1. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., The Science of Mili-tary Strategy, Beijing, China: MiliMili-tary Science Publishing House, 2001 (Chinese edition), 2005 (English edition), pp. 454, 459. All quotes are from the English edition.
2. According to M. Taylor Fravel, “The Evolution of China’s Military Strategy: Comparing the 1987 and 1999 Editions of Zhan-lüexue,” James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, eds., China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2005, pp. 83-84, according to the authors of the PLA National De-fense University’s 1999 version of Science of Military Strategy, “two of Mao’s most important strategic ideas are Active Defense and People’s War. . . . Mao’s other strategic ideas that are less promi-nent today including protracted war (持久战) and guerrilla war (游击战争) among others. In Western military thought, the analog of strategic ideas are the writings of strategists such as Clausewitz or Liddell Hart, whose concepts to this day remain a part of mod-ern strategic thinking even [though] their implications for mili-tary operations may have changed.” In that same volume, David Finkelstein (p. 17) observes:
The official military strategy of the PRC and PLA re-mains embedded in what is known as the ‘National Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period’
(‘新时期国家军事战略方针’), which is the closest Chinese analogue to the U.S. National Military Strategy. This highest-level national military guidance in China has two main com-ponents. The first component is operational, and it remains the ‘Active Defense’ (‘积极防御’) as adjusted for prosecuting
‘Local Wars Under Modern High-tech Conditions.’ The sec-ond of the two components concerns the myriad reform and modernization programs in both software and hardware the PLA is undergoing. It is generically referred to by the PLA as ‘army building’ (‘军队建设’) or ‘new period army build-ing’ (‘新时期军队建设’).
3. The Chinese armed forces currently include the active and reserve forces of the PLA, the PAP, and the militia.
4. Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolu-tionary War,” December 1936, available from www.marxists.org/
reference/archive/mao/works/1936/12.htm#s5-1.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report On The Mili-tary Power Of The People’s Republic Of China,” June, 2000, avail-able from www.defense.gov/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm.
8. Mao Zedong, “The Period Of The War Of Resistance Against Japan (1),” July 23, 1937, available from www.marxists.org/
reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_01.htm.
9. Mao Zedong, “Problems of War and Strategy,” Novem-ber 6, 1938, available from www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/
selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_12.htm.
10. “National Defense Policy,” China’s National Defense in 2006, December 2006, available from www.china.org.cn/english/
features/book/194485.htm.
11. “No nationalization of military in China: senior PLA of-ficer,” Xinhua, June 20, 2011, available from news.xinhuanet.com/
english2010/china/2011-06/20/c_13940229.htm.
12. Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government,” April 24, 1945, available from www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_25.htm#p6.
13. Jiefangjun Bao (JFJB) Commentator on Studying Hu Jin-tao’s Speech to Leading Provincial Cadres (9) CPP20120907787004 Beijing Jiefangjun Bao online in Chinese, September 7, 2012, p. 1, translated by the Open Source Center (OSC).
14. Mao, “On Coalition Government.”
15. Links to English-language translations of all Chinese gov-ernment White Papers are found at english.gov.cn/official/2005-08/17/
content_24165.htm. Chinese language versions are found at www.
gov.cn/zwgk/2005-06/02/content_3618.htm. It is likely a new edition of The Science of Military Strategy has been prepared to update the 2001 Chinese edition and the 2005 English-language translation used here. The 2001 edition was written before the PLA adopted the concepts of “Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Char-acteristics,” informationization, “Three Warfares,” and MOOTW.
A new edition would probably incorporate these concepts and other new terminology into the book while maintaining most fundamental doctrinal principles from decades past, adapted as necessary to account for the country’s economic and technological modernization as well as the development of new military capa-bilities. The 2005 English-language translation was an important step in transparency. Let us hope the Chinese government sees the benefit of that effort and provides an official translation of the new edition whenever it is published. It is useful to compare both the English and Chinese texts of this volume, however, as there sometimes are discrepancies between the two texts. For example, and perhaps of interest to the topic of Hu Jintao’s leadership, in the English version section on “The Military Strategy in the New Age” (pp. 117-118), Deng is directly quoted twice and mentioned a third time. In the Chinese version (pp. 125-127), Jiang Zemin is referenced supporting each of Deng’s three statements. How-ever, the English text does not include Jiang’s name as found in the Chinese text. Jiang, of course, was CMC Chairman when the Chinese text was written, but had stepped down by the time the English-language edition was issued.
16. China’s National Defense in 2002, December 2002, available from english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/28/content_17780.htm.
17. Ibid.
18. All quotes from the 2004 White Paper are found at China’s National Defense in December 2004, available from english.gov.cn/
official/2005-07/28/content_18078.htm.
19. “National Defense Policy,” China’s National Defense in 2006, December 2006, available from www.china.org.cn/english/fea-tures/book/194485.htm.
20. “National Defense Policy,” China’s National Defense in 2008, January 2009, available from english.gov.cn/official/2009-01/20/con-tent_1210227_4.htm.
21. Chai Yongzhong, “军民融合：国防可持续发展的必由之 路” (“Civil-military Integration: The Only Way for the Sustain-able Development of National Defense”), PLA Daily, November 8, 2007, available from www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/zbxl/2007-11/08/
content_1010161.htm.
22. China’s National Defense in 2010, March 2011, available from english.gov.cn/official/2011-03/31/content_1835499.htm.
23. The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, April 2013, available from eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china- military-news/2013-04/16/content_5301637.htm.
24. Peng and Yao, The Science of Military Strategy, p. 102.
25. Ibid. The statement “technology determines tactics” is also found in the 2000 and 2006 editions of the National Defense Uni-versity’s Science of Campaigns (战役学). For additional information on this subject, see Dennis J. Blasko, “‘Technology Determines Tactics’: The Relationship between Technology and Doctrine in Chinese Military Thinking,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 34, Is-sue 3, June 2011.
26. Ibid. p. 104. By now, it should be readily apparent that the Chinese are not consistent in their use of the terminology associ-ated with the concepts of People’s War and Active Defense.
27. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
28. Ibid., p. 23.
29. Ibid., p. 35.
30. The Science of Military Strategy included “military deter-rence, military diplomacy, arms control and disarmament, mili-tary conflict of low intensity, and border and coastal struggle in peacetime” as “nonwarfighting utilization.” MOOTW also emphasizes anti-piracy, disaster relief operations, international peacekeeping, domestic security, and public health emergencies, along with other noncombat missions. Some of these tasks might have been considered as “low intensity” operations a decade ago.
31. Ibid., p. 213.
32. Ibid., p. 215.
33. The direct link between deterrence and Active Defense is found in Xu Guangyu, “积极防御的第一功能是防御性威慑” (“The First Function of Active Defense is Defensive Deterrence”), PLA Daily, August 23, 2012, available from chn.chinamil.com.cn/ll/2012-08/23/content_5000970.htm.
34. Ibid., p. 217.
35. Ibid., p. 222.
36. All quotes in this paragraph from Ibid., p. 224.
37. Ibid., p. 228.
38. Ibid., p. 229.
39. Ibid., pp. 103-117.
40. Ibid., p. 117. The Chinese-language text (p. 126) notes Ji-ang’s emphasis; the English-language text omits his name here and two more times in the following paragraphs.
41. Ibid., pp. 230-231.
42. Ibid., pp. 456-457.
43. According to Lin Biao, “Long Live the Victory of Peo-ple’s War!” available from www.marxists.org/reference/archive/lin- biao/1965/09/peoples_war/ch05.htm,
Sparrow warfare is a popular method of fighting created by the Communist-led anti-Japanese guerrilla units and militia behind the enemy lines. It was called sparrow warfare because, first, it was used diffusely, like the flight of sparrows in the sky; and because, second, it was used flexibly by guerrillas or militiamen, operating in threes or fives, appearing and disappearing unexpectedly and
wounding, killing, depleting and wearing out the enemy forces.
44. Peng and Yao, The Science of Military Strategy, p. 452.
45. Ibid., p. 133.
46. Ibid., pp. 135-136.
47. Ibid., p. 426.
48. All quotes about the active strategic counterattack on the exterior lines come from Ibid., pp. 459-461. This feature from The Science of Military Strategy was brought to the public’s eye by An-ton Lee Wishik II, “An Anti-Access Approximation: The PLA’s Active Strategic Counterattacks on Exterior Lines,” China Secu-rity, Issue 19, pp. 37-48, available from www.chinasecurity.us/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=487&Itemid=8.
49. Ibid., p. 461.
50. Peng and Yao, The Science of Military Strategy, p. 470.
51. Ibid., p. 466.
52. Ibid., p. 468.
53. Office of Naval Intelligence, China’s Navy 2007, Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2007, p. 24.
54. Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, Suitland, MD:
Office of Naval Intelligence, 2009, pp. 57.
55. Office of Naval Intelligence, China’s Navy 2007, p. 26. As new capabilities are added to the PLA, such as may be provided by an aircraft carrier, this operational reach will expand.
56. China’s National Defense in 2000, September 2000, available from english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/27/content_17524.htm.
57. China’s National Defense in 2004.
58. China’s National Defense in 2006.
59. China’s National Defense in 2008.
60. China’s National Defense in 2010.
61. The term “distant waters operations” (“远海作战”) has appeared on several occasions in Chinese-language PLA Daily-associated publications since 2007.
62. The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces.
63. For a concise review of the PLAN’s main focus on “build-ing a navy to handle a highintensity conflict close to home,” see Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “China’s Real Blue Water Navy,” August 30, 2012, available from thediplomat.com/2012/08/30/
chinas-not-so-scary-navy/.
64. For the first time ever, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces provided the manpower strengths for the Navy and the Air Force, but not for all of the Army and Second Artillery. For Army and Second Artillery estimates, see James Hackett, ed., The Military Balance 2012, London, UK: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012, pp. 233-237.
65. Based on the funding levels for the reserves and militia listed in the 2010 White Paper, the actual combat readiness of these forces is subject to question. About 1 percent (about $700 million) of the entire announced defense budget is allotted to the reserves (of 500,000+ personnel) with about 2.8 percent (about $2 billion) allocated to the militia (with eight million personnel). Additional funds from local governments would be necessary for any mili-tarily significant training to take place. Even with local funding, the money available to these forces is probably exponentially less than is available to the active-duty PLA. Limited training results in limited capabilities to support the active forces. This situation points to a discrepancy between the theory of People’s War and its actual implementation in force structure.
66. The Military Balance 2012, pp. 231-232.
67. The Military Balance 2012 assesses over 65 Type 022s in the force; another estimate increases that number to 100, with an operational range estimated at 500 nautical miles. See “Type 022 FAC Page,” available from www.jeffhead.com/redseadragon/new-fac.htm. Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Firing as Part of Combined Arms Anti-Carrier Exercises in East China Sea, 30 June-5 July,” July 6, 2010, available from www.an- drewerickson.com/2010/07/combined-arms-anti-ship-exercise-in-east-china-sea-30-june-5-july/, provides the shorter operational range estimate.
68. The Military Balance 2012 counts nearly 800 J-7 and J-8 se-ries out of some 900 total air defense fighters, while most new fighters, over 600 airframes (J10, J11. JH7, and Su30), fall into the fighter groundattack category. The J7/J8 fleet accounts for about 51 percent of all fighters/fighter groundattack aircraft. This percentage is likely to go down as new aircraft enter the force.
69. For discussion of PLA cyber capabilities, see Mark A.
Stokes, Jenny Lin, and L. C. Russell Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure,” Project 2049 Institute, November 11, 2011; and James Mulvenon, “PLA Computer Network Operations: Scenar-ios, Doctrine, Organizations, and Capability,” Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait: PLA Mis-sions Other Than Taiwan, Carlisle PA, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009, pp. 253-286. The series of U.S. DoD annual reports to Congress document the growth of the Chinese missile force. See also Ron Christman, “Conventional Missions for China’s Second Artillery Corps: Doctrine, Training, Escala-tion Control Issues,” Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, eds., Chinese Aerospace Power, Naval War Institute Press, 2011, pp. 307-327.
70. This fact is best illustrated by the chart in “Select PLA Modernization Areas, 20002009,” the Office of the Secretary of Defense Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Devel-opments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010, p. 45, which reports about 25 percent of naval surface forces, 50 percent of the submarine force, 25 percent of air forces, and 42 percent of air defense forces as modern in 2009. This conclusion can be corrobo-rated by calculating percentages of old and new equipment listed in The Military Balance 2012.
71. China’s National Defense in 2010.
72. Numbers of Military Districts and Subdistricts can be tal-lied in the Directory of PRC Military Personalities October 2011. The numbers of the various government administrative divisions, as of 2005, can be found at “Villages, Towns, Cities, and Provinces,”
available from www.cfguide.com/admdiv2.asp.
73. For a cogent analysis of China’s objectives in the South and East China Seas island disputes, see M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Island Strategy: “Redefine the Status Quo,“ The Diplomat blog, November 1, 2012, available from thediplomat.com/china-power/
chinas-island-strategy-redefine-the-status-quo/.
74. “3 Chinese ships enter Japan’s territorial waters near Senkakus,” Kyodo, December 31, 2012, available from english.
kyodonews.jp/news/2012/12/202170.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_
medium=twitter.
75. “China sends marine surveillance plane to patrol Diaoyu Islands,” Xinhua, December 14, 2012, available from news.xinhua-net.com/english/photo/2012-12/14/c_132039802.htm.
76. “Chinese flotilla patrols waters near Diaoyu Islands,” Xi-nhua, December 10, 2012, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/
china/2012-12/10/content_16003998.htm.
77. China’s National Defense in 2010.
78. The author thanks M. Taylor Fravel for compiling these statistics.
79. “17 mln students join military training annually,” Xinhua, September 26, 2012, available from news.xinhuanet.com/english/
culture/2012-09/26/c_131875203.htm. However, as the Global Times reported the following day, a large percentage of those students attempt to avoid that training. See “Students dodge military training,” September 27, 2012, available from www.globaltimes.cn/
content/735806.shtml.
80. The physical toughness of PLA soldiers is often demon-strated by breaking bottles or bricks over their heads or with their hands, performing calisthenics in the mud or water, and in hand-to-hand combat techniques. Such training may be useful for mo-rale, but it may also lead to a mistaken perception of their invul-nerability or martial prowess.
81. “Advanced passenger ro-ro ship commissioned in Shenyang MAC,” PLA Daily, January 19, 2012, available from eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/photo-reports/2012-01/19/
content_4772483.htm.
82. U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Press Conference with Secretary Gates and General Liang from Beijing, China,” 10 Janu-ary 2001, available from www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.
aspx?transcriptid=4750.
83. Commentator, “更加坚定地贯彻落实科学发展观” (“More Firmly Implement the Scientific Development Concept”), PLA Daily, August 3, 2012, available from www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/
content/2012-08/03/content_11228.htm.
CHAPTER 4