from Khrushchev to Gorbachev
In recent decades, scholarship on the USSR that has explored the formulation and implementation of policy at the highest levels of government has tended to adopt the analytical framework of “patron-client relations”1. Such work has depicted groups of officials acting in their own interests, united by a senior patron figure. Across the formerly Soviet world, dominant narratives in popular historiography have presented the whole of Soviet society as run by a flagrantly incompetent and thoroughly corrupt party apparatus, managed by semi-literate and decrepit seniors from the Politburo.2
This article presents the findings of research conducted between 2007 and 2018 on the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU Central Committee).3 The data primarily consists of interviews with about 120 former CPSU Central Committee members who worked in that institution between 1953 and 1985, and a collection of around seventy published and unpublished memoirs in book and pamphlet form writ-ten by members of this group. The interviews were conducted according to an in-depth interviewing approach, using a semi-free questionnaire consisting of about three hundred questions. Usually, there were two or three meetings with each informant, while in certain cases the interviews took place in five or more meetings. It was not feasible to go through the entire questionnaire with each respondent, but the answers recorded provide a considerable amount of information on a wide range of topics. Interviews were supplemented by conversations with this group’s former colleagues in other spheres of the Soviet
1 For a key example see: John Willerton, Patronage and Politics in the USSR, Cambridge 1992; for an earlier alternative see: Archie Brown, Pluralism, Power and the Soviet Political System, London 1983, pp. 61–107.
2 Mikhail Voslenskii, Nomenklatura, Moskva 1991; Il’ya Zemtsov, Chastaya zhizn’ sovyetskoi elity, London 1986; Yegor Gaidar, Gibel’ imperii: Uriki imperii dlya sovremennoi Rossii, Moskva 2006.
3 This project was supported by the Gerda Henkel Stiftung Foundation from 2006 to 2008, and by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) from 2009 to 2011. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Professor Dietrich Beyrau, whose wide-ranging assistance made this project possible, as well as this project’s Moscow-based collaborator Olga Sibi-reva, who conducted important parts of the interviewing and taped all the interviews used in this research.
bureaucracy’s highest echelons, the experts that served under them, family members, archival work, as well as accounts of interactions with the CPSU Central Committee apparatus in memoirs by former Soviet officials, diplomats, directors of industrial enterprises, and high-ranking military officers.4
One of the key research aims was to find an adequate description of the decision-making mechanism within the CPSU Central Committee apparatus.5 How accurate is the term ‘telephone law‘, popularized in the Perestroika period, in its depiction of this process? How important was blat, explored in the work of Alena Ledeneva, in filling positions in this apparatus and advocating the neces-sary decisions?6 Were all such officials really involved in the ‘administrative market’, as described by the Russian sociologist Simon Kordonsky?7 Moreover, how did these bureaucrats run the country, and what was their motivation in making certain decisions?
This article examines several aspects of these questions. Under what condi-tions did the mechanism for controlling the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee function? What was the process of reconciling its interests with
4 Some fragments of the interviews used here have been published. See, for example: V redakstii partiinoi gazety v nedoumenii byli: “Kak vy smogli? Kak vy sumeli?” Beseda Nikolaya Mitrokhina s Aleksandrom Gavrilovym, in: Neprikosnovennyi zapas 86 (2012), http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2012/6/g17.html (Retrieved: 21 June 2018); Nikolay Mitrokhin, Mikrouroven’ ideologicheskogo konflikta. Vospominaniya rabotnikov apparata TsK KPSS ob Aleksandre Solzhenitsyne: fragment interv’yu, in: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie 3 (2012), pp. 106–123, http://magazines.russ.ru/nlo/2012/115/m15.html (Retrieved: 21 June 2018); ‘Bor’ba s natsionalizmom’ i politicheskaya istoriya SSSR 1960–1970-kh godov. Beseda Nikolaya Mitrokhina s Vyacheslavom Aleksandrovichem Mikhailovym, in: Neprikos-novennyi zapas 78 (2011), http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2011/4/ni20.html (Retrieved: 21 June 2018); Nikolay Mitrokhin, Povesti o komsomol’skoi lyubvi, in: Neprikosnovennyi zapas 65 (2009), http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2009/3/mi6.html (Retrieved: 21 June 2018);
Izdatel’stva davali polovinu byudzheta partii: Beseda Nikolaya Mitrokhina s Vadimom Vladimirovichem Kostrovym, in: Neprikosnovennyi zapas 68 (2009), pp. 69–82, http://
magazines.russ.ru/nz/2009/6/ko7.html (Retrieved: 21 June 2018); Na ideologicheskom postu: 1960-e. Vospominaniya sotrudnikov TsK KPSS, in: Neprikosnovennyi zapas 60 (2008), http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2008/4/pa15.html (Retrieved: 21 June 2018).
5 See also: Nikolay Mitrokhin, Back-office Mikhaila Suslova: Otdel propagandy TsK KPSS v kontse 1960-kh–1985 godakh, in: Cahiers du Monde Russe 54 (2014), pp. 409–440;
Elita ‘zakrytogo obshchestva’: MGIMO, mezhdunarodnye otdely apparata TsK KPSS I prosopografiya ikh sotrudnikov, in: Ab Imperio 4 (2013), pp. 145–185; Lichnaya pamyat’
o ‘repressiyakh’ u rabotnikov apparata TsK KPSS 1960-kh–1980-kh gg. I ee politicheskie posledstviya, in: A. Sorokin / A. Kobak / O. Kuvallina (ed.), Istoriya stalinizma: Zhizn’ v terrore. Sotsial’nye aspekty repressii, Moskva 2013, pp. 60–83; Revolyutsiya kak semeinaya istoriya: iz interv’yu I memuarov rabotnikov apparata TsK KPSS 1960–1980-kh godov, in:
Antropologiya revolyutsii. Sbornik statei, Moskva 2009, pp. 435–476; Apparat TsK KPSS v 1953–1985 godakh kak primer zakrytogo obshchestva, in: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie 100 (2009).
6 Alena V. Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favors. Blat, Networking and Information Exchange, Cambridge 1998.
7 Simon Kordonskii, Rynki vlasti. Administrativnye rynki SSSR i Rossii, Мoskva 2000.
those of the main government departments like? What was the range of options for coordinating the work of the various ministries at the highest levels—both formal and informal? To what extent was this controlled by the General Secre-tary? And how did all this affect the stability of the political system at the time?
1. Functioning Conditions of the Governing Mechanism
Existing scholarship has described the key conditions under which the CPSU Central Committee apparatus operated.8 Here, I provide a brief overview.
At all the highest levels of Soviet bureaucracy, verbal communication had greater sway and greater significance than written correspondence. In particu-lar, the overwhelming majority of ‘directives’ (direktivnye ukazaniya) within the party apparatus were issued orally, while the vast majority of meetings and other forms of decision-making were not formally recorded. It is possible to find sources that document such oral communications. These include working note-books, and other types of informal records, which all employees of the apparatus had to keep. They contained numerous instructions from the leadership, as well as semi-formal information. They also recorded the views expressed by various participants in meetings, or the positions of their bosses on certain issues. Such booklets can be found in the private archives of former apparat staff members and their families.9
Still, the term ‘telephone law’ (telefonnoe pravo) was never mentioned in any interviews conducted throughout this research. Described in the Perestroika-era press as party officials issuing directives over the telephone to state bureaucrats, following these results, this practice was not widespread.
More commonplace in working relations were practices of ‘recommenda-tions’ (soviety) and ‘endorsements’—subtle, semi-obligatory forms of pressure, which made it possible to ‘take the initiative’ (vziat’ na sebia otvetstvennost’), or appeal to a higher-level party boss through other channels. This practice can also be interpreted as a mechanism of collective decision-making, which considered the views of different sides in the presence of mediators. Often, state officials requested recommendations from the party in order to distribute the responsibility for certain decisions that they should have made independently.
8 Nikolay Mitrokhin, Lichnye svyazi v apparate TsK KPSS, in: Neprikosnovennyi zapas 3 (2012), pp. 166–175, http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2012/3/m13.html (Retrieved: 21 June 2018); Apparat TsK KPSS v 1953–1985 godakh kak primer zakrytogo obshchestva, in: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie 100 (2009), https://magazines.gorky.media/nlo/2009/6/apparat-czk-kpss-v-1953-8212-1985-godah-kak-primer-zakrytogo-obshhestva.html (Retrieved:
21 June 2018); Apparat TsK KPSS I patron-klientskie otnosheniya v 1950-e–1980-e gody (in preparation for publication in a collection for Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie on patron-client relations forthcoming 2018).
9 In some cases, it was possible to acquire them for the Forschungsstelle Osteuropa Research Centre for East European Studies archive at the University of Bremen.
‘Blat’, the acquisition of illegal—or legal, but ‘scarce’ (defitsitnykh)—benefits through acquaintances, ‘patron-client relations’ or the participation of officials in the ‘administrative market’, were by no means the predominant forms and tropes of behavior at the highest levels of Soviet bureaucracy. Actions that were publicly censured, such as ‘blat’ or simply criminal, such as bribery (vziatka), carried too high a risk for high-placed officials. Therefore ‘blat’ had many limi-tations, while blatantly criminal behavior was not widespread. One’s potential to
‘trade on one’s professional role’ (torgovat’ dolzhnost’iu), that is, to take certain decisions based on agreements with other officials working the ‘administrative market’, was limited by one’s responsibilities, personal ideological motivation, long-term career and family considerations, as well as the actions of other colleagues. For the same reason, ‘patron-client relations’ had great limitations, which in many cases subjected officials to political risks that were too high. In the Khrushchev era, there was an explosion of political clans, primarily based on regional affiliation.10 During Brezhnev’s leadership, a systemic struggle took place against such groups.
‘Personal connections’ (lichnye sviazi) played an essential role in the CPSU Central Committee apparatus. Such relationships included different types of horizontal and vertical interactions, which in some cases continued to take place over a long period, but more often were non-binding and frequently short- lived.
Various groups of influence formed within the party apparatus on the basis of
‘personal connections’, made through ideological ties (for example, ‘revisionists’
and ‘Stalinists’), professional associations (for example, ‘coal men’ and ‘railway men’), regional identifications (such as, ‘Leningraders’ and ‘Siberians’), age, and even commemorative affiliations (for example, ‘front-line soldiers’ and ‘Cos-sacks’). Each apparatus staff member decided on the extent of their participation in such groups, which in any case only partly entailed some kind of permanent involvement. Apparat staff could belong to multiple groups of influence or keep away from all of them.
The party apparatus was not the sole root of political power. It was subject to the powerful sway of other, external groups of influence, which in the USSR enjoyed pockets of authority in the form of access to certain resources or other kinds of leverage. Such groups included, for example, untouchable Soviet ‘seleb-ritiz’—high-profile personalities or high-ranking Soviet army generals.
There was a high turnover in the majority of CPSU Central Committee apparatus staff. The average member worked in the apparatus for about five years. For a typical ‘apparatchik’, a term commonly used in reference to party bureaucrats, this job was something like an internship with an indefinite end
10 Nikolay Mitrokhin, The Rise of Political Clans in the Era of Nikita Khrushchev, in:
Jeremy Smith / Melanie Ilic (ed.), Khrushchev in the Kremlin. Policy and Government in the Soviet Union 1953–1964, London 2013, pp. 26–40.
date. Therefore, there was little incentive to fall out with the professional world, region, or department, from which one was seconded to the Central Committee.
This provided opportunities for various groups of influence to lobby for their interests through one of their own.
2. Administrative Ping-Pong
In such a system, an important mechanism for decision-making in the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, the Secretariat, and the CPSU Central Com-mittee Politburo was a process of coordinating the interests of myriad actors operating both inside and outside of these structures. I refer to this phenomenon as ‘administrative ping-pong’.
The most significant actors were institutions, such as those of the party and state, and administrative units, such as republics and regions. They had consolidated interests—for example, on the issue of maintaining or increasing the budget, but internal conflicts existed among various influence groups over various issues, such as support for a given project. As a result, the resolution of a particular vital issue for these actors could be agreed at some initial stage, to then be adopted through highly complex administrative intrigue involving the principal figures of the party and state.
For example, the deputy editor-in-chief of a major Moscow media outlet could negotiate directly with the instructor of the CPSU Central Committee on the publication of a ‘problem’ article—one that would raise a new issue while criticizing certain shortcomings. The answer could be a refusal. In this case, the deputy editor-in-chief could appeal to his superior if they considered the publi-cation to be important. The superior at the newspaper could take the following actions: consult a senior official in the censorship department Glavlit, then, given a positive response, appeal to a party official of sufficiently high rank, namely the deputy head of a department in CPSU Central Committee apparatus.
Choice of department, such as the department of propaganda, to which the media answered, the relevant specialized branch department that dealt with the issue being raised in the article, or the Organizational Department in the region where this problem was uncovered, rested on finding a deputy head who shared the chief editor’s views on the issue. The deputy department head (zamzav) would weigh the risk of publication within the current political climate. They would be guided by the opinions and knowledge of ideologically close officials within the apparatus, consult with the deputy heads of other departments whose jurisdiction could relate to the questions posed in the article, and then make the necessary corrections with a view to authorizing publication. This would be subject to the approval of the CPSU Central Committee Secretary in charge of the ideological sphere or branch or regional issues in question. The department deputy head, the editor-in-chief (if his publication was important enough), or the deputy head of the agency to which the newspaper was subordinate, such
as the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, could all contact the CPSU Central Committee Secretary themselves. If the working secretary refused, yet the publication was seen to be raising an ‘issue of principle’, the matter of the article could be brought to a Politburo meeting. There were many ways this could happen. For example, the head of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions was a member of the Politburo, and therefore able to float a paper with a resolution. Alternatively, one of the General Secretary’s speechwriters was perhaps in the same cohort at university as the newspaper editor-in-chief, available to an old friend in times of need, and in a position to pass the article text to his boss.
In another common format, the ‘ball’ in the game of ‘ping-pong’ would be a CPSU Central Committee apparatus official responsible for drawing up a particular document. The document could have been initiated either by the apparatus itself—for example, based on the results of an inspection of a certain region or a certain topic. Or it could be proposed from outside, such as by a ministry requesting an increase or decrease in production of a certain product or calling for the construction of a new large-scale facility. The same decision could be worked out during meetings of experts invited to a working meeting of CPSU Central Committee staff, or to one of the Committee staff’s special working meetings at one of its large ‘dacha’ work and recreation resorts in the Moscow suburbs. But it would need to be agreed with ‘the departments’
(otdely)—the basic structural units of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus whose interests it affected—before its final formulation in the form of a decision by the Secretariat. Greater scrutiny would be required for it to be issued by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.
It was advantageous if this document was verbally agreed upon in advance by key staff in the departments responsible for the issue in question. Otherwise, a written document could simply be rejected, which would mean rewriting and renegotiation. Therefore, the official in charge of writing up the document per-sonally ran from floor to floor in the buildings belonging to the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, spending hours in waiting rooms for the opportunity to answer the questions of the department heads or their deputies signing the document. In signing, department heads sought to ensure that the interests of the branches of government (otrasli) for which they were responsible were not violated. They officially supervised these branches on behalf of party organs and ‘approved’—in many cases actually appointed—their leaderships, while at the same time they represented the interests of these branches in the world of party politics. They acted as their defenders and patrons in the face of competitors from other branches fighting for their share of national resources, the redistribution of which was decided for the most part through the adoption and implementation of party decisions.
Overall, the role of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, despite its repu-tation as bearing final authority in all matters—an impression that the CPSU Central Committee actively promoted—was that of a ‘facilitator’ in many if not
most questions. In this role, the apparatus either identified complex problems, or responded to the requests of various lobbyists, including regional party com-mittees, to resolve a particular issue. Elsewhere, it was engaged in moderating discussion, and seeking compromise between various players. In one example, with the approval of their superiors, two instructors from separate departments of the CPSU Central Committee, who were on good terms with one another, facilitated communication between two departments they were responsible for supervising, whose respective ministers refused to recognize one another.11
In processing paperwork, officials could fall back on previous decisions taken by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat that determined the rules of the game in a particular sphere. One of the most serious reasons for concern among party officials was whether a new document might violate existing resolutions—especially those adopted within the last five to seven years. To avoid this, all draft documents were reviewed by the most experienced bureaucrats, the heads of department secretariats. They usually worked in this role for decades, kept their own files on previous documents, and, in contrast to other staff members who were turned over with some regularity, were able to recall and check such things.
If a matter could not be resolved at the lower levels, it was submitted to the Secretariat and Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. These were the parts of the collective dictatorship that ruled the USSR. Simultaneously, they carried out the final coordination of the positions of major ‘interest groups.’
3. Official Conciliation Institutions
Ostensibly, the CPSU Central Committee had a rigid structure and hierarchy.
Departments controlled certain spheres. Within them, different sectors con-trolled a given set of departments and issues. Within the sectors, an instructor
‘led’ (vyol) the various departments or institutions, and, according to the remit of the sector, supervised certain regions on a particular issue. ‘Working’ secre-taries from the CPSU Central Committee who controlled groups of departments that were close in function were supervised by members of the Politburo ranking as CPSU Central Committee secretaries.
At the same time, within the framework of this structure, there were numer-ous official conciliation institutions, in which representatives of varinumer-ous depart-ments of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus took part, as well as of other
At the same time, within the framework of this structure, there were numer-ous official conciliation institutions, in which representatives of varinumer-ous depart-ments of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus took part, as well as of other