Political science: four theories of the press revisited

Traditional comparative politics and communication studies point out that media plays different roles in non-democratic and democratic societies; “the media have been depicted as manipulative and subversive of individual freedom and political choice in the former and as guarantors of political liberties and government accountability in the latter” (Neuman cited in Gunther and Mughan 2000, 4). A number of scholars have challenged the widespread cliché that media in democratic states is ‘a watchdog’, responsible for “articulating a variety of political viewpoints to educate the public and allow it to make informed choices, particularly at election time” (Gunther and Mughan 2000, 5). They point out that media organizations are business and, therefore, are about news values and not organizing the political process.

“[T]he news media are poorly suited to the role of organizing public opinion and debate…The commercial media’s primary objective is ‘to attract and hold a large audience for advertisers’”

(Jamieson and Campbell quoted in Patterson 1998, 56). By contrast, the widespread cliché that the media in authoritative states is simply top-down propaganda is difficult to reject.

Aiming to explain ‘why is the press as it is’ and ‘why does it apparently serve different purposes and appear in widely different forms in different countries’, Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956, 1) suggested four theoretical models of the press –Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist. Under their Authoritative theory, the press

functions “from the top down”; under their Libertarian theory, the press is “a partner in the search for truth”; under their Social Responsibility theory, a nearly monopolized media has an obligation to see that all sides are fairly presented; and under their Soviet Communist theory, the tightly controlled “press operates as a tool of the ruling power” (Siebert et al.

1956, 2-6). Since the Social Responsibility theory is a successor to the Libertarian theory and the Soviet Communist theory is the successor to the Authoritative theory, these four models can be traced to two media environments – libertarian and authoritarian.

Critiques of Four Theories of the Press by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956) have traditionally been the starting point for subsequent studies suggesting ‘more appropriate’

models or what Siebert et al. called ‘theories’ of interaction between media and social settings, in which they operate. Thus, Ostini and Fung (2002) presented a detailed overview of previous criticism and offered a new model based on their content-analysis of coverage of an actual event in different countries. To operationalise the value systems of journalists, they used the dichotomous categorization ‘liberal’ vs. ‘conservative’, and to operationalise structural constraints of states they used dichotomous categorization ‘democracy’ vs.

‘authoritarianism’. Ostini and Fung came up with a two-dimensional model, according to which national press systems can be classified as democratic-conservative, democratic-liberal, authoritarian-conservative, or authoritarian-liberal:

“Democratic-conservative media systems are those in which the political system is democratic but the professional values of the majority of journalists are conservative – that is, the professional system(s) in which they operate emphasize support of societal status quo. Conversely, in democratic-liberal systems, dissent and free speech are values supported by both the political system and the individual journalists within that system.

Authoritarian-conservative systems officially control press content and professional values within media organizations support such constraints.

Authoritarian-liberal systems are those in which official policies suppress dissent, but individuals within media organizations support social reform and display such support in their practice of journalism” (Ostini and Fung 2002, 48).

Ostini and Fung (2002, 55) concluded that “incorporation of value systems of journalists as a level of categorization allows for differentiation between countries that would otherwise be categorized as similar on the basis of state or economic system.”

Also having considered the classical four theories and its adaptations, Yin (2008) proposed a two-dimensional model with the degrees of freedom in a press system and responsibility of a press system taking into account Eastern and Western cultural values. She described ‘free and responsible’ as a group of countries, in which the press is

“…mostly free and chooses to avoid sensationalism and play a positive role in society on its own. With or without public funding, it provides mostly quality information and often a public service – fighting crime in neighbourhoods, boosting voter turnout, and education and empowering the poor rural population. Depending on events of the day, its content can be a mixture of negative and positive stories. [‘Free and not responsible’ means the] press is free to pursue whatever story sells on the market with little concern for the consequences of such reporting. In the race to be the first on the market, accuracy in reporting and ethical standards are often compromised. If criticized for their low professional standards and lack of accountability, journalists in such media environment often invoke the defence of freedom of the press…Another form of press irresponsibility is the partisan press or political patronage of the press, in which case some press allows itself to be used as political tools especially when the democratic system is still young…Under such press systems, media content is often negative… [The press is ‘responsible but not free’ when it tends] to stress the importance and interests of the country, society, community, and families rather than freedom and rights of individuals. It tends to follow moral or religious principles and societal goals in news coverage rather than follow market demand because to publish what is perceived to be responsible is more important than to publish what sells. The ‘not free and not responsible’ press] does not enjoy much freedom of operation…is also prohibited from criticizing the government or exposing corruption…does not have freedom to make its own editorial decision” and it is full of glorification of the state leaders in the press (Yin 2008, 50-52).

Although Ostini and Fung’s (2002) and Yin’s (2008) models are based on empirical findings and theoretical knowledge respectively, their paradigms do not allow placement of the three countries in this study – Germany, Great Britain, and Kyrgyzstan – into a unified theoretical framework. Instead, they only suggest that there might always be ‘other’ levels of categorization that would differentiate democratic and non-democratic states within themselves. Thus first discussing Germany and Great Britain as case studies of how differently media operate in two democratic states and then describing the Kyrgyz press system along the same lines, this dissertation relies on the work of Hallin and Mancini (2004, 10) who claimed that “Four Theories of the Press has stalked the landscape of media studies like a horror-movie zombie for decades beyond its natural lifetime. We think it is time to give it a decent burial and move on to the development of more sophisticated models based on real comparative analysis.”

I.2.3.1 Media in democratic states

Comparing media systems along four dimensions – development of media markets, political parallelism, journalistic professionalism and state intervention – Hallin and Mancini (2004) proposed three models – Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist model; Northern European or Democratic Corporatist Model; and North Atlantic or Liberal model – to

illustrate how relations between media and politics differ in 18 countries that are widely accepted as democracies. See Figure I.4 for the main characteristics of these models.

Figure I.4. The Three Models: Media System Characteristics

Mediterranean

Source: Hallin, Daniel C., and Paolo Mancini. 2004. Comparing media systems: Three models of media and politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 67.

To clarify the dimensions, development of media markets refers to the historical emergence of a mass circulation press that evidently influenced the shaping of current settings for the press in different societies. Party-press parallelism can be manifested “in the ownership of news media; in the affiliations of journalists, owners and managers; in readership patterns; and in media content” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 156). Journalistic professionalization is manifested in autonomy, “not necessarily the autonomy of individual journalists, but of the corps of journalists as a whole”; distinct professional norms, “a tendency of journalists to define their standing in the field in terms of the opinions of fellow journalists, rather than those of outsiders - political party leaders … stockholders”; and, public service orientation, the existence of mechanisms of journalistic self-regulation organized formally or informally (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 34-7; original emphasis). State intervention can be manifested in media ownership, funding and regulation, as well as being the primary source of information with enormous influence on the agenda and framing of public issues.

Since the proposed models are “ideal types” and the countries do not adhere to one model or another (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 69), I consider in detail only Germany and Great Britain to compare the settings in which media operate in these democracies.

I.2.3.1.1 Germany

Development of media markets

The early development of mass literacy in Germany was closely connected with the Protestant Reformation, industrialization and the growth of market institutions. It contributed in a variety of ways to the growth of a mass circulation press with the first daily Einkommende Zeitung founded in Leipzig as early as 1650. While conflicts between press and state censors were common until 1874, press freedom finally emerged with Bismark’s introduction of “a Reichspressegesetz (Imperial Press Law) [that] eliminated prior censorship and made possible the birth of national newspapers” (Sandford cited in Hallin and Mancini 2004, 147-9). The Weimar Republic witnessed the most important flourishing of the party press, when about a third of the press was linked to political parties and journalists were publicists who propagated ideas, rather than reporters. In such a political polarization of the press, Alfred Hugenberg created a highly politicised commercial media empire – Europe’s first multimedia conglomerate, involving mass-circulation newspapers, a news agency, an advertising agency, and cinema production. The Nazis took over Hugenberg’s empire as they seized power and established control of the press as an instrument of political propaganda.

(Hallin and Mancini 2004, 155)

After World War II, the occupying Allied powers determined the media system. In the Eastern part of divided Germany, the mass media was controlled by the totalitarian Soviet regime; in West Germany the Western allies were “unanimous in their view that the mass media system should be independent of government influence and that structures should be created that were conducive to the democratic re-education of the German citizenry” (Kaase 2000, 376). Since American and British press officers controlled media content and taught a new generation of German journalists the principles of objective journalism⁸, extreme polarized pluralism did not reoccur but the partisan character of the German press was then re-established.

8 Esser (1998, 397) quoted Koszyk and listed three principle objectives of journalism: (1) clear sourcing of all news, (2) quoting of competent authority for every statement and (3) sharp divorce between editorial opinion and factual reportage.

Party parallelism

The media in Germany is privately owned and newspapers neither openly proclaim their political sympathies nor openly campaign for political parties during elections.

Empirical studies showed, however, that opinions expressed in the editorials of quality newspapers could be traced to approximate party affiliations and placed on a left-right political continuum.

In her study of editorials in five quality newspapers from 1994 to 1998, Eilders (2000, 203) found “no particular cleavages between liberal and conservative papers” in regard to issue repertoire. In regard to positions expressed in the editorials on the same issues “no paper exclusively held either left or right positions. A clear cleavage, however, was found between the Welt and FAZ on the one hand and the SZ, FR, and Taz on the other hand. Only in conflicts regarding economic matters did the SZ deviate from left-wing papers” (Eilders 2002, 41).

Attempting to trace the right-centre-left positions taken by 25 German print media outlets regarding the ‘caricature conflict’ in 2006⁹, Jäger (2007) analysed 254 articles published from the end of January until the beginning of March and found that Taz being the leftist newspaper that has recently moved a bit more to the centre; FR and SZ being left-liberal newspapers; FAZ as “Leitorgan einer konservativen ‘Mitte’” (Jäger 2007, 64) (leading agent of the conservative centre; my translation) that presents the positions of the right conservatives and a bit more liberal positions; and DW as “strikt konservatives Blatt” (Jäger 2007, 67) (the strictly conservative newspaper; my translation).

Studies on German journalists’ partisan bias found that (for German journalists) it was important to promote concrete values and ideas (71 percent compared with 45 percent for British and 21 for American journalists) (Donsbach cited in Hallin and Mancini 2004, 180).

The established social proximity between journalists and politicians hindered journalists from expressing harsh criticism since the latter were indispensable sources of information for journalistic products (Saxer cited in Pfetsch 2001, 57). The media was seen by more than 90 percent of the German journalists and spokespeople interviewed as an instrument for legitimising the government, i.e. mobilizing support for the pre-negotiated compromises of parties, and presenting politics (Pfetsch 2001, 62). Thus, in Pfetsch’s words (2001, 62), communication in Germany is “clearly political in motivation.”

9 Although the Danish daily newspaper Jyllands-Posten published caricatures with the Prophet Mohammed on 30 September, 2005, the violent conflict around this publication exploded only in February 2006 and that mainly in the Arabic countries. Reportedly this event was seen as a provocation to strengthen migration politics and right-wing extremist sentiments in Denmark in particular, and as a gesture of freedom of speech in Europe in

On the other hand, comparing British and German newsrooms, Esser (1998, 399) concluded that “German newspapers are by no means as partisan as some of the British [since] their editorial structures are more ‘open.’” That means that the organizational bias in Germany – “the overall tone of the paper’s political coverage laid down by the editor and the management” – is much less explicit. Also, the editorial structures are less able to prevent personal bias – “the effect of personal attitudes and beliefs which influence an individual journalist’s news decisions (own style of writing, rating of newsworthiness of events and stories, of headings, of pictures and so fourth)” – from getting into the paper (Esser 1998, 398-399). In this regard, understanding the professionalization of German journalists sheds light on how Esser came to such conclusions.

Professionalization

The Journalists’ Union and the Newspaper Publishers’ Association (Verband deutscher Journalisten- und Schriftstellervereine) were founded as early as 1895 (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 171). At this time in Germany, journalists redefined their occupations as professions with Karl Bücher, the influential figure in journalism education, arguing that “journalists were similar to civil servants in their social functions and that systematic journalism education should for that reason be supported by the state” (Hardt quoted in Hallin and Mancini 2004, 195). In the 20^th century, the professionalization of German journalists was marked by a high level of autonomy, freedom and strong job security.

According to Patterson and Donsbach’s (1996) survey of British, German, Italian and American journalists in 1992, only 7 percent of German journalists (compared to 22 percent of British, 35 of Italian and 14 of American journalists) reported having experienced pressure from senior managers and editors as an important limitation on their work. Such autonomy of German journalists in comparison to British journalists was explained by the highly different ways of work distribution in the two cases:

“While you need almost a dozen job labels to describe the members of a British newsroom, all German members call themselves Redakteur (i.e.

editor or desk worker)… [that according to German Journalists’ Union and the Newspaper Publishers’ Association official description of the job includes] gathering, looking and sifting through copy and picture material as well as selecting and preparing them for publication, contributing to reporting and commentating with own copy and/or pictures, dealing with the editorial planning and production (design and page makeup), and/or coordinating all this activities” (Esser 1998, 379).

On the one side, in enjoying such freedom, German journalists express their personal views more explicitly and more often than British journalists. On the other side, role

differentiation contributed considerably to the fact that German journalism is referred to as

“agency and opinion oriented” (Donsbach cited in Esser 1998, 394), while Anglo-Saxon journalism is often characterised as investigative. This observation conforms to the empirical findings of Donsbach and Patterson (1996), in which 51 percent of news decisions reflected German journalists’ own subjective beliefs on issues. By comparison, news decisions by British journalists conformed to their personal beliefs in 33 percent of cases. What further complicates the issue is that German broadsheets do not strictly separate who writes editorials and news articles. Thus in Germany, unlike in Britain or the US, the same person can write editorials expressing opinions of the owners of the newspapers – and news articles – the product of professional reporters (Esser 1998, 389). The autonomy of German journalists has been characterised as a lack of quality control in the newsroom. Because the word ‘control’ is often misunderstood as ‘censorship’ in Germany, Reschenberg clarified that quality control, to the contrary, could “…release the qualified redakteur of the constraints of recurrent routines and yield room for more creative actions. Systematic quality control is not only of benefit to the paper, but also to one’s own journalistic work” (Reschenberg cited in Esser 1998, 394). Since German journalists enjoy so much freedom that they are not constrained even by the senior colleagues, does the German ‘state’ have strings to pull?

State intervention

While the scarecity of literature about state intervention into media functioning in Germany may suggest the absence of such intervention, Hallin and Mancini (2004, 163) pointed out that Democratic Corporatist countries, including Germany, strongly protect press freedom with a significant level of regulation. On the one hand, such countries have right-of-reply laws; on the other hand, they may have hate-speech laws banning media content that denigrates specified social groups. Thus Germany, Austria and the Netherlands ban dissemination of Nazi propaganda and Holocaust denial, but unlike other Democratic Corporatist countries in Figure I.4, Germany and Switzerland do not provide direct state subsidies to the press (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 163).

To summarize Hallin and Mancini’s (2004, 71) view, German media shares such characteristics with other ‘Democratic Corporatist’ countries as high newspaper circulation and strong involvement of organized social groups in policy, including media policy. “It shares with the Polarized Pluralist countries a history of sharp ideological conflict”, has a confrontational political style and “political parties play a particularly strong role in social life, as they do in the media.” “Similar to the Liberal systems, it lacks press subsidies and tends to give strong emphasis to the privileges of private ownership in much media policy.”

I.2.3.1.2 Great Britain Development of media markets

The media characteristics of Great Britain are best described by the Liberal Model, often called the ‘Anglo-American’ model. Although the purest example of the Liberal Model – the USA – historically owes much to Britain, the latter differs significantly from the United States due to its “statist conservatism, liberal corporatism, and social democracy” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 198). The strong early development of the press in Britain occurred not only because of Protestantism, industrialization and expansion of market and social class, but also due to “political conflicts that led to the development of parliamentary democracy and the opening of the public sphere” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 199). The conflict between the Crown and Parliament, followed by the English civil war of 1642, marked a historical moment when political pamphlets and tracts were circulated to fight a propaganda war and to promote reading secular literature among the masses. Development of press freedom that started with the expiration of the Licensing Act in 1695 was intentionally hindered by the

The media characteristics of Great Britain are best described by the Liberal Model, often called the ‘Anglo-American’ model. Although the purest example of the Liberal Model – the USA – historically owes much to Britain, the latter differs significantly from the United States due to its “statist conservatism, liberal corporatism, and social democracy” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 198). The strong early development of the press in Britain occurred not only because of Protestantism, industrialization and expansion of market and social class, but also due to “political conflicts that led to the development of parliamentary democracy and the opening of the public sphere” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 199). The conflict between the Crown and Parliament, followed by the English civil war of 1642, marked a historical moment when political pamphlets and tracts were circulated to fight a propaganda war and to promote reading secular literature among the masses. Development of press freedom that started with the expiration of the Licensing Act in 1695 was intentionally hindered by the