In order to understand the continuity and change in the concepts of People’s War and Active Defense during the period of Hu Jintao’s CMC chairmanship, a review of status of these concepts just prior to him assuming that position is useful. The continuation of many Maoist principles is apparent in the 2002 White Paper on National Defense—before Hu became Chair-man of the CMC. The section on “National Defense Policy” states:
China implements a military strategy (军事战略) of active defense. Strategically, China pursues a prin-ciple featuring defensive operations, self-defense and attack only after being attacked. In response to the profound changes in the world’s military field and the
requirements of the national development strategy, China has formulated a military strategic guideline (军事战略方针) of active defense in the new period.16 (emphasis added)
For terminology buffs, in a single paragraph, Ac-tive Defense is called both a “military strategy” and
“military strategic guideline.” This discrepancy in ter-minology persists in subsequent White Papers.
Furthermore, the “guideline” appears to encom-pass the “concept” (or “thought,”
思想
) of People’s War as it explains:This guideline is based on winning local wars under modern, especially high-tech conditions . . . stresses the deterrence of war [遏制战争, often translated as
“containment of war”] . . . [and] highlights and carries forward the concept of people’s war (人民战争思想).17
People’s War is explained as:
In the face of new changes in modern warfare, China persists in relying on the people in national defense building, enhancing the popular awareness of national defense, and instituting an armed force system of com-bining a small but capable standing army with a pow-erful reserve force; upholds the principle of combining peacetime footing with wartime footing, uniting the army with the people, and having a reserve among the people, improving the mobilization mechanism with expanded mobilization scope, and establishing a national defense mobilization system in line with the requirements of modern warfare; and adheres to flex-ible applications of strategies and tactics, creating new ways of fighting so as to give fuller play to the strength of a people’ s war.
The 2002 White Paper clearly enumerates the basic fundamentals of China’s military strategy: strategi-cally self-defensive; emphasizing deterrence of war in general, not only nuclear war; and combining military with civilian factors through mobilization. Further-more, it stresses the flexible application of People’s War strategies and tactics and specifically identifies
“creating new ways of fighting” within these param-eters. In short, Active Defense and People’s War are concepts adaptable to changing conditions.
The modification of terminology for these prin-ciples is seen in the 2004 White Paper, issued just a few months after Hu assumed the chair at the CMC. Be-cause Hu had been the civilian Vice Chairman since 1999, he undoubtedly was involved in the formulation and approval of these changes during the consensus-building, study-driven process of decisionmaking within the CMC. The 2004 White Paper repeats (in the English version) that “China adheres to the military strategy of active defense” (though the Chinese used
“military strategic guideline”) and adds for the first time in a White Paper “and works to speed up the RMA [Revolution in Military Affairs,
中国特色军事 变革
] with Chinese characteristics.”18 This latter term is explained in its own chapter that begins with the sentence:The PLA, aiming at building an informationalized force and winning an informationalized war, deepens its reform, dedicates itself to innovation, improves its quality and actively pushes forward the RMA with Chinese characteristics with informationalization at the core.
The section on the RMA with Chinese characteris-tics contains details of the PLA’s force structure; per-sonnel policies; command and leadership structure;
and developments in logistics, education, training, and equipment modernization. Thus, from the PLA’s perspective, the concept of the RMA with Chinese characteristics entails all aspects of army building in general and includes more than integrating new weapons and systems into the force and developing new methods of fighting.
People’s War is mentioned multiple times, par-ticularly in the same paragraph that introduces the concept of winning “local wars under the conditions of informationalization” (“
打赢信息化条件下的局部战 争
”). The 2004 White Paper speaks of developing the strategies and tactics of People’s War, along with giv-ing priority to developgiv-ing new weapons and equip-ment and building integrated joint operational capa-bilities (indicating “People’s War is not confined to the war of low technology”). Moreover, the chapter on na-tional defense mobilization and reserve force building begins with the statement:China adheres to the principle of having all people engaged in national defense with an aim at giving full play to the overall advantages of the present-day people’s war so as to promote the national defense mobilization and reserve force building on the basis of the overall national strength. (emphasis added)
Mobilization of the national economy is identified as a “powerful deterrence to war” (once again
遏制战
争
is used). Mobilization of national economy includes mobilization of “industry, agriculture, communica-tion and transport, post and telecommunicacommunica-tions, sci-ence and technology, medical care and health, urbanconstruction, commerce and trade, and finance”—lit-erally all aspects of society. Taking note of 2002 guid-ance on strengthening urban militia work, the White Paper states the urban militia should be prepared for winning “people’s wars under high-tech conditions,”
not yet under the “conditions of informationalization”
the active force is preparing for.
The 2006 White Paper uses Active Defense only once as a section heading “Implementing the military strategy of active defense” (once again using “
军事战 略方针
,” “military strategic guideline”). This section mentions preparation for military struggle (军事斗争 准备
), winning local wars under conditions of infor-mationization, and upgrading and developing:the strategic concept of people’s war, and work for close coordination between military struggle and political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and legal endeavors, uses strategies and tactics in a compre-hensive way, and takes the initiative to prevent and defuse crises and deter conflicts and wars (遏制冲突 和战).19
The section on “The People’s Liberation Army”
adds a very important modification to the concept of People’s War stating:
The Navy is enhancing research into the theory of na-val operations and exploring the strategy and tactics of maritime people’s war under modern conditions (现代条件下海上人民战争).
The White Paper does not further explain this state-ment; however, as will be seen, a similar idea had been discussed in the 2001 Chinese edition of The Science of Military Strategy and in the English-language transla-tion available to foreign analysts.
The 2008 White Paper repeats the same verbiage as in 2002: “China implements a military strategy of active defense” and ends the paragraph referring to Active Defense as a “military strategic guideline.” The paragraphs that follow are very similar to the 2002 White Paper’s discussion of local war (this time under
“conditions of informationization”), deterrence, and People’s War, but also add for the first time a para-graph on “diversified military tasks” (“
多样化军事任 务
”) and military operations other than war (MOOTW,非战争军事行动
). This section concludes with a longer section about the relationship of the PLA to the people and national economic development adding a new wrinkle to People’s War.China is striving to make innovations in the content and forms of people’s war, exploring new approaches of the people in participating in warfare and support for the front, and developing new strategies and tac-tics for people’s war in conditions of informationiza-tion (信息化条件下人民战争). Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) subordinates its development to the overall national construction, supports local economic and social development, and consolidates the unity between the PLA and the government, and between the PLA and the people.20 (emphasis added)
This is the first appearance of the term “people’s war in conditions of informationization” in a White Paper. It had appeared at least once before in the PLA Daily in a November 2007 article about military civil-ian integration21 and has appeared only a few times afterwards, but not in later White Papers.
The 2010 White Paper repeats the formulation “Chi-na implements the military strategy of active defense of the new era” (using the Chinese for “military
stra-tegic guideline”) only once and then speaks of imple-menting Active Defense as one of the responsibilities of the State National Defense Mobilization Commis-sion or Committee (
国家国防动员委员会
). Interesting-ly, People’s War under any type of conditions is not mentioned at all. The White Paper on “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” published in April 2013 mentions the military strategy Active Defense only once and reminds readers that the PLA constantly brings “forward new ideas for the strate-gies and tactics of people’s war.”22 Thus, references to People’s War continue to be found in the Chinese military literature, but perhaps the most extensive ex-planation of its content is found in the 2001 Chinese-language edition of The Science of Military Strategy and its 2005 English translation.PEOPLE’S WAR À LA THE SCIENCE OF MILITARY