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VI. APPENDIX

5. S UMMARIES OF THE I NTERVIEWS

5.7. Cyprus

The UN’s involvement in Cyprus

The UN was invited by both conflict parties to assist in the settlement of the dispute. The reasons for the UN’s involvement can be found in the Secretary-General’s report on Cyprus of 1999.

In 2006, the Secretary-General’s good offices mandate continues to exist. It is not suspended as such but at the moment there is not a process of particular talks and the Secretary-General has not appointed a new special envoy. However, Mr. Gambari, the Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Political Affairs, continues to monitor the situation. He was just on the island recently speaking to the parties. They have talked about creating technical committees and had discussions about some of the day-to-day issues. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission of UNFICYP, Michael Moller, is also in contact with the parties and is aware of what is going on.

Impartiality: present

The UN’s impartiality was acknowledged by both parties. This is often difficult to evaluate because in any negotiation there is a discrepancy between what the parties say at the table, what they say to the public, and what they may actually think. It might even be a negotiating tactic of the parties to imply that the UN is biased but this cannot necessarily be taken as an indication of how the parties really feel.

In the last round of talks, one of the parties initially did not want a strong UN role in the negotiations but preferred having a conversation amongst the disputants only. Consequently, the UN had a very facilitating role and let the parties run their own discussions. The UN simply created opportunities for the parties to come together and helped mediate their talks but stayed in a back-seat role.

In particular, for a very long period of time, the parties asked the UN not to put forward a proposal. But in 2002, the Secretary-General decided that there was no other way to move the process forward than to present a proposal which reflected everything that the parties had been saying to one another and to the UN in the previous two years.

Credibility: present

The conflict parties accepted the UN as a credible mediator with no own interest except for the peaceful settlement of the dispute.

The mediator is clearly a very important character and the parties do need to trust that the mediator is fulfilling the role of good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General. Alvaro de Soto had that respect and trust of the parties and they knew that he was trustworthy.

Member States Pressure: absent

Pressure of the international community was not so much an issue in Cyprus. The dispute had been going on for a very long time and the UN had been engaged for a very long time. For the Cypriots, this is the most important question, it has been on their minds for decades and they want to see it resolved. They have become quite used to the UN’s presence and it did not cause any pressure on them.

What was indeed applying pressure on the parties for the 1999 round of negotiations was the pending EU accession. That was one of the key circumstances that gave rise to impetus for new talks.

A lot of support came from the EU in the process. There were also a number of states, the so-called group of friends of the Secretary-General, which were briefed regularly by the mediation team, in particular the UK and the US. They followed the process closely and were involved in the discussions. However, all of the decisions were those of the UN. Some people in Cyprus believe that the US and the UK dictated some of the elements of the settlement plan but that was certainly not the case. The plan was solely drafted by the UN team based on what they had received from the parties about what they wanted to see in the plan.

P5 Engagement: present

The member states and the P5 have always been supportive of the UN being engaged The US and the UK had a leading role in the support of the Secretary-General’s mission but they did not initiate the negotiation process. The 2003 resolution, after the collapse of the talks in the Hague in March, was sponsored by the UK.

Implementation Power and Economic Aid: absent

Cyprus is not dependent on resources coming in from outside. There is a conflict but without fighting or a humanitarian crisis. The island functions more or less normal. The UN peace operation is a comforting presence for each side and provides a sense of security on the island but the UN is not needed to provide resources or run humanitarian programs. The Greek community is very well-off and enjoys a very high living standard.

If the UN had stayed in Cyprus during a transitional period, the Cypriots would have needed donor support but practically they would have been able to deal with the situation themselves.

The implementation power of the UN played a role although the peace operation was conducted separately from the talks and it is a small peace operation. In the course of the negotiations, it became clear that the Greek Cypriots wanted the UN presence to remain in Cyprus for a few years to take on a transitional administrative role if a settlement was reached but that was not agreed to by the parties. None of the parties wanted the UN presence to be on the island for a very long time. Part of the settlement actually regulated the ultimate draw-down of UN forces.

The Turkish Cypriots called for assistance with the relocation of people as those who would have been displaced under the settlement agreement would have needed relocation assistance.

But this concerned only a relatively small number of people. The settlement agreement

allowed for a national structure to assist with that, so it would not have been the UN to aid with the relocation.

Mediator of Last Resort: absent

In Cyprus, the UN was not a mediator of last resort. All participants to the negotiation process believed that the UN was the only appropriate mediator in the Cyprus problem and no one even considered changing that. It was not a question of willingness on the part of the UN; it was just a question of who the most appropriate mediator was. In the international community there was no question that it should be the UN. And the conflict parties as well wanted the negotiations to be under UN auspices.

Central Authority: present

When talking about central authority, one needs to distinguish the two forms of UN engagement in Cyprus. The peacekeeping element has been there for decades. The disputants had turned to the UN for protection and to help end the fighting on the island. The Greek Cypriots wanted to maintain the status quo so that the Turkish forces could not advance any further. No one expected the peacekeeping operation to be present for thirty years.

Turning to the Secretary-General under his good offices mandate is less about protection.

Instead, the parties sought the UN’s assistance to help them mediate a solution. They turned to the UN for its impartial role, for that neutral, trustworthy, independent third party that has some statue and some recognition which the UN has.

Legitimacy: absent

The Security Council and General Assembly resolutions were accepted by the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots were sceptical about the Security Council resolutions because these acknowledged the Greek Cypriots as the government of the Republic of Cyprus. But in the subsequent stages of the negotiations, it was actually the Turkish Cypriots who were asking for the process to go through the Security Council.

Throughout the Cyprus conflict, it was very difficult for the Turkish Cypriots to accept that the Security Council resolutions acknowledge the Greek Cypriots as the legitimate government of Cyprus and that they referred to the Turkish involvement as invasion and occupation. This has led to the international isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community because they realized that the UN member states have not been supportive of their position through the Security Council resolutions. Still, the Turkish Cypriots respected the UN and the good offices mission as an independent mediator.

Brand Name Power: absent

The UN has a unique image but brand name power played a minor role for the selection of the UN as the best mediator.

Reputation: present

The parties did acknowledge the experience of the UN and appreciated it. The UN has been a mediator and a negotiator in the resolution of a number of conflicts. It has it been involved in similar cases before which played a role in the Cyprus mediation. However, any party to the negotiation focuses only on the UN characters involved in this particular negotiation. Overall, de Soto had the respect and trust of the parties and that was also related to his experience in El Salvador. The parties knew him to be an experienced negotiator.

Experience: present

Every team member had his or her own experience in negotiation and mediation and drew on that. Although experience in similar cases is valuable, one needs to be very careful about directly using other cases as blueprints because each conflict has its own particularities. When drafting the settlement plan for Cyprus, the UN team considered some aspects of the Bosnian context. Some of the team members had worked in Bosnia and were aware of some of the problems that emerged in the Bosnian situation. They were very careful not to repeat these mistakes and not to use that model exactly. There are lessons that can be learnt from every conflict and from every mediation.

The UN plan was the product of what the parties were sharing with the UN during the negotiations and in separate meetings. The UN’s job was not to invent a new plan but to put together the negotiated solution between the parties.

Expertise and Professionalism: present

In the Department of Political Affairs, the UN does have expertise in mediating conflicts.

That was also the case in Cyprus.

Resources and Logistics: present

The UN member states supported the mediation team in a number of ways. An important form of support was funding. When a technical team of experts was pulled together on very short notice, different member states provided experts to that team.

Commitment of the Secretary-General: present

The Secretary-General is committed in many situations but he did play a special role in Cyprus. In 1999, he felt that there was a real chance for a solution on the island. And sometimes, the presence of the Secretary-General can make a difference because of the international figure that he is and the sort of authority that he lends to the situation. It was felt that there were certain points in the negotiations where his presence and engagement would help move the process forward.

The Secretary-General has a position of moral authority. He does not have any international legislative authority. In the Cyprus case, there was no need for a moral authority as such. The Secretary-General in general has that position of authority and moral authority. In his good

offices mission, he acts as an impartial and credible figure in international relations. The good offices mission is representing the Secretary-General in that way.

Other potential mediators

More recently there has been some discussion whether the EU should play a larger role. The EU certainly did begin to get more involved and provided a lot of support but they were not an acceptable mediator for the Turkish Cypriots.

In some circumstances it might be possible to find a particular country that during some conflicts can act as an independent third party. In the case of Cyprus, any country would be bound by the Security Council resolutions which do not acknowledge the Turkish Cypriot community. That recognition issue was incredibly key for both sides. It was one of the fundamental issues for the negotiations. So, Turkey could obviously never be a mediator. This leaves some kind of international body rather than a single member state as a mediator.

Having a small NGO mediate the conflict would not have worked for the parties, also because there had been the UN peacekeeping force on the island for so long. When this force went in and when the first good offices efforts were made in the 1960s, the UN had been engaged from the beginning.

All the participants agree that the UN has to remain the mediator. There is not any question about that.

Reasons for Failure – or was it a Failure?

The Cyprus peace talks do not necessarily count as a failure. Clearly, the settlement plan has not gone through in 2004. But the story is not over yet.

For thirty years the parties have not managed to sit down and talk to one another and come up with a solution. It was important for them to have a very comprehensive proposal on the table.

And even though in the end it was not accepted by one of the parties, this process cannot be regarded as another failure. One can say that if one only looks at the results but in fact a huge amount was achieved during the negotiations. For the first time ever, a comprehensive plan was put on the table and there was actually a document to work with. For the first time in a very long time the parties did come together and were negotiating with one another.

Over the previous thirty years, each side has made promises to the respective constituency and a lot of mythology had built up around what a solution might look like. But any solution has to be a compromise and this negotiation process demonstrated what a realistic compromise solution might look like. This helped not only the leadership but also the population to start thinking much more rationally about what the future might look like. In any negotiation there is give and take, so they had to start thinking much more realistically about what they were prepared to give and where their bottom line was. That exercise had not ever happened before and is quite fundamental to any solution that will happen on the island.

When the peace talks continue sooner or later, this process and that document will form the basis of the settlement.

There were a number of different factors that accounted for the impetus for the talks in 1999 and for the final outcome. The parties had different stages of being willing to negotiate and engage in the process. One of the factors is timing; when the parties are actually ready to line up. Throughout this round of talks there were a number of elections that took place in Greece and in Turkey, for the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Any time there is an electoral or voting process, that has a political impact in the community and therefore also on the talks because it changes the engagement of different players. Obviously, if there is a change in leadership, this will also have an effect on the negotiating parties.

Overall, there were a number of different factors that accounted for the outcome. Clearly, when Cyprus acceded the EU without a solution being reached, that changed a lot of the pressure for the Greek Cypriots. It just put them in a much stronger position.