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PERCEIVED VS. ACTUAL DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT RISKS'

Im Dokument RISK: A Seminar Series (Seite 179-200)

Baruch Fischhoff, Paul Slovic, and Sarah Lichtenstein Decision Research, A Branch of Perceptronics,

120 1 Oak Street, Eugene, Oregon 9740 1, USA

I t i s obvious that some members of the public and some members of the community of technical experts disagree about the risks of nuclear power. It i s less obvious why they disagree. Since the source of a disagreement has important implications for how a demo- cratic society might bring about its resolution, there may be a strong temptation to fall back on politically convenient explanations (e.g., the public i s stupid; the experts have tunnel vision). The paper attempts to characterize the full range of possible and probable sources of disagreement, finding them to be rather more diverse and complicated than i s often acknowledged. On the basis of this analysis, it offers some suggestions for how conflict resolution may be accomplished and where it i s superfluous.

'Paper prepared for a session on ' T h e Analysis of Perceived vs. Actual Risks: Nuclear Power Plants

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a U.S. Perspective", First Annual Meeting of the Society for Risk Analysis, at National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., June 1-3, 1981.

A r e c e n t p u b l i c opinion aumey ( E a r r i a , 1980) r e p o r t e d th. following thr.. r e a u l t s :

a. Among f o u r "leadership groups" (top c o r p o r a t e e x e c u t i v e s , inv.stors/laPders, Congressional repr.sentatives and f e d e r a l r e g u l a t o r s ) , 96-981 of a l l r.spond.nts agraed with t h e statement "even in a r e a in which th. a c t u a l l e v e l of r i n k m y have decreasad fn th. p a s t 20 y a u s . our s o c i e t y is significantly more aware of r i s k . "

b. Betwean 87% a d 91% of thou. f o u r l a a d e r a h i p groups f e l t t h a t

" t h e m o d of t h a country r e g a r d i n g r i s k " will have a substant+al o r m d a r a t e impact "on i n v e s m t dacisions-that is, t h a a l l o c a t i o n of c a p i t a l in our s o c i e t y in th. decade ahead." (The remainder believed that i t would have a minirpll impact, no impact a t a l l . o r were n o t s u r e . )

c. No such consensus was found. hawaver, when t h e s e groups were asked about t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of t h i s concern about r i s k . A m a j o r i t y of t h e top c o r p o r a t e e x e c u t i v e s and a p l u r a l i t y of l e n d e r s b e l i e v e d that

"American s o c i e t y i s o v e r l y s e n s i t i v e t o r i s k . " vhereaa a l a r g e majority of Congressional r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and f e d e r a l r e g u l a t o r s believed t h a t

"we ar. becoming more a v a r e of r i s k and t a k i n g r e a l i s

t i c

p r e c a u t i o n s

."

A s w l e of t h e p u b l i c endorsed t h e l a t t e r statement over t h e foramr by 78%

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15%.

In s-ry, t h e r e is g r e a t agre-t t h a t r i s k d e c i s i o n s w i l l have a major r o l e in shaping our s o c i e t y ' s f u t u r e s and that those d e c i s i o n s w i l l , in turn. be shaped by p u b l i c perceptiona of r i s k . There is, h a r e v e r , much disagreement about t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of those percep- t i o n s . Sorne b e l i e v e t h e p u b l i c t o be v i s e ; o t h e r s do not. These c o n t r a r y

b e l i e f s imply r a t h e r d i f f a r e n t r o l e s f o r p u b l i c involvemsnt in r i s k manage- nrant. As a r e s u l t , t h e way in which t h i s disagreement is resolved v i l l a f f e c t not only t h e f a t e of p a r t i c u l a r technologies, b u t a l s o t h a f a t e of our s o c i e t y and its s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n .

The views about r i s k p e r c e p t i o n s given by t h e respondents t o t h i s p o l l , lllce those o f f e r e d by o t h e r c o m e n t a t o r s on t h e c o n t w o r a r y scene, a r e , a t b e s t , based an intense, b u t unsystematic obsarvation. A t worst, t h e y r e p r e s e n t attempt6 t o b i a s t h e p o l i t i c a l process by promulgating s e l f - s a r v i n g b e l i e f a . Such happena, f o r example, vhen one c l a i m that people a r e s o poorly informed (and uneducable) t h a t t h e y r a q d r e pater- n a l h t i c i ~ t i t u t i o n e t o defend tham o r t h a t they would ba b e t t e r o f f s u r r d a r i n g soma of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s t o t e c h n i c a l marts. It a160 happem, a t t h a o t h e r extrem, vhan one c l a i m that people a r e s o v e l l i n f o d (and o f f e r e d such freedom of choice) t h a t they can fend f o r themselves in t h e marketplace and need no gwcrnmantal p r o t e c t i o n .

Lib speculations about chemical reactions, s p e c u l a t i o n 6 about human n a t u r e need t o be d i s c i p l i n e d by f a c t . To t h a t end, v a r i o u s inves- t i g a t o r s have been studyFng how and how v e l l people t h i n k about r i s k s . Although t h e r e s u l t s of t h a t r e s e a r c h a r e n o t d e f i n i t i v e a s y e t , t h e y do c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e t h a t a c a r e f u l d i a g n o s i s is needed vhenever "the public" arid "the e x p e r t s " appear t o d i s a g r e e . It

is

seldom adequate t o a t t r i b u t e all such d i s c r e p a n c i e s a s r e f l e c t i n g p u b l i c m i s p e r c e p t i o ~ . From a f a c t u a l p e r s p e c t i v e , t h a t assumption Fs o f t e n vrong; from a s o c i e t a l p e r s p a c t i v e , it Fs g e n e r a l l y c o r r o s i v e by encouraging d i s r e s p e c t between t h e p a r t i e s involved. When t h e a v a i l a b l e r e s e a r c h d a t a do not allw one t o make a c o n f i d e n t d i a g n o s i s , a sounder assumption is t h a t t h e r e is some mathod in anyone's apparent madness. The p r e s e n t e s s a y s u g g e s t s some

ways t o f i n d t h a t m t h o d . S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t o f f e r s six reasons vhy d i s - agreemeats between t h e p u b l i c and t h e e x p e r t s need n o t be i n t e r p r e t e d a s c l a s h e s between a c t u a l and perceived r i s k s . 1

Reason 1: The D i s t i n c t i o n Between

"Actual" and "Perceived" r i s k s Is Misconceived

Although t h e r e a r e a c t u a l risks, nobody knovs v h a t thay a r e . All t h a t anyone does h o w about r i s l c s can be c l a s s i f i e d as p e r c e p t i o n s . Those a s s o r t i o m t h a t a r e t y p i c a l l y c a l l e d " a c t u a l risks" ( o r " f a c t s "

o r " o b j e c t i v e information") i n e v i t a b l y c o n t a i n sow element of judgment on t h e p a r t of t h e s c i e n t i s t s vho produce them.2 That element is most m i n i m a l vhen judgment FB needed o n l y t o assess t h e competence of a p a r t i c u - lar s t u d y conducted w i t h i n a n e s t a b l i s h e d p a r a d i p . It grows a s one needs t o i n t e g r a t e r r e u l t e from d i v e r s e s t u d i e s . o r t o e x t r a p o l a t e r e s u l t s from a domain in v h i c h thay a r e r e a d i l y o b t a l n a b l a t o a n o t h e r domain i n v h i c h t h e y a r e r e a l l y needed (a.g.. from animal s t u d i e s t o human e f f e c t s ) . Judgment becomes a l l vhen t h e r e a r e no ( c r e d i b l e ) a v a i l a b l e d a t a , y e t a p o l i c y d e c i s i o n r e q u i r e s t h a t same assessment of a p a r t i c u l a r f a c t be mpda

.

The e x p e r t o p i n i o m t h a t comprise t h e s c i e n t i f i c l i t e r a t u r e a r e t y p i c a l l y considered t o be " o b j e c t i v e " in two s e n s e s , n e i t h e r of which can ever ba achieved a b s o l u t e l y and n e i t h e r of which is t h e e x c l u s i v e province of t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t s . One maaning of o b j e c t i v i t y is reproduci- b f i i t y : one e x p e r t should be a b l e t o r e p e a t a n o t h e r ' s s t u d y , review a n c t h e r ' s p r o t o c o l , r e a n a l y z e a n o t h e r ' s d a t a , o r r e c a p a n o t h e r ' s l i t e r a - t u r e srlmmsrp and r e a c h t h e same conclusione about t h e size of a n e f f e c t . C l e a r l y , aa t h e r o l e of jud-t i n c r e a s e s in any of t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s . t h e r e s u l t s become i n c r e a s i n g l y s u b j e c t i v e . T y p i c a l l y , one vould expect r e p r o d u c i b f i i t y t o d e c r e a s e (and s u b j e c t i v i t y t o i n c r e a s e ) t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t a problem a t t r a c t s s c i e n t i s t s v i t h d i v e r s e t r a i n i n g o r t o t h e

e x t a n t t h a t t h e f i e l d e n t r u s t e d v i t h a problem has y e t to r e a c h 8 consensus on b a s i c i s s u e s of methodology.

The second sense of " o b j e c t i v i t y " means i n u m d t y t o any i n f l u e n c e by v a l u e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . b e ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of d a t a should n o t be b i a s e d by o n e ' s p o l i t i c a l viws o r pecuniary i n t e r e s t s . Applied s c i e n c e s n a t u r a l l y have developad g r e a t s e n s i t i v i t y t o such problems and a r a a b l e t o invoke some p e n a l t i e s f o r d e t e c t e d v i o l a t i o n s . There i s , hovever, l i t t l e possibility of "regulating" the vays in which v a l u e s i n f l u e n c e o t h e r a c t s . such a s one's c h o i c e of t o p i c s t o s t u d y o r ignore. Some of t h e s e c h o i c e s might be s o c i a l l y s a n c t i o n e d , i n t h e s e n s e t h a t o n e ' s v a l u e s a r e widely shared (e.g., d e c i d i n g t o s t u d y c a n c e r because it i s a n impor- t a n t problem); o t h e r choicea might be more p e r s o n a l (8.g.. n o t s t u d y i n g a n i s s u e b e c a u e o n e ' s employer does n o t wish t o have a troublesome d a t a b a s e c r e a t e d on t h a t t o p i c ) . Although a c o d t m a n t t o s e p a r a t i n g i s s u e s of f a c t from i s s u a s of v a l u e is a f u n d a m e n t d a s p e c t of i n t e l l e c t u a l hygiene, a complete s e p a r a t i o n is never p o s s i b l e (Bazalon. 1979; Fisch- hoff e t al., in p r e s s ;

jobe erg,

1979).

A t times, t h i s s e p a r a t i o n is n o t even desired-that happens vhen e x p e r t s a r e asked f o r ( o r v o l u n t e e r ) t h e i r v i e v s on how r i s k s should be managed. Because t h e y mir q u e s t i o n e of f a c t and v a l u e , such views might be b e t t e r thought of a s t h e opinions of e x p e r t s r a t h e r t h a n a s e x p e r t o p i n i o n s , a term t h a t should be reserved f o r e x p r e s s i o n s of s u b s t a n t i v e e x p e r t i s e . Often t h e r e a s o n s f o r e l i c i t i n g such o p i n i o n s a r e obscure.

I t vould seem a s though members of t h e p u b l i c a r e t h e e x p e r t s vhen i t comes t o s t r i k i n g t h e a p p r o p r i a t e t r a d e o f f s between c o s t s , r i s k s , and b e n e f i t s . That e x p e r t i s e is b e s t tapped by s u r v e y s , h e a r i n g s , and p o l i t i c a l campaigns (Hammond & Adelman, 1976: Mazur, 1981).

Of c o u r s e , t h e r e is no a l l - p u r p o s e p u b l i c any more than t h e r e a r e a l l - p u r p o s e e x p e r t s . The i d e a l e x p e r t on a m a t t e r of f a c t has s t u d i e d

that p u t i c u l u i s a u e and F. capable of rendering a properly q u a l i f i e d opinion in a form u s e f u l t o d e c i s i o n malcars. Using t h e same c r i t e r i a f o r s e l e c t i n g v a l u e e r p a r t a might l e a d me t o pbilosophers, p o l i t i c i a n s . paychologists. s o c i o l o g i s t s , c l e r g y , i n t e r v e n o r s , p u n d i t s , shareholders.

o r bystanders. depending upon how those c r i t e r i a v e r e i n t e r p r e t e d . Thus.

one muot amk. ''in what sauae," vh~hanever someone says. "upart" o r "public"

(Schnrlburg, 1980; Thompson, 1980). W e v i U we part" In tha

r u u i c -

t i v e s a m e and "public" o r "hypeupla" t o r e f e r t o . e v e r y onn dLse. including

s d m t t t r

in th& p r i v a t e l i v e s .

W o n 2: Laypeople and & p e r t o Are TIUdng D i f f e r e n t Langurgea

h p l i c i t r i a k analyses u a a f a i r l y new a d d i t i o n t o t h e r e p e r t o i r e of inteLlectual a n t a r p r i s e s . & a result, t h e r i s k e x p e r t s a r e only b e g i n ~ d n g t o reach coruensus on tesminology and methodology. Their corn-

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mmicatioru t o t h e p u b l i c are only beginning t o u p r e s a aome coherent p e r s p e c t i v e and t o halp t h e p u b l i c s o r t o u t t h e v a r i e t y of meanings t h a t

" r i s k " could have (Crouch 6 Wilson, 1981). Experimental s t u d i e s (Slovic.

Piachhoff, and LFchtanatain, 1979; 1980) have i n d i c a t e d t h a t vhen u p e r t r i s k

assessors

a r e aslcad t o a s s e a s t h e " r i s k " of a technology on an unde- f i n e d scale, thay tend t o respond v i t h numbers t h a t approximate t h e number of recorded o r estimated f a t a l i t i e s in a t y p i c a l year. When asked t o e s t i ~ n n t e "average year f a t a l i t i e s , " laypeople produce f a i r l y similar numbers. Whan asked t o a s s e a s " r i s k , " h w e v e r , laypeople produce q u i t e d i f f e r e n t r e s p o ~ s e s . These e s t i m a t e s seem t o be an amalgam of t h e i r average year f a t a l i t y jud-ts, along v i t h t h e i r a p p r a i s a l of o t h e r f e a t u r e s , such a s a technology's c a t a s t r o p h i c p o t e n t i a l o r t h e e q u i t y vith which ifs risks a r e d i s t r i b u t e d . These c a t a s t r o p h i c p o t e n t i a l judgments match thoae of t h e e x p e r t s in some cases, but d i f f e r in

ochers (e.8.. n u c l e a r pover).

Oo s-tic grounds, words can mesn v h a t e v e r a population group v a n t s them t o mean, a s long a s t h a t usage ia c o n s i s t e n t and does n o t obscure b p o r t a n t s u b s t a n t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s . On p o l i c y grounds, t h e choice of a d e f i n i t i o n is a p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n r e g a r d i n g v h a t a s o c i e t y should be concerned about vhui d e a l i n g vfth "risk." Whether v e a t t a c h s p e c i a l importance t o p o t e n t i n l c a t a s t r o p h i c l o s s e s of L i f e o r convert such 1oss.s t o expected annual f a t a l i t i e s (1.e.. by multiplpFng th. p o t a n t i a l l o s s by i t s annual p r o b a b t l i t y of occurrence) and add them t o t h e r o u t i n e t o l l l a a v a l u e question-aa w u l d be a d e c i s i o n t o v e i g h t t h o s e r o u t i n e l o s s u e q u a l l y r a t h e r than g i v i n g added v e i g h t t o l o s s e s among t h e young

( o r .mong t h e non-beneficiaries from a technology).

For o t h e r concepts that r e c u r in r i s k d i s c u s s i o o a , t h e q u e s t i o n of v h a t they do o r should mcan ia c o n e i d s r a b l y murkier. It is o f t e n argued, f o r exaiuple, t h a t d i f f e r e n t s t a n d a r d s of s t r i n g e u c y should apply t o v o l u n t a r i l y and i n v o l u n t a r t l y i n c u r r e d r i s b (e.g., S t a r r , 1969). Heuce, f o r example, s k i i n g could ( o r should) l e g i t i m a t e l y be a more hazardous e n t e r p r i s e t h a n l i v i n g belaw a major dam. Although t h e r e is g e n e r a l agreement among e x p e r t s and laypeople about t h e v o l u n t a r i n e s s of food p r e s e r v a t i v e s and s k i i n g , o t h e r technologies a r e more problematic (Fisch- hoff a t a l . , 1978; SlovLc e t a l . , 1980). We have found c o n s i d e r a b l e disagreement w i t h i n e x p e r t and l a y groups in t h e i r r a t i n g s of t h e volun- t a r i n e s s of technologies such a s p r e s c r i p t i o n a n t i b i o t i c s , colmnercial a v i a t i o n , hand guns and home a p p l i a n c e s . These disagreemeats may r e f l e c t d i f f e r e n c e s In t h e r e f e r e n c e groups considered; f o r example, u s e of coamercial a v l a t i o n may be voluntary f o r v a c a t i o n e r s , but i n v o l u n t a r y f o r c e r t a i n b u s i n e s s people and s c i e n t i s t s . O r they may r e f l e c t disagree- ments about the n a t u r e of s o c i e t y o r t h e meaning of t h e term. For example, each d e c i s i o n t o r i d e In a c a r may be v o l u n t a r i l y undertaken and may, i n

p r i n c i p l e , be foregone ( i . e . , by not t r a v e l i n g o r by using an a l t e u n a t i v e mode of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ) ; but in a modern i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y , t h e s e a l t e r - n a t i v e s may be somewhat f i c t i t i o u e . Indeed, i n soma s o c i a l and profcs- s i o u a l s e t s , the d e c i s i o n t o ski may have an i n v o l u n t a r y aspect. Even if o m makas a c l a a r l y v o l i t i o n a l d e c i s i o n , soma of tha r i s k s t h a t one aasumss v o l u n t a r f l y may be i n d i r e c t l y and I n v o l u n t a r i l y imposed on one's family o r t h e s o c i e t y t h a t rrmst pick up t h a piecaa (e.g., pay f o r h o s p i t a l - i z a t i o n dua t o s U g a c c i d e n t s ) .

Such d e f i n i t i o n a l problems a r e n o t r e s t r i c t e d t o s u b j e c t i v e terms such an voluntary. Even a t e c h n i c a l term such an "exposure" may be c o n a a n s u d l y defined f o r scnm hazarda (e.g., medical x r a y s ) but n o t f o r o t h e r s (e.g., handguns). In such cases, t h e disagreements w i t h i n q e r t and l a y groups may ba a s l a r g e a s those between them. For debate t o pro- ceed, one needs sorns g e n e r a l l y accepted d e f i n i t i o n f o r aach important term- o r a t l a a s t a good translating d i c t i o n a r y . For d e b a t e t o be u s e f u l , one needs an e x p l i c i t a n a l y s i s of vhather each concept, s o defined, m a h a s e n s i b l e b a s i s f o r p o l i c y . Once they have been repeated o f t e n enough, i d e a s such as t h e importance of v o l u n t a r i n e s s o r c a t a s t r o p h i c p o t e n t i a l tend t o assume a l i f e of t h e i r own. It does n o t go without saying t h a t s o c i e t y should s e t a double standard on t h e b a s i s of v o l u n t a r i n e s s o r c a t a s t r o p h i c p o t e n t i a l , h w e v e r they a r e defined.

Reason 3: Laypeople and Experts Are Solving D i f f e r e n t Problems

Many debates t u r n on vhethar t h e r i s k a s s o c i a t e d with a p a r t i c u l a r c o n f i g u r a t i o n of a technology Fs acceptable. Rasearch (Slovic, Fischhoff,

& L i c h t e n s t e i n , 1981) h a s found s u b s t a n t i a l disagreesnents n o t only betveen people belonging t o d i f f e r e n t population groups, but a l s o v i t h i n groups

vhen t h e q u e s t i o n is posed in d i f f e r e n t vays. Although t h e s e disagreements

may be i n t e r p r e t e d aa r e f l e c t i n g c o n f l i c t e d s o c i a l v a l u e s o r confused i n d i v i d u a l v a l u e s , c l o s e r -tion s u g g e s t s t h a t t h o a c c e p t a b l c r i s k q u e s t i o n i t s e l f may be poorly f o d a t e d .

To ba p r e c i s e , one doas n o t accept r i s k s . One a c c e p t s optione t h a t e n t a i l solpa l e v e l of r i s k m u g t h e i r consaquances. Whenever t h e decision- making process has considered b e n e f i t s o r o t h e r (non-risk) c o s t s , t h e m e t a c c a p t a b l e o p t i o n need not be t h e one w i t h t h e l e a s t r i e k . Lndeed, one might choose ( o r accept) t h a o p t i o n v i t h t h e h i g h e s t r i s k i f i t had rnough compensating b e n e f i t s . The a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of an o p t i o n depends upon its f u l l s a t of r e l e v a n t p o s i t i v e and n e g a t i v e conrraquencee (Fisch- hoff a t al., Ln p r e s s ) .

Ln t h i s l i g h t , t h e term "accaptable r i s k " I s F l l d e f i n e d , without s p e c i f y i n g t h e o p t i o n s and consequences t o ba considered. Once o p t i o n s and consequences a r e mpecif i e d , "acceptable r i s k " mlght ba used t o denote t h e r i s k a s s o c i a t e d v i t h t h e w e t acceptable a l t e r n a t i v e . When using t h a t d e s i g n a t i o n , i t may be q u f t e d i f f i c u l t t o remember hov c o n t e x t dependent i t in. Tnat is, people may d i s a g r e e about t h e " a c c e p t a b i l i t y of r i s k s "

n o t only because they d i s a g r e a on hov t o e v a l u a t e t h e consequences ( i . e . , they have d i f f e r e n t v a l u e s ) , b u t a l s o because they d i s a g r e e about what consequences and o p t i o n s a r e t o be considered.

A number of vell-known p o l i c y d e b a t e s might be s p e c u l a t i v e l y a t t r i b u t e d , a t l e a s t in p a r t , t o d i f f e r i n g conceptions of what t h e s e t of p o s s i b l e o p t i o n s is. For example, t h e r i s k s ( o r p o s s i b l e r i s k s ) of s a c c h a r i n may look unacceptable vhen compared v i t h che r i s k s of ( t h e o p t i o n o f ) l i f e v i t h o u t sweeteners. They may, hovever, seem more p a l a t a b l e vhen the only a l t e r n a t i v e o p t i o n considered is another s v e e t e n e r t h a t appears t o be more c o s t l y and more r i s k y . Or, nuclear pover may seem a c c e p t a b l e vhen compared with a l t e r n a t i v e sources of g e n e r a t i n g e l e c t r i c i t y (with t h e i r r i s k s and c o s t s ) , but not s o acceptable vhen a g g r e s s i v e conservation is

addad t o t h e o p t i o n s a t . Technical people from t h e nuclear Fndustrp'seem t o p r e f e r t h e oarrwer d a f i n i t i o n s of t h e p r o b l e q parhaps becarua

they l i k e t h e l i g h t i t c o s t s on t h e i r energy source, parhaps bacausa they p r e f e r t o c o n c a u t r a t e on t h e kinds of solutions most w i t h i n t h e i r do-in of u p e r t t s a . C i t i z e n s involved in enargy d e b a t e s may f o a l themselves l a s s o a r r w l y b o d ; they may a l s o be more comfortable with s o l u t i o n s such a s consanration t h a t r e q u i r e t h e i r kind of e x p e r t i s a (Biclrarstaffe 6 Pearcm, 1980).

People who a g r e e about t h e fircts and share.conmon v a l u a may s U d l e a g r e e a b o u t . t h a a c c e p t a b i l i t y of r i s b because

they have d i f f e r a n t n o t i o n s about which of those v a l u e s a r e r e l e v a n t t o a p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n problem. W p a r t i e s may t h i n k that e q u i t y is a good t h i n g in g e n e r a l without a l s o agreeing t h a t energy p o l i c y i s t h e proper a r e n a f o r r e s o l v i n g i o c q u i t i e s . For emuuplo, s w may f e e l t h a t both those new i n e q u i t i e s cawed by a technology and those o l d ones epdemlc t o a

s o c i e t y a r e b a s t handled s e p a r a t e l y (e.g.. through t h e c o u r t s o r with incomes p o l i c i a s )

.

Thru, when laypeople and u p a r t s d i s a g r e e about t h e acceptability of a r i s k , one must always consider t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t they a r e addressing d i f f e r e n t problems, with d i f f e r e n t s e t s of a l t e r n a t i v e s o r a d i f f e r e n t s a t of r e l e v a n t consaquences. bssumlng t h a t each group has a f u l l under- s t a n d i n g of t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of its f a v o r d . p r o b l e m d e f i n i t i o n , t h e choice betveen d e f i n i t i o n s is a p o l i t i c a l question. When t h e p u b l i c ' s d e f i n i t i o n i s adopted in whole o r in p a r t , then t h i s a s p a c t of p u b l i c perceptions has been a c c d a t e d in t h e decision-making process without any s p e c i f i c ' component of t h a t process being l a b e l e d as such ( S t a l l e n , 1980).

Reaaon 4: Debates over Substance May Dimguise Battlu over Form-arrd Vice Versa

In most p o l i t i c a l a r e m a , t h e c o n c l w i o n of one b a t t l e o f t e n s e t s soma of t h a initial c o n d i t i o ~ of its eucceaaor. I n s o f a r as r i s k manage- m n t d e c i m i m e a r e s h a p i n g t h e economic and p o l l t i c a l f u t u r e of a country, they a r e t o o inrportant t o be l e f t t o r i s k managers ( w e , 1980). When people from o u t s i d e t h e r i s k co-ity e n t e r i n t o r i s k b a t t l e s , they may t r y t o master t h e t e c h n i c a l d e t a i l s , o r they may c o n c e n t r a t e on m n i t o r i n g a d a h p i n g t h e r i s k management procasa i t s e l f . The l a t t e r s t r a t e g y may u c p l o i t t h e i r p o l i t i c a l axpertime and keep them from being o u t c l a s s e d ( o r mialead) on technical i a a e a . As a r e s u l t , t h e i r concern about t h e magni- tude of a rimk may energa in t h e form of carping about t h a vay i t is s t u d i e d . Thcy may be quick t o c r i t i c i z e any r i s k assessment t h a t does not have such f e a t u r e s as aager peer r e v i e v , ready acknowledgement of un- c e r t a i n t y , or. e a s i l y a c c e s s i b l e documentation. E v a i f t h o s e f e a t u r e s a r e consonant with good research, s c i e n t i s t s may r e s e n t being t o l d by laypeople hov t o conduct t h e i r b r u i n a s s even -re thaa they r e s e n t being t o l d by novicea w h a t v a r i o u s r i s k s r e a l l y a r e .

Lay a c t i v i s t s ' c r i t i q u e s of t h e r i s k asaessmont process may be no l e s s i r r i t a t i n g , but somewhat l e s s r e a d i l y ignored, vhan they focus on t h e vay i n vhich s c i e n t i s t s ' agendas a r e s e t . As v e t e r a n p r o t a g o n i s t s i n hazard -nagement s t r u g g l e s know, v i t h o u t s c i e n t i f i c information, i t may be hard t o arouse and s u s t a i n concern about an i s s u e , t o a l l a y inappro- p r i a t e f e a r s , o r t o achieve enough c e r t a i n t y t o j u s t i f y any a c t i o n . How- e v e r , information is, by and l a r g e , c r e a t e d only i f someone has a (pro- f e s s i o ~ a l , p o l i t i c a l , o r economic) use f o r i t . Thus, v e may knov something only i f someone i n a p o s i t i o n t o decide f e e l s that i t is ~ r C h h a w i n g .

Doam (1978) proposal t h ~ t l a c k of i n t a r e s t in t h e f a t e of workers is

r a s p o n s i b l a f o r tho l a c k of rosearch on tho risks of uranimu mining; Neym~~n (1979) wondered whether t h o s p e c i a l concern avrr r a d i a t i o n hazards ham r e s t r i c t e d tho s t u d y of c h d c r l c a r d n o g e n e ; C-nor (1979) accuaed o i l intuasts of preventing tho rosearch t h a t could a s t p b l i s h s o l a r p w a r as a e b l o energy option. I n soma s i t u r t i o n s , h o w l e d g e i s s o s p e c i a l i z e d that a l l r a l o v a n t a x p a r t s may be in t h a employ of a tochnologp's p r m t o r a , luving no o m c o m p a t a ~ t to discovar troublesoma f a c t s ( G d b l e , 1978).

Whothu t h o cause ia f a d s o r f i n a n c e s , f a i l u r e t o s t u d y p a r t i c u l a r t o p i c s can t h v o t t p u t i c u l u p u t i o s and may l e a d tham t o i q u g n the s c i e n t F f i c procans

.

A t tho o t h e r e x t r a , dobatos about p o l i t i c a l processan may u n d o r l i e d b p u t a n that a r e o e t e n a i b l y about s c i e n t i f i c f a c t s . Aa mantioned e a r l i e r , tha d o f i n i t i o n of an a c c e p t a b l e r i s k problem circumscribes the e a t of r e l e - v a n t f a c t s , consequences and options. This agenda s e t t i n g is o f t e n s o p w u f u l t h n t a d e c i s i o n haa o f f e c t i v d y b a a d e once t h a d e f i n i t i o n

a

s a t . Indeed, t h o o f f i c i . 1 d e f i n i t i o n of a problem may precluda ona from & a c i n g o n e ' s p o i n t of viev in a balanced faahion. Consider, f o r axample, an Fndivldual who ia opposed t o increased energy consumption but

o n l y askad about which energy source t o adopt. The -err t o t h e s e n a r r o w quantiona provida a d e f a c t o anawer t o t h e broader question of growth. Such an i n d i v i d u a l may have l i t t l e c h o i c e but t o f i g h t d i r t y , engaging in u n c o n s t ~ c t i v e c r i t i c i s m , poking h o l e s in ~ n a l y s a e supporting o t h e r p o s i t i o m ~ , o r r i d i c u l i n g opponents who adhere t o t h e nure n a r r w d e f i n i t i o n .

This

a p p a r e n t l y i r r a t i o n a l b e b e o r can be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e r a t i o n a l p u r s u i t of o f f i c i a l l y unreasonable o b j e c t i v e s .

Another s o u r c e of d a l i b e r a t e l y unreasonable behavior a r i s e s vhen p a r t i c i p a n t s in technology debates a r e in i t f o r t h e f i g h t . Hany approaches t o determining acceptable-risk l e v e l s (e.g., c o s t - b e n e f i t analyses) make

t h e p o l i t i c a l - i d e o l o g i c a l asrumption t h a t our s o c i e t y F. s u f f i c i e n t l y coheriva and ccmmcm-goaled t h a t i t s problems can be tasolved by remaon a d without stuggle. Although such a "gat on with bushtars" o r i e n t a t i o n will be pleasing t o many, i t d l not s a t i s f y all. For those who do not b e l i e v e t h a t s o c i e t y ia in a fine-tuning s t a g e , a technique t h a t f a u s t o w b F l i z e public cooaciournass and Fmrolvement has l i t t l e t o recrnmend it. Their s t r a t e g y may Involve a c a l c u l a t e d a t t a c k on what thay i n t e r p r e t an n a r r a v l y defined r a t i o n a l i t y .

A v a r i a n t on t h i s theme occurs when p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l accept any process u long as i t does not l s a d t o a d e c b i o n . Delay, par r e , may be t h e goal of those vho wish t o p r a s e m e soma s t a t u s quo. These may i n c l u d e e n v i r o m w n t a l i s t a who do not v a n t a p r o j e c t t o be begun o r indus- trialists who do not vant it t o be regulated. An e f f a c t i v a way of t h v a r t i n g p r a c t i c a l decisions i s t o h i s t on t h e highest standards of s c i e n t i f i c r i g o r .

Reason 5: Laypeople and Experts Disagree about What Is Feasible

Laypeople a r e o f t e n berated f o r m i s d i r e c t i n g t h e i r e f f o r t s when they choose r i s k i s s u e s on which t o focus t h e i r energies. However, a more c a r e f u l diagnosis can o f t e n suggest a number of d e f e n s i b l e s t r a t e g i e s f o r s e t t i n g p r i o r i t i e s . For example, Zentner (1979) c r i t i c i z e s t h e public because i t s r a t e of concern about cancer (as measured by newspaper coverage) F. increasing f a s t e r than the cancer r a t e . One reasouable a r p l a a a t i o n f o r t h i s p a t t e r n is t h a t people may b e l i e v e chat too l i t t l e concern has been given t o cancer Fn the p a s t (e.g., our concern f o r acute hazards like t r a f f i c s a f e t y and i n f e c t i o u s d i s e a s e allowed cancer t o creep up on us). A second is t h a t people may r e a l i z e t h a t some forms of cancer a r e t h e only atajor causes of death whose r a t e s a r e increasing.

Systematic o b s a r v a t i o n and q u e s t i o n i n g a r a , of c o u r s e , needed t o tall v h e t h e r t h e s a r p e c u h t i o n a a r e a c c u r a t e (and whather t h e assumption of r a t i o n a l i t y h o l d s in this p a r t i c u l a r c a s e ) . F a h e p o s i t i v e s i n d i v i n i n g p e o p l a ' s underlying r a t i o n a l i t y can be as daleterioucl as f a l s e n e g a t i v e s . E r r o m o u s l y assuming that they undarstand an Fasua m y deny them a needed education; e r r o n e o u s l y asaumlng that they do n o t understand may deny thrm a naeded hearing. Pending syst-tic s t u d i e s , t h e s a e r r o r r a t e s a r e l i k e l y t o b e d a t a m i n e d l n r g d y by t h e r a t i o P r l i e t o r e w t i o n a l i s t c a s t of o n e ' s e e w of human n a t u r a .

In l i e u of d a t a about s p e c i f i c c a s e s , perhaps the most reasonable g u m r a l assumption Fa that p a o p l a ' r inveammat in probl- ia d a t a m i n e d by t h a i r f a d i n g s of p e r s o n a l e f f i c a c y . That Fa, t h e y do n o t g a t Frnrolved unles8 t h a y f a d t h a t t b y can make a d i f f e r a n c a , p e r s o d l y o r coLLectively.

In t h i s l i g h t , t h e i r decFaiorramking p r o c e s s Fa dominated by a concern t h a t is known t o dominate o t h e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s e s : perceived f e e l i n g s of c o n t r o l (Seligman, 1975). be a r e s u l t , people vill d d i b e r a t e l y i g n o r e amjor problmna if they s e e no p o s s i b i l i t y of a f f e c t i v e a c t i o n ; some

reasone vhy they might r e j e c t a change of "misplaced p r i o r i t i e s " vhen they n e g l e c t a h a r d t h a t poaes a l a r g e r i s k :

(a) Tha hazard is needed and has no s u b s t i t u t e s ;

(b) The hazard is needed and has only r i s k i e r s u b s t i t u t e s ;

(c) No f e a o i b l e s c i e n t i f i c s t u d y can y i e l d a s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r and h c o n t r o v e t t i b l e signal t o l e g i t i m a t e a c t i o n ;

(d) The hazard is d i s t r i b u t e d n a t u r a l l y , hence cannot be c o n t r o l l e d ; ( e ) No one e l s e is worried about t h e r i s k i n q u e s t i o n , hence, no one w i l l heed messages of danger o r be r e l i e v e d by evidence of s a f e t y ;

( f ) No one is empowered t o o r a b l e t o a c t on t h e b a s i s of evidence about r i s k .

Thus, t h o p r o b l m t h a t a c t i v e l y concern pooplo need n o t be t h o s e whose r e s o l u t i o n they f e e l should rank h i g h e s t on s o c i e t y ' s p r i o r i t i e s . For u a m p l e , one may aclrnovledge t h a t t h e expected d e a t h s from automobile a c c i d e n t s w a r t h e n e x t c e n t u r y a r e f a r g r e a t e r than t h o s e expected from n u c l a a r p w e r , y e t s t i l l be a c t i v e only in f i g h t i n g n u c l e a r p w e r o u t of t h e c o n v i c t i o n that "Hore, I can make a d i f f e r e n c e . T h i s i n d u s t r y i s on t h a ropes now. It's *ortaut t o move i n f o r t h e k i l l b e f o r e i t becomas am i n d i s p ~ i b l o t o A m e r i c a s o c i e t y a s automobfik t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . "

Where t h e p r i o r i t i e s of e x p o r t s and laypeople d i f f e r , i t moy a n t r e f l e c t disagreements about t h o s i z e of risks, b u t d i f f e r i a g opinions on what can be dona about them. At times, t h e t e c h n i c a l knovledge o r can-do p e r s p e c t i v e of tho e x p e r t s may l e a d them t o s e a a broader range of f e a s i b l e a c t i o n s . At o t h e r times, faypeople moy f e e l that they can e x e r c i s e t h e p o l i t i c a l c l o u t needed t o m o b some o p t i o n s happen, whereas t h e e x p e r t s f e e l c o n s t r a i n e d t o doing what they a r e p a i d f o r . I n s t i l l o t h e r cases.

both groups may be s i l e n t about very Large p r o b l e m because they s e e no optione. That might be t h e -st c h a r i t a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e r e l a t i v e s i l e n c e of s c i e n t i s t s and c i t i z e n s regarding t h e t h r e a t of n u c l e a r war.

Reason 6: Laypeople and Experts See t h e Facts D i f f e r e n t l y

There a r e , of course, s i t u a t i o n s in which d i s p u t e s between laypeople a d e x p e r t s cannot b e t r a c e d t o disagreements about objectivity, terminology, problem d e f i n i t i o o e , process o r f e a s i b i l i t y . Having eliminated those

p o s s i b i l i t i e s , one may assume t h e tvo groups r e a l l y do s e e t h e f a c t s of t h e m a t t e r d i f f e r e n t l y . Given t h a t laypeople and e x p e r t s a r e t a l k i n g about t h e same t h i n g , i t may be u s e f u l to d i s t i n g u i s h between two s i t u a t i o o e : t h o s e in vhfch laypeople have no source of information o t h e r than t h e e x p e r t s , and those in which they do have such sources. The reasonableness

of diaagresmarto and t h e a t t e n d a n t p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s look q u i t e d i f f e r e n t I n each c u e .

Hov might Laypeople hove no aourca of information o t h e r t h a n t h e e x p e r t s , y e t coma t o a00 the f a c t a d i f f e r e n t l y ? Ona vay l a f o r t h e e x p e r t s ' uuaoage n o t t o g e t through I n t a c t , perhapa bacause: (a) the a p e r t a o r e u n c o n c a r n d about d i s a e r i n n t i n g t h e i r knawladga o r h e a i t a n t t o do s o b a a s u e of ita t m t a t i v e n a t u r e ; (b) only a biased p o r t i o n of t h e e x p e r t s ' i n f o r m t i o n g e t a o u t , p a r t i c u l a r l y v b n t h e s a l a c t i o n hns bean i n f l u a u c e d by thoae i n t e r e a t d in c r e a t i n g a p a r t i c u h r impraseion;

(c) tho =soage g e t . garblad in transmiasion, perhapa due t o ill-informed o r a u r r a t i o l u l l a t joumalbta; (d) th. m s s a g e g e t s garblad .upon r e c e p t i o n , a i t h e r because i t wan poorly e x p l i c a t e d o r because t h e r e c i p i e n t s lacked tho t e c h n i c a l b u i s f o r u u d a r s t u d i n g i t (Friedman, 1981; Eanley, 1980;

Nelkin, 1971)

.

3

A second vay of goIng a s t r a y is t o m i s i n t e r p r e t n o t t h e subatance, b u t tha p r o c e s s of science. For v l e , unlcsa a n o b s e r v e r has reason t o b a l l e v a o t h a r v l s e , i t might seem s e n s i b l e t o t h a t t h e w u n t of s c i e n t i f i c a t t e n t i o n paid t o a r i s k Fe a good measure of i t s importance.

Science can, however, be -re complicated than that, vlth r e s e a r c h e r s going v h e r e t h e c o n t r a c t s , l h e l l g h t , b l u e ribbon p a n a l s , o r j u i c y c o n t r o v e r s i e s a r e .

In

t h a t l i g h t (and in h i n d s i g h t ) , s c i e n c e may have done a disaerrrice t o p u b l i c understanding by the e x c e s s i v e a t t e n t i o n i t paid t o saccharin.

A sac& a s p a c t of t h e s c i e n t i f i c process t h a t mny cauee confusion Is its f r e q u e n t l y d i s p u t a t i o u s nature. It may be a l l t o o easy f o r o b a e m e r s t o f e e l t h a t "Ff t h e e x p e r t s c a n ' t agree, my guess mny be as good as t h e i r s "

(Elandler, 1980). O r , they may f e e l j u s t i f i e d I n p i c k i a g the e x p e r t of t h e i r c h o i c e , perhaps on spariourigrounds, such as a s s e r t i v e n e s s , eloquence, o r p o l i t i c a l views. Lndeed, we suspect that i t is seldom t h e c a s e t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of l a y opinions on an I s s u e doas n o t w e r l a p a t l e a a t a

p o r t i o n of t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of a r p e r t opinions. A t t h e o t h e r axtreme.

l a y p e o p l e m ~ y be b a f f l e d by t h e v e i l of q u a l i f i c a t i o n s t h a t s c i e n t i s t s o f t e n c a s t o v u t h e i r w r k . All too o f t e n , a u d i e n c w may be w e d more by t v o - f i s t e d d e b a t o r s (angar t o m h d e f i n i t i v e s t a t e m e n t s ) t h a n by two-handed s c i e n t i s ts (saying "on t h e one hand X, b u t on t h e o t h e r hand Y," in a n e f f o r t t o achieve b a l a n c e ) .

In arch of t h e r e c a s e a , t h e d s u n d a r r t a m i i n g is excusable, i n the Sanaa chat i t nead n o t r n f l e c t p o o r l y on t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e of t h e p u b l i c o r on

iu

a b i l i t y t o govern i t s e l f . It, however, would seam hard t o j u s t i f y u i n g t h e p u b l i c ' s view of t h e f a c t s Fnatsod o f o r in a d d i t i o n t o the e a p a r t s ' view. A =re r e a s o n a b l e s t r a t e g y w u l d seem t o be

a t t u m p t s a t education. T h w e a t t a m p t s would b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a t t e m p t s a t propaganda by allowing f o r two-way commnication, t h a t is, by being open t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t even vhen laypeople appear misinformed, they m y s t i l l have some d e f e n s i b l e r e a s o n f o r s e e i n g t h i n g s d i f f e r e n t l y than do t h e -arts.

For laypeople t o d i s a g r ~ reasonably, they w u l d have t o have some independent s o u r c e of knowledge. What might t h a t b e ? One p o s s i b i l i t y i e that they have a b e t t e r overview on s c i e n t i f i c d e b a t e s t h a n do t h e a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s . Laypeople m y s e e t h e f u l l r a n g e of e x p e r t o p i n i o n s and h e s i t a t i o n s , bmnme t o the t e m p t a t i o n s o r p r e s s u r e s t h a t a c t u a l deba- t o r s might f e d t o f a l l i n t o one camp and t o d i s c r e d i t s k e p t i c s ' opinions.

I n a d d i t i o n , laypeople may n o t f e e l bound by t h e g e n e r a l l y accepted assump- t i o n s about t h e n a t u r e of t h e v o r l d and t h e v a l i d i t y of methodologies t h a t every d i s c i p l i n e a d o p t s in o r d e r t o go about i t s b u s i n e s s . They m y have been around long enough t o n o t e t h a t many of t h e c o n f i d e n t s c i e n t i f i c b e l i e f s of y e s t e r d a y a r e c o P f i d e n t l y r e j e c t e d today (Frankel, 1974). Such l a y skep-

t i c l a m would s u g g e s t expanding the confidence intervals around t h e e x p e r t s ' b e s t guess a t t h e s i z e of t h e r i s k s .

F i n a l l y , t h e r a a r a s i t u a t i o n s in vhich the p u b l i c , aa a ruult of i t s l i f a e x p u i a n c u , i.p r i v y t o information that hu u c a p a d tha e x p e r t s (Brokanaha, W a r ~ e n , 6 Wemat. 1980). To t a k a t h r e e -1u: (1) The I h c K a u i e Valey P i p a l h a (or B e r g u ) I n q u i r y discovared that a a t i v e a of r h e f a r w r t h lmmw thingn about t h e r i s k a c r a t e d by ica-pack movamnt and mu-bad s c o u r i n g t h t ware tmhovn t o t h e p i p e l i n e ' s p l n n n r r s (Gamble. 1978). (2) Post-occidurt a n a l y s e s o f t - r m u l that t h e oper- a t o r s of at chi nu ware ~ u of p r o b l e m e that t h e d e s i g n u s of thosa mnchhas had miasad ( S h u i d o n , 1980). (3) S c i u r t i r t s may shy m y from s t u d y i n g b e h a v i o r a l o r psychological e f f e c t s (8.g.. dizzyness, t e a a i o n ) that a r e hard t o mamare, y e t s t i l l are q u i t e apparant t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l s w h o s u f f u from than. In such cases, l a y p u c e p t i o n o of r i s k should i n f l u a n c a the a x p u t s ' r i s k u t h t e s .

Conclusion

There are many raabloee f o r laypeople and e x p e r t s t o d i s a g r e e . These i n c l u d e misunderstanding, mlscommmication, and misinformation. Discerning r h e c a w a s u n d u l y i n g a p a r t i c u l a r disagreement r e q u i r a n a combination of (a) c a r e f u l thought, t o c l a r i f y j u s t w h a t Fe being t a l k e d about and v h a t h e r agreement is p o s s i b l e given rho d i s p u t a n t s ' d i f f e r i n g fr-s of r e f e r e n c e , a d (b) c a r e f u l research.to c l a r i f y j u t what i t i.t h a t t h e v a r i o u s p a r t i e s lmw and b e l i e v e . Once t h e s i t u a t i o n has been c l a r i f i e d , rho underlying problem can be diagnosed aa c a u i n g f o r a

scientific.

e d u c a t i o n a l , emmantic, o r p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .

The m a t d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o e e w i l l be t h o s e in which t h e p a r t i c i - p a n t s cannot a g r e e on vhat t h e problem Fe (and have no r e c o u r s e t o an F n e t i t u t i o n t h a t vFll r e s o l v e t h e q u e s t i o n by a r b i t r a t i o n o r by f i a t ) , and t h o s e in vhich education is c a l l e d f o r , y e t f a i l s ( a f t e r same reasonable, d i l i g e n t e f f o r t ) . P o l i c y makers then f a c e t h e hard c h o i c e e i t h i r of going

a g a i n s t t h e i r own b e t t a r judgment by u s i n g t h e p u b l i c ' s assessment of r i s k ( i n v h i c h they do n o t b e l i e v e ) o r of going a g a i n s t t h e p u b l i c ' s f e e l i n g s by imposing p o l i c i e e t h a t will b e d i s l i k e d . Such p o l i c i e s m y s e a n o v e r l y c a u t i o w (e.g., n m o r c y c l e h e h t laws--to so- people) o r i n 8 u f f i c i m t l y c a u t i o u a (e.g., n u c l e a r p w e r - t o some people). When f e a r s are ignored.

t h e r e s u l t c a n b e stress o r psychoeomatic e f f e c t s , v h i c h c a n b e as real

Fn t h e i r impact a s they a r e i l l u s o r y in t h e i r s o u r c e . When s t r o n g p u b l i c o p i n i o n 8 a r e i g n o r e d , t h e result can b e h o s t i l i t y , m i s t r u s t , a d a l i e n a t i o n . S i n c e a s o c i e t y does -re t h a n manage rislce, t h e p o l i c y maker must c o n s i d e r whether t h e s o c i a l b e n e f i t s t o b e gained by o p t i m i z i n g t h e a l l o c a t i o n of

resources

in a p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n i s g r e a t e r t h a n the s o c i a l c o s t s of o v e r r i d i n g a concerned p u b l i c . A p e s s i m i s t i c v i e v on "going w i t h t h e public'' might a r g u e t h a t "it only encourages t h e f o r c e s of i r r a t i o n a l i t y

( F n d i r e c t l y g i v i n g c r e d e n c e t o a s t r o l o g y , s u p e r s t i t i o n , and t h e l i k e )

."

An o p t i m i s t i c view might be t h a t r i s k q u e s t i o n s a r e going t o b e v l t h us f o r a l o n g time. For a s o c i e t y t o d e a l v i t h them v i s e l y , i t must l e a r n a b o u t t h e i r s u b t l e t i e s . i n c l u d i n g h w appearances c a n b e d e c e i v i n g . One way of l e a r n i n g i s by t r i a l and e r r o r . Often, t h e e x p e r t s v i l l be a b l e t o s a y "ve t o l d you s o . It would have been b e t t e r t o l i s t e n t o us." In o t h e r c a s e s . t h e y may b e s u r p r i s e d . Learning i s p o s s i b l e a s l o n g a s some b a s i c r e s p e c t remains between t e a c h e r and p u p i l . T h a t r e s p e c t may be one of a s o c i e t y ' s greatest assets.

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