Since the concerns of all the major players in the Middle East are centered on either import or export of oil and natural gas or even control of the same, the region has seen divergent perceptions of security and regime stability. For the energy hungry countries of Asia, particularly India and China, prime concerns relate to energy transportation and securing energy sea lanes. Nevertheless, it is clear that transportation risks are directly or indirectly related to political stability in the region, while political instability can further give rise to price fluctuations, excessive resource nationalism, and increased external interventions.
For the oil-rich Gulf economies, there is convergence of views in the areas of energy security and economic integration, but divergence regarding the future security architecture. For Iraq, the focus is on reconstruction and recovery to pre-war levels. For Iran, the objective is to gain maximum support and sponsorship of its oil and natural gas program. The current environment is one where energy-resource nationalism and transnational energy cooperation are being practiced simultaneously. It is an environment marked by conflicting politics/geopolitics and the push of strategic imperatives where energy resources are employed to achieve geopolitical objectives. And is an environment where the winners and the looser in the broader struggles for energy security and geographical advantage, have yet to be determined.
It goes without saying that any new security architecture for the Gulf region must satisfy three basic goals:
1. It should make the Gulf States safer than they already are.
2. It should simplify, rather than complicate, the security dynamics of the region.
3. It should be flexible and robust enough to withstand both internal and external changes.
According to some Gulf security analysts, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) provides for a potentially very useful model of what the Gulf States might adopt to create a more peaceful, stable Arabian Gulf.
Beyond the GCC core, Iran and Iraq would have to be invited to participate. Only with their participation would it be possible to address the Gulf ’s main security problems through cooperative threat reduction and conflict resolution measures.
The US should be a member, just as it has been a member of the CSCE/OSCE, because it is the principal military ally of the GCC states and Iraq. China and India both have great and growing interests in the Gulf and the potential to play roles similar to that of the United States; they too would be good candidates for inclusion. Indeed, attempting to exclude China or India could compromise such an organization because both have their economic and political clout.
In the words of Dr. N Janardhan, “Seldom does the discussion on Gulf-Asia relations focus beyond the expanding economic ties between the oil-rich producers and some of the biggest energy consumers. Exploring the ‘what next’ dimension of this engagement reveals tentative, but interesting, attempts to diversify toward
‘strategic’ cooperation that offer alternative possibilities for Gulf security and stability in the long term.
It appears, however, that the progress of any Asian country’s strategic role in the region impinges on several regional and external players having their own interests and concerns. Hence, rather than an individual country, an Asian cooperative approach would serve the purpose better.”
Gulf regionalism that is outward looking, flexible, dynamic, and consistent with regional diversity would contribute to regional and global welfare, peace and security. This would also enable these nations to take advantage of the opportunities emerging from enhanced economic integration and also face the common threats of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as ensure energy exports, security of sea lanes, tackling pandemics, natural disasters and others. A few essential ingredients for this cooperative security architecture are as follows:
• It should articulate an inclusive, open and transparent process of community building.
• Soft regionalism based on informal dialogue and consultation mechanisms, consensus building and open structure would help in establishing co-operative and beneficial norms of state behavior.
Hence, an Arabian Gulf that is integrated through a web of regional cooperative structures will offer more opportunities for socio-economic advancement of its people and lay the foundation for eroding political rivalries and harsh nationalist impulses and bringing about regional stability and peace.
Prevailing Security Threats from a United States Point of View
Dr. Peter J. Croll is Director, Bonn Int’l Center for Conversion (BICC), Germany Amb. James Larocco is Director, Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Stud-ies (NESA), National Defense University (NDU), United States
Professor Joseph Liow is Associate Dean, Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Dr. Daniel Möckli is Head, Strategic Trends Analysis, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, Switzerland
Dr. Vladimir A. Orlov is President, PIR - The Russian Center for Policy Studies, Russia
Dr. Marina Ottaway is Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, United States
Dr. Leanne Piggott is Director, Business Programs Unit, The University of Sydney Business School, Australia
Lt. Gen. (ret.) Vasantha Raghavan is President, Center for Security Analysis, India Amb. Yukio Satoh is Vice-Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Japan Institute of International Affairs, Japan
Prof. Janice Gross Stein is Director, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, Canada
Amb. Theodor Winkler is Director, Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Switzerland