Despite the persistent confusion among observers over the true reasons for the US intervention in Iraq, from an American viewpoint, the results are mainly negative at various levels. The human and financial costs of the intervention in Iraq were huge for American society. More than 1.5 million troops were sent to Iraq, 4,488 were killed and 32,225 wounded, and the financial cost of the war exceeded $800 billion.3
3. Jordan Weissmann, “An $800 Billion War: The Immense Cost of Invading Iraq, in Charts,” Atlantic, March 22, 2013, available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/
At the same time, the tenth anniversary of the fall of Saddam Hussein should have been a joyous occasion for the Iraqi people. Unfortunately, the current situation is far from being satisfactory.
On the political level, tensions between Sunnis and Shiites have worsened, and the conflict between the Kurds and Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki will only aggravate the situation further. Moreover, corruption is widespread in all areas, and stability and security are far from being restored.
Just as history will judge harshly the action of former US President George W.
Bush, it will also blame President Barack Obama for his policies in Iraq and Syria.
Indeed, Obama’s Syria policy raises many questions, bearing in mind the lack of direct support of the United States (and of all western countries) to the revolt of the Syrian people. This passive policy strengthens the difference in the power struggle between the resistance groups and the army of Al-Assad regime which resorted to the use of chemical weapons, even if at a low level (according to the White House).4
While the US responsibility for the instability in Iraq is clear, the situation has been aggravated by the crisis in Syria, the strengthening of Iran in the region, and various security and stability issues caused by the Arab Spring events as well as the nature of the region’s political regimes.
Uncertainty and Threats Faced by the Political System
Ten years after the beginning of the war in Iraq, the situation is alarming with the country completely disfigured by war. Iraq today clearly illustrates that it needs more than elections and a constitution to establish a democracy. The new political system oriented towards pluralism threatens to succumb to the growing domestic polarization. There were signs that a democratic political process could be established;
however, there are many substantive issues impeding the implementation of such process. These issues are many and varied including sectarian violence, economic and social problems, external interference issues, and the effects of the Arab Spring.
This chapter will address some of these points as part of the overall discussion on the GCC-post-war Iraq relationship.
business/archive/2013/03/an-800-billion-war-the-immense-cost-of-invading-iraq-in-charts/274290/.
4. CBS News, “White House: Obama’s ‘Red Line’ on Syria Chemical Weapons Not Crossed,”
April 26, 2013, available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505263_162-57581556/white-house-obamas-red-line-on-syria-chemical-weapons-not-crossed/.
At the sectarian and ethnic levels, Iraq today is a country completely divided between Shia, Sunni, and Kurds. With the withdrawal of the US armed forces, Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki’s policy shows signs of a new dictatorship trying to centralize power to the maximum and eliminating the main Sunni political rivals (e.g., the Sunni Vice President Tareq Al-Hashemi). In addition, there are many conflicts with the autonomous Kurdish region mainly on the issues of borders and oil. However, the Kurds also feel threatened by the concentration of power with Al-Maliki. Even though they participated positively in the construction of a central government; they have simultaneously made many efforts to strengthen their autonomy with the support of the United States. Their relations with Al-Maliki deteriorated significantly and the disputes aggravated because the Iraqi Kurds and Arabs cannot, so far, either agrees on the extent of the Kurdish autonomy or the territorial boundaries of autonomous Kurdistan. The current situation in Iraq is especially worrisome because a similar polarization as continues to escalate tensions in Mesopotamia could occur at the regional level. Iraq with its sectarian and ethnic heterogeneity presents an image of what the Gulf region might be in the future as far as internal stability is concerned. The country is no longer a real power in the region as it threatens to become the plaything of external powers.
Although Al-Maliki tries to maintain a political balance between Tehran and Washington, the situation with the neighboring countries remains very tense. Iraq is already tested today by the ‘‘Cold War’’ between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This cleavage has a geopolitical context plus the sectarian element of an Iranian-Arab rivalry. In the context of the Arab Spring, such sectarian polarization has rarely been seen so far on an interstate level, and the social cohesion in the Gulf region is increasingly far from these forms and/or characteristics of sectarian polarization.
However, Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Gulf monarchies like Qatar are trying to tip the regional power balance in their favor as a result of the Arab upheaval.
In Egypt and Tunisia, Sunni conservative actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists have gained influence. Bahrain, meanwhile, witnessed military intervention by the Peninsula Shield in order to prevent external military aggression and maintain internal political and social stability. In Syria, the competition between Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey on the one side (who are committed to support the Syrian opposition) and Iran and Russia that support the al-Assad regime on the other has never been so clear.
Prime Minister Al-Maliki is clearly opposed to the overthrow of President Bashar Al-Assad as a Sunni government in Syria would never be in the interest of the Iraqi Shiites. This attitude confirms the view of the Gulf monarchies that
Al-Maliki is a representative of Iran’s interests. The reintegration of Iraq in Arab politics is extremely difficult against this background. The summit of the Arab League in March 2012, organized in Baghdad, may well be considered a success for Al-Maliki, but the low representation of Sunni Gulf monarchies and the refusal of Saudi Arabia to open an embassy in Baghdad indicates their distrust vis-à-vis the Shii-dominated government in Iraq.
The polarization inside Iraq and the regional polarization have recently become very critical, and further complicate the situation in Iraq in terms of foreign and domestic policy. Growing tensions between Iraq and its Sunni neighbors could push the Gulf States to encourage the efforts for Sunnis’ autonomy in Iraq. In case of a further escalation of the situation in Syria, it is even conceivable that Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey will work to overthrow Al-Maliki thereby increasing the chances of an end – also sought by Ankara – to the Assad regime. There are many signs of correlation of the crises in Syria and Iraq. This is also why Al-Maliki and large parts of Iraqi Shiites will rely more on Iran in the future.
The danger of a new explosion of sectarian violence in Iraq increases in this context. The potential for more violence is much higher than a few years ago because Iraq’s neighbors are more heavily involved in the current disputes and the American support for stability is missing. The fear of being caught in a civil war in Iraq could have a moderating influence on the neighbors. However, Saudi Arabia, for example, should always consider the impact that its Iraq policy will have on its own Shiite minority living in regions of oil transit.
The ethnic cleavage between the Arabs and Kurds is less virulent for the moment in the context of the sectarian polarization currently marking the region.
The Kurdish issue could, however, also erupt depending on the escalation of the situation in Syria. The Syrian National Council is not supporting the claim of the Syrian Kurds for autonomy and that is why the Kurdish parties have kept their distance from the Syrian National Council. But if there is a real emancipation of the Iraqi Kurds, the Kurdish issue could also gain a new momentum in neighboring Turkey and then in the whole region. The impact of such developments on the sectarian polarization in the region - especially in Iraq - is hardly predictable today.
The conditions are now too complex and too volatile.