Ideology and goals

The ideology of HT is best described in its core document, The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change, written by its founder Taquiddin Al-Nabhani.

“Hizb ut-Tahrir is a political party and its ideology is Islam. Politics is its activity and Islam is its ideology, and it works together, among, and with the Ummah (Muslim community; my translation) in order that she takes the re-establishment of Islam in life, state, and society as its vital issue, thereby leading her to establishing the Khilafah and returning to the bukm (rule) of Allah” (Taquiddin 1999, 23).

One should not, however, perceive HT as a political party in the classical Western meaning. HT is not registered as a party anywhere; it rejects any kind of political structure such as democracy, socialism, capitalism, “...nationalism, patriotism, localism or sectarianism...” and it "…does not accept to participate in the ruling system of the government, because it is based on the ruling of Kufr (rejection of faith; my translation), and this is a matter that is forbidden for Muslims” (Taquiddin 1999, 31). Thus, aiming to re-institute an Islamic caliphate, HT has three stages to go through: (1) winning the support of people who believe in the idea in order to form a party group; (2) working with the Muslim community to carry the message of Islam into all spheres of life; and, (3) establishing a caliphate, implementing Islam generally and comprehensively, and carrying its message to the world (Taquiddin 1999). It is believed that HT is in the second stage of the process, at least in Arab and Central Asian countries (Mayer 2004; Swick 2005). “The Caliphate will be led by a Caliph appointed by the Muslim community, who will swear allegiance to him. The Caliph will rule according to the Koran and the Sunnah (the practices of the Prophet that have become sanctified customs) and he will be obligated to disseminate Islam through Da‘wa (propaganda) and militant Jihad” (Taquiddin quoted in Maliach 2006a). HT’s goal of

building a caliphate is criticized since HT speaks of it without any historical or geographical consideration and disregarding social circumstances (Roy 2004, 238, 288).

Although the ideas of Taquiddin appear to be utopian today, the modernized message of Imran Waheed, the HT chief media advisor in Britain, may appeal to the masses, especially Muslim immigrant communities in Europe and people of Central Asia, who long for justice.

“Our aim is to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate in the Muslim world. Our vision of the Islamic Caliphate is one of an independent state with an elected and accountable leader, an independent judiciary, political parties, the rule of law and equal rights for minority groups. Citizens of a caliphate have every right to be involved in politics and hold the ruler accountable for his actions.

The role of the ruler (caliph) is to be a servant to the masses who governs them with justice” (Paraipan quoted in Whine 2006, 3).

Of two major branches of Islam – Sunnite und Shi’a – HT is seen as a Sunni organization. According to Lewis (1993) the major distinction between two ideologies relates to the obedience of subjects to the ruler.

“[For Sunni Muslims] the community is God’s community, obeying and exemplifying God’s law and ruled and led by a caliph whose office is established by God but whose person is chosen by the community… Sunni Muslims…need not, indeed must not, obey when the commands of the ruler are themselves unlawful. This principle underlines the teaching and actions of the radical Sunni fundamentalist groups at the present time… For the shia, this is not so. For them virtually all Islamic government since the murder of Ali ibn Talib has been illegitimate or, at best, provisional. There is no legitimacy in the existing order. Sometimes the response to this is passive acquiescence – separation and withdrawal rather than involvement; at other times, the Shia embark on great projects and actions whose purpose is to restore history to the right path” (Lewis 1993, 164-165).

The mainstream and traditionalist branch of Sunnite Muslims (nine-tenths of all Muslims) is prevalent in the Arab Middle East and Indian subcontinent (Roy 1994, 2). The minority sect of Shi’a Muslims is dominant in Iran, Iraq, and Yemen and strong in Afghanistan (Jenkins 2007, 125). Turkey has its own organizations distinct from those in the Arab world. Although Shi’a Muslims represent a minority in Europe, they appear to be a real force in Germany.²

Although HT claims to be a non-violent organization that rejects terrorist means to achieve its goals, it openly accepts carrying out ‘militant Jihad’ after the establishment of a caliphate. Roy (2004, 256) noted that HT’s “position against the launching of jihad is purely

2 “Twenty percent of Germany’s 3.1 million Muslims are non-Sunnis. This includes 400.000 of the Turkish-based Alevi sect, a form of Shi’ism that rejects many of the basic tenets of orthodox Islam; they do not even recognize prohibitions against pork or alcohol. Fifty thousand are Ahmadiyyas, a tradition that many Muslims

tactical. The organization believes that the time has not yet come for jihad, but that it is a compulsory duty for any Muslim.” Meanwhile, HT has been heard using the radical vocabulary of terrorist organizations and praising terrorist acts against the West. International Crisis Group (ICG) researchers warned that while “…historically, the party’s record provides no evidence of it being involved in terrorist activity against civilians, or in military actions against U.S. or Western interests…the view that Hizb ut-Tahrir is opposed to political violence per se is mistaken” (ICG 2003a, 7). Zeyno Baran, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, went to the extent of claiming that

“…HT’s renunciation of violence is only superficial… The group never denounces terrorist attacks. In many ways, HT is part of an elegant division of labour. The group itself is active in the ideological preparation of the Muslims, while other organizations handle the planning and execution of terrorist attacks. Despite its objections to this description, HT today serves as a de facto conveyor belt for terrorists” (Baran 2004, 11).

Asaf Maliach (2006a), a senior researcher and HT specialist at the Institute for Counter Terrorism, noted that while using the terminology of such terrorist organizations as al-Qaida, Hezbollah, Hamas and many others, “…HT is no less of a contributor to worldwide Islamic terrorism”. In his research paper on HT, Michael Whine (2006), defence and group relations’

director of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, provided a partial but impressive list of terrorists who were once members of HT or were influenced by HT’s ideology. Citing examples, Whine (2006) maintained that HT indeed supported terrorism, especially against Israel and Jews.

Indeed, apart from establishing a caliphate, HT advocates the destruction of Israel and maintains a strong anti-Semitic rhetoric. The best known example is found in HT communiqués in Indonesia that state, “And kill them [the Jews] wherever you find them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out…The Jews are a people of slander. They are a treacherous people who violate oaths and covenants… Allah forbids you to befriend them” (Yusanto quoted in Whine 2006, 4). HT France claimed in its on-line manifesto that "it is not possible to wait for the United States, the chief supporter of Israel, and Europe to find the utopian peace plan. Peace will not exist as long as Israel exists. The Muslims are the masters of their own destiny with the help of Allah. The Islamic state will be announced anew, Muhammad's army will rise anew and will liberate Palestine” (HT France quoted in Maliach 2006a; original emphasis). Since its banishment in Germany and because of its problematic relationship with Danish authorities due to its anti-Semitic rhetoric, HT tried not

to publicise this integral part of its ideology in Western countries to avoid confrontations with local communities and host governments.

I.1.3 HT in Europe

Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah or Taliban – Islamist organizations tightly connected to geographical units like the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Afghanistan – HT is an international movement like al-Qaida and the Muslim Brotherhood that recruits members and supporters around the world, including Western Europe. In Western Europe, HT is particularly popular among second-generation Muslim immigrants, who did not “…flee from tyrannical states as many of their parents did….” and, thus, are “…more critical of democracy and the inequalities of capitalism and correspondingly attracted to Hizb ut Tahrir’s message of a just Islamic order” (ICG 2003a, 11). Because proclaiming its goal to overthrow governments and establish a caliphate in Britain, for example, would be fatal to the organization, HT limits its activities in Europe to recruiting members, fundraising and media programs; it stays virtually at the first stage of its development there, i.e. recruiting and educating members for the formation of the party (Whine 2006; Horton 2006).

Unlike in other European countries, HT seems to be influential among young Danish converts (Baran 2004, 41). Thus in 2003, parents of Danish children engaged with HT created an association named “People against fundamentalism” to combat Islamic fundamentalism (Langkjer 2006, 28) and to steer children into other activities and away from HT (Siddiqui 2004, 22). The HT branch in Denmark has also had serious clashes with Danish authorities in the past. In 2002, Fadi Abdullatif, leader of the branch, was sentenced to sixty days in prison after the Danish HT produced a “hit list” of fifteen to twenty leading members of Denmark’s Jewish community and distributed a leaflet urging people to kill Jews (Whine 2004, 105). In August 2006, Abdullatif was sentenced to three months in jail for threatening Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Danish prime minister (Morgan 2008). In February 2008, Abdullatif led demonstrations in Copenhagen attended by 1.500 people against the publication and reprinting of the controversial cartoons (Morgan 2008). Nevertheless, HT continued to openly and actively engage with the Danish public to promote its political views and Islamic values. Thus there were reports of HT representatives meeting with fifteen Danish journalists in London and discussing issues pertaining to the state of Islam, status of Muslim women in Europe and the uniqueness of an Islamic caliphate (Maliach 2006b). There were also media reports about HT gaining a majority of a governing body in a publicly subsidized, private kindergarten, Salam, in Copenhagen and demanding separate playgrounds

for boys and girls, as well as not teaching children according to democratic principles (Western Resistance 2007).

I.1.3.1 Great Britain

The British branch of HT was founded by Omar Bakri Mohammed, an asylum seeker from Saudi Arabia, and a Syrian, Farid Kassim, in 1986. The provocative statements of Bakri in 1995 urging “Queen Elizabeth to convert to Islam and threatening that Muslims would not rest until ‘the black flag of Islam flies over Downing street’”, led to his formal removal from power over the British branch by the worldwide amir (high-ranking official) of HT. Until 15 January 1996, Bakri stayed the informal leader, and just three days later, as he completely left HT, he founded a far more radical group, al-Muhajiroun; unlike HT, it promoted jihad and establishment of an Islamic state in Britain (Wiktorowicz 2005, 9). Anti-terrorist legislation and a crackdown on al-Muhajiroun members in the context of 9/11 terrorist attacks led to the official disbanding of the group by Bakri in 2004. Since then, members of al-Muhajiroun have gone underground and continued to operate under different names (Morgan 2008;

Wiktorowicz 2005).

After Bakri’s departure, HT’s profile in the UK between 1996 and 2002 was low. From 2002 onwards, HT tried to re-launch its activities and recruitment and to improve its image.

To reach new constituencies, HT campaigned against the invasion of Iraq and against Pakistan’s President Musharraf during his visit to the UK; it also tried to shape Muslim opinion on debates about citizenship, multiculturalism and integration (Hamid 2007, 148).

The British HT branch is well organized and holds elections among male and female members in the UK every two years to determine its Executive Committee. The HT leadership team in Britain as of April 2008 included Dr. Nasim Ghani, UK Party Chairman;

Dr. Abdul Wahid, Chairman UK Executive; Mr. Taji Mustafa, Media Representative; Dr.

Imran Waheed, Chief Media Advisor; Dr. Nasreen Nawaz, Women’s Media Representative;

Mr. Hasan Al-Hasan, Media Representative (Arabic); Mr. Jamal Harwood, Head of Legal Affairs; Mr. Sajjad Khan, Chief Political Advisor; and Mr. Akmal Asghar, Head of New Civilisation Think Tank (www.hizb.org.uk).

The HT branch in the UK has around 10,000 active members, predominantly of Indian and Pakistani origin, and has attracted young Muslim second-generation immigrants by providing them a sense of belonging, identity and goals, which they are missing in the British society (Mandaville 2007, 263; Swick 2005; Morgan 2008). Sadek Hamid (2007), a scholar who interviewed former members in Britain, also found,

“People join HT also [apart from searching for identity and sense of belonging] for a number of [other] different reasons such as a search for shelter from racism and Islamophobia, the negative impact of geo-politics and social dislocation…Indeed, many young people were attracted to HT entirely due to their slick appearance, and their ability to be well-spoken and seemingly possess religious knowledge at the same time… HT rhetoric promises neatly packaged answers to all the socio-political issues facing Muslims; this is particularly attractive to rootless young people looking for ready-made solutions in a rapidly changing world” (Hamid 2007, 150).

Adrian Morgan, a British-based writer knowledgeable about HT, added,

“At the very base of the pyramid are British HT's disaffected and alienated young recruits, who have poor education and who will never hone their Aqeeda (creed; my translation) skills to rise to upper levels. For them, HT is a vehicle to express contempt and hatred for the society in which they live.

They are taught that the West hates all Muslims. Within such an environment their anger is encouraged. They are given empty promises of a caliphate, which would only come about in a hypothetical future. Among these youths, beyond the direct gaze of their leaders, threats and acts of violence already happen. How long before such violence involves explosives?” (Morgan 2007).

Swick (2005, 11) took a different view and claimed that although most reports and studies on HT were filled with negative instances of HT influence on British youth, there were cases where HT contributed positively to Muslim-British society. For example, HT motivated discussions about “…long ignored and misunderstood social issues such as drug use and gang violence among Muslim youth…” and “…empowered young female Muslims by encouraging them to voice their opinions and including women in visible leadership positions.” Although the number of white British converts to HT is not known, there were extensive media reports about Ian Nisbet, a white British convert spreading HT propaganda in Egypt in 2002 with Reza Pankhurst and Maajid Nawaz.

The departure of HT members is also discussed in scholarly works and media reports.

As Hamid (2007, 158) observed, “Young people who complete their education and settle down into adult life, and those who can think for themselves, usually leave. HT’s long-term appeal will most likely be determined not by the radicalism of its ideas but by the absence of alternatives.” Maajid Nawaz, reaching the position of a national leader of HT in Britain, left HT and together with Ed Husain, another former HT activist, co-founded the Quilliam Foundation, a counter-extremism think tank. Husain (2007) reflected on why he joined radical Islam in Britain, what he saw inside the movement and why he left in his book The Islamist. He also wrote about what was wrong with the organization: “its arrogance, extremism, superiority complex, confrontational style, cultism, rejection of Britishness or any national identity, and serious lack of spirituality.” Arguing that “home-grown British suicide

bombers are a direct result of Hizb ut-Tahrir disseminating ideas of jihad, martyrdom, confrontation, and anti-Americanism, and nurturing a sense of separation among Britain’s Muslim” (Husain 2007, 119), Husain (2007, 266) concluded, “The Hizb should have been outlawed a decade ago, and so spared many of us so much misery.”

The main HT activities in Britain include running websites; publication of books and the biweekly magazines Khalifah and New Civilization; handing out pamphlets around mosques and university prayer rooms; organizing study groups or debate clubs in universities under pseudonyms; making provocative statements to attract media attention; and, organizing marches and demonstrations. The content of HT leaflets is always provocative and asserts that the only solution to each problem is establishing a caliphate. In 1995, HT was banned from UK university campuses by the National Union of Students for promoting hatred, its strong anti-Semitic sentiments and its pressure on young women to wear hijabs (a female dress that covers all the body except the face; my translation) (Morgan 2007; Mandaville 2007, 267; Swick 2005). Penetrating into government and civil service positions is also high on the HT’s agenda, but it has been not easy to identify how successful HT has been in this endeavour. In November 2006, it was disclosed that HT member Abid Javaid worked in the information technology department of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate, part of the Home Office (Gardham 2006). That example is, however, a rare case of publicly naming an HT member who occupied a civil position.

While HT has been charged but never convicted of breaking British laws, there have been hot debates in British society about whether to ban it. As then-British Prime Minister Tony Blair said in an August 2005 statement about the need to outlaw the group, his extremism advisers from the Muslim Council of Britain demanded that the right-wing British National Party also be banned. When his successor, Gordon Brown, was questioned in Parliament in July 2007 about why the Labour Party failed to ban HT, he replied that there was not enough evidence to prohibit the group. Following extensive debates in Great Britain, Australian Attorney General Philip Ruddock ordered the national intelligence service, ASIO, to investigate HT. Reportedly, Wassim Doureihi, spokesman for the Sydney branch of HT, cooperated with the ASIO investigations and Ruddock eventually decided against banning the group (Morgan 2007). Morgan (2007) explained the UK and Australian decisions against banning HT by the fact that authorities had looked “…at the surface but not substance of Hizb ut-Tahrir.” The substance of current HT was discussed by Husain (2007, 272) in detail:

“Had the Hizb really changed? Was there any substance to the new claims that the Hizb was a ‘non-violent’ organization? How could an organization committed to the creation of a violent state seriously brand itself as

‘non-violent’? Majid and I have had long discussions on the Hizb and my conclusion is that there are now at least two strands within it. The first is desperately trying to ensure survival in Britain by adopting a more moderate tone and appearance in an attempt to gain acceptance among the constituency that matters most to them: the Muslim community, now increasingly under government pressure to sideline extremists. Britain remains vital to the Hizb, for it gives the group access to the global media and provides a fertile recruiting ground at mosques and universities. The second strand is more radical and committed to the writings of Nabhani and less concerned about engagement. Most members of the Hizb’s national executive belong to the former, while most rank and file members, it seems,

‘non-violent’? Majid and I have had long discussions on the Hizb and my conclusion is that there are now at least two strands within it. The first is desperately trying to ensure survival in Britain by adopting a more moderate tone and appearance in an attempt to gain acceptance among the constituency that matters most to them: the Muslim community, now increasingly under government pressure to sideline extremists. Britain remains vital to the Hizb, for it gives the group access to the global media and provides a fertile recruiting ground at mosques and universities. The second strand is more radical and committed to the writings of Nabhani and less concerned about engagement. Most members of the Hizb’s national executive belong to the former, while most rank and file members, it seems,