US workers—which have benefited from the world’s highest wages—will increasingly bring only mediocre skills to the workplace.”
Income distribution in the US is considerably more unequal than in other advanced countries and is becoming more so. Although incomes of the top 1 percent of Americans have soared, median household incomes have declined since 1999. Social mobility is lower and relative poverty rates are higher in the US than in most other advanced countries. Despite its high productivity and competitiveness, the US cumulative current account deficit during the last 30 years was
$8.5 trillion, a reflection of extremely low household savings rates and government deficits.
The context in which US global power has operated has changed dramatically: it is just not a matter of the United States’ relative economic decline, but also of the West— Washington’s historic partners. Most other Western states have also suffered a stiff downturn, while developing states are accounting for a larger share of the global economy. The post-World War II era was characterized by the G-7 countries—which were allies and partners—leading both economically and politically. US projection of power was dependent on and amplified by its strong alliances with Western partners, which were forged during an extensive
us power: lInchpIn of The InTernaTIonal sysTem
element of Power Present status Trendline factors
economic the Us share of world GdP was largely steady until 2005. it is currently around 24 percent (market rate) of world GdP, which makes the Us still the single country with the largest share.
But the Us share of world GdP will continue to drop, and the Us will be the world’s second-largest economic power in PPP terms.
China and india are gaining ground at an unprecedented rate (the Us rise in the 19th century was slower as measured by gains in world GdP).
Military the Us ability to maintain near-current levels of defense spending is open to serious question.
the trend for national defense spending as a share of the Us economy has been downward for several decades.
spending for major entitlement programs makes it difficult to reverse the trend of decreasing military spending.
the G-7 overall will account for a decreasing share of total global military spending. Although the Us will remain the leading military power in 2030, the gap with others will diminish and Washington’s ability to depend on its historic alliance partnerships will diminish even further.
Political the Us remains preeminent, though the unipolar moment has passed.
there is no competing alternative to the Western liberal order, though many rising states want less Us
“hegemonic” behavior.
the potential for an overstretched Us facing increased demands is greater than the risk of the Us being replaced as the world’s preeminent political leader.
s & T the Us remains the world’s leader, but Washington has growing worries about declining educational and skill levels.
China’s large, sustained investments could make it close to a peer competitor by 2030.
technology is increasingly a networked and
international enterprise.
leadership in key fields will increasingly entail working with international partners.
soft Powers Us preponderance across hard and soft powers makes it unique among great powers.
the gap with others almost certainly will narrow, but China is unlikely to rival the Us in soft power in 2030.
Us ability to integrate outsiders will remain a key strength for attracting the world’s best talent and ensuring s&t and economic leadership.
Internet has boosted even more the power of nonstate actors and been a key factor in the diffusion of power.
In most cases, US power will need to be enhanced through relevant outside networks, friends, and affiliates that can be gathered on any particular issue.
As mentioned earlier, leadership will increasingly be a function of position, enmeshment, diplomatic skill, and constructive demeanor.
mulTIple poTenTIal scenarIos for The unITed sTaTes’ Global role
The degree to which the United States continues to dominate the international system could vary widely.
Historically many such powers have played a dominant role long after their economic or even military weight has lessened in relation to others. The American economy surpassed Britain’s in the late 19th century, but the US only assumed its global role during World War II. The legacy of US power—as chief architect of the post-WWII order—has a potentially long tail.
In other key domains, a similar pattern exists of a narrowing gap between the US and its competitors and between the West and the “rest.” This pattern has implications for the United States’ role and power in the world of 2030. The US will still be the world’s S&T leader in 2030, but the gap with China, India and others will have shrunk. The US continues to have the biggest contingent of top-ranked universities while the number in Asia grows and Europe’s share has diminished.
Under any scenario, the US will also have to contend with the growing diffusion of power, which would make it virtually impossible—as we stated in chapter one on the relative certainties—for any power to act hegemonically. Power has become more multifaceted—reflecting the diversity of issues—
and more contextual— certain actors and power instruments are germane to particular issues. The United States’ technological assets—including its leadership in piloting social networking and rapid communications—give it an advantage, but the
elemenTs of power of leadInG counTrIes In 2030
Source: International Futures Model.
Percent share of global power
-5 0 5 10 15 20 25
Russia Germany
France United
Kingdom Japan
India China
United States
Internet/Communication Technologies Research & Development
Government Revenue Human Capital
International Assistance Foreign Direct Investments Trade
Nuclear Weapons
GDP (purchasing power parity) Military Spending
Energy
newly empowered consumers will demand education, entertainment, and products and services driven by information technology—all goods the US excels at producing. Moreover, as a global technological leader, the US could be motored by innovations in medicine, biotechnology, communications, transportation, or energy. For example, developments that improve the efficiency or extraction of shale natural gas and oil—of which the US possesses large reserves—will provide disproportionate benefits to the United States.
In an optimistic scenario, the US would address its structural weaknesses, including falling educational standards, skyrocketing health-care costs, and widening fiscal deficits. At the same time, outside the US, the euro zone would remain intact, eliminating one of the major threats to US recovery in the short-to-medium term. Continued prosperity in emerging market countries, where approximately one billion people will be added to the world middle class by 2030, could play to US economic strengths. These