The fall of Dien Bien Phu and its impacts

157

opposed any “united actions”²⁸⁶ in Indochina despite fearing an intervention from Red China.²⁸⁷ France did not want to see this happen because, if it did, France would have to distribute its interests to those who intervened. The press continued reporting on Indochina even after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and saw that the French National Assembly did not intend to send more troops to Indochina after the fall of Dien Bien Phu.²⁸⁸ This was seen as a signal of the total defeat of France in Indochina in West German public opinion.

158

battle they would have a better position at the negotiation table in Geneva in May 1954.²⁹⁰ The FAZ compared Dien Bien Phu to Verdun and predicted that the fall of Dien Bien Phu would be a great defeat for France which would also badly damaged its prestige and honor.²⁹¹

The West German press also showed their concerns about the fate of Dien Bien Phu when they criticized the military situation. By referencing the Vietminh’s continuous success on the battlefield they affirmed that the outcome of Dien Bien Phu was being finalized in a way that would be unfavorable for France and its allies.²⁹² With the headline “Frankreich gefallen” (France defeated), DZ stated outright that France was absolutely the loser and Dien Bien Phu was a great symbol for France’s defeat. The newspaper went on to conclude that, Dien Bien Phu would be written about in the history books as one of the most impressive oriental victories but the worst catastrophe of the Western world, and that Dien Bien Phu totally destroyed the image of France as a great nation.²⁹³

Evidently, the outcome of Dien Bien Phu demonstrated the inevitability of French defeat in Indochina and this would have a profound effect on the attitudes and moves of the participants at the Geneva Conference which was about to be held mainly to discuss Indochinese issues. After nine years of fighting against the Vietminh, the French control in Indochina declined shortly after the bloody battle of Dien Bien Phu because they were unable to obtain U.S. reinforcements or additional military aid. The West German press saw that a win for the Vietminh in Dien Bien Phu would be a huge challenge for France at the Geneva Conference.

The day-by-day process on the Dien Bien Phu battlefield created difficulties not only for the French military forces in Indochina, but also for the French diplomatic delegation at Geneva.

290 SZ, 17. März 1954.

291 SZ, 07. April 1954.

292 SZ, 03,04. April 1954.

293 DZ, 13. Mai 1954.

159

More than that, it would have a great influence on the French domestic political stage if the national assembly kept on opposing Laniel’s government.²⁹⁴ All national theaters were closed after the fall of Dien Bien Phu.²⁹⁵ This was not a military failure alone but rather had a profound impact on the French domestic political theater. The West German press predicted that Laniel’s government would be pulled down after the shameful fall of the stronghold.²⁹⁶ Besides, the French defeat would cause a lot of disputes within both the government and the national assembly, especially about the fate of more than 16,000 troops fighting there.²⁹⁷

Moreover, DZ commented that happened in Paris and Geneva would have enormous consequences for Germany as it could totally change the world’s political complexion which in turn could have a crucial impact on Germany.²⁹⁸ From the beginning of May 1954, West German public opinion was concentrated on the Geneva Conference and the fate of the EDC as the two issues that were always connected and influenced by one another. EDC protesters in West Germany were looking and hoping for a ceasefire and peace agreement for the whole of Indochina. They also opposed talks with Bao Dai and demanded negotiations with Ho Chi Minh.

At Geneva, an eight-point proposal proposed by the communists for a general and free election for the whole of Vietnam greatly attracted the attention of the West German press. It reminded Germans of the same suggestion made by the SU two years before, of a similar proposed election in both the Soviet Zone and the Bundesgebiet. At the negotiation table France supported a general election for the whole of Vietnam controlled by an international control committee. West Germany carefully watched this move, wondering whether the same model could

294 Spencer C. Tucker (editor), The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History, 2nd. Ed. USA, 2011, p. 626.

295 SZ, 11. Mai 1954.

296 FAZ, 11. Mai 1954.

297 FAZ, 12. Mai 1954.

298 DZ, 13. Mai 1954.

160

be applied for the whole of Germany.²⁹⁹ The West German view suggested that the outcome of the the situation in Indochina would be decisive for peace not only in Asia but also in the entire world.³⁰⁰

Thus, Dien Bien Phu and its consequences at the Geneva Conference were becoming heated issues in the West German press. A large number of articles and news stories in West German newspapers reported on Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Conference. Dien Bien Phu and its fall finally marked French military and political destruction in the former colonial possession. This can be inferred from the West German description of the battle and its suggestions that it would lead to an end of the French colonial presence in Indochina and Asia as a great empire.

Rarely, however, did the West German use the exact term “French decolonization”. What happened to France in Indochina, notable in the failure of Dien Bien Phu and at the negotiating table at Geneva, directly indicated the beginning of French decolonization, with all its subsequent consequences.

5.1.5. West German state and other countries’ attitudes towards EDC and West