El Salvador

Impartiality: present

While exploring a potential UN mediation, the FMLN expressed its concerns that the Security Council might be biased toward the Government as the United States were an ally of the Salvadoran Government at that time. The Secretary-General and the UN mediator recognized that their impartiality could only be guaranteed by minimizing the influence of the Security Council in the Salvadoran peace process. During the mediation process itself, the UN was perceived as being impartial by both the Salvadoran government and the FMLN.

Credibility: present

The Secretary-General was from the region and so the parties trusted the UN. Additionally, the mediator, Alvaro de Soto, was from Peru, thus also from South America. So there was a credibility and trust and hope in the UN.

Especially the credibility from the rebel group was very high. FMLN was very much impressed by the UN getting involved. They were the ones who approached the UN and contacted the Secretary-General to ask for his support.

Member States Pressure: present

The Group of Friends provided the Secretary-General with the political support he needed to guarantee his impartiality and often served as an effective channel of communication between the Parties. The Friends also took on the task of writing draft resolutions for the Security Council and reviewing reports by the Secretary-General on the situation. By that time, Venezuela and Spain were both on the Security Council, which facilitated this arrangement.

During the negotiations in December 1991 in New York, the Friends provided critical support to convey the parties' positions.

P5 Engagement: absent

After FMLN expressed its doubts that the Security Council might be partial toward the Salvadoran government, the P5 played a minimal role and the mediation process did not go through the Security Council but required only a General Assembly mandate.

Implementation Power and Economic Aid: present

The UN did not dangle implementation assistance but the UN’s implementation capacity was certainly visible because the UN already had observers on the ground at the time of the negotiations (ONUSAL) and subsequently set up a Human Rights Division of ONUSAL.

Regarding, the UN consulted the World Bank, a UN-affiliated institution, for economic aid.

Mediator of Last Resort: present

The UN was the mediator of last resort. The Church, the Contadora Group and the regional organization OAS had been involved previously. The UN came in last.

Central Authority: present

The UN was seen as a central authority and a forum that provides certain norms and values in the international system. For example, the human rights norms, as laid down in the Human Rights chapter in the UN Charter, were a central part of the negotiations.

Legitimacy: present

The conflict parties did acknowledge the legitimacy of the UN and the terms that the UN dictated for mediation. Although the mediation was completely outside the Security Council, the lawfulness of the process was assured.

Brand Name Power: present

The UN was seen as a global, well-recognized institution with a unique image. This became especially noticeable after the OAS and the Church had failed to settle the conflict in El Salvador.

Reputation: present

The parties certainly knew of the UN's involvement in the Middle East, the DRC and in Namibia and valued it.

Experience: absent

El Salvador was the first case of a wave of civil war involvement for the UN. Something had to be invented. It was the first case in which the UN was involved in negotiations between a government and an armed group. So there was no relevant past experience that it could draw from in that aspect.

However, the mediator relied on the UN's the experiences in Namibia that he could use in the negotiations in El Salvador.

Expertise and Professionalism: present

The UN was extremely professional and an expert at conducting the negotiations in El Salvador. The mediator could rely on the best practices from various specialized agencies.

The UN's expertise was noticeable when the organization positioned itself as a potential mediator through observation of the Esquipulas process. This allowed for regular contacts

with the governments of the region but not with the guerrilla movements, which had not been invited to participate in the process. The Secretary-General, however, was convinced that no peace process could be successful without the guerrillas’ participation. He therefore commissioned an Assistant Secretary-General to lead the UN’s groundwork proceedings with the FMLN and other regional guerrillas. The Assistant Secretary-General’s frequent contacts with FMLN representatives, which always remained informal, instructed the guerrillas in the art of shuttle diplomacy and gave incentive for further moderation. They helped make the UN a potential channel of communication between governments and guerrilla groups, and also fostered a better understanding of guerrillas’ positions and interests, which offered useful insight for UN-led mediation.

Resources and Logistics: present

The UN had enough resources for the logistics of the mediation effort and also relied on the member states for financial support.

Mexico and, to a lesser extent, Venezuela and Costa Rica hosted a number of the negotiating sessions, which often lasted several weeks. The host countries provided all the logistics for those meetings, including hotel bills, meals, staff support and security.

Secretary-General’s Commitment: present

The Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar, was incredibly personally committed. He was from Latin America, so he certainly wanted to make sure that he was seen to have contributed to stopping the Central American conflicts.

Note: The statements of Nita Yawanarajah in the interview were complemented with information from a UN-case brief on El Salvador by Nita Yawanarajah and Renaud Rodier.