Foucault and Moral Codes

3.1 Foucault and Moral Codes

As companions to the cultivation of the inquiry mind, Foucault, Kant, and the Hellenists do exhort their readers to follow certain traditional moral virtues. In Kant’s essay “What is Enlightenment?”

he states that courage is necessary if an individual is to think freely and independently (Kant, 1983). Kant believed that those who do not attain such maturity, are timid, lazy, and dependant on others for

knowledge. Thinking freely leads to acting freely and makes humans deserving of just political governance (Kant, 1983: 45-46). In “What is Critique?”, a lecture delivered in 1978, Foucault shares Kant’s sentiment that self-enlightenment is a moralist’s “call for courage” (Foucault, 2002: 194). Thus, Kant and Foucault both associate familiar kinds of traditional virtue, courage, and maturity, to preparation and the act of perception. Butler (2002) elaborates on Foucault’s moral code in a commentary on his

“What is Critique?” She attempts to identify what Foucault would see as virtue by linking Kant’s belief in emancipation with Foucault’s call for a default attitude of skepticism and resistance. But Foucault only mentions the word “virtue” twice, in back to back sentences, in the introduction to his essay: “There is something in critique which is akin to virtue. And in a certain way, what I wanted to speak to you about is this critical attitude as virtue in general” (Foucault, 2002: 192). Butler extends that thought by speculating that Foucault’s virtue is based on his unconscious belief in “originary freedom” (Butler, 2002: 224). Such a claim, however, strays much too far from Foucault’s postmodernism. There is nothing to support that conjecture in his theory on ethics and the schema for the ethics of the self.

The moral code espoused by Foucault, Kant, and the Hellenists, nevertheless, remains the

application of critique itself and not any motivations, traits, or values associated with it. In this sense, they differ from the mainstream Anglo-Western ethical tradition. Gane, (1986) and Davidson (1986: 231) argue that Kant parts company with the dominant Western moral tradition that is preoccupied with moral codes that enumerate duties to society and the state. Rather, Kant believed that individuals have a greater moral duty to themselves (Davidson, 1986: 232). In his essay “What is Enlightenment?” Kant encourages individuals to undertake an intellectual preparation to become free in their thought (Kant, 1983). In Hermeneutics, Foucault finds the same lesson in Hellenist thought. Foucault says that “caring about the self means equipping ourselves for a series of unforeseen events by practicing a number of exercises”

(Foucault, 2005: 485). Epictetus Discourses III.x.1., maintained that the practice of philosophy is to

“make preparation” (Foucault, 2005: 484-485). Foucault said that “to put ourselves in a frame of mind,”

to use the “set of exercises available to us,” will ensure that we are “permanently prepared for this life which will only ever be, until its end, a life test in the sense that it will be a life that is a test” (Foucault, 2005: 485). Preparation is not a straight path, he cautions, and could even require a period of “losing of one’s way” (Foucault, 2005: xxviii). Disorientation is a means by which a person can be detached from the espoused moral codes learned by rote and be free to deliberate toward a way of life tailored to the needs of a particular place and time. Foucault distinguishes between preparation for a specific activity and a more general preparation for a moral life (Foucault, 2005: 94). He refers to the specialized training Plato gave to Alcibiades so he could participate in the governance of the polis. At the same time, Alcibiades needed to learn how to lead a moral life whether for his own benefit and for the greater good in the public sphere. The moral code, in this case, is to carefully prepare.

Perception is a process dependent on freedom of thought and individual deliberation. For

Foucault, critique of discourse was at the core of Hellenist ethics (Foucault, 2005: 264). Foucault refers to the precept in Seneca Letters CIV, which requires moral individuals to see through the narratives of glory (Foucault, 2005: 264-265). For Plutarch, ethics is skepticism toward discourse when discourse shapes the moral quality of human life (Foucault, 2005: 237-238). He characterized the Hellenists’ pursuit of the moral life as a “spiritual” transformation and introspection into one’s soul (Foucault, 2005: 457). Ethical preparation requires that one relate to “a world that is perceived, recognized, and practiced as a test”

(Foucault, 2005: 485-486).

As was argued above, in the chapter on ethical substance and discourse, Foucault, Kant, and the Stoics believe that ethical subjects ought to participate in public life by engaging in governance. In the chapter on telos below, this moral imperative will be distinguished from that of the Epicureans. It is important to note that participation also carries moral weight when viewed as a series of tests in life in general as mentioned above in the discussion on preparation. Public life, it becomes clear, does not mean political office or any other socially notable accomplishment, but can refer to struggle of any kind that involves ethics and power-knowledge.

The moral code, therefore, as the continuation of the ethical substance and discourse can be summarized as preparation, perception, and participation in public life. It differs from the nihilistic position often attributed to Foucault as the philosopher of power-knowledge.