UN considerations

There has been significant progress in the United Nations system-wide coordination efforts since 1997 when Secretary General Kofi Annan launched his reform agenda. Various coordination mechanisms such as the United Nations Development Group and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs were established to enhance the collective impact of the separate operational entities. It is particularly important in the case of field coordination.⁴³⁶ Planning instruments such as the Common Country Assessments (ccas) and the United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (undafs) were developed with the collaboration of host governments to address, have and respond to national priorities.⁴³⁷ The consolidated appeals process (CAP) another planning instrument, included a common humanitarian action plan (CHAP) to deal with the needs of countries in crisis. In Kosovo and

434 Conversation with Mr. Steve Bennet, Director Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS).

435 Contributed by UNSSC

436 “For most of the world’s citizens, the relevance, capacity and effectiveness of the United Nations are seen through the prism of their experiences with United Nations staff and activities in their home country. In every country in which the United Nations operates, its overarching purpose is to serve its people. We can perform this mission effectively only by working together.” Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change”, Report of the SG, A/57/387, 9 September 2002, para 116, page 20.

437 A primary constraint in providing adequate system-wide response stems for the current state of field representation. “Country level representation by individual organizations largely responds to organization-specific considerations rather than to system-wide assessments of the requirements of United Nations system development cooperation or of the priority requirements for development assistance of individual developing countries” Triennial comprehensive review operational activities for development of the United Nations system:

conclusions and recommendation, Report ogf the SG, A/59/387. 28 September 2004, para 46, page 13.

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Afghanistan, the Secretary General appointed Deputy Special Representatives (DSRSG) to coordinate UN activities in order to respond more effectively to the political, security, humanitarian and development needs. In Mozambique the Resident Coordinator the head of the UN country team in the country also serves as the Humanitarian Coordinator.⁴³⁸

In the case of Afghanistan and Kosovo, the coordination challenges involving UNAMA and UNMIK were the focus of attention, whereas in the case of Mozambique, the coordination efforts involving the development and humanitarian aspects were the subject of investigation.

The results of the three cases analysed together with the review of relevant UN documentation, revealed a number of common elements related to the topic on UN coordination at field level, which are presented below:

a. A judgment on the success of the UN reform launched in 1997 depends on how successfully the reform of the coordination of UN operational activities at country-level progresses.

The objective of improving coordination for better development results (both within UN organizations and between UN organizations and other stakeholders) is an issue encompassing all the countries where there is a UN presence. The strengthening of the coordination of UN development assistance to recipient countries is one of the cornerstones of the latest wave of reforms launched in 1997. Due to its centrality in the reform design, the extent to which it is effectively achieved and practiced provides a significant indication of the success of the overall UN reform of operational activities itself.

b. The new UN coordination policy in place since 1997 would need additional efforts to accomplish its primary objective: a more efficient and effective UN development assistance.

The institutionalization of new coordination mechanisms and tools (e.g., the RC system, the CCA and UNDAF) was designed for more efficient and effective aid delivery. The policy contains important innovations as well as areas for further improvements (e.g., a clearer definition of the role of the RC vis-à-vis UN Country Team members; a more decisive shift from information sharing to joint programming in substantive areas; a clearer vision of how UN coordination instruments would replace existing agency-specific ones, rather than adding on them). Despite successes and shortcomings, its degree of enforcement is open to a certain level of ‘discretionality’ by the RC system and the UN Country Team members.

c. The implementation of the UN coordination policy follows different speeds and absorbs different levels of attention and resources, depending from various stakeholders and on the country-specific context.

The strengthening of the UN coordination varies from country to country, depending on the stage of development, including whether in a conflict or post-conflict phase, and the history of the country (including its economic, political, social and cultural context). In general, in addition to the various UN agency-specific headquarters, the main

438 The resident coordinator system is the key to field coordination and a key instrument for organizing a coherent response to country needs and priorities. .

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stakeholders for the UN system at country level are the Government counterparts and the donor community (including, international financial institutions), with whom the aid policy is determined and financed respectively. There is certainly scope for enhancing the participation and role of csos in the formulation of aid policies. Overall, the level of speed and enforcement of UN coordination is influenced by the priorities and operational modalities of these main stakeholders, to which the UN reacts.

d. The extent to which the UN system gets more coordinated affects its relevance as a development partner at country-level.

The issue of improving the UN coordination of development aid is so central that - in those countries where it is a policy priority, its degree of success may determine the degree of relevance of the UN system organizations as a key development partner of the Government counterpart and the donor community.

5.4. NATO’S considerations

NATO’s strengths

a. Suited to operate security sensitive programmes.

The nature of NATO's rules of engagement (ROE), Force Protection and security focus, enable it to be extremely effective when it involves itself with DDR and reconstruction projects in the post-conflict environment.

b. Sufficient in capacity to conduct and sustain DDR programmes.

Due to the self-sufficiency of NATO's IFOR/SFOR and its available resources including administrative and logistical capabilities, they have assisted IOs and NGOs in the fulfillment of their mandates in BiH. Furthermore, it is often the case, that highly skilled military personnel may in fact be able to assist in DDR and security sector reform projects in a civilian led operation as to convey to a better coordinated goals.

c. Expertise to engage in DDR programmes with efficiency and efficacy.

With regards to disarmament, NATO's military expertise allows for arms control activity achieved efficiently and professionally, with minimal conflict with host nation police and military forces. In most case the DDR programme is directly tied to the armed forces reconstruction and to provide a country security control mentoring action to those forces in process of learning-by-doing while still defeating the existing threat.

d. Have the ability to punish non-compliance.

Unlike any other agency involved in restructuring police and military forces, NATO can punish non-compliance with its demands. This allows for the dominance of its decision in Theatre of Operations.

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NATO’s deficiencies

e. Narrow focus on disarmament, security and exit rather than sustainable peace.

Disarmament alone cannot improve security unless it is part of a clear political process.

Security can only be restored through an arms-control regime, an effective economic-development programme that makes demobilization possible and the integration of both initiatives in the political process.

f. Excessive fear of Mission Creep.

There are examples of NATO's "effort to limit the military role to the letter of the agreement“. This can be the case of IFOR which did not take on effective demobilization assistance when it was most needed following the signing of the DPA, but cannot be the case of Afghanistan where despite the 2013-2014 critical political transition and the signing of the Bilateral US-Afghanistan agreement and the NATO Agreement didn’t hampered the ISAf will to deliver its action in support of the mission.

g. Rapid Staff Rotation Inhibits institutional learning.

NATO's rapid rotation of staff, on average deploying for six-months, is not long enough for SFOR to retain institutionalized knowledge of DDR processes in the country. As DDR programmes may require several years to become effective, staff overlap is required. Related to this is the ad hoc informal nature of NATO's DDR assistance. Often its involvement is based on the interests of its individuals rather than the interest of the organization. When the individual leaves the mission, so does NATO involvement.

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