goes on to disparage postmodernism as nothing more than an act of desperation and resentment by unemployed academics, adolescent rebels, immature students, and anti-establishment individuals deprived of power (Rosenau, 1992: 11). An essay by Murphy (1988), “The Relevance of Postmodernism for Social Science,” offers an explanation for the disquiet shown by Rosenau and the military social scientists.
Murphy (1988: 93-94) writes that “postmodernism appears to the uninitiated as an attempt to subvert rational discussion,” which “causes many problems for traditional sociology, due to the challenge that is posed to some of its most hallowed precepts.” Modernist social science, Murphy continues, assumes that a legitimate claim to truth and order will save society from anarchy, something that is obviously of the utmost importance to the military and the state. While this resistance has been lessening in mainstream academia, it remains strong in the military affairs community.
The Inter-University Seminar on the Armed Forces and Society
The dominance of the modernist discourse in Anglo-Western military affairs is reinforced by two prominent institutions: The Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS AF&S), based in the U.S., and the Royal Military College of Science in the UK. The latter is discussed in the next sub-section. The IUS AF&S is described as “the major inter-disciplinary and international learned society in the field, with over six hundred members in more than twenty countries” (AF&S, 2008a: 5). Academics not allied with the military, especially those using postmodern methods, have been reluctant to participate in such organizations because of ethical reservations about war being treated as a scholarly discipline and the perception that military bureaucracy stifles innovative thought (Burk, 2002; Ouellet, 2004; McFate, 2005; AF&S, 2008a: 9). Thus, the IUS AF&S consists in the main of specialized academics and
uniformed personnel, many funded or paid by militaries and defence departments. Military members tend to work on leadership and culture, or in related fields like social work and personnel administration. The IUS AF&S is clear about its intent to serve the needs of the state. David R. Segal, the “IUS Immediate Past President” in 2003, for example, received the U.S. Department of the Army Medal for Outstanding Civilian Service in 1989 and 2000; was Special Assistant for Peace Operations to the U.S. Army Chief of Staff from 1994 to 1996; and served two terms on the Board of Visitors of the U.S. Army War College (U. of M., 2005). When the U.S. military occupied Afghanistan, Segal argued that military sociologists should forego further discussion of postmodernism and return to traditional service to the state (Segal, 2002).
There are long-standing and close ties between the IUS AF&S and the military in the U.S. and Canada. A member of the IUS AF&S Canadian Chapter Board of Directors, Franklin C. Pinch, is a frequent contributor to military sociology within the public and private sector (Moskos, Williams, Segal, 2000: xvi). While a colonel in the Canadian Forces, Pinch was the Personnel Selection Officer Branch Advisor and senior ranking executive for uniformed social scientists. Later, he taught at the Royal Military College and worked at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute. The mission of the Institute is
“to generate and disseminate leadership and professionalism research, concept development and doctrine to support the Canadian Forces in generating effective military leaders” (CFLI, 2008). His successor and President of IUS AF&S Canada from 2003 to 2010, Allan Okros, followed the same career path. While at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Okros and Pinch were on the writing board for the official Canadian Forces ethos manual entitled Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada (CFLI, 2003). That publication will be discussed later as the seminal text on the Canadian military moral code.
As of 2010, Okros is an Associate Professor at the Royal Military College, deputy head of the military leadership institute, and executive director of the Centre for Security, Armed Forces, and Society (GoC, 2010a)
Two essays related to the IUS AF&S, U.S., and Canadian chapters further describe the
relationship between social scientists and the military. “Core Issues and Theory in Military Sociology,”
was published by Siebold (2001), a founding member of the IUS AF&S, while working at the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Ouellet (2004) authored “A New Paradigm in Military Sociology?” for the IUS AF&S conference, Canada Region that was held in Toronto, October 1-3, 2004. At the time, Ouellet was Conference Director, member of the Conference Program Committee, and a professor and Director of Academics at the Canadian Forces College, Toronto. As of 2010, he is a member of the international Board of the IUS AF&S. Siebold argues for a military sociology that is focused on, and wholly subordinate to the interests of the state. He recommends that research concentrate on a limited number of core issues and theories to support the military’s mission of taking “raw
‘materials,’ such as recruits, weapons systems, and doctrine and work with them to produce capable combat units (land, sea, and aerospace) ready to engage the enemy on the battlefield (or carry out alternate military missions)” (Siebold, 2001: 140, 150). This is nearly identical to the mission statement found in the capstone field manual for U.S. Army professionalism (FM 1, 2005). At the same time, Siebold suggests there is a need to incorporate alternative viewpoints into military sociology from other fields, such as political science. The military should also adapt to the culture of its host society, in his view, to increase its power and prestige and showcase its unique culture and ethos. If military sociology
does not choose core issues, it risks becoming disunited, less productive, “fractionalized like wide areas of sociology,” and as a result, it might “like an old soldier, just fade away.”(Siebold, 2001: 155). While Ouellet (2004: 7) also believes that military sociology should incorporate alternative points of view, he questions whether an over-emphasis on service to the state has strayed from the organization’s original aims. He cites Janowitz, one of the organization’s founders, who believed that such service must be balanced by efforts to preserve independence and objectivity. That is difficult, Ouellet writes, because the military chooses the research topics it will fund, controls access to data, and expects results with
immediate utility. Consequently, researchers would appear to be co-opted by the military (Ouellet, 2004:
8). As a remedy, Ouellet recommends that epistemological and ontological methodologies be broadened and shifted closer to those of non-military, mainstream sociology. He begins by advocating a shift toward postmodern methods, but loses heart along the way. Ouellet would like researchers to revisit ideas of self-identity and concepts of “patriotism, courage, gallantry, liberation, and oppression,” but without
undermining the legitimacy of these moral codes (Ouellet, 2004: 15-17). He asks that one not “construe”
his recommendations “as an attempt to do a true Kuhnian… revolution by replacing one paradigm by another” Ouellet (2004: 27).
A volume of Armed Forces & Society, the official journal of the IUS AF&S, was devoted to the teaching of sociology in military academies and officer training programs across the West and in some peripheral states such as Japan, Turkey, and South Africa (AF&S, 2008b). The project was supported in part by the U.S. Army Research Institute (AF&S, 2008a: 3). As an a further indicator of their influence on the discipline, David R. Segal, along with Morton G. Ender, is a guest editor and the entry from Canada is co-authored by Pinch and Ouellet. In their introduction, Segal and Ender give credit to a few charismatic figures for the spread of sociology in military academies. It began with Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos and was passed on through a cadre of their students: James Burk, David R. Segal, and Mady Segal. “Most sociologists at the academies,” they write, are their “direct scholarly descendants,” including twenty of the thirty-six sociologists at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point (AF&S, 2008: 10). Pinch is the charismatic figure named for Canada (AF&S, 2008: 10).
Royal Military College of Science, UK
The Royal Military College of Science of the UK, a part of Cranfield University, hosted a conference entitled “Post-Modern Military: Rethinking the Future,” on April 24-25, 2003 (Cranfield, 2003). It was to pursue the themes of postmodernism raised in the anthology authored by IUS AF&S senior members Moskos, Williams, and Segal (2000). Only one panel session, however, used postmodern analysis. Kennedy-Pipe (Cranfield, 2003) warned that an attempt to isolate the military from postmodern skepticism risked attracting and retaining undoubting authoritarians. Kennedy-Pipe cites the example of the U.S. military, which is being increasingly dominated by religious fundamentalists and incremental utilitarianism. Welch (Cranfield, 2003) describes how military culture could be analyzed by postmodern theories on domination, self-constructed identities, and humanitarian aid as a new imperialism. Research on recruiting, Welch believed, would reveal that the process would favour persons who are authoritarian and conformist. The keynote speakers, meanwhile, either ignored postmodernism, despite the stated theme of the conference, or dismissed it as an irrelevant and harmful distraction. The U.S. and UK were in the process of occupying Iraq as the conference began. As did Segal early in 2002 in response to Afghanistan, they too had a change of mind. In their opinion, postmodernism had outlived its purpose and it was now time to act in solidarity with the military. These speakers included Chris Bellamy, Christopher Dandeker, John Allen Williams, Gwyn Prins, and Ian Andrews, who was then Under-secretary for the Ministry of Defence, UK (Cranfield, 2003) while Dandeker and Williams were senior members of the IUS AF&S. Keynote speakers were applauded when they praised and expressed gratitude to troops.