The destruction of the regional balance of power between Iraq and Iran after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime has been seen by the GCC states as a serious threat to stability in the region. Today after the US withdrawal from Iraq, ethnic and sectarian unrest seriously affects Iraq’s national identity struggle. Complex security,
political, social and economic dynamics at internal, regional and global levels hold the potential to affect Iraq’s future by pushing it into civil war or turning it into a dictatorship aligned with an aggressive Iran. Either way, Iraq will pose a challenge to the GCC countries’ security.
Iraq’s Internal Unrest and Potential for Internal Civil War
Internal security in Iraq has dramatically worsened since the US pulled out its forces.
Current challenges that threaten Iraq’s internal security are complex and straddle the boundaries of political, economic and social relations among Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian groups. As a result, struggle for new Iraq’s identity is now deeply trapped in violent sectarian disputes between Iraqi Shias and Sunnis on the one hand and inter-ethnic disputes between Shias (who form a majority) and Kurds on the other.
A recent political crisis that challenged Iraq’s internal security dates back to the events before and after the 2010 elections. In general, complex political disputes over power sharing among Iraq’s Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds are ethnic and sectarian driven, with shifts in alliances (former strong enemies who indulged in armed violence against each other are now together). Leading political representatives of Iraq’s ethnic groups fight over autonomy, authority, and control of Iraq’s vast natural resources. In addition, the struggle for political power along with economic issues are segmented inside specific ethnic or sectarian groups which further influence the overall security of the country. In the current environment characterized by strained relations among various groups, everybody accuses everybody else and each side views the other with growing suspicion in this high-stakes competition.
The Shia-Sunni, Shia-Kurdish, and Sunni-Kurdish Confrontations
Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki’s political moves have fostered sectarian and ethnic divisions in Iraq. According to his opponents, Al-Maliki’s goal is to centralize power in his and his party’s hands.1 They accuse him of establishing control over independent bodies, for minimizing the Irbil Agreement provisions regarding power sharing and for denying Sunnis the right to exercise autonomous political power in regions where they constitute a majority.2
1. See also Marisa Sullivan, “Maliki’s Authoritarian Regime,” Middle East Security Report 10 (April 2013).
2. This agreement was supposed to serve as the basis for the formation of the new Iraqi government and enable political accord. For more about the Irbil Agreement, see Ramzy Mardini, “Iraq’s Recurring Political Crisis,” Institute for the Study of War, February 16, 2012, available at:
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraqs-recurring-Numerous events seem to confirm these allegations. After the official US withdrawal from Iraq, Al-Maliki attempted to arrest Sunni Vice President Tariq Hashemi and to dismiss top Sunni official Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Al-Mutlaq.3 As a result, Iraqiyya (dominated by Sunni parliamentarians) announced a boycott of Parliament.4 Although Hashemi (who previously moved to the Kurdish regional government–KRG) asked for assurance of a fair trial, in May 2012 a Baghdad court launched the trial in absentia and in September 2012 convicted him for the killing of two Iraqis and sentenced him to death.5
Ethnic Kurdish-Arab unrest deepened when KRG President Masoud Barzani, accused Al-Maliki of a “power grab” by taking control of the security forces. Furthermore, sectarian disputes initiated a cascade effect on ethnic tensions.
Given Al-Maliki’s recent moves (including the establishment of Tigris Operational Command), fear has begun to grow among the Kurds that Al-Maliki will try to remove President Jalal Talabani from his position and permanently replace him with a Shiite (Khuzai).
Territorial disputes among Sunni Arabs and Kurds clearly attest to the complexity of Iraq’s internal security. After provincial elections in 2009, Sunni Arabs wrested control of the Nineveh-Mosul province from the Kurds. When Al-Hadba’a won clear victory, it became clear that its search for an Arab-Islamic identity with no Kurds could instigate ethnic unrest. The Kurdish populace from this region also opposes the Sunni dominance. As a result, in the region where Kurds dominate, Nineveh Governor Atheel Al-Nufaiji’s visits are not welcomed. Along with current Shia-Sunni-Kurd struggle for political power, there is growing social and economic unrest that could deepen the inter-sectarian and interethnic disputes.
Economic and Social Challenges to Iraq’s Security
Sectarian and ethnic disputes as well as inter-sectarian and inter-ethnic divisions over economic and social interests have affected Iraq’s internal security after the US withdrawal and the subsequent elections. Disputes over Iraq’s natural resources underlie ethnic tensions between the Shia-led federal government and KRG. These
political-crisis (accessed December 3, 2012).
3. Raad Alkadiri, “Iraq: Back to the Future,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 53, no. 1 (2011): 10.
4. Liz Sly, “In Iraq, Sense of Relief is Chilled by Political Crisis,” Washington Post, December 18, 2011.
5. Omar Al Jawoshy and Michael Schwirtz, “Death Sentence for a Top Iraqi Leader in a Day of Bloodshed,” New York Times, September 9, 2012.
disputes have been interpreted through defense budgets, territorial issues (over oil-rich territory), laws regarding oil production, and signing of contracts with specific firms. Thus, these issues and challenges endanger the security situation, pushing Iraq toward sectarian and ethnic armed conflict and opening the door for outside forces to step in and influence the overall security of the country.
Iraq’s Security under Serious Threat from Violent Groups
In order to reduce the pressure against him, Al-Maliki undertook several short-term political and populist social measures. Nevertheless, Al-Maliki’s political outreach ended when ten bodyguards of Finance Minister Rafi Al-Issawi were arrested and culminated when protests in Faluja by Sunni demonstrators left seven dead and 70 injured. These events along with other complex political, economic and social issues have complicated Iraq’s security environment by offering space for violent groups to accomplish their agenda.
Calling for restraint, Al-Maliki warned that the current scenario matches the violence of groups such as Al-Qaeda. Given the many attacks carried out by these violent groups since 2012 and the accompanying rhetoric, Al-Maliki was telling the truth. Fighting between rebels and Syrian regime forces has been regularly reported in close proximity to the Iraqi border. Furthermore cross-border armed incursions have also occurred. These and similar events, on the one hand have sharpened the arguments for Al-Maliki’s government to use harsh measures against his political opponents (especially Sunnis) in the name of security. On the other hand, these events along with other political and social factors have pushed Iraq’s leadership toward Iran’s arms.
Iraq’s Dictatorship Aligned with an Aggressive Iran?
The possibility of Iraq turning into a dictatorship depends on several factors. These factors include Al-Maliki’s shifts in policies (internally and externally) in the context of his ambition to stay in power; Iraq’s ethnic and inter-sectarian dynamics; Iraq’s economic, social, and energy challenges; the US role in the region; Iran’s ambitions;
Syrian internal conflict, and the role of other regional players such as GCC and Turkey.
Internal political dynamics show that an unconstrained Al-Maliki might move toward dictatorship. Attempts to tighten his hold on power mentioned earlier lead one to conclude that he is indeed moving in that direction. However, so far it is not clear whether this was preplanned or the result of unforeseen circumstances
leading to that eventuality. On the other hand, it could be argued that regional configurations and their influence on Iraq’s security have pushed Al-Maliki toward Iran. The Syrian conflict (the involvement of foreign Sunni fighters threatens Iraq’s internal security), Turkey’s regional ambition, potential for Kurdish secession, and overall Iraq’s sectarian and inter-sectarian dynamics (alliance between al Sadr and Sunni clerics) are some of the main reasons that explain Al-Maliki’s moves.
Several reports attest that Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I) and other Sunni insurgent groups have escalated their numerous attacks on Shiites as well as members and installations of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Their ultimate goal is to undermine Al-Maliki’s leadership and the confidence of the ISF and to inflame sectarian conflict. In April 2013, Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi announced that his group was joining with Syria’s Al-Nusra Front to form the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Although ISI and Al-Nusra’s immediate priorities remain quite different and focused on domestic pursuits, Al-Maliki’s concern is valid for two reasons.
First, if the war in Syria is won by the opposition, ISI could have a major staging area in Syria’s Al-Nusra-controlled territory from which it can launch attacks against the Iraqi government. Second, if the Syrian regime prevails, Sunni militants are likely to return to Iraq and will join established extremist groups such as the ISI/AQI.
The conclusion of the civil war in Syria could also pose a threat to Iraq’s stability in terms of the inter-ethnic conflict (i.e., the so-called Kurdish question) and this may be seen as an additional argument for Al-Maliki’s recent political play. So far the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq is the only autonomous region governed by the Kurds. Given the recent dynamics in Syria and the West and the GCC countries’ support of the predominantly Sunni-led opposition against Assad, it could be argued that it is reasonable for Al-Maliki’s government to fear potential secession. Should the war in Syria end with the opposition’s victory, there is a reasonable likelihood of the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous region in northeastern Syria. Another Kurd region is likely to bolster general Kurd goals for a single Kurd state. Since Iran also fears Kurdish secession from its territory, and Turkey has already launched a project to cooperate with KRG, the conflict in Syria only pushes Al-Maliki toward Iran. At the same time, this also gives Al-Maliki an excuse to bring security matters within his power grip.
Additional political circumstances related to GCC countries and Iran’s relationships in the region play in favor of Iraq’s aligning with Iran. Iran’s power projection and its behavior in the Gulf and in the broader Middle East largely
shape the GCC countries’ fear of Iran and determine their attitudes to the events in Iraq. The Arab monarchies’ fear of Iran’s influence in the Gulf has grown after the Islamic revolution. In fact, the establishment of the GCC chiefly came as a response to the threat perceived from Iran. According to Vali Nasr “…the Iranian Islamic revolution changed the Shia–Sunni power equation in Muslim countries
‘from Lebanon to India’ arousing the traditionally subservient Shia to the alarm of traditionally dominant and very non-revolutionary Sunni… The removal of the Taliban and the Saddam regime has strengthened Iran’s position in the Gulf.” At the same time, as the GCC countries saw it, the US-led coalition’s withdrawal from Iraq arguably opened the door for Iran to influence the political shape of Iraq and added to its strength. Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear program pushed the GCC countries toward unity. As Mustafa Alani holds, the GCC states see Iran as an aggressive and expansionist state and are convinced that a nuclear Iran would constitute a major challenge for them.
Thus, it is more than clear that if the right approach is not taken, Iraq will be a fertile ground for regional destabilization through its neighbors’ proxy wars and non-state actors. Hence if the GCC countries are concerned about Iraq’s stability and want to prevent Iran from dominating the Gulf, they have to help restore Iraq’s stability and security. One possible way would be to approach Iraq with a promising project that will produce a win-win situation. This approach nevertheless must not be as Neil Patrick underlines, based on a familiar pattern of symbolic collective actions in one way. Instead it should be designed in two directions (GCC-Iraq) with a comprehensive scope.