Diplomatic strategy and efforts of Ho Chi Minh

The diplomatic program of the new government was first stated in Ho Chi Minh’s Declaration of Independence: “All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness…” On 3 October 1945, the newly established government of the DRV proclaimed its diplomatic policies, in which main goals of the state were clearly out-spoken. Alongside other tasks, diplomatic strategies were “to lead Vietnam to an entire and long-lasting independence”. In the announcement it also pledged to cooperate with the allies “to rebuild peace for the whole world”. The basic policies as applied to the main four subjects in international relations can be briefly summarized as follows:

37 Nguyễn Đình Bin (Chief editor), Ngoại giao Việt Nam 2000 (Vietnam’s Diplomacy 1945-2000), National Political Publishing House, tr. 47.

38 Prior to 1945, the term “Indochina” referred to five parts of the Indochinese peninsula including Tonkin, Annam, Cochin-China, Cambodia and Laos. After the August Revolution, the CPV could actually only control Northern and Central parts of Vietnam. Meanwhile, the CPV in the South was not strong enough to master the new developments in the region. Thus, Cochin-China was still claimed as a French territory. This also explained why France chose to return to Cochin-China in September 1945 first when they attempted to regain control over the whole of Vietnam.

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• To the world powers and allies which had been fighting against fascism:

Vietnam would be very friendly and truthfully co-ordinate based on equal and helpful attitudes;

• To France: if French people living in Vietnam would respect Vietnam’s independence then their lives and properties would be legally guaranteed;

for de Gaulle’s government, if they intended to re-occupy Vietnam, the Vietnamese people would fight against this at any price;

• To neighbors like China, Laos and Cambodia: the announcement stressed equal cooperation and friendship. The three Indochinese countries would develop side by side because they had economic relations;

• To other countries, the Vietnamese government was willing to be friendly, closely cooperating on an equal footing in order to support one another in the course of building and maintaining their independence.³⁹

With regards to the U.S., the new government tried to make contact with American representatives in Vietnam such as American Missions in Indochina, or some officers at the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Ho Chi Minh took advantages of what Franklin D. Roosevelt had proclaimed on the issue of self-determination for colonial nations after WW II. This provides an explanation for why Ho Chi Minh sent many letters to the leaders of the Truman administration.

However, as some newly declassified documents show, the Americans were not very much interested in Indochina as they had to concentrate on what was happening in Europe during the Cold War. Moreover, the U.S. refused contact with Ho Chi Minh because they were convinced that Ho Chi Minh was a communist rather than a nationalist. However, it was then clearer that the world was dominated by the U.S. and the SU after WW II. Initially, the U.S. had little interest in Vietnam and South-east Asia. Later on, the question of how to isolate communist movements in this region took on an increased importance. Their

39 Nguyễn Phúc Luân, Ngoại giao Việt Nam từ Việt Bắc đến Hiệp định Geneva (Vietnam’s Diplomacy from Viet Bac to Geneva Agreement), People’s Police Publishing House, tr. 39-40.

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concerns were ultimately formed into the doctrine of containment which had been first stated in 1947and domino theory thereafter.

On the other hand, Ho Chi Minh conducted many negotiations with French representatives in Hanoi on the unification of the entire country under the control of the DRV. However, the French attempted to maintain control of the South, which contained most of their economic interests. After many efforts, on 6March 1946 the two sides signed a Preliminary Accord, in which the French recognized the DRV as a free state of the Indochinese Federation and an association of the French Union.⁴⁰ The Vietnamese pledged to maintain the French economic and cultural presence in the North, including 15,000 troops in this area to replace Japanese troops and protect French interests. A national referendum would be held to decide whether Cochin-China would rejoin the North and the centre in a reunited state or remain a separate French territory. Nonetheless, France did not seriously implement what it had agreed with Ho Chi Minh and postponed action in order to keep on negotiating with him. To illustrate Vietnamese good will, a parliament delegation led by Pham Van Dong⁴¹ paid an official visit to France from 25 April to 16 May 1946. In addition, another Vietnamese delegation headed by Nguyen Tuong Tam⁴² and a French delegation led by Max André joined a common preparatory conference in Dalat to discuss the main issues which would be discussed in France later on. But almost nothing was accomplished at the conference.

After that, Ho Chi Minh was invited to France to start the Fontainebleau Conference from 6 July to 10 September 1946 with the following agenda: the position of Vietnam in the French Union and its diplomatic relations with other

40 One may know that the French Union was an association modelled by the British Commonwealth. This entity targeted to replace France’s old colonial system and promote France’s culture and interests within the member states.

41 Pham Van Dong (1906-2000), a close comrade of Ho Chi Minh, served as Prime Minister of the DRV (1955-1976) and Socialist Republic of Vietnam until his retirement in 1987.

42 Nguyen Tuong Tam (1905-1963), served in the government of the DRV as Minister of Foreign Affair since March 1946. He was one of the leaders of the “Việt Nam Cách mạng Đồng minh hội -Việt Cách” (League for the Revolution of Vietnam), an opposing political party of the CPV.

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countries; the organization of the Indochinese Union; the unification of the three Kỳs (Parts) of Vietnam; a referendum in Cochin-China Vietnam; some other economic and cultural issues; and a draft of a Modus Vivendi. Ultimately, the Fontainebleau Conference failed, as the French firmly maintained its imperial standpoint. Once again Vietnamese good will was shown as, shortly before leaving France for Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh and Moutet, a French representative, signed a Modus Vivendi on 14 September 1946. This Modus Vivendi stated some fundamental points on economic and cultural relations between the two nations and agreed a ceasefire in the South which was seen as a gesture of good will on the part of the new government. Both sides also promised to return to the negotiating table in early 1947.

This Modus Vivendi, however, did not satisfy several members in the cabinet, even some communists. To conciliate them, Ho Chi Minh explained that

“we need peace to construct our country so we were forced to make concessions to keep that peace... If France really wants a war and we cannot bear any more, we will fight.”⁴³ In a word, the diplomatic policies of the new state were reasonably flexible, especially in harmonizing the two enemies at the same time. Many researchers agree that it was a sensible move for Ho Chi Minh to negotiate with France, and signing the two agreements was a great success. Ho Chi Minh chose to face France rather than China as his nation had experienced almost one thousand years living under the Chinese rule in the past. Once the Chinese were stationed in Vietnam it would not easy for them to withdraw. But France was another case as it came from the West and Ho Chi Minh believed his government and army would be able to struggle against the French and win one day.⁴⁴

43 Lê Mậu Hãn (Chief editor), Đại cương lịch sử Việt Nam, tập 3 (General Introduction to Vietnamese History, vol. 3), Education Publishing House, tr. 43.

44 Actually, in February 1946, according to the Sino-French Accord, the Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek had agreed to withdraw from North Vietnam and allow the French to return to Hanoi in exchange for French concessions in Shanghai and some other Chinese ports as well as the colony of Kwangchowan.

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2.1.3. France’s return to Indochina and the outbreak of the first Indochina War