Historical background

The Portuguese presence in Mozambique dated back to the 16th century. In that century, the Portuguese crown began the occupation of the lower Zambezi and established the two garrisons and trading posts of Sena and Tete.

Since then, the Portuguese crown granted land in Mozambique to Portuguese settlers, guaranteed them almost total control over the indigenous labour force and built up private armies, also described as slave armies. The so-called prazo-system, started in 1629, developed into Africanized autonomous kingdoms, ruled by Afro-Guan-Portuguese descendents and sustained by slave armies. With the beginning of the 19th century, the prazeros increased the export of slaves.

The Mozambique borders were settled in the late 19^th century, during negotiations between the German and British colonial powers in Africa. Between 1895 and 1897, Southern Mozambique fell under the control of Portugal. Nonetheless, like the Gaza state, other groups, such as the Barue of central Mozambique, the Afro-Portuguese of the Zambezi-prazos, the Yao of Mataka, and the Makua chieftains throughout the north, resisted the union under the Portuguese crown.

During this whole period of time, prazo holders and Arab and Portuguese traders tried to advance their positions. In summary, the Portuguese rule between 1880 and the 1930s was characterized by the exploitation of people and resources by private parties, whether foreign company shareholders or colonial bureaucrats and settlers.

At the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885, the Portuguese colonial forces maintained a minimal presence in most of what is Mozambique today. During this period two european companies (the Zambezi Company and the Niassa Company), scrambled for control over African resources, raw material, human labour force and markets.

∗ The context has been elabourated through the analysis of the following sources and on line site:

War and peace in Mozambique in www.c-r.org/accord/moz/accord3 (date 12.12.05) Mozambique. History and politics in www.iss.co.za; www.crisisstates.com Mozambique Country Brief: chronology of history in www.iasa.ac.at (date 12.06.06) Country Report Intelligence Unit, “Country Report November 2005”

Jane’s Review

Social and Political contex: www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de HDR Statistics: hdr.undp.org (date 12.06.06)

Mozambique. History and politics in www.iss.co.za (date 12.06.06) Chissano biography in www.cibod.org (date 28.06.06)

Peace process and GPA in www.panagea.org

Information on the context comes also from: http://ec.europa.eu; http://en.wikipedia.org

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Through the years Portuguese abuses continued and intensified. By the late 1950s, the African leadership, composed of exiled political groups, founded the FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) in order to resist the colonial power.

In 1964, under Eduardo Mondlane’s leadership, FRELIMO launched an armed struggle for independence from bases in the United Republic of Tanzania. Portugal answered with enormous military power when the first guerrilla attack took place in Northern Mozambique.

After the killing of Eduardo Mondlane in 1969, Samora Moïses Machel arose as the new leader. Under his leadership, FRELIMO proceeded in its struggle against the Portuguese colonial regime. In 1974, the party forces almost completely infiltrated North and Central Mozambique, ultimately claiming them to be "liberated zones". That year, FRELIMO took advantage of the disorders in Portugal, that eventually led to a coup-d'état, to claim the right for independence. The Lusaka Accords, signed on 7 September 1974, formally ended the colonial regime and handed over to FRELIMO the administration of the country.

One year later, on 25 June 1975, Samora Machel was elected president of the independent People’s Republic of Mozambique.

In 1977, the Liberation Front was transformed into a Marxist-Leninist party, giving a start to the state mass socialism experiment. The unique party system and the socialist scientific doctrine became the two pillars of Machel’s Chabinet. FRELIMO’s policy basically focused on state farms and communal cooperatives. By the mid-1980s, state ownership over markets and state control over the economy had had devastating consequences on both the economic and social situation. By 1982, FRELIMO’s forces were active in most of the country. In accordance with this domestic policy, FRELIMO’s foreign policy promoted economic and military relations with the USSR.

Legacy of the war and FRELIMO’s foreign policy

On the external front, FRELIMO’s foreign policy supported the independence of Rhodesia as well as the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. Such support was one of the triggering factors of the war. In fact, theRhodesian government in response attacked refugee camps and military training bases inside Mozambique, and sustained the creation of the Mozambique National Resistance - Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) with the aim of destabilizing Mozambique.

Since the late 70s, RENAMO has been the principal opponent of FRELIMO and of Machel’s politics. However, initially it did not pose a serious threat to peace. After the independence of Zimbabwe, RENAMO was transferred to South Africa to destabilize Mozambique and to end FRELIMO's support to the ANC. To this end, RENAMO also undermined extensive government investments in the health sector, education and services by attacking administrative posts, health centres, schools, and infrastructure projects throughout central Mozambique.

In the early ‘80s, the South African government revitalized and increased RENAMO’s forces. As regards the Mozambican government position, Chissano, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, supported the implementation, at the regional level, of the Nkomati non-aggression

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pact, signed in 1984 by Mozambique and South Africa⁹. The aim of this pact was limiting the consequences of the military pressure coming from the presence of South African troops and RENAMO.

In the meantime, RENAMO overcame its role as “an instrument of Rhodesian and South African foreign policy”¹⁰, and adopted an insurgency tactic based both on the exploitation of the local population provisions and on conventional military operations against civilian targets.

The dynamics of the conflict showed RENAMO and FRELIMO’s strategy centred on exerting their influence over specific regional areas.

While the civil war continued, there were relevant shifts in the political scene. In 1986, Joaquin Chissano replaced Samora Machel, who had died in a plane crash¹¹. The government under Chissano abolished colonial rules, such as forced cultivation, forced labour and racial discrimination, and the majority of settlers left Mozambique. Still, the Republic emerged as a fragile entity. Over 90% of the population were illiterate and the exodus of the Portuguese settlers left the country without a technical and managerial elite.

President Chissano slowly turned the Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO party into a more socialist one, and turned the country towards the West. FRELIMO adopted a strategy which was basically founded on modernisation, the overcoming of the self-sufficient production in the rural areas through new approaches to education, health, social services.

Changes at both the national and international level influenced the internal conflict. At the national level, by 1990 the weakness of the socio-economic context forced FRELIMO to abandon its Marxist-Leninist ideology. Indeed, by then the annual pro capite income had shrunk down to USD 150 and infant mortality had become the world second highest.

At the international level, the Soviet Union collapsed, and the apartheid was coming into question. For Mozambique, that meant the withdrawal of the Soviet bloc military advisers who had heavily supported FRELIMO government forces until 1989. This collapse and the opening of political dialogue in South Africa facilitated negotiations to settle the war.

Consequences of the war were dramatic, as showed in The United Nations blue books series,

“The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995”. According this document, “hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans died as a result of the war (..). By late 1986, at least 3,2 million Mozambican rural dwellers had been displaced or otherwise affected, the number rising to 4.6 million by 1989 as many families from rural areas from Zambesia, Tete, Sofala and Manica provinces found relative safety in district towns and the Beira corridor. By this time, more that 1 million Mozambicans had fled to Malawi, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe to escape fighting. (..) About 250,000 children had been either orphaned or separated from their parents. School enrolment was reduced by an estimated 500,000 and medical facilities serving approximately 5 million people were destroyed (..).

(In 1990, Mozambique appeared) dependent on external aid for 90% of its cereal needs (..).

9 The Agreement’s relevant achievements were: 1) reciprocity in the monitoring of the own borders in order to impede hostilities against each other. 2) Mozambique expelled from its borders exiled members belonging to the anti apartheid front called African National Congress.

10 “Angonia: why RENAMO?” in Southern Africa Report SAR, Vol 10, No 2, December 1994 pag. 13 "Mozambique" in www.africafiles.org/article.asp%3FID%3D3966+renamo+guerrilla&hl=it&gl=it&ct=clnk&cd=1 (retrieved 24.07.06).

11 The crash plane cause is still controversial, as showed João Cabrita in A morte de Samora Machel. Edições Novafrica, Maputo 2005.

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(In the same year), annual per capita income was estimated at 150 USD, very nearly the lowest in the world, and infant mortality was the world’s second highest”¹².

General Peace Agreement

The road to peace was difficult and took a long time. The above mentioned Nkomati Accord can be considered a very first step for the negotiation peace process, promoted by South Africa. “Under Nkomati atmosphere, the South African authorities tried to bring together the government of Mozambique and RENAMO to the first face-to-face negotiations in Pretoria in October 1984”. This attempt had failed. The late 1980s was characterised by informal and explorative meetings among belligerents through the facilitation of the Mozambican Churches, and the attempt of a joint mediation by Zimbabwe and Kenya.

When S. Egidio Community, under the auspices of the Italian government, offered Rome as a place for a face-to-face meeting to FRELIMO and RENAMO, they accepted the mediation¹³. So the Peace talks began in 1990 ( by 8-10 July) and were protracted until 1992¹⁴.

Formally, the war ended in October 1992 with the signing of a General Peace Agreement (GPA) in Romebetween President Chissano and RENAMO leader Alfonso Dhlakama. The Italian government, the United States, Great Britain, France, Portugal and the United Nations also provided political and technical support for the GPA’s implementation.

The agreement called for an immediate cease-fire; demobilization of the militaries; creation of a new and national military (the Mozambican Defence Force); described how elections should be held and it made arrangements for the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. It was remarkably comprehensive, because it included also provision for the formation of political parties; stipulated freedom of movement and freedom of press.

Immediately after the signing of the peace agreement the Government of Mozambique invited the United Nations (UN) to undertake a peace-keeping operation that would ensure the implementation of the peace process. For this purpose, the UN Security Council approved the establishment of a UN peace-keeping force (ONUMOZ) of 7,500 military personnel and 354 observers, leaded by the Italian diplomat Aldo Ajello. The mission, estimated as one of the most complex ever undertaken until then, was financed with USD 260 million. In accordance with its mandate, that included political, military, electoral and humanitarian objectives. ONUMOZ operations lasted from 1992 until 1995.

The need to secure the corridors of Beira and Nancala emerged as the principal task of the military component of the operation. This task had till then been the responsibility of Zimbabwean, Malawian and Tanzanian forces which, during the 1980s, had been sent to Mozambique, with the consent of the local government, to patrol these corridors because of their importance for foreign trade.

By mid-1993, peace was still being maintained and the spontaneous return of refugees from neighbouring countries continued, despite the hazard posed by land-mines. By late November 1994, the demobilisation process monitored by the UN was nearly complete.

12 The United Nations blue books series, “ The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995”, New York May 1995.

13 Iraê Baptista Ludin, “The paece process and the construction of reconciliation post conflict. The experience of Mozambique”. Barcelona 27-28 February 2004, International Seminar: Experiences of panel alternatives in peace process in www.panagea.org (find 15.09.06).

14At the first formal meeting in S. Egidio, Frelimo’s delegates were Armando Guebuza, Teodato Hunguana, Raul DomiNGO’s, Vincente Ululu, Agostinho Murrial and João Almirante. Jaime Gonçalves, Mario Raffelli, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi were observers.

Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, Moambique da guerra à paz. Histόria de uma mediação insólita. Maputo 1998

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From a total of 91,691 registered troops, of which 67,042 were from the government army and 24,449 from RENAMO, demobilisation accounted a total of 78,078, of which 57,540 government and 20,538 RENAMO soldiers.

The electoral process and multi-party elections were a crucial test for peace. They required an extension of two years of ONUMOZ’s mandate. The General Peace Agreement foresaw a new electoral law that became effective in January 1994.