5.1. West German newspapers and the first Indochina War
5.1.3. French dilemma in Indochina
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West German newspaper. The press saw France would not be able to escape the consequences of Dien Bien Phu. Thus, reluctantly or not, France should seek a political solution. The West German press could see the connection between Indochina and decisions made in the French parliament where a majority of deputies hoped to put an end the war. Thereupon, all observations actively led West Germany to the subsequent decisions dealing with regional and international issues.
The West German public also even compared Vietnam after Dien Bien Phu with another Korea by which the whole world’s political situation might be changed significantly.278 Two days after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the FAZ ran an article on the front page reiterating that Dien Bien Phu reminded Germans of Stalingrad where the German army was defeated in WW II. Obviously, the West German government’s attitudes towards the first Indochina War as viewed by the West German press are only one channel for historical researchers when examining West Germany’s policies on the French colonial conflict.
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fourth of the total cost of the war. Also, German journalists analyzed the French economic conditions of the French at that time.279 The West German media described the French war in Indochina as one in which even a victory would be a defeat (Ein Krieg, in dem auch der Sieg eine Niederlage wäre) when criticizing the French dilemma on the Indochina battlefield. France depended too much on American aid at this time. One option for France was to internationalize the war, from which would pave a way for the UN to intervene in the conflict. France could therefore end the war honorably. Another option for France was to continue the war, which would increase the financial and human burden on itself. With regard to the latter, France was no longer able to do it due to terrible domestic problems of financial weakness and political instability.280
West German correspondents in Paris also reported that the French National Assembly and the French people were indeed fed up with the war in Indochina. Evidently, this made the long-drawn-out war in Indochina unfavorable for France because the majority of French did not want to lengthen the war. West German journalistic commentators realized very clearly that negotiation with Ho Chi Minh to find a peaceful solution would be unavoidable for France.281 Several months later, the SZ shared this view.282 This meant in the West German view, it was considered a future defeat of France in the war when the conflict almost came to an end.
In February 1954, a conference was held in Berlin for the first time with the intention of discussing the issues of Germany and Austria, but they then turned to related issues of Asia. The meeting place for the next conference on Asia in Geneva was also decided. The Geneva Conference would be very crucial for the whole of Europe. This is because in fact, the Indochina War did not only influence France but the process of European integration and the French role in
279 SZ, 16. Oktober 1950.
280 DZ, 20. November 1952.
281 FAZ, 28. Oktober 1953.
282 SZ, 15. Februar 1954.
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that process as well. The influence of the war might slow down this European integration process.283
More importantly, it could change both German and French awareness and actions in their development aid strategies in Africa. In terms of finance and military, Indochina became a huge burden for France towards the end of the war.
According to what France had proposed in the framework of the EDC, France had to contribute 14 divisions; meanwhile West Germany was committed to providing 12 divisions. Nonetheless, the realities on the Indochina battlefield meant that France could never meet these demands while most of its divisions were stationed in Indochina or in North Africa.284
Last but not least, the West German press was to some extent interested in what the position and role of Indochina would be when it was completely decolonized. Would Indochina still belong to the French Union? The press predicted possible scenarios for Indochina as follows: Indochina would be independent and fully separate from France; or Indochina would be autonomous and would then volunteer to join the French Union.285 For the Federal Republic, this was very important while Germany was attempting to assess French domestic and overseas problems. West German leaders fully understood that French eminence depended heavily on its colonial territories in Asia and Africa.
Therefore, what would France be without its colonial territories? The West German press observed French attitudes towards the war during which France
283 For more discussions on the connection of the first Indochina War, Dien Bien Phu and the European integration, see also: Philippe Mioche, If European Integration Had Stumbled at Dien Bien Phu, in: (ed.), Piyanart Bunnag, Franz Knipping, and Sud Chonchirdsin, Europe-Southeast Asia in the Contemporary World: Mutual Images and Reflections 1940s-1960s, International Conference of Historians, Bangkok, 25-27 August 1999, pp.51-58.
284 Ibid.
285 SZ, 09. März 1954. In fact, French Union did not last long after the French decolonization in Indochina. This political entity of France was then replaced by the French Community under the Fifth Republic from 1958.
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opposed any “united actions”286 in Indochina despite fearing an intervention from Red China.287 France did not want to see this happen because, if it did, France would have to distribute its interests to those who intervened. The press continued reporting on Indochina even after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and saw that the French National Assembly did not intend to send more troops to Indochina after the fall of Dien Bien Phu.288 This was seen as a signal of the total defeat of France in Indochina in West German public opinion.