Historical trends over the past two decades show fewer major armed conflicts and, where conflicts remain, fewer civilian and military casualties. Maturing age structures in many developing states point to the likelihood of continuing declines in the number of intrastate conflicts. In contrast, the chance of interstate conflict, including one that could draw in the great powers, although historically low, is rising. The great powers would not want to engage in interstate conflict because too much would be at stake. Their main objective is economic development, and they know that conflict could easily derail that. The nuclear context also makes the cost of war prohibitively high.
Nevertheless, miscalculation by any one player remains a possibility.
The globalizing environment over the past several decades characterized by growing interdependence could change, particularly as economic growth slows in many countries and the global economy becomes more volatile and potentially crisis-prone. In a more competitive atmosphere, great power conflict may not be inconceivable. Several regions—the Middle East and South Asia—appear particularly susceptible to outbreaks of large-scale violence despite the costs to themselves and others. Many experts also have hypothesized that growing resource constraints combined with the possibility of increasing environmental degradation may be a tipping point for societies already struggling and lead to greater intra- or interstate conflict. Finally, unlike during previous periods, large-scale violence is increasingly no longer the monopoly of the state. Individuals and small groups will have access to WMD and cyber instruments capable of causing massive harm and widespread disruption.
poTenTIal for Increased conflIcT
Type present status Trendline Factors changes in character
Intrastate the proportion of youthful countries experiencing one or more violent intrastate conflicts declined from 25 percent in 1995 to 15 percent in 2005.
the risk of intrastate conflict will continue to decline in countries and regions—such as latin America and Asia—with maturing age structures (median age above 25 years). the risk will remain high over the next two decades in western, central, and eastern portions of sub-saharan Africa; in parts of the Middle east and south Asia; and in several Asian-Pacific island hotspots.
Constrained natural resources—such as water and arable land—in many of the same countries that will have disproportionate levels of young men—particularly sub-saharan Africa, south Asia, and parts of the Middle east—
increase the risks of intrastate conflict.
Most intrastate conflict will be characterized by irregular warfare—
terrorism, subversion, sabotage, insurgency, and criminal activities.
however, the spread of precision weaponry—
such as standoff missiles—may make some conflicts more like traditional forms of warfare.
Interstate several interstate conflicts have occurred in the past decade, but the number is at a historical low.
new powers are rising, but they stand to benefit from the existing international order and are therefore status quo oriented. An increasing number of states has consciously or implicitly chosen to maintain military capabilities far below their inherent capabilities.
A more fragmented international system increases the risks. Additionally, increased resource competition, spread of lethal technologies, and spillover from regional conflicts increase the potential for interstate conflicts.
Future wars in Asia and the Middle east could include nuclear element. information superiority will be increasingly vital.
Proliferation of standoff missiles will increase the capacity of nonstate actors. distinction between regular and irregular forms of warfare may fade as some state-based militaries adopt irregular tactics.
peace during the past five centuries.a Scholars account for this in several ways. There have been few if any periods in the past when global power has been distributed as incongruously as it is today. US military capabilities are unmatched by any other plausible combination of powers and are likely to remain so for decades to come. New powers are rising, but they stand to benefit from the existing international order and are therefore status quo-oriented. An increasing number of countries has consciously or implicitly chosen to maintain military capabilities far below their inherent capabilities. This reflects their assessment of the modern utility of using force to achieve political objectives and perhaps their belief that they have little to fear regarding the threat of major war in the near future.
Nevertheless, we and other experts believe that the risks of interstate conflict are increasing owing to changes in the international system.
The underpinnings of the current post-Cold War equilibrium are beginning to shift. If the United States is unwilling or less able to serve as a global security provider by 2030, the world will be less stable. If the international system becomes more fragmented and existing forms of cooperation are no longer as seen as advantageous to many of the key global players, the potential for competition and conflict also will increase.
Three different baskets of risks could conspire to increase the chances of an outbreak: changing calculations of key players, contention over resource issues, and a wider spectrum of more accessible instruments of war.
In addition, the chances are growing that regional conflicts—particularly in the Middle East and South Asia—will spill over and ignite a wider conflagration.
The Middle East most likely will remain the most volatile region, even as it moves toward greater
a This information is from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2011. The SIPRI classifies a conflict that has a core intrastate dynamic and attracts outside actors as an intrastate conflict rather than an interstate one. Also see Bruno Tertrais’ article, The Demise of Ares: The End of War as We Know It?, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2012, 35:3 pp 7-22.
We need to be cautious about the prospects for a marked decline in the number and intensity of intrastate conflicts, however. First, such an outcome is probably dependent on continued global support for costly PSOs. Second, a gradual increase in intrastate conflict is occurring in countries with more mature country-level populations that contain a politically dissonant, youthful ethnic minority. Strife involving ethnic Kurds in Turkey, Shia in Lebanon, and Pattani Muslims in southern Thailand are examples of intrastate conflicts persisting in states that display an intermediate age structure (median age from about 25 to 35 years). A few of these conflicts have persisted after the country-level age structure turned mature (median age from 35 to 45 years). Examples include the Chechen conflict in southern Russia and the Northern Ireland Troubles. Looking forward, the potential in Sub-Saharan Africa for intrastate conflict is likely to remain high even after some of the region’s countries graduate into a more intermediate age structure because of the probable large number of ethnic and tribal minorities who will remain much more youthful than various countries’ overall populations.
Moreover, constrained natural resources—such as water and arable land—in many of the same countries that will have disproportionate levels of young men increase the risks of intrastate conflict breaking out. An index of countries facing growing resource scarcities and environmental risks highlights many Sub-Saharan African and South and East Asian countries, including India and China. Many of the wealthier countries are already dealing with the growing threats; however, a number of countries in these regions—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Somalia—also have faltering governance institutions and may not be able to cope with increasing
environmental challenges and population pressures.
InTersTaTe conflIcT: chances rIsInG Few interstate conflicts have occurred for almost a decade, and no major power war has erupted since 1939, constituting the longest era of major power
mistrust. This situation probably won’t change as both powers grow simultaneously—a first for Asia, where one power has usually dominated. India’s concern is fueled by what it perceives as a Chinese policy of containment that threatens India’s rise. China’s continuing cooperation with Pakistan on nuclear and missile developments, its growing assertiveness in its territorial claims, and opposition to New Delhi’s participation in regional and global forums are likely to remain irritants and shape India’s strategic outlook.
Russia’s strategic calculations will depend to a great extent on whether Russian leaders decide to increase Russia’s integration into the international system and mitigate the threat of future armed conflict or whether they choose to continue Russia’s relative isolation and mistrust of others, exacerbating interstate tensions.
Russia has serious concerns regarding the threat posed by a rapidly expanding China, particularly Beijing’s growing appetite for natural resources which could eventually encroach upon the Russian Far East and Siberia. Russian leaders believe that they need to be wary of the potential for the US and NATO to intervene democratization. Fledgling democracies have a higher
risk of backsliding and instability. Endemic rivalries—
such as between Iran and its neighbors—would be inflamed if Iran decided to develop nuclear weapons.
Many of these conflicts, once begun, would not be easily containable and would have global impacts. The increasing empowerment of nonstate actors, such as Hizballah, in the region has the potential to further escalate any conflicts. Instability in South Asia would also have strong global repercussions as the region increasingly becomes the driver for global economic growth. Indo-Pak tensions remain at the forefront: we are concerned, for example, about an escalation in tensions should another major terrorist attack occur on Indian soil emanating from territory under Pakistan’s control. A conflict-ridden East Asia would constitute a key global threat and cause large-scale damage to the global economy. We address the possibility of regional conflicts with global consequences in Game-Changer Four, which begins on page 73.
chanGInG calculaTIons of key players The strategic calculations of the emerging powers—
whose regional and global interests are in flux—are likely to change dramatically over the next 15-20 years.
Heated debates are occurring among China’s elites, for example, regarding whether China should move away from its traditional policies —not having overseas bases or major military alliances and not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries—as its overseas interests expand. The outcome of these debates will be critical indicators of whether China intends to become a global superpower, which in turn will have major implications for the prospect of future great power competition. Historical parallels with other great power rises suggest that Chinese assertiveness might increase as its economic growth slows and there is political need at home to demonstrate China’s standing in the world.
With growing economic ties and dependencies in both the Persian Gulf region and Asia, India’s worldview is expanding rapidly. Despite booming bilateral trade and economic relations between Beijing and New Delhi, the India-China relationship is clouded by
Global Trends In vIolenT conflIcT, 1946-2009
Source: Center for International Development and Conflict Management.
Number of active conflicts
disasters to grow in scope, US military assets—such as lift and intelligence information—will be key for the success of broad-based global efforts.
new sources of frIcTIon In a resource-consTraIned world
Allied with the changing security outlooks are increasing tensions over resources. Access to key resources—minerals in addition to energy—will be vital to many developing states’ continued rapid economic growth, and these states will be increasingly dependent on outside sources. The potential for disputes to grow over seabed rights is particularly striking in several regions—the South China Sea and the Indian, Arctic, and South Atlantic Oceans (see textbox on page 68). Not only are the territorial claims unsettled, but new technologies are increasingly able to tap deep seabed resources. Nevertheless, the relevant countries know that engaging in conflict over these resources would jeopardize their exploitation.
This might prove to be a deterrent.