Defining the terms: clash of definitions

The title ‘clash of definitions’ is borrowed from Edward Said’s (2000) reacting essay to Samuel Huntington’s (1993) ‘clash of civilizations.’ It appropriately reflects the purpose of this sub-chapter, which is not so much to provide working definitions for the study as to show a lack of consensus among scholars, who define and use these terms in their academic work in general, and in reference to HT in particular. Since the mass media are often criticized for confusing the terms ‘Islamism’ and ‘fundamentalism’ as well as ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism,’

or using them interchangeably, I look at different examples to illustrate how such confusion takes place in the academic world as well. While I had not intended to select the scholars who present the opposing poles of perception of Muslim people as ‘good Muslim’ – secular and moderate – and ‘bad Muslim’ – militant and anti-Western – such dichotomous polarization takes place in the academic community, with new voices gradually joining one pole or the other. Thus, I analyse the works not only of such scholars as Olivier Roy, John Esposito, Edward Said and Bernard Lewis but also a range of other scholars to present the ‘clash of definitions’ as clearly as possible.

I.1.7.1 Islam – Muslim

According to Britannica Concise Encyclopedia, the Arabic word Islam means

"submission" — specifically, submission to the will of the one God, called Allah in Arabic.

According to Lewis (2003, 3), an orientalist and historian of Islam, the word ‘Islam’ has two meanings: “In the one sense it denotes a religion, a system of belief and worship; in the other,

the civilization that grew up and flourished under the aegis of that religion. The word Islam thus denotes more than fourteen centuries of history, a billion and a third people, and a religious and cultural tradition of enormous diversity.” While Lewis tended to strictly divide schools of Islam along certain lines, Roy (2004, 9) claimed, “The many different Islams (liberal, fundamentalist, conservative) with which we are familiar are more a construction than a reality, especially if one looks not at ideas but at the life path of an individual…We speak about trends, poles, and not about given and structured schools of thought. People change and adapt.”

The definition of ‘Muslim’ also varies from the precise translation from Arabic - "one who wants or seeks wholeness" - to broad definitions used by agencies and scholars. Jenkins (2007, 18), a scholar of history and religion, adopted the definition allegedly offered by Islam itself, “a Muslim [is] anyone brought up in a Muslim community, or whose father is a Muslim”. He explained that “…Muslim is an ethnic label loosely applied…” to the African or Asian communities in France, to the Turkish communities in Germany and Pakistanis and Bengalis in Britain since those people are coming from the countries in which Islam is the default religion (Jenkins 2007, 156). Roy (1994, viii) used the word ‘Muslim’ “to designate what is based on fact (a “Muslim country” is a country in which the population is Muslim; a

“Muslim intellectual” is an intellectual of Muslim origin and culture), and the term “Islamic”

for the result of an intention (an “Islamic state” is a state that bases its legitimacy on Islam, and “Islamic intellectual” is an intellectual who consciously organizes his thought within the conceptual framework of Islam).” Mandaville (2007, 5), a scholar of politics, intentionally did not define Islam, claiming that “a Muslim is anyone who identifies him or herself, at least in part, with Islam – regardless of how the latter may be understood.” Finally, Halliday (2000, 134), a scholar on the Middle East, quoted an Iranian intellectual as saying, “Islam is a sea in which it is possible to catch almost any fish one wants.”

I.1.7.2 Islamism vs. Fundamentalism

In the second half of the twentieth century, scholars and journalists faced a challenge in labelling Muslim movements that used Islamic ideology in their political and social endeavours. In his 1985 book on Muslim extremists in Egypt, the French sociologist of Islam Gilles Kepel did not use the term “fundamentalism” and instead used the French islamiste that was subsequently translated into English as Islamist (Kramer 2003). The word fundamentalism implied a sense of extremism, prejudice and dismissal; there was a need, however, to differentiate between extremist and mainstream Muslims. In 1996, Robert

Pelletreu Jr., at that time US assistant secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs, formulated the following definition:

“We normally use the term “Islamist” to refer to Muslims who draw upon the belief, symbols, and language of Islam to inspire, shape, and animate political activity. We do not automatically seek to exclude moderate, tolerant, peaceful Islamists who seek to apply their religious values to domestic political problems and foreign policy. We, however, object strongly to Islamists who preach intolerance and spouse violence in the domestic and international arenas” (Pelletreu quoted in Kramer 2003).

The security forces of Germany – the Federal Office for the Protection of Constitution – defined ‘Islamism’ and ‘Islamists’ as follows:

“Islamism is a political, mostly socio-revolutionary movement – heterogeneous in itself – which is supported by a minority of the Muslims.

With reference to the original Islam of the 7th century, its adherents - the Islamists – are calling for the "reinstitution" of an "Islamic order", in their understanding the only legitimate state and social order which is to replace all other orders… Militant Islamists feel legitimised to impose the "Islamic order" with violent means”

(http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/en_fields_of_work/islamism/, accessed on 23.01.2009).

Unlike authorities, scholars overall have been reluctant, or at least cautious, in using the term Islamism with negative connotations in references to different Muslim communities.

Jenkins’ (2007), Wiktorowicz’s (2004, 2), Mandeville’s (2007, 57) and Roy’s (1994, ix) definitions of ‘Islamism’ were all connected to political activities or ideologies with the vision of promoting Islamic spirituality, law, order and/or state. However, Jenkins (2007) described organizations like Hezbollah, Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist, militant or radical Islamist movements; Wiktorowicz (2005) referred to the al-Muhajiroun movement as radical Islamic activists; Mandaville (2007, 239) referred to al-Qaida and HT as radical Islamist groups willing to use “violent struggle (jihad) as the primary or even the exclusively legitimate method for the pursuit of political change” varying in the degree of acceptable violence from movement to movement; and, Roy (2004, 309) referred to HT as a radical fundamentalist organization.

Roy’s (1994, 36-39) argument that there are three major ideological differences between radical Islamists and conservative fundamentalism – “the place of politics, women, and the sharia” – implies, however, that applying the terms ‘Islamists’ and ‘fundamentalists’ to the same movement interchangeably is unacceptable. Indeed, the term ‘fundamentalism’

originally came from America and referred to Protestant Christians’ reaffirmation of the literal text of the Bible and returning to the “fundamentals” of Christian belief (Kramer 2003;

Euben 1999, 17). However, as ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ became frequently cited in the media (Kramer 2003; Euben 1999, 17; Poole 2002, 140) scholars were divided among sympathizers with the new Islamic movements who rejected use of the ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ term and who believed that ‘fundamentalism’ was accurate terminology applicable to such movements. Other scholars like Lüders (2007, 112) and Halliday (2000, 131-132) used these terms interchangeably.

Thus for Esposito (1992, 7-8) ‘fundamentalism’ was “pejorative or derogatory”, often equated to “political activism, extremism, fanaticism, terrorism and anti-Americanism”; he suggested that Islamic fundamentalism be replaced with ‘Islamic revivalism’ or ‘Islamic activism.’ Lewis (1988, 117-18), to the contrary, argued that, although unfortunate, the term

‘fundamentalists’ is applicable to a number of Islamic radical and militant groups; for him, all Muslims are “at least fundamentalists” because the core of Muslim religion is belief in the literal text of the Koran. This view was supported by Syrian philosopher Sadik J. al-Azm and Egyptian philosopher Hasan Hanafi, who independently analysed the doctrines of the Islamic movements and came to the same conclusion; they strongly argued that use of the term

‘fundamentalists’ is “the most adequate, accurate, and correct word” to describe the Islamic revival (al-Azm and Hanafi cited in Kramer 2003).

Edward Said, one of the first Muslim critics of the portrayal of Islam in Western media, did not object to the term ‘fundamentalism’. However, he heavily criticized how journalists used it against Islam by making controversial statements and deliberately ensuring that the average reader will think that Islam and fundamentalism are the same; “fundamentalism equals Islam equals everything-we-must-now-fight-against, as we did with communism during the Cold War” (Said 1981, xix).

I.1.7.3 Extremism vs. Terrorism

While the academic world is full of examples of how differently ‘extremism’ (Breton et al. 2002) and ‘terrorism’ (Schmid and Jongman 2005) are defined, demonstrating the difference between Islamic ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ is more complicated. As Wiktorowicz (2004, 20) rightly pointed out, “Self-proclaimed ‘experts’ on ‘Islamic terrorism’ frequently are of little help, since few have actually met their subjects and therefore rely on open public sources such as newspapers and Internet resources, which are often superficial, uniformed, and biased.” Therefore, this part of the chapter is confined to definitions applied in scholarly works solely dedicated to the study of Islam or Islamic movements.

Although it is unrealistic to expect scholars with different backgrounds to agree on what Islamic extremism and terrorism are, it is vital to understand how two distinct positions

crystallize. The first position largely supported by Roy, Halliday and Esposito, maintains that Islam is not inherently violent. Instead, Islamic extremism is a result of a crisis of modernity, terrorism is a security problem and the ‘war’ against it is not a real policy. The second position, largely supported by Huntington, Lewis, Kramer and Pipes, maintains that violence and use of terror are inevitable parts of Islam’s history. Thus security depends not on the defence, but on the offence and that on the battlefield. Jenkins takes a middle position, maintaining that Islam has its own wars to fight with modernity, but it remains far from clear how militant Islamists become active terrorists.

Thus Roy (2004, 43) argued that there are no examples in Muslim history that could serve as prototypes of terrorist acts in the 21^st century; Halliday (2003, 45) was also convinced, “Modern political terrorism did not originate in the Middle East, or among Muslims, nor has it been predominantly carried out by such people.” Urging “great care in using the term ‘terrorist’ or ‘radical’ as it is used by the media and/or the authorities” (Roy 2004, 7), Roy (2004, 197) noted, “We tend to focus on extremists because they make the news, but a sociology of militants is not automatically relevant to the silent majority.”

Halliday (2000, 80) claimed that “identification of ‘Islam’ with ‘terrorism’ is a misuse of the latter term for polemical political purposes: on the one hand, to delegitimize not just the actions but the very programme of political groups – in Palestine above all – who mobilize Muslim peoples, on the other, to confine discussion of terrorism only to Muslim states.”

Esposito’s (Esposito 1992, 5) view that “American policymakers, like the media, have too often proved surprisingly myopic, viewing the Muslim world and Islamic movements as a monolith and seeing them solely in terms of extremism and terrorism” is another example of how scholars in this camp perceive Islam and Islamic movements.

Furthermore, Roy (2004, 43, 57) explained terrorist acts committed in the name of Islam as having more to do with “a Western tradition of individual and pessimistic revolt for an elusive ideal world than with the Koranic conception of martyrdom” and argued that “Al Qaeda is not a strategic threat but a security problem. The war on terrorism is a metaphor, not a real policy.” Esposito (2002, 124) argued that Muslims struggle with questions of modernity but lack time, the centuries the West had to develop and accommodate it; “as Islamic history makes abundantly clear, mainstream Islam, in law and theology as well as in practice, in the end has always rejected or marginalized extremists and terrorists from the Kharijites and Assassins to contemporary radical movements such as al-Qaeda” (Esposito 2002, 128).

To contrast the views of Roy, Halliday and Esposito, I consider works of Huntington (1993), Lewis (1967, 1993, 2001, 2003), Kramer (2001) and Pipe (2001, 2003). Huntington’s (1993, 31) Clash of Civilizations offered a simple logic of how the ‘Muslim’ world is different from the ‘Western’ world and how “conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1300 years.” Although heavily criticized by the academic community, the ‘clash’ triumphed in 2001 and became a main paradigm used by the quality media to explain the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Renowned newspapers and magazines in the West – the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Atlantic Monthly, the Economist, Foreign Affairs and Great Britain’s Guardian among them – framed the 9/11 attacks in the context of Islam and referred to a ‘clash of civilizations’ in one way or another (Abrahamian 2003). Even an earlier critic of Huntington’s paradigm, Salman Rushdie, published an op-ed piece in the New York Times titled ‘Yes, this is about Islam’ (Abrahamian 2003, 534).

However, the phrase ‘clash of civilizations’ was coined by Lewis and first appeared in his essay The Roots of Muslim Rage in the Atlantic Monthly in 1990. While explaining

‘Muslim fundamentalism’ in terms of excessive modernization – the view largely supported by Roy, Esposito and Halliday – Lewis (2001) traced the emergence of first Islamic terrorists back to 656 A.D., when the third caliph was murdered by “pious Muslim rebels who believed they were carrying out the will of God”; Lewis asserted that “in this sense, the Assassins are the true predecessors of many of the so-called Islamic terrorists of today, some of whom explicitly make this point…For Osama bin Laden, 2001 marks the resumption of the war for the religious dominance of the world that began in the seventh century.” In some works Lewis emphasized that “human sacrifice and ritual murder have no place in Islamic law, tradition or practice” (Lewis 1967, 127) and that “[b]oth as tyrants at home and as terrorists abroad, their actions [of fighters for Islam] are in violation of Islamic morality and law”

(Lewis 1993, 182). He also persisted in asserting that ‘terrorism’ has long been part of Islam’s history, at least of its Shi’a sect (Lewis 1993, 162) and “[i]f the fundamentalists are correct in their calculations and succeed in their war, then a dark future awaits the world, especially the part of it that embraces Islam” (Lewis 2003, 127).

Lewis’ works were criticized by Esposito (1992, 173-174) as reinforcing “the stereotypical image of Islam and Muslims as menacing militant fundamentalists…that predisposes the reader to view the relationship of Islam to the West in terms of rage, violence, hatred, and irrationality”; Said (2000, 572) described Lewis’ “methods” as “the lazy generalizations, the reckless distortions of history, the wholesale demolition of civilizations into categories like irrational and enraged”; Miles (2004) criticised Lewis, along with Dick

Cheney, Richard Perle, Ahmad Chalabi and others, who “worked for an invasion of Iraq from the week following 9/11,” saying, “The Lewis doctrine, in effect, had become US policy” – and concluding, “It is tragic that such an admired scholar may be remembered for a policy which history is likely to categorise as ill conceived, illegal and a costly failure.”

In return Kramer (2001, 56-57), the editor of the Middle East Quarterly and a former Ph.D. student of Lewis, criticized Esposito and what he called “the camp led by Esposito” for failing “to ask the right questions, at the right times, about Islamism”: “They underestimated its impact in the 1980s; they misrepresented its role in the early 1990s; and they glossed over its growing potential for terrorism against America in the late 1990s.” Pipes (2003, 45-46), a historian and a political commentator on the Middle East, supported Kramer’s view regarding Esposito as among “probably the most important academic advisors” (including Roy), who gave bad advice to the US government in presenting militant Islam as “a democratic force that can help stabilize politics in the region”, despite the fact that “every one of them [militant Islamic groups] is inherently extremist.” Although Pipes (2003, 47), attempted to distinguish between Islam as “an ancient faith and capacious civilization” and militant Islam as “a narrow, aggressive twentieth-century ideological movement”, he was convinced that “seeing terrorism primarily as a problem of law enforcement is a mistake” and that “the safety of Americans depends ultimately not on defence but on offence; on victories not in the courtroom but on the battlefield” (Pipes 2001).

Jenkins took a middle road. Similarly to Roy, Esposito and Halliday, he saw ‘Muslim extremism’ as the result of globalisation – wider access to information and greater opportunities “to explore alternative ideas” – and not something inherently bad (Jenkins 2007, 140). For him, however, radical movements seriously endanger Europe, partly because it is difficult to differentiate between radical activism – Islamist movements – and potential armed violence – terrorists. For him, ‘Muslim terrorism’ is “a broad brush term covering quite different type of activities that demand quite distinct responses” (Jenkins 2007, 214). He explained that if in theory terrorists could wear distinguishing uniforms, in reality many militants who sympathize with al-Qaida maintain their membership in organizations that do not have such a negative reputation and cannot be easily differentiated. Jenkins (2007, 215) asserted that an extreme fringe would exist as long as Islam exists in Europe, and “it is far from obvious when militant Islamism shades into active terrorism or conspiracy.” He defined

‘terrorism’ as a socially constructed phenomenon, “shaped by social and political processes, by bureaucratic needs and media structures” (Jenkins 2003, ix).

To summarize, there is no consensus among scholars on definitions and borders for these terms. However, they almost unanimously blame the media and journalists, who are often far from being experts on political Islam and the Middle East, for using these terms inaccurately and inconsistently. Such criticism, however, lacks constructive argumentation.

Even if authorities and journalists were to comprehensively research how the academic community defines and uses these terms, they would probably become more confused than enlightened. Relying mainly on official sources of information and reproducing biased meanings in the public discourse, journalists unconsciously become part of a vicious circle, together with academics, who blame media for wrong interpretations and fail to come to terms with ‘Islam,’ ‘Islamism,’ ‘Fundamentalism,’ ‘Extremism,’ and ‘Terrorism.’ Perhaps, however, the problem of Islamic movements is not what they are called but what they do; as long as they “…spawn, nurture and tolerate the most violent forces in contemporary Islam, they would bring stigma to whatever term was applied to them” (Kramer 2003, p).